The Concept of Energy Security: Implications of EU-Russia Energy Relations, 2004-2012 by Johnson, Olga
  
The Concept of Energy Security: Implications of 
EU-Russia Energy Relations, 2004-2012 
 
 











Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 









The University of Leeds 
 
 








The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit 
has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 
no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
© 2016 The University of Leeds and Olga Johnson 
 
The right of Olga Johnson to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by 














I would like to express my special appreciation and massive thanks to many people, 
who at different stages of my PhD research were an important part of my life and 
generously contributed to the work presented in this thesis.  
First and foremost my profound gratitude goes to my invaluable and truly dedicated 
supervisors Dr. Hugh Dyer, Dr. Neil Winn and my former research supervisor Dr. 
Charlotte Burns. All of you have been amazing mentors for me who encouraged, 
guided and challenged my research, providing me with the opportunity to develop as a 
research scientist. Your advice regarding my research, academic career and general 
life circumstances have been much appreciated and acted upon. Your approach to 
supervision of this thesis, with a sense of humour, a ‘pinch of salt’ and constructive 
criticism, has undoubtedly strengthened my thesis. 
I am very grateful to the POLIS department for believing in me and granting a 
scholarship to pursue this PhD and the Open Society Institute that provided the 
necessary financial support required for me to complete my fieldwork. Thanks to their 
funds and support this research project was possible. 
I would like to extend thanks to energy specialists and those I interviewed in Brussels, 
Warsaw and Berlin, who agreed to contribute to my work with their knowledge, 
expertise and time. Without them my research would be incomplete and unsustainable.  
Finally, but by no means least, I am very grateful to my immediate and extended family. 
Words cannot express what their understanding, support and kind attitude has meant 
to me along this academic journey. I would also like to thank all of my friends and PhD 
colleagues who supported me in thinking, writing, and encouraging me to finish this 










This research project presents a novel and fundamental understanding of energy 
security and threat perceptions by analysing the EU-Russia energy relationship 
concerning gas supply during the period 2004-2012. The ultimate goal of this thesis is 
to address the two-fold research question of why differences exist in the threat 
perceptions and understandings of energy security among member states of the EU, 
and how they affect EU’s energy stance and its gas relations with Russia. Encountering 
endemic problems with the coherence of EU energy policy towards Russia, the 
research focuses on two case studies, those of Poland and Germany, based on 
identifying their energy interests and identities and the previous patterns of energy 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Energy is a basic public necessity and a fundamental component of daily life for 
modern society (Bohme, 2011: 41). It is an increasingly important sector of countries’ 
economies, as a source of their sustainable economic development and growing 
prosperity. According to Wigell and Vihma (2016: 614), ‘in general economic relations, 
energy is a persuasive foreign policy tool, as energy resources are, by almost any 
definition, ‘strategic goods’’. Energy is vital resource for maintaining countries’ 
sovereignty, national security and a popular tool of geopolitical influence. In the current 
politically, economically and environmentally volatile and unpredictable world, energy 
security has become a centre of public attention and an inevitable part of countries’ 
national agenda (Yergin, 1991; 2011; Aalto, 2008; Bohme, 2011).  
In the 21st century energy security became a core of international security debates for 
both energy-rich states and import-dependent countries. During the last decade energy 
security encompassed a variety of geopolitical and economic issues, revolving around 
different types of energy sources (gas, oil, nuclear, coal and renewable energy), means 
of energy transportation (pipelines, oil tankers, gas terminals, and generation through 
electricity networks) and energy actors (energy producers, transiting states, and 
consumers).  
The growing array of energy challenges and the origins of energy threat perceptions in 
the inter-state relations are commonly referred to as being implicitly or explicitly rooted 
in the hard-power dimension of foreign policy, geopolitics and geoeconomics (Hadfield, 
2008: 243; Wigell and Vihma, 2016). Underpinned by the challenges of possession, 
preservation and control, energy resources and energy transportation routes have 
become central to states’ national security priorities and an instrument of policy-making. 
As history illustrates, cases of growing demand and limited availability of energy 
commodities, price fluctuation, disruption of transportation systems, and concentration 
of energy resources in a limited number of countries, have often led to clashes of 
actors’ interests and energy conflicts. 
On an international scale, the second half of the 20th century was marked by 
globalisation, industrial development, significant energy interdependence and 
increased oil production in the Middle East. The United States and Western Europe 
became reliant on relatively cheap oil supplies from other countries. However, the oil 
crisis, the supply shortages and the price shock triggered by the events in the Middle 
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East in the 1970s1, brought the security of oil supply to the top of the agenda for the 
whole international community. Thus, the problem of political and economic energy 
dependence created a feeling of vulnerability for the energy consuming countries. For 
the first time energy was used as an offensive geopolitical tool and a hostile non-
military ‘oil weapon’ (Cherp and Jewell, 2011; Yergin, 1988; 1991: 588). It made oil 
supplies the object of securitisation in Europe, accentuating the need for alternative 
sources of fossil fuels, when mainly gas became a common energy choice for the next 
several decades (reasons for which will be explicated in Section 1.2.2.).   
The evolution of energy security references can be observed through historical events 
and major energy crises, which are critical junctures in defining the nature of global 
energy security concerns. There has been a significant number of events and disasters 
that have changed the perceptions of energy security in terms of the involved actors 
and reliance on particular types of fossil fuels. For instance, nuclear disasters at 
Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima in 2011 undermined trust in nuclear power2. The 
2010 ‘Arab Spring’ revolutionary wave spreading across the gas and oil-endowed North 
Africa and the Middle East3, and Russia’s unpopular gas diplomacy and the supply 
disruptions during the 2000s, created severe trepidations in the West about the political 
stability of the main energy suppliers. The unpopularity of non-environmentally friendly 
coal has grown and become more unpopular amongst environmentalists due to its 
irreversibly damaging effects on climate change. Therefore, for the last decade, natural 
gas became the most widely used source of relatively clean energy in domestic 
consumption and for industrial purposes, such as heating and electricity generation. 
Consequently, the security of gas supplies lay at the core of the international energy 
security agenda.   
For the European Union (the EU), since the 1950s energy security was mostly 
associated with the key idea of unification of the European continent after World War 
Two. Energy security in Europe has historical roots in the creation of the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), and has since transformed into a more complex issue. Energy security and 
the unification of the coal and steel industries and networks under the pan-European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 1973 OPEC oil countries proclaimed an oil embargo as a response to the US foreign policy 
of military supplies to Israel during the Yom Kippur war. In addition, following the embargo the 
oil crises gained significant momentum in 1979 due to the Iranian Revolution and the rise of a 
hostile government in oil rich Iran. 
2 However, not everywhere nuclear is an unpopular choice. Regardless of nuclear energy being 
a controversial political issue during the 1970s and 1980s due to concerns about capital-
intensive construction costs and disposal of radioactive waste, for some European states like 
Belgium, France and Sweden, nuclear power-stations became the major source of energy 
(mainly electricity). 
3 For example, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and others. 
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assembly became a peace-keeping mechanism for maintaining continent-wide security. 
Only in the early 1990s did energy become fundamental to the common European 
market, with the security of supply being a precondition for EU prosperity and security. 
Therefore, in order to understand the essence of EU-Russia energy relations and 
explain why threats exist and how they are perceived in the EU, the EU-Russia energy 
relationships should be observed in a broader geopolitical context. Those of pre-
existent material-based foreign policy architecture and the historical conditions of the 
EU-Russia relationships underpin their energy security interactions and contribute to 
the variety of energy threat perceptions in the EU, especially in such EU member 
states (EU MSs) as Poland and Germany. Consequently, the next section of this 
chapter considers a foreign policy perspective on the EU-Russia energy relationship 
and explicates the importance of the topic in terms of the original contribution and key 
objectives of the thesis, as supported by the research questions. 
 
1.1. General Context of the EU-Russia Energy Relations 
Since the 2000s the development of relations between Russia and the EU has been 
controversial and problematic. The dynamics in relations between the parties was 
undermined in areas of foreign policy, international security, market and trade relations, 
energy security, environment cooperation, identity building, rule of law, democracy and 
others. The period of 2004-2012 illustrated a number of confrontations over a range of 
international events, such as the ‘frozen’ conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya, 
the Ukrainian democratic revolution of 2004-2005, the Russian-Georgian military and 
territorial conflict of 2008, the Kosovo independence precedent of 2008, and the Arab 
Spring revolutions of the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-2011 (Prozorov, 2006; 
Dellecker and Gomart, 2011; Lucas, 2012). Russia’s direct and indirect involvement in 
the majority of international conflicts and Russia’s growing prominence as a great 
military, geopolitical and economic power that built its identity around energy and its 
strategic national interests and sovereignty (Trenin, 2007; Smith, 2008; Klare, 2008; 
Bohme, 2011: 47) contradicted with the developing ‘EU model’ of Western democracy, 
liberal values, the supremacy of the rule of law and the principles of market-based 
economy.  
Principally different geopolitical and ideological stances (widely described in the 
scholarly liberalist vs. neo-realist debate) determined the conflicting dynamics of the 
bilateral EU-Russia interactions, throwing shade onto the successful development of 
their energy security relations. For instance, Hadfield (2008: 240) noted that ‘EU 
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enlargement, the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Ukraine’s political 
reorientation following its November 2004 ‘Orange revolution’ affected successful EU-
Russia energy relationships and led to diplomatic fallout in the Energy Dialogue. 
Specifically, the Ukrainian upheavals in mid-2000s and its pro-western support caused 
an array of political misunderstandings between Russia, Ukraine and the EU in general, 
eventually leading to gas supply interruptions to the EU through the transiting states 
(Yafimava, 2011). Likewise, the Georgian war of 2008 had negative regional 
implications for the Trans-Caspian energy security projects and undermined the 
Nabucco pipeline to the EU (Dellecker and Gomart, 2011: 34, 174).  
In addition to divergences between the EU ‘soft-power’ liberal values and Russian ‘hard 
power’ foreign policy, protracted EU-Russia confrontations have been fuelled by the 
individual EU MSs. Specifically, the 2004 eastward EU enlargement made Russia the 
largest neighbour of the EU, where they shared not only extended geographical 
borders, but also historical Cold War legacies of the clash between Western capitalism 
mind-set and Eastern Communist ideology, creating ‘far-reaching geopolitical 
implications’ and bringing new economic challenges (Raszewski, 2015: 31). Mainly, the 
expanded EU included Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries with 
unaccomplished transition from the Soviet past to Western liberal values, which on the 
one hand, possessed anti-Russian foreign policy and national security stances with a 
clear aim to rebuild their sovereignty independently of Russia and integrating with 
Western international structures and the EU architecture. On the other hand, for 
decades CEE countries have been bound by tight economic ties with Russia and 
burdened by high import dependence on energy supplies from Russia, which like any 
type of material dependence undermines their autonomy and national sovereignty. 
Youngs (2009: 4) confirmed that EU MSs’ geopolitical behaviour cuts across market 
based approaches to external energy security, eschewing the ‘hard-power 
securitisation of energy policies’.  
While becoming the biggest economic actor in the world, the EU was polarised by 
uneven stages of economic development, different structures of their energy sectors, 
historically divergent political cultures and practices and distinct cultural values among 
the ‘new’ MSs and the ‘old’ MSs (Szczerbiak, 2012; Raszewski, 2015). Having very 
contrasting historical interpretations, inherent differences in national identities and 
different national interests of the EU MSs created additional tensions both in relations 
with Russia and between newly joined EU MSs and the ‘old Europe’. For instance, 
Poland’s historically driven sensitivity about Russian assertive military and economic 
power, its geographical proximity to Russia and being ‘in-between the Russia and 
Germany buffer zone’ has created a particular mentality. Which when combined with 
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particular reconciliation aspects of the World War Two and the Soviet occupation 
(including the Katyn massacre and others) has caused to reinforced anti-Russian 
foreign policy stereotypes (Copsey and Haughton, 2009; Szczerbiak, 2012: 96-98). 
Those path-dependent stereotypes served as the foundation of the most serious and 
current problems in Polish-Russian relations (including in energy relationships). For 
example, the collapse of the USSR instigated Poland’s drive for promoting security 
through facilitating the expansion of NATO to the East, which threatened Russia’s 
security (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007; Bienczyk-Missala, 2016: 102). Energy 
security was still incorporated into national security that should be preserved and 
defended on the state’s level. Such an anti-Russian hostile stance and hard-power 
driven approach to energy security clashed with Germany’s aim for post-world war 
historical reconciliation with Russia and the rest of the world and any non-aggressive 
security policy. Germany’s conceptualisation of a ‘civilian power’ national identity (Maull, 
2006), mainly guided by national-administered policy-making and market-based 
approaches to Russia triggered a range of misunderstandings with other countries of 
the EU, specifically Poland (to be explored in the case study chapters).  
Nevertheless, the stage, at which energy became a national security priority and 
ultimately part of foreign policy, differs for Russia, the EU and its MSs. For instance, 
from 2000 onwards Russia placed its energy resources at the core of its geopolitical 
priority (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2003)  and its use of energy as a 
foreign policy tool became almost undeniable (Klare, 2008; Bohme, 2011), constituting 
vulnerability for many countries. For the EU MSs, not all had security, political and 
economic incentives to place energy on their foreign policy agenda (most of the CEE 
countries did since the end of the Cold War, while Germany did not). Yet again, the 
above-mentioned existing natural differences and historical conditions, which were 
exacerbated by the variations in domestic endowment of energy sources and different 
levels of external energy dependence, partially explain variations in foreign policy 
approaches of the EU MSs. In the EU, energy security importance gained application 
to foreign policy rather late. Despite energy security not being institutionalised as such, 
being a missing part of Common Foreign and Security Policy in the EU, the sense of 
energy security for a long time was implicitly attributed to be EU’s foreign policy priority 
in relations to other countries in early 2000s. However, during the last few years after 
2009 gas disruptions to the EU from Russia there is a considerable shift in the 
positioning of energy security in the EU discourse more explicitly. The period starting 
from the mid-2000s was characterised by the rising importance of energy security in a 
foreign policy context, as ‘a combination of high oil prices, demand and supply trends 
and the nature of political developments in a number of crucial energy providers 
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rendered energy security an urgent concern within European foreign-policy 
deliberations’ (Youngs, 2009: 2). 
The above-mentioned pre-existent material conditions and external circumstances of 
the broader geopolitical material context of EU-Russia relations should not be 
underestimated in the identification of the causal origins of countries’ energy threat 
perceptions (Belov, 2012). The external factors are important for broader 
understanding of threat creation and appreciating how perception-based policies 
operate in progressive and regressive ways. Their path-dependent effect on differing 
national and material interests of the EU MSs can largely (but not solely) explain a 
variety of threat perceptions in the EU and individual energy security responses to 
Russia posing a threat. In fact, those national differences do not determine energy 
threat perceptions in all of the EU MSs equally and do not necessarily result in 
particular energy threat related behaviour. Other conditions and origins of energy 
threats, which often have an ideational nature, should be addressed and studied more 
specifically as explanatory factors for states’ behaviour. Regardless of the material-
based impact of foreign policy implications for energy relations between Russia and the 
EU (including individual EU MSs) remaining pertinent and indisputable (Tichy and 
Kratochvil, 2014: 6; Belov, 2012: 83-97), the thesis acknowledges but does not engage 
in scrutiny of energy security in foreign policy terms as such. For the latter, there exist a 
plethora of the EU literature that analyses energy security as being translated into the 
foreign policy domain (Hill, 2004; Gotz, 2008; Hadfield, 2008; Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008; Peters and Westphal, 2013; Peters, 2016). Instead this research 
looks at a more nuanced and intricate dimension of energy security and the basis of 
threat creation, based on understandings of energy security and explanations of a 
variety of energy threat perceptions revealed through the ideational dimension of 
interests and identities found in constructivism (to be discussed further in current 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2).  
 
1.2. Importance of the Research  
1.2.1. Why EU-Russia Energy Security and Threat Perceptions? 
For the last decade, the relations between Russia and the EU have been marked by 
perplexity and tension on the one hand and incentives for cooperation on the other. 
Despite being affected by the geopolitics and foreign policy trends (as highlighted in the 
previous section of this chapter) and the international energy market (such as global 
competition over scarce energy resources, climate change challenges, oil price 
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fluctuation, discoveries of new energy sources and the economic downturn in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis of late 2000s), the key disagreements in EU-
Russia energy relations took place over energy security and supply issues (Aalto, 
2012). 
The dynamics of EU-Russia energy interactions has gone through a variety of stages: it 
ranged from strategic cooperation based on partnerships and energy initiatives, such 
as the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 
Partnership for Modernisation, to political and economic-based energy confrontations. 
Regardless of a number of cooperative initiatives (arguably unsuccessful, poorly 
organised and not aim-driven but rather developed by inertia), the majority of IR and 
EU studies scholars attributed the nature of the EU-Russia relations to a reoccurring 
confrontation based on conflicting interests (Hadfield, 2008; Perovic, 2009; Bozhilova 
and Hashimoto, 2010: 636). Their mutual energy security was undermined not only by 
differences in material developments of their energy policies but also was endemically 
impeded by threat perceptions grounded in mutual distrust, high politicisation of energy 
relations, a severe lack of political incentives to compromise, and misunderstanding 
and misperceptions of each other’s energy policies. During the 2000s Russia and the 
EU have been involved in energy confrontations connected to the stability of gas 
deliveries, differences on energy supply diversification policies, gas price-making 
mechanisms and energy market liberalisation regulations (Lucas, 2008; Youngs, 2009; 
Perovic and Orttung, 2009). Therefore, since ‘normalisation of energy relations’ 
between Russia and the EU as a long-term objective was still posed in 2011 (EU-
Russia energy Dialogue: The First Ten Years, 2011: 29), the research departs from the 
initial observation that energy relations between Russia and the EU during 2004-2012 
remained in a state of ‘abnormality’ and confrontation, being uneasy, and bound by a 
variety of energy threats.  
Russia remains the largest energy supplier to the EU and the key energy actor on the 
European energy security agenda, which is expected to last for the foreseeable future 
(IEA, 2011b: 7). According to Hadfield, ‘Reliance on energy resources is inextricably 
linked to energy security. Whether dependent upon energy imports or exports, all 
states, regions and companies strive to reduce the risks associated with resource 
dependence by linking energy with their own security’ (Hadfield, 2008: 231). The 
situation with import dependence inevitably leads to dealing with external actors. Thus 
the second initial observation of this research is that energy threats to the EU (and its 
MSs) are mainly posed externally by high gas import dependence on Russia, whose 
energy supply policies are characterised as assertive, often aggressive, towards other 
states (Milov, 2006b; Orban, 2008; Balmaceda and Rosner, 2006; Balmaceda, 2008).  
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However, European energy security of supply is economically and politically intertwined 
with Russian security of demand, making it a two way street. The balance of such 
mutual interdependence seems to be often forgotten or neglected by Russia and the 
EU. Both parties seem to overlook their shared aim of creating a reliable strategic 
energy partnership (EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, 2001:1). The sooner parties realise 
and accept their mutually shared goals of promoting energy security and stability of 
each others’ energy policies, the less conflicting their relations will be.  
Energy security became an encompassing concept and a point of reference that 
captures a variety of threats and everything that goes wrong in the inter-state energy 
relations on technical, economic, political, and environmental levels. Energy security is 
an area that is most characterised by a variety of countries’ energy interests and 
undermined by divergent threat perceptions. Threat perception is ‘a subjective category 
that stems from the 'objective' attributes of a state’ (Misik, 2015: 200) and a key 
variable that accompanies political and economic underpinnings of energy security, 
becoming its essential and inseparable attribute. Both of energy security and threat 
perceptions remain under empirically explored and poorly contextualised in IR studies 
and in EU literature. This, in turn, requires a more profound study of those conceptions 
through the analysis of the EU-Russia energy interactions as the most revealing 
context of energy threat construction. It is impossible to explore the richness of the EU-
Russia gas relations and the essence of their intricate energy disagreements without 
understanding what exactly constitutes an energy security threat for the EU and more 
importantly for its MSs as the key stake holders of the EU-Russia energy security 
debate. By illustrating the origins and conditions for the EU MSs to present Russia as 
an energy security issue, the thesis is set to explain the existing differences in threat 
perceptions towards Russia among the EU MSs and as a result, perception-based 
policies. Specifying the above will enhance understanding of how to move forward in 
building mutually beneficial, trustworthy and stable EU-Russia energy security 
relations.  
1.2.2. Gas as a Source of Energy Conflicts 
Concerning the nature of the EU-Russia energy relationship, it seems that the 
continuous energy confrontations of the 21st century have been leading parties away 
from favourable market-determined export-import based and mutually beneficial 
relationships into a politically undermined environment, where gas supply remains a 
driver for EU-Russia energy insecurity. The conception of energy security and threat 
perceptions in the EU-Russia realm has been concentrated around gas and its supply 
to the EU. Natural gas has been specifically chosen to analyse EU-Russia energy 
20 
 
relations as it is a ‘potential source of conflicts over access, use and distribution’ 
(Peters and Westphal, 2013: 92) and the main ‘platform’ for social constructs and 
threat perceptions. This section of Chapter 1 elaborates the significance of gas-based 
relations for understanding the creation of energy threat environment between Russia 
and the EU.  
Firstly, for the EU, gas represents a strategically vital economic and political resource. 
Gas is one of the most stable and widely used sources of energy in domestic 
consumption and for industrial purposes (gas is commonly the preferred fuel for 
electricity generation). It is relatively one of the most climate friendly energy resources 
(when compared to oil or coal), which the EU has committed to use in order to reach its 
de-carbonisation and climate change targets. So far it remains a transition fuel for the 
EU to a low-carbon economy and renewable resources (Aalto and Korkmaz Temel, 
2014: 759). According to multiple predictions and forecasts from the International 
Energy Association (IEA) ‘the share of natural gas in the global energy mix increases 
from 21% to 25% in 2035, pushing the share of coal into decline and overtaking it by 
2030’ (IEA, 2011b: 7). The decrease of its internal production and growing gas demand 
in the EU characterises the ‘golden age of gas’, when the EU is likely to rely on gas 
more than the rest of the world (IEA, 2011b: 13-15). Being gas import dependent on 
Russia and thus reliant on one dominant supplier is a major risk to which the Union 
attaches its main vulnerability in the energy sector (Council of the European Union, 
2004; European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010).  
Secondly, natural gas is the only commodity that can be supplied predominantly via 
pipelines, as applies to the majority of the EU deliveries. Pipelines connect countries 
physically, economically and ultimately politically. Such interconnectedness creates 
potential points of tensions and a basis for threat perceptions, as ‘threats travel more 
easily over short distances’ between energy interdependent countries (Buzan and 
Waever, 2003: 461). The emerging cross-border pipeline projects that connect the EU 
with its suppliers ‘lock the Union further’ into a rigid pipeline grid, as is the case with 
Russia and the EU MSs (Aalto and Korkmaz Temel, 2014: 759).  
Thirdly, unlike oil, the global market for gas is not developed yet, where gas is supplied 
and freely traded as a commodity at the competitive energy hubs and energy platforms. 
Therefore, regionalised trade is organised through long-term bilateral energy contracts 
with limited volumes of traded gas and gas contractors. Thus among the economic 
bases of the gas price, the favourability of the imported gas price depends on the EU 
MSs’ contract negotiating capacity with Russia. Such energy dependence on third 
parties, in turn, essentially holds an inevitable political element of sensitivity and 
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contributes to political and economic uncertainty, and therefore energy threats for the 
consumer countries (Larsson, 2007b). In addition, the gas price is indexed to crude oil 
or oil products, depending on transportation costs, political risk and even oil taxation 
(Asche et al., 2002). Therefore, energy actors like Russia with its long-term monopoly 
on gas supply has the potential to manipulate price policies, establishing preferential 
discounts for particular customers and create contract conditions on their terms.  
Thus heavy dependence on the deliveries of natural gas from Russia, the lack of viable 
political and economic alternatives to natural gas in the medium-term perspective and 
problems with gas market liberalisation of the EU, provides ample reason for analysing 
European gas relations specifically as a key dimension of energy security. However, it 
is essential to understand if material conditions for external gas dependence on 
Russian supplies are enough of a reason to determine threat-based perceptions in 
Poland and Germany. That is where this thesis aims to explore the essential conditions 
for putting all the blame for energy insecurity on the Russian side, and the part EU MSs 
play in this energy equation and the creation of threats.   
1.2.3. The Benefits of Constructivism  
As previously highlighted, the best way to understand the troublesome nature of EU-
Russia energy relations is through the conception of ‘energy security’ and ‘threat 
perceptions’. Those two concepts operate on different levels and within a variety of 
academic disciplines and theoretical schools (like International Relations (IR), Foreign 
Policy, Sociology, Political Philosophy, Security Studies and EU studies). A significant 
number of contemporary energy security debates still reside within the broad IR school 
that continue to draw upon and further develop a variety of theoretical approaches, 
providing new perspectives on different energy issues.  
For decades the realist school of IR dominated the analysis of the EU-Russia energy 
security relations through ‘energy security’ and ‘threat perception’ concepts in 
theoretical and analytical terms (Klare, 2008; Peters and Westphal, 2013: 92-93). 
Mainly during the Cold War, energy security was under the geopolitical umbrella of 
realism that viewed state-centric relationships in terms of distributions of military and 
economic capabilities, power struggles over physical availability and control over 
distribution of energy resources as a given nature of states’ behaviour, with fixed 
interests and preferences that exist in a material-based reality and inevitably lead to the 
existence of threats and energy conflicts. Fundamental consideration of energy as a 
tool to pursue countries’ goals and an element of ‘hard power’, overlapping with military, 
political and economic dimensions, was made by neoclassical realism specifically 
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(Morghenthau, 1985; Klare, 2008). Hitherto, geopolitical perspectives on energy 
security have been commonly used to understand inter-state resource conflicts and 
rivalries among countries (Klare, 2008: 21-22) and general monopolistic behavioural 
trends of energy suppliers, like Russia. A variety of scholars such as Prozorov (2006), 
Trenin (2007), Stullberg (2007), Orban (2008), Lucas (2008), Perovic and Orttung 
(2009), Youngs (2009: 6-9) and Favennec (2011: 211-212) extensively apply 
geopolitical inferences to Russia’s interest-driven international approach and its 
Eurasian imperialistic aspirations.  
While a great deal of insightful literature has focused on the realist theoretical 
interpretation, another group of IR scholarly debates on EU-Russia gas relations 
derives from the broad liberal theoretical camp. The liberal account utilises norms and 
regulatory driven approaches combined with energy governance and global energy 
market perspectives (the ‘markets and institutions storyline' according to the 
Clingendael International Energy Programme (2004: 23)). As opposed to viewing 
energy as a geopolitical tool, the liberal school tends to treat energy mainly as a market 
commodity, which largely informs the European perspective on energy security and 
cooperation. Thus, this view encounters debates around economic power and interests, 
welfare, energy market developments, energy cooperation and market ties. Energy 
governance and the impact of the institutional and regulatory frameworks (such as the 
World Trade Organisation, the Energy Charter, the EU liberalisation packages) on 
international relations are the focal points of liberal thinkers (Talus and Fratini, 2010; 
Haghighi, 2007; Kuzemko et al., 2012; Gerrits, 2009; Eberlein, 2005: 59-88; Kuzemko, 
2014; Romanova, 2008; 2010; Mitrova, 2012; Belyi, 2008; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015a).  
In broad terms, both IR schools adhere to geopolitical and economic underpinnings of 
EU-Russia energy interplays based on the materialist perception of reality, highlight the 
impact of anarchy on IR, and view states and structure as given. However, if the 
complexity of contemporary energy relations between states can be explained through 
the notions of power capabilities, material interests and security as an ultimate goal, 
then why and how states perceive and construct energy threats differently cannot. The 
theoretical value of these two schools of IR thought is very constrained when it comes 
to analysing the intangible constructs of energy threats based on the perceptions of 
identities, interests and countries’ own vulnerability. Such static approaches, when 
applied to the analysis of transforming energy identities and attitudes between the 
countries and the visible patterns of threat perceptions, seem analytically simplistic and 
theoretically narrow-minded. They fail to plausibly tackle the fundamental questions 
about mutability of structure and agents and explain how and why different energy 
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threat perceptions are constructed in the EU domain and what the implications of such 
constructions are for the energy policies of the EU MSs.  
Departing from the first initial observation posed in Section 1.2.1. that the nature of the 
EU-Russia energy relations is deeply undermined by conflict, out of the two theoretical 
perspectives, realist theorising is more appropriate for the understanding of rivalry and 
the impasse in energy relations between Russia and the EU. This is, as opposed to the 
liberalist argument that advances cooperative incentives on the market-society level 
rather than the state level and emphasises peaceful mechanisms of shaping inter-state 
relations. The latter has little value in explaining the nature of energy threats and the 
impact of such ideational factors as interests and identities triggering problems in the 
inter-state relationships. 
While the material role and the actors’ systemic constraints as viewed by realism in the 
study of energy security threats between the states will be acknowledged in more detail 
in Chapter 2, realism singularly cannot provide a fully comprehensive understanding of 
why and how energy threats develop and progress in such a complex and multi-
dimensional non-state entity as the EU. Given that the energy security and threat 
perceptions in EU-Russia relations are often ambiguous and complex, they require a 
more nuanced approach than is currently recognised in the conventional IR and 
geopolitics-dominated literature. Originating from the conventional materialist analysis, 
the notion of energy security has transcended its traditional meaning and reference into 
the ideational dimension (Chester, 2010; Dyer and Trombetta, 2013: 6). Revolving 
around economic, political and social variables, constructivism is particularly useful in 
explaining the conflict in the inter-state energy relations that develops beyond simply 
material triggers of the conflict, like halts in physical gas deliveries and price hikes. It 
allows one to argue that certain structures of meanings influence how actors realise 
those material conditions, and therefore the ideational context, in which states pursue 
and conceive their political and economic interests, is important. By viewing energy 
threats as a result of social constructs by the actors (accounting for domestic and 
international factors), it explores how and why various actors react to similar threat 
circumstances differently, making the process of threat creation politicised and 
subjective. Thus constructivism can provide deeper understanding of the existence of 
the variability of threat perceptions in the EU-Russia energy domain, from the position 
of the EU countries. 
As will be developed further within Chapter 2, ‘one of the key accomplishments of 
constructivist research in the last years has been to draw attention to the differences 
between EU Member States in terms of their foreign policy traditions, and strategic and 
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bureaucratic cultures’ (Meyer and Strickmann, 2011: 64). Therefore, constructivism 
allows understanding of the role of ideational factors, such as interests and identities, in 
the constitution of the EU MSs’ energy threat perceptions on both the international and 
the domestic levels (Hopf, 2002) and the political implications of these phenomena 
(Risse, 2004: 164-165). Constructivism explains a variety of perception-based energy 
security approaches in the EU MSs and the importance of their policy outcomes for 
energy relations with Russia (Checkel, 2006; Saurugger, 2013: 889; Peters and 
Westphal, 2013).  
1.2.4. The EU and its Member States as Units of Analysis 
A review of the IR literature, but mainly the constructivist EU studies (which both follow 
in Chapter 2) indicates that the EU does not comply with the existing practices and 
types of actors in the IR understanding and suggests the problematic nature of the EU 
as a global actor and inconsistencies in the collective narrative of the emergent energy 
policy (Hill, 1993; Wright, 2011; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015a; Anderesn et.al., 2016). 
Having shared energy competences with its MSs and being restricted by them, the EU 
has very limited supranational capability to act as a coherent energy actor in the foreign 
and domestic energy milieu (Haworth, 2010; Delreux, 2014; Peters, 2016). Sections 
2.2.2.2. and 5.3.2. problematise the nature of the EU energy actorness in theoretical 
and empirical terms through the range of the EU studies literature. Therefore, despite 
the scrutiny of the EU-Russia energy relations starting on the supranational level of the 
EU in Chapter 5, the thesis moves its analysis to the level of the EU MSs in Chapters 6 
and 7, mainly Poland and Germany.  
The previously described foreign policy and energy tensions between the EU and 
Russia in the 21st century became aggravated by disruptions of gas flows to the EU 
due to intermittent energy conflicts with the transiting states of Belarus (2005 and 2010), 
but mainly Ukraine (2006 and 2009) as the most important transit route to Europe. 
These gas supply disruptions exposed long-standing problems in the EU’s external 
energy dimension with the EU’s energy identity as a fragmented energy actor (see 
Chapter 5). The literature also reveals vulnerabilities that are associated with the 
construction of the EU internal energy market, which are directly related to the diverse 
energy interests of the individual EU MSs (Howorth, 2010; Wright, 2011; Peters, 2016). 
Thus the EU’s evolving role as a global actor is not sufficient enough in the energy 
sector to be able to overcome a variety of perception-based policies in relation to 
Russia. The fact that the EU has shared energy competences with its MSs (European 
Union, 2010), and does not have a unified approach to the conduct of external energy 
policy towards third countries allows the thesis to look at the level of the EU MSs. 
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Therefore the security of gas supplies from Russia to import-dependent Poland and 
Germany creates an essential platform for analysing what constitutes energy 
differences in crafting various national threat perceptions and reactions of the EU MSs 
towards Russia. 
Discrepancies between ‘old’ EU MSs, where the gas supplies still belonged to the area 
of national sovereignty, and a more pro-solidarity energy approach of ‘new’ member 
states, compromise a coherent European energy policy towards Russia and complicate 
energy relations with its key gas supplier (Aalto, 2012). The case studies of Germany 
and Poland demonstrate the divergence of energy interests and identities inside the EU 
and explain the lack of collective narrative in perception-based energy policies among 
the EU countries. Hopf (2002) and Checkel (2006) noted that ‘constructivists will 
benefit from a more systematic integration of domestic politics into their arguments’ 
(Checkel, 2006: 1), and that is exactly what this research has done. By including social 
practices that constitute identity and energy interests on a domestic level of the EU 
MSs, it is possible to investigate their transformative impact on the relations within the 
EU and energy interactions with Russia.  
1.2.5. The Significance of the Time Frame 
As identified above, the complexity and controversies of energy security and the 
grounds for the construction of threat perceptions can be best understood through the 
example of EU-Russia gas relations between 2004 and 2012. From a methodological 
perspective, the choice was influenced by the view of Pierson (2004: 79) stating that 
observation of social processes over such a time period favours the identification of 
mechanisms that would not otherwise be identified. For EU-Russia energy relations, 
this period illustrates sufficient continuity to observe the development of European 
threat perceptions and any possible changes in the EU’s attitudes towards Russia’s 
energy identity and interests (George and Bennet, 2005). The inclusive period of eight 
years allows for a plausible examination of the EU-Russia energy confrontations based 
around the construction of the EU’s energy market, the diversification policies and most 
importantly the key gas supply disruptions from Russia. During this time the issue of 
energy security related to the ‘Russian problem’ appeared, started to develop and 
reached extremely high importance on the European political agenda.  
However, the significance of the indicated time frame lies specifically in the EU MSs’ 
energy identities and their relations with Russia. Firstly, the period of 2004-2012 
reveals more explicitly the nature of interests and the complexities formation of 
countries’ energy identities within the EU architecture specifically, aggravating ‘old’ 
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problems in the ‘new’ reality (specifically for Poland). The year 2004 was the starting 
point of Poland’s accession to the European Union, allowing the thesis to focus on two 
case studies of Poland and Germany as fully-fledged members of the EU. In effect, 
both countries received equal opportunities to upload their energy interests to the 
supranational EU level (which in the German case its adherence to energy efficiency 
policy became rooted as a key energy security priority, being transmitted to the EU 
level), to be eligible to benefit from the EU funds to support different energy projects 
(which Poland specifically relied upon) and ultimately be equally affected by the EU 
energy market liberalisation policies. Moreover, both Germany and Poland held the 
Presidency of the EU Council during this period (Germany in 2007 and Poland in 2011), 
which provided additional inferences for exploring countries’ energy security priorities. 
Secondly, despite both Germany and Poland being in long-standing import dependent 
relations with Russia way before 2004, the indicated period of 2004-2012 
demonstrated the peak concentration of energy conflicts that undermined countries’ 
energy security. Specifically, they included gas supply disruptions from Russia to the 
EU in the winters of 2006 and 2009, the most significant of Poland’s gas contract 
renegotiations with Russia in 2010 and Germany’s contestations with Russia about 
high gas prices for energy (alongside with other EU MSs). 
While the chosen time frame serves the purpose of the analysis of the variety of 
European attitudes towards its main gas supplier, it will not prevent this thesis from 
referring to earlier contingent historical events, circumstances or conditions for more 
profound explanatory purposes of the study (for example, Polish-Russian contract-
based energy agreements on particular gas related issues from earlier). Thus, the 
analysis recognises that current EU MSs-Russia relations have also been influenced 
by the long-term decisions and policies that were made prior 2004, making it somewhat 
path-dependent. This, in turn, needs to be understood and studied precisely. 
 
1.3. Novelty and Originality of the Research  
In a nutshell, the originality of this thesis lies in the empirical application of threat 
perceptions to the case studies of Poland and Germany to understand EU-Russia 
energy security relations. By empirically studying the political construction of energy 
threats and applying those to specific case studies of Poland and Germany, the thesis 
makes novel contribution to knowledge about the evolution and the implications of 
threat perceptions and refines conceptualisation of energy security in the EU-Russia 
relations. This section only provides an overview of the key original features of the 
research below, which will be reconsidered in the final Conclusion chapter of the thesis. 
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Until recently, politicisation of energy security in EU-Russia relations was largely 
attributed to Russian international behaviour and its use of energy as a foreign policy 
tool (Baran, 2007; Trenin, 2007; Aalto, 2008; 2012; Hashim, 2010; Smith, 2011). Yet 
the underlying reasoning behind energy-related behaviour from EU side and the 
conditions for political constructions of energy threats in the EU member states were 
either largely underestimated or simply neglected in IR and EU literature. No 
systematic comparative research has been done on the variability of meanings 
attached to energy security threats among the EU MSs that are exposed to mutually 
shared material factors and energy challenges (such as growing gas import 
dependence on Russia, gas price renegotiations with Gazprom, supply disruptions, 
energy price fluctuations and the impact of the EU energy market liberalisation 
processes). By analysing origins, means and implications of political manipulations of 
energy threats in Poland and Germany, the research fills in the empirical vacuum and 
clarifies the politically constructed nature of energy security threats, presenting a novel 
understanding of how and under what circumstances energy can become a security 
issue. 
Following the problematic and conflicting nature of the EU-Russia energy security 
relations and the need to explain a variety of threat perceptions in the EU this section 
seeks to elaborate the novel understanding of energy security threats based on 
supremacy of ideational factors. The role of ideational factors of energy interests and 
identities and the previous history of interactions (rather than solely material reality), 
contributes to more knowledge about the determinants of states’ perception-based 
behaviour and explains the social construction of energy security threats. The politically 
constructed nature of energy security and threat perceptions is something 
constructivists have not considered before in the empirical application to specific case 
studies of Poland and Germany. The case studies are established to demonstrate 
different conceptualisations of energy threats and explain how countries construct their 
policies around chosen definitions and attached meanings (Wendt, 1999). 
The above approach enhances understanding of the constitutive process of threat 
constructions as interests and identities have a transformative effect on threat 
perceptions and inter-state energy relations in general. This transformative effect is 
revealed through the causal link between interests, identities and threat perceptions. It 
exposes how non-tangible understandings of particular meanings of energy threats are 
translated into tangible policy outcomes (that is under which circumstances energy 
security threats result in specific perception-based policies and become a powerful 
governmental tool that states use to pursue specific political and economic goals and 
justify particular policy choices in the EU MSs).  
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1.4. Research Objectives and Positioning of the Research Questions  
Acknowledging that contemporary international politics is not restricted to national 
security of states, material interests and existential threats to their survival, the main 
aim of the research is to examine the ideational basis for energy threat perceptions and 
energy securitisation processes in the EU, along with energy challenges that occur in 
relations with Russia, leading to an impasse in energy cooperation. Due to variations in 
the level of energy dependence on gas supplies from third parties, domestic level of 
energy endowment, historical legacies, previous patterns of political and economic 
relations with Russia, different European countries are naturally exposed to different 
levels of energy insecurity. Those material-based energy insecurities combined with 
socially constructed energy threats generate disparities in perception-based policies 
between the EU MSs, which need to be contextualised and explored in more detail. 
Thus, the intention of this thesis is not to objectively determine whether Russian energy 
policy presents a real or an imaginary threat. Neither does this thesis seeks to test the 
‘realness’ of Russian clichéd ‘superpower’ identity (Milov, 2006b; Rutland, 2008), as 
the consequences of Russia’s energy approach having detrimental effect on European 
energy security are obvious. Rather it seeks to understand why energy threats exist in 
the EU and how they are perceived and reproduced in the EU generally and in 
Germany and Poland in particular. If energy security threats are closely related to 
supply security vulnerabilities, then the thesis aims to uncover what exactly constitutes 
an energy threatening environment to the EU and individual MSs. How far is the 
problem hidden in resource availability (domestic or external resources to satisfy fast 
growing energy demand) and the level of gas import dependence? Is it all about the 
‘quality’ of interactions between importers and suppliers, and what role do domestic 
factors of the EU MSs play in the creation of energy threats about the Russian energy 
stance? The impact of individual country-cases is vitally important for understanding 
the variety of perceptions of commonly shared energy security of gas supply 
precedents in the EU. This variety of tangible consequences and policy outcomes 
produced by intangible perceptions is fundamental for understanding the EU-Russia 
energy security relations, regardless of whether or not the perceptions of threat are 
accurate or perceived.  
For this reason this thesis will look at the mechanisms and implications by which states 
derive meanings about energy security threats from the complex European energy 
security environment and the EU relations with Russia. The goal is to clarify the 
intentions behind the policy choices that EU MSs make, and what value and 
significance Poland and Germany attach to energy security in the Russian context. If 
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the political and economic interests are a matter of construction, rather than simply the 
competition for power (as realists would claim), it is vital to understand why they are 
constructed in a particular manner and at a specific time. The proposed case studies of 
Germany and Poland will provide a spectrum of perspectives on energy security 
concerns, and on their contribution to the construction of the energy security threat 
agenda at the EU level.  
In pursuit of the above aims and deriving from the highlighted importance of the topic, 
being predicated on controversies in the constructivist debates about energy security 
and threat perceptions, inherent foreign policy misunderstandings between Russia and 
the EU, problems with EU energy actorness, and strong attachment of the EU MSs to 
their sovereignty and energy competences, the research project formulated the 
following two-fold primary question:   
‘Why do differences in threat perceptions and understandings of energy security 
among member states of the EU exist, and how do they affect the EU’s energy stance 
and its relations with Russia?’  
The above key research question arises from the need to understand the existing 
discrepancies and the lack of inter-subjectively shared understanding of energy 
security and threat perceptions between Russia and the EU, as well as among the EU 
MSs, that has causal explanatory strength for the impasse in the EU-Russia energy 
interactions. It will be answered throughout the whole thesis and will be supplemented 
with three working sub-questions, which are employed to be the guiding principles of 
the following chapters. It is important to note that due to the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of the topic, the answers to those sub-questions will not be provided in 
one singular chapter, but will be cross-referenced between the chapters. 
In brief, Chapter 2 identifies both the overly materialistic perspective of realism and the 
simplified broad conceptualisation of security as a threat to survival by the Copenhagen 
School of Security Studies, as insufficient approaches for understanding self-referential 
practice of energy security and complexities of threat constructions between states, 
applying the constructivist lenses. It presents the theoretical constructivist explanation 
of interests and identity as influencing factors on a construction of a variety of energy 
threat perceptions towards Russia and explores differences in perception-based 
policies of the EU MSs (undermining the EU energy actorness). Chapter 3 links 
constructivist understanding of the conflicting nature of EU-Russia energy relations with 
the analytical categories of energy security, threats, and sensitivity and vulnerability. 
The emphasis on the impact of threat perceptions on the development of the EU-
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Russia energy relationships will be made. While Chapters 2 and 3 provide theoretical 
and conceptual foundations for understanding the nature of the EU-Russia energy 
relationships, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 illustrate how the above constructivist insights are 
operationalised in the empirical cases of the EU and its members Poland and Germany 
(which methodological choice is justified in Chapter 4).  
Therefore, deriving from the theoretical and conceptual premises about potential 
reasons for inter-state conflicts, to answer the first sub-question of ‘What factors 
undermined energy relations between Russia and the EU between 2004 and 2012?’ it 
is essential to empirically explore the structure and dynamics of EU-Russia energy 
interactions. The analysis starts with development of hardly successful multilateral and 
bilateral EU-Russia energy initiatives (Section 5.1.) and continues with understanding 
of the most contentious areas, differing EU and Russian perceptions about gas import 
dependence and energy security, diversification policies and EU’s market liberalisation 
processes (Section 5.4.). Alongside the previous Chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 5 reveals 
the lack of inter-subjectively shared understanding of energy security challenges 
between Russia and the EU and the lack of political incentives to cooperate more 
effectively.  
Energy misunderstandings between Russia and the EU (being a determining 
undermining factor in itself) is complemented with the scrutiny of the EU and Russia’s 
energy identities and policies. Thus a contribution of this chapter in answering the first 
research sub-question lies in identifying the troublesome nature of Russia’s identity as 
an international energy player (Section 5.2.) and more importantly incoherence of the 
EU’s energy actorness in domestic and international energy affairs (which is 
theoretically conceptualised by Jupille and Caporaso’s framework in Chapter 2 and 
analytically scrutinised in Chapter 5). The empirical findings of Section 5.3.2. about the 
EU’s weak and incoherent energy actor identity, which is affected by the EU MSs’ 
reluctance to delegate their energy competences to the supranational EU level, explain 
the methodological choices of reducing the EU-wide level of energy policy-making to 
the individual EU MSs of Poland and Germany (in Methodology Chapter, Section 
4.1.2.). In addition, domestic energy policies and strong feeling of energy sovereignty 
of the EU MSs have an adverse impact on a commonly shared European energy policy 
approach and the EU-Russia energy security relations (Sections 6.1., 6.2. and 7.1., 
7.2. of Poland and Germany case studies). 
The problematic nature of EU identity as a coherent energy actor brings the thesis to 
pose the second research sub-question, which is more case-study specific: ‘Which role 
do the conditions and origins of energy insecurity in Poland and Germany play in 
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triggering threat perceptions?’. The analysis of Russia’s assertive foreign energy 
policies and the conflicts with the transiting states in Chapter 5 demonstrates that 
energy threats for the EU and its MSs are posed externally and triggered by 
unpredictable and complicated relations with the key energy supplier Russia. A threat 
does not have to be material, real, intentional or exclusively posed externally due to 
high EU’s energy import dependence to cause threat perceptions. However, a large 
part of EU MSs’ energy threats originate inside the EU: from the supranational EU level 
(gas market liberalisation obligations imposed by the evolving consolidating EU’s 
energy market) and from domestic energy policies of Poland and Germany. Sections 
6.1. and 6.2. and 7.1. and 7.2. expand on the conditions and nature of Polish and 
German internal energy market relationships, providing a comparative analysis of 
countries’ attitudes towards EU energy security priorities (such as diversification of 
energy sources and routes, energy solidarity and EU market liberalisation), uncovering 
why and how various EU MSs perceive energy security threats differently.  
Since the theoretical tenets of constructivism allow us to explore threat perceptions 
through the causal impact of interests and identities, the thesis arrives at the last sub-
question: ‘Under what energy identities do Poland and Germany act in the EU and 
what is their role in the construction of threat perceptions?’. The answer to this question 
is mainly presented in Sections 6.4. and 7.4. of the case-study chapters. Coming from 
the constructivist premises, those sections aim to explore Poland’s dual energy identity 
between a victim and an energy solidarity agitator and Germany’s energy actorness as 
a ‘reluctant leader’ in the EU (Vaisse and Kundnani, 2011: 17). Both energy identities 
and self-identification within the EU architecture contribute to understanding Polish and 
German energy interests better, having an impact on countries threat perceptions and 
their relations with Russia, which those sections will demonstrate. By utilising a 
particular image these countries are able to enhance the material and ideational 
aspects of their energy security.  
Finally, the Conclusion Chapter 8 of the thesis will briefly summarise and emphasise 
the original findings of this research, summing up the main answers to the research 
question about the existence of variability in threat perceptions among the EU MSs and 
their implications for the EU-Russia energy security relations. Relying on the empirical 
contribution to understanding the EU-Russia energy security relations, the future 
research agenda will be identified. 
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Chapter 2. Theoretical Foundations 
A wide range of academic approaches exists in exploring the issues of energy security 
and threat perceptions through different theoretical prisms. This chapter aims to 
contribute to the natural evolution of thought about energy security, beginning with the 
developments within the realist school and the cross-cutting realist and constructivist 
findings of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, both dealing with the material 
underpinnings of security and threats. However, while adapting some of the conceptual 
elements of the material world, the research encounters inherent limitations of realism 
and the Copenhagen School for analysing political construction of energy threat 
perceptions. Therefore, this chapter only recognises the virtues and genealogical 
legacy of realism and the Copenhagen School, departing from their findings and 
embarking on a constructivist ideational account. The goal of this chapter is not to be a 
part of realist-constructivist theoretical debates, but to emphasise the importance of 
constructivism specifically as a key theoretical perceptive for analysing the EU-Russia 
energy security and to explain the construction of threat perceptions through the 
ideational categories of interests and identity.  
The choice of these particular schools is determined by the complexity and multifarious 
understanding of the energy security concept and the multi-layered and highly 
problematic nature of EU-Russia energy security relations (Chester, 2010; Cherp and 
Jewell, 2011; Zeniewski et al., 2013), being characterised by the rapidly changing 
dynamics of the security debates, a variety of involved actors, and the diversity of their 
perceptions and interests. Any solitary theoretical account seems to fail to 
comprehensively address the problem of EU-Russia energy relations. As confirmed by 
Cherp and Jewell (2011: 1), complex and intertwined energy security challenges 
‘cannot be analysed within the boundaries of any single perspective’. 
Inferring from the above, the initial Section 2.1. explains some of the realist 
fundamental ideas, advancing its key theoretical assumptions about state-centric and 
interest-based approach to analysing states’ behaviour and security as stake-holders’ 
ultimate goal. Alongside presenting a relatively plausible framework of EU-Russia 
energy problems based on material power struggle and imperative national interests, 
the main focus of the section nevertheless is on the limited capacity of the variants of 
realism (like classical realism, structural realism and neoclassical realism) to explain 
systemic changes, the formation of interests in the inter-state interactions and threat 
perceptions, justifying constructivism as the main theoretical perspective that underpins 
this thesis.  
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Section 2.2. aims to remedy the limited realist approach to understand international 
relations purely though the given nature of states’ behaviour and naturally existing 
conflict between them, actors’ exogenously fixed interests and given preferences, and 
a static understanding of materialist reality (Wendt, 1992; 1999; Adler, 2013). In the 
process of doing so, this section draws on the general theoretical premises of 
constructivism in the school of IR that emphasises the pre-eminence of ideational 
factors over the material world, while acknowledging the legacy of realist doctrine and 
its close relations with constructivism (Checkel, 1998; 2006; Roussau, 2006). More 
specifically, the section focuses on two main factors affecting EU MSs’ energy threat 
perceptions and the EU-Russia energy relations: 1) mutually constituted interests and 
identity and 2) the previous history of interactions between the actors. Constructivist 
tenets of interests and identities are specifically chosen as the most viable, 
encompassing and plausible explanatory perspective of the ideational dimension for 
analysing the problematic energy relations between the EU and Russia.  The section 
looks not only at the relations between interests and identity, but explains their 
ideational role as facilitators of countries’ behaviour, mainly how and why states 
interact with others, pursue energy policies in a particular way and construct subjective 
reality. The importance of those two factors is specifically underlined in the construction 
of threatening images in the EU MSs, having causal effect on threat perceptions in the 
EU-Russia energy relations. Consequently, in this research identity and interests and 
the history of previous interactions are used as components of a broader threat 
analysis in the EU and the determinants of positive or negative perceptions of Russia 
and friendly or rival attitudes. To answer the research question about the role of 
interests and identity in the construction of threat perceptions in Germany and Poland, 
constructivism allows the exploration of the conditions and sources for constructing a 
variety of threats within the Union, as well as the implications these constructions have 
for countries’ energy relations with Russia. 
However, despite for more than two decades the origins of constructivism stayed within 
the field of IR, not the field of EU studies (Hopf, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002; Barkin, 2003, 
Checkel, 2006: 1; Epstein, 2013; Adler, 2013), it is short-sighted to disregard the latter 
while studying the EU-Russia energy interactions and the developments within the 
European Union architecture (Smith, 1999: 690; Christiansen et.al., 2001, Checkel and 
Moravcsik, 2001; Risse, 2004; Tanil, 2014; Delreux, 2014; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015a;  
2015b). With the expansion of the European Union (in terms of accession of new EU 
MSs) and deepening processes of economic, political and normative integration, 
analysing the complexity of the EU’s identity and its energy competences solely within 
the IR school became incomplete and superficial. For instance, if IR analytical 
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orientation of constructivism to be applied to study EU’s identity, it commonly becomes 
a part of the EU integration debate between liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism (Christiansen et.al., 2001; Risse, 2004). However, attributing the nature 
of the EU’s identity to a state-like entity or a functional organisation with the set of 
institutions demonstrates ‘narrow focus and sterility of the debates’ (Risse, 2004: 159)4, 
downgrading the complexity and unprecedented nature of the EU as a collective actor 
of a special sui generis type (Niemann and Bretherthon, 2013). Consequently, with the 
purpose of the research to understand why the EU cannot engage Russia in its energy 
policy in a consistent way and to explain a variety of energy threat perceptions within 
the EU, there is little explanatory value in reducing the nature of the EU’s identity to a 
unitary state-like entity or defining it in purely institutional terms.  
In order to theoretically and empirically study the contested nature of the EU’s energy 
identity, IR constructivism transcends into the area of EU studies, facilitating this thesis 
to rely on the range of EU literature that looks at the constructivist account of EU 
actorness (including but not limited to Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Risse, 2004; 
Saurugger, 2013; Jupille et.al., 2003; Goldthau and Sitter, 2012; 2015a; Thomas, 2012; 
Delreux, 2014; Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2015; Peters, 2016). Deriving from the 
above, this thesis relies on widely used constructed conception of EU’s ‘actorness’, 
generally defined as ‘the capacity to behave actively and deliberately’ in the 
international system (Sjostedt, 1977: 16)5. Actorness as a concept enables the thesis to 
explore the evolution of the EU’s energy policies and actions. Most of the existing 
research notes that the material energy conditions of EU and its MSs (gas import 
dependency, material energy capabilities, geographic position, diversity of energy 
supplies, etc.) influence the way these countries behave in the EU and international 
context (Matlary, 1997). However, constructivism also adds the subjective ideational 
dimension of actorness, such as mutual political will of the EU MSs and shared 
understanding of energy security challenges in the EU as determinants of unified 
European energy security approach. 
In conceptual terms, the majority of existing academic debates about the nature of the 
EU actorness in general, and particular areas within the first and partially second pillars 
of the EU, indicate huge interest and high importance for scholars that try to explain 
causality in EU’s foreign policy behaviour (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Thomas, 2012; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Even though the liberal theoretical camp is not discussed in this thesis, the nature of EU’s 
structure and its energy actorness is bound to be explained through an institutional dimension, 
which aims to emphasise the EU’s ineffectiveness as an energy player and in relations with 
Russia. This, in turn, will justify the methodological choice of exploring the EU MSs and 
Russia’s bilateral energy relations. 
5 ‘Actorness’ and ‘actor capacity’ or ‘capability to act’ is used interchangeably in this thesis 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 214). 
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Peters, 2016; Hebel and Lenz, 2016). They demonstrated a variety of problems with 
the EU collective approach as an international actor and with an effective institutional 
framework, due to the determining role EU MSs play in EU’s policy-making (Bretherton 
and Vogler, 2006; Howorth, 2010; Wright, 2011; Maltby, 2014; Anderesn et.al., 2016). 
The existing research about the EU’s problematic international role and the importance 
of the EU MSs facilitated the need to investigate the constructed nature of EU’s energy 
actorness on the underexplored domestic and international energy levels (to be 
empirically scrutinised in Section 5.3.2.). For this reason the conceptual framework of 
Jupille and Caporaso (1998) to theoretically define the criteria for analysing EU’s 
energy actorness has been chosen and will be justified in Section 2.2.2.2.  
The limitations of realist premises are partly scrutinised in Section 2.3. with reference to 
Barry Buzan, who brought the realist-constructivist synthesis of the English School 
even further, grounding it in the Copenhagen School of Security Studies (Barry Buzan, 
Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde). The theoretical contribution of the Copenhagen 
School to this thesis lies in its constructivist genesis of treating security as ‘a referential 
practice’ that is socially constructed (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School 
expands the traditional conceptualisation of security and clarifies how energy can 
become a security issue through the process of securitisation. This is particularly 
important for a complete understanding of the notion of energy security that is to be 
more profoundly conceptualised in the next Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the precise focus 
of the Copenhagen School on analysing the detailed process of securitisation through 
the technicality of the speech act (with the involvement of the securitising actor, 
securitising move and the acceptance of the audience of presented existential threat as 
being such) makes this school overly reflectivist in nature, which is not the basis for this 
thesis. Likewise references to the nature of existential security threats provide an 
overly narrow realist conceptualisation, which does not cover intricate energy threat 
aspects. Due to those important limitations elaborated in Section 2.3., the Copenhagen 
School provides merely a platform for conceptualising energy security and threats in 
constructivist terms and will be only indirectly referred to in the examples of the 
empirical chapters. Summarising the above, the constructivist perspective will explore 
the way in which the EU and its MSs identify, define, shape and justify their energy 
insecurities, threat perceptions and energy policies, as well as reveal what role their 
interests and identities play in the construction and reproduction of negative threat 





2.1. Realism as a Limited Attempt to Analyse EU-Russia Energy Relations 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the conventional realist literature in the area of 
security has developed a general understanding of actors’ behaviour and the existence 
of threats. By focusing on the state-centric level of analysis, power as a key analytical 
category, the given nature of anarchy, the static understanding of material-based reality, 
exogenously fixed states’ interests, and security as a zero-sum game, this section 
presents the limitations and weaknesses of the broad realist school for analysing the 
EU-Russia energy security relations. 
While having a relative consensus about explaining states’ behaviour through the 
distribution of material power in the international system and military and economic 
capabilities under anarchic conditions (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001; Morgenthau, 
1985), realists vary in identifying the source of power and the driving force for state’s 
actions. For example, classical realism underlines an actor-driven approach with 
superiority of the state and the justified power-struggle. The existence of international 
conflict is characterised by the imperfect human nature of an actor and actors’ drive for 
domination and superiority. While neo-realists (or structural realists) adhere to 
structure-dominated reality, ‘blaming’ the anarchic international structure for forcing 
states to be bellicose and aggressive in the process of competing for power 
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 139–161).  
Regardless of which of the two sides of the realist debate scholars occupy, there is a 
relative agreement on the inevitable outcome of state behaviour – inherent conflict of 
interests and the existence of threats. States seek to gain a better position among 
others under the influence of international structure, being guided by power-
maximisation characterised by Mearsheimer (2001) or security-maximisation that was 
used by Waltz (1979), which ultimately creates threats for other countries, thereby 
undermining their security. Overall, the situation is also known as a ‘security dilemma’, 
when intensification of one country’s security leads to the increase in force of another 
country as a response (Hertz, 1951; Jervis, 1978). As a result, insecurity creates a 
perpetual potential for conflicts, misunderstandings, uncertainty and distrust between 
states.  
Security is treated in terms of an ultimate goal and security-related actions of states are 
realistically credible only when obtaining security for one state means a loss for another 
(the zero-sum game). However, constructivists like Wendt (1992) suggest that anarchy 
does not inevitably lead to a self-help system and conflict and lack of security are not 
necessarily natural, but can be created through practices over time. Realist 
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understanding is limited in explaining the situations when one state’s security is not 
perpetually threatened by other security-gaining states or when states want to 
cooperate to maintain security rather than compete for power. Thus, realism would 
struggle to adequately explain the co-existence of conflicting relationships between 
Russia and the EU and their cooperative attempts under the integrative frameworks of 
the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (2000), Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(1997), Early Warning Mechanism (2009), EU-Russia Roadmap for Energy 
Cooperation until 2050 (2013).  
Both classical realists and neo-realists take interests as exogenously fixed and 
identities of states as static, thereby excluding discussion on how changes in energy 
policies, preferences, attitudes and behaviour may come about (Wendt, 1999: 17). The 
above, together with a state-centric approach, where states are often treated as ‘black 
boxes’ (Waltz, 1979), seem inadequate in studying processes of policy-making and the 
dialectics of interest formation, ignoring why states construct and execute their 
preferences differently6. Realism does not provide coherent tools for analysing the 
emerging, shifting and diversifying EU-Russia energy policies that characterise 
contemporary rather than bipolar and menacing Cold War energy security debates. As 
a result, it disregards differentiation of countries’ behaviour and functionality, the 
dynamics of time, place, context and space in shaping their preferences, which can, in 
turn, be important in shaping actor’s attitudes and threat perceptions (Kratochwil, 1993). 
In general, classical and structural realism overlook that states do not pursue energy 
policy in isolation from their domestic political context and energy needs (Matlary, 2009: 
79; Hopf, 2002). This, in turn, prevents researchers from understanding how threats 
can be constructed both domestically and internationally (rather than given) and what 
events cause countries to alter their attitudes and perceptions of each other.  
A more balanced approach to explaining countries’ behaviour and the response to a 
threat is taken by neoclassical realists, who combine systemic and unit-level variables 
in explaining causalities in foreign policy behaviour of states (Schweller, 2004: 164-
165; Rose 1998: 145; Kitchen 2010). Despite being a branch of structural realism or 
the ‘logical outgrowth of neo-realism’ as Rathbun noted (2008: 297), neoclassical 
realists observe structure and interacting units in the co-influential environment. Thus 
according to Kitchen: 
Neoclassical realists regard the structure of the international system as 
providing states with information about the costs and benefits of particular 
courses of action, but how that information is processed and weighed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Checkel (1998) called this process as ‘the black box of interest and identity formation’, which 
constructivism aims to understand. 
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depends on the way states understand the world, their preferences, their 
ideas and their ethics (Kitchen, 2010: 143).  
Unlike neo-realists that merge the internal characteristics of the state into the account 
of international politics, considering states as ‘black boxes’ (Waltz, 1979: 80), 
neoclassical realists combine ‘elements of system, structure and domestic politics, of 
material and ideational factors’ (Kitchen, 2010: 119). Schweller (2004) studied the 
impact of domestic policies, which often constrain the ability of states to act on the 
international arena and balance external threats successfully. Simplifying the role of 
domestic factors, ‘states with similar internal bureaucratic structures will address similar 
threats in similar ways’ (Kitchen, 2010: 133). However, by integrating the conceptual 
role of ideas as an intervening variable in policy making, rather than simply material 
capabilities, Kitchen (2010: 129) noted that neoclassical realism can ‘explain the 
differing approaches of states towards similar threat by reference to differing 
operational ideas as much as differing coercive capabilities’. It provides an input in 
understanding the variety of driving factors for energy threat perceptions and the level 
on which threats are shaped and assessed (Lobell, 2009).  
However, strong connections of neoclassical realism with structural realism and 
constructivism contain a few weaknesses and trigger criticism. For instance, Legro and 
Moravcsik (1999) consider that the domestic shift in preferences remains to be an ad 
hoc extension of structural realism (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 28), making 
neoclassical realism not distinctive or deep enough. Neoclassical realism simply shows 
that ‘when states do not respond ideally to their structural situations, neo-realism tells 
us we should find evidence of domestic politics and ideas distorting the decision-
making process’ (Rathbun, 2008: 296). This means the ‘use of domestic politics or 
ideas is by definition an ad hoc effort to explain residual variance’ (Legro and 
Moravcsik, 1999; Rathbun, 2008: 308).  
The integration of domestic political processes and ideational influence into analysis of 
states’ behaviour makes neoclassical realism overly compatible with the constructivist 
approach. This in turn triggers another criticism of neoclassical realism that the use of 
ideas cannot be attributed to the genuine realist school tenets (Legro and Moravcsik, 
1999: 36-38; Rathbun, 2008: 300). Kitchen (2010: 139) argues that ideational variables 
are able to account for changes at the unit level and affect static international 
environment and the structure of the system and provide historical explanations, which 
is against core realist assumptions. He problematises the role of ideas as key variables 
of realism by questioning that ‘if the ideas in question reject realism, how can a realist 
theory account for them’ (ibid.: 139). Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 9-10) argue that any 
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variant (or a ‘paradigm’ as they call it) of realism should be coherent and clearly 
differentiated from other theoretical alternatives. According to their view, neoclassical 
realism is not theoretically determinant and relies on ‘exogenous variation in state 
preference’ (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 27-28, 47). Therefore, the role of socially 
constructed ideas should be rather a prerogative of a theory dealing with ideational 
factors directly, like constructivism.  
The above connections of realism with constructivism in studying energy security 
threats can be traced to works of Barkin (2003), Walt (1987) and Jervis (1978) and 
others. Thus, Walt (1987: 20-21) and Jervis (1978: 101, 112) noticed that not only 
states’ actions but also threatening intentions contribute to another state’s insecurity. 
With this in mind, Walt (1987) argued that threat perception is a function of four factors: 
geographical proximity, aggregate power, offensive capabilities and aggressive 
intentions. Applied to the EU-Russia energy nexus, Russia borders five EU members7 
(when geographical proximity matters due to threats travelling easier short distances in 
the gas pipeline grid, according to the Copenhagen School premises), is energy 
endowed (has the largest known stocks of the natural gas in the world, second largest 
coal reserves and is in the top-ten oil endowed countries), and has the capacity of 
using its aggregate energy power in an offensive way (Balmaceda, 2008; Smith, 2008)8. 
Russia’s attempts to influence its post-Soviet spheres of interests, manipulations of the 
energy supplies and prices, ownership of the energy assets and the use of energy as 
political and economic tool have been viewed by the European countries as dominating 
and aggressive behaviour (Trenin, 2007: 96-98; Hill, 2004; Stulberg, 2007; Balmaceda, 
2008; Orban, 2008). Therefore, if the geographical proximity, aggregate power and the 
offensive capabilities are matters of material facts that cause tangible negative 
consequences, the aggressive intentions are ideational and are subjects to a variety of 
European perceptions. That is where classical and structural realism (which look only 
at political outcomes and the given nature of states’ behaviour) fails to fully explain the 
process of constructing of threat perceptions, differences among countries in viewing 
the behavioural intentions as menace and some EU countries’ lack of incentives to 
unite against ‘mutual’ energy threat (Wendt, 1999: 301). Moreover, a general realist 
view struggles with evaluating the ‘realness’ of a state’s aggressive intentions or if that 
state is only perceived to have aggressive intentions, making it problematic to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Russia became the EU neighbour when Finland joined the EU in 1995, and in 2004 Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania and Poland (through the Kaliningrad  region) became the immediate 
neighbours of Russia. 
8 To name but a few well-known energy incidents between Russia and European countries such 
as energy price discrimination to different European companies leading to the court trials with 
Russia (German E.ON, Polish PGNIG), energy assets acquisitions and energy disruption (oil 
deliveries to Lithuania in 1998-1999, 2001; Latvia in 2002; Georgia in 2003; gas to Ukraine in 
2005 and 2009). 
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distinguish what exactly constitutes the hostile intentions and threatening behaviour 
(Rousseau, 2006: 10, 20-22).  
Therefore, while acknowledging the material foundations of many threat perceptions, 
the element of subjectivity provides scope for the constructivist to step in and extend 
the materialist-based reality into the ideational dimension, encountering identities of 
states, conceptions, attitudes, interests and perceptions (see Section 2.2.). The fact 
that constructivism allows this thesis to problematise the process of interest and 
identity formation that reproduce themselves through states interactions and explore 
their effect on threat perceptions and energy securitisation policies puts it in an overall 
preferable theoretical position for this thesis, compared to realism (Zehfuss, 2002). The 
constructivist understanding of reality is to be explored in the following section. 
 
2.2. Constructivism in IR 
Since the end of the 1980s, constructivism underwent huge changes on its way to 
establishing itself as a significant field of IR (Zehfuss, 2002: 4). IR scholars 
continuously participate in the cross-cutting aspects of ontological and epistemological 
debate about the essence and application of constructivism. A number of authors 
searched for attempts to situate constructivism in the field of IR, by opposing and 
contrasting the constructivist paradigm to other mainstream IR approaches or 
complimenting them with constructivism. Among those are Adler (1997), Checkel 
(1998), Christiansen et al. (1999; 2001), and Risse and Wiener (1999), who distinguish 
constructivism as a ‘middle ground’ theory, helping ‘building bridges’ between 
rationalist theories of IR (neo-realism, neo-liberalism and other rational choice theories) 
and reflectivism (like feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism and critical theory). 
The ontological dispute progressed among scholars like Onuf (1989), Smith (1999), 
Zehfuss (2002: 5-6), Jupille et al. (2003), and Checkel (2012), who problematise the 
‘middle ground’ constructivist position. They insist that constructivism successfully 
engages with the premises of other IR theories, shifting the balance of the ‘middle 
ground’ towards one pole or the other. A few scholars attributed constructivism to the 
reflectivist camp (Diez, 1999; Rosamond, 1999; Onuf, 2003), but the majority siding 
with rationalism (Wendt, 1999; Jupille et.al., 2003; Barkin, 2003; Checkel, 1998; Smith, 
1999; Saurugger, 2013), making a constructivist synthesis with rationalism become the 
mainstream (Checkel, 1998; Reus-Smit and Price, 1998).  
In this context, having strong connections with the broad rationalist camp of IR, 
mainstream constructivism does not have an anti-materialist position that entirely 
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rejects the importance and the impact of tangible material reality or material policy 
outcomes (Wendt, 1999: 25; Kratochwil, 1993; Checkel, 1998; Onuf, 1989; Katzenstein, 
1996; Guzzini, 2007; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Adler, 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001; Klotz and Lynch, 2007). Instead the international structure includes both - 
objective material reality (Checkel, 1998) and ‘the world of our making’ (Onuf, 1989). It 
simply suggests looking beyond the material factors in the understanding how the 
world functions, being socially interpreted and dependent on the meanings actors 
attach to the material structure, shaping it through ideational factors (such as norms, 
ideas, conceptions, interests and identities, inter-subjective believes, and practices). 
Within the mutually constitutive understanding of the relations between structure and 
actors, constructivists argue that reality is socially constructed through actors’ 
interactions (based on their ideas and conceptions), which in return enables and limits 
actors’ behaviour. Subsequently, through the social process of interaction between 
actors and with the structure, not only the reality is shaped, but also countries’ identities 
and interests evolve, change and are reproduced (Wendt, 1992; 1995; Adler, 2013). A 
‘social process through which agent properties and preferences change as a result of 
interactions’ (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001: 220-221) needs to be studied carefully as 
they can reveal causal mechanisms that underlie states’ behaviour.  
The key theoretical features of constructivism were summed up by John Ruggie: 
Constructivists hold the view that the building blocks of international reality 
are ideational as well as material; that ideational factors have normative as 
well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but 
also collective internationality; and that the meaning and significance of 
ideational factors are not independent of time and place (Ruggie, 1998: 33). 
Naturally, there exist distinctions within constructivists of the rationalist type. For 
instance, Smith (1999: 683) claims that constructivism is closer to the ‘neo-liberalist 
wing of the rationalist paradigm’, while Checkel (1998), Barkin (2003) and Kitchen 
(2010) argue for constructivism and different variants of realism being more 
compatible. Technically the variants of rationalist-constructivist camp have the same 
ontological belonging by posing essentially the same questions (about how reality is 
socially constructed and how constructs affect international politics). They also deal 
with similar social facts, processes and developments, agreeing on mutual constitution 
of structure and actors.  
Thus, the research sees little added value in conceiving of the EU-Russia energy 
security as contributing to the above meta-theoretical ‘quarrel’ of either constructivism 
with other theories or detailed distinctions within the constructivist group (Checkel, 
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1998: 327; Adler, 2013). Instead, since the research derives from the assumption of the 
conflicting nature of EU-Russia energy relations, it resides within the mainstream 
constructivism-realism theories, using their virtue of combining material factors and 
ideational structures (Adler, 1997; Meyer and Strickmann, 2011). Having broad 
ontological connections with realism, constructivism relies on realism’s genesis by 
operating with such concepts as ‘security’ and ‘threats’ (which will be the key analytical 
elements of the thesis, to be explored in Chapter 3).  
It should be noted though that for the last three years the developments within the 
constructivist school has shifted ‘the middle ground’ towards reflectivist camp, using 
post-positivist linguistic approaches, discourse and practice analysis. However, this 
shift has not affected or undermined the well-established epistemological and 
methodological positivist position that much (Adler, 2013: 112-113). Consequently, this 
research considers that the ‘new middle ground’ has not yet reached the sufficient level 
of maturity in the literature that analyses the EU-Russia energy relations. 
As a general rule, adherence to rationalist theories provides commitment to positivist 
epistemology, whereas reflectivist-based constructivism subscribes to a post-positivist 
epistemology. For instance, Checkel (2006: 58-59) and Saurugger (2013: 889) 
presented a comprehensive discussion on positivist or ‘conventional constructivism’ 
that looks at how ideational factors result in political behaviour (see Jupille et al., 2003) 
and ‘post-positivist constructivism’ that sheds light on how background context, 
language and discursive practices make certain changes in norms and identity of the 
EU possible in the first place (Saurugger, 2013: 889; Hopf, 2002; Price and Reus-Smit, 
1998; Checkel, 2006; Diez, 1999; Epstein, 2013)9. Post-positivist orientations deal with 
the nature of the explored process (like the EU integration process) and examine 
mainly the ‘constitutive logic’ of ideational factors that ‘constitute the environment in 
which actors are embedded’ (Saurugger, 2013: 890), while conventional constructivism 
explains causal effect of norms, interests and identities on countries’ behaviour that 
result in international political outcomes (Checkel, 1998; 2006).  
As previously mentioned, being in line with rationalist mainstream assumptions, 
conventional constructivism does not refuse the role of materialistic factors and power 
as it analyses the material reality, which actors inevitably construct in a form of certain 
policy outcomes. Similar to realism’s treatment of structure as constant, positivist 
constructivism presumes a relatively stable state of affairs to be able to trace these 
causal mechanisms. The difference is that the change in actors’ interests derives not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Checkel also  distinguishes between ‘interpretative’ and ‘critical/radical’ constructivism as a 
part of post-positivist angle, both having a linguistic focus, but adding an explicit normative 
dimension to the latter (Checkel, 2006). 
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from changes in the material environment of the structure (as realism presumes), but 
depends on actors themselves and their understanding and perceptions of the 
changing structure. Such ‘actor-centred constructivism’ suggested by Saurugger (2013: 
896-897) explores how ideas frame actors’ interests and identifies (which are not pre-
determined by structure), why actors consider particular ideas over others and ‘why 
certain decisions are made at a specific period and not at another’.  
Some scholars are convinced that more attention should be paid to differentiating the 
epistemological types of constructivism (Risse, 2004: 160; Checkel, 2006). According 
to Smith (1999: 689) epistemological differences are incommensurable and present 
extremely polar standpoints, making it impossible to use combined variants of 
constructivism. However, this view remains debateable, and this research uses a 
combination of both constitutive and causal explanations of social phenomena (Wendt, 
1999; Saurugger, 2013). According to Saurugger (2013: 890) such combined logic in 
constructivism provides a toolkit to understand policy processes in the EU energy 
threat dimension and allows a richer grasp of the empirical research about the 
construction of social reality and policy implications of such constructions (Adler, 2013: 
113). This approach allows an account of the complexity of the observed phenomenon 
of the EU energy actorness to explain how ideational factors (in particular interests and 
identities) evolve and constitute the energy security environment, and become a tool 
for the EU MSs to reach their aims (as a consequence constructing the material 
reality). Not simply policy outcomes, but also processes of reaching those outcomes 
should be in the focus of analysis. Thus, constructivism encounters the dynamics of 
time, place and context in the analysis of the energy relations between Russia, the EU 
and its MSs.  
Attempts to ground constructivism within a particular epistemological basket are limiting 
to the analysis of interest and identity formation in the EU energy arena and the 
European energy security domain. It reduces the capacity to analyse multi-faced entity 
of the EU, and the development of threat perceptions of its MSs. As Saurugger (2013: 
889) noticed, ‘ideational aspects of policy-making processes make constructivist 
approaches particularly useful at explaining policy outcomes in a context of high issue 
complexity’. The European Union presents a perfect example of complexity (including 
an institutional and the division of energy competences complexities) and a 
contradictory set of energy interests, which are embedded in different values, 
perceptions and identities of the EU MSs and diverse rules of the EU institutional 
apparatus. The above actor-centred constructivism is extremely helpful in 
understanding the EU MSs’ energy behaviour as arising from external and internal 
energy security challenges, and in explaining differences in countries’ perceptions of 
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those challenges. On the empirical level, this will allow explanation of the multiplicity in 
energy threat perceptions in the EU and how perception-based energy policies of 
Poland and Germany operate. ‘In order to understand how actors think and how their 
ideas count in policy-making, one must take into account the way actors use ideas 
strategically’ (Saurugger, 2013: 888, 898), which in this research effectively makes 
Germany and Poland purposeful actors that use ideational structures of threat 
perceptions in accordance with their interests. 
2.2.1. Constructivist Account of Identity and Interests: Implications for 
the EU-Russia Threat Perceptions  
In general terms, depending on ontological and epistemological persuasions, 
constructivist IR scholars vary in their approach to studying the nature of social reality 
and the relationships between structure and agents. Some scholars study actors’ 
behaviour under the influence of such ideational factors as interests and identities 
(Wendt, 1992; 1999; Hopf, 2002), while others look at norms, power and identity 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 537), Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009), strategic culture (Meyer 
2006: 20; Meyer and Strickmann, 2011), norms (Kratochwil, 1993; Risse, 2004; 
Finnemore, 1996), norms and culture (Peters, 2016), social discourses, language and 
speech acts (Kratochwil, 1993: 27; Onuf, 2003), meanings, representations and the 
viewpoints of social agents (Zehfuss, 2002: 36), sovereignty (Reus-Smit, 2001; 
Kratochwil, 2010) and other different combinations of those.  
Coming from the above connection between constructivism and realism to understand 
how and why states interact with each other in a particular way and what value is 
attached to energy threats, interests (what actors want) and identity (what actors are) 
were chosen as key determinants of states’ behaviour, and triggers of negative or 
positive attitudes and consequently perception-based policies (Wendt, 1999: 231). 
Being the main properties of the state and the key attributes of actors’ security, 
interests and identity correspond to the actor-centred approach chosen in this thesis, 
where reality is shaped with the help of actors.  
Due to the fact that constructivists see relationships between structure and agents as 
mutually constitutive, they provide different to realism understanding about how actors’ 
interests and identities change. Unlike materialists that attribute altering interests to 
changes in the structure, actor-centred constructivism assumes that ‘interests of actors 
cannot be treated as exogenously given or inferred from a given material structure’ 
(Risse, 2004: 161), but rather social, economic and political contexts of actors’ 
understandings shape those interests. Wendt, for this instance, claims that ‘only a 
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small part of what constitutes interests is actually material…the rest is ideational’ 
(Wendt, 1999: 114-115), making the material world indeterminate without ideas. Thus 
identities and interests represent ‘the products of inter-subjective social structures’ 
(Wendt, 1999: 193; Reus-Smit, 2005) that ‘may well condition the identities and 
interests of actors, but those structures would not exist if it were not for the 
knowledgeable practices of those actors’ Reus-Smit (2001: 218). The categories of 
interests and identities are both rather contested and politically constructed identity’s 
‘content and potential policy implications are highly context-specific and often 
fundamentally contested, and hence inherently political’ (Hebel and Lenz, 2016: 475). 
Some authors try to determine the prevailing relationships between interests and 
identities in search of drivers for states’ behaviour (Wendt, 1999; Haas, 2001; Zehfuss, 
2002; Adler, 2013). For instance, Wendt proposed a definition of interests as ‘beliefs 
that actors actually have about how to meet their identity needs, and it is these which 
are the proximate motivations for behaviour’ (Wendt, 1999: 232). Without interests 
identities ‘by themselves cannot explain actions’, so cannot generate behavioural 
disposition. By arguing that ‘without interests identities have no motivational force, 
without identities interests have no direction’, Wendt noted that ‘interests presuppose 
identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is’ (Wendt, 
1999: 231). Adler (2013: 127) also prioritises identity by claiming that ‘identity lies at the 
core of national and transnational interests’. Likewise, Haas (2001) also supports the 
supremacy of identity in explaining the behaviour of actors, as interests arise from a 
country’s self-understanding, noting that ‘state-actors are constituted by that system 
and take their roles from their perceived positions in it’ (Haas, 2001: 26).  
Drawing from the multi-dimensional and already complex nature of the research, this 
thesis does not need to determine whether identities inform interests or interests 
constitute identity. Since identities on their own do not fully explain the behaviour of 
states, one should explore interests as a constitute element of identity on theoretical 
and empirical levels (Zehfuss, 2002; Wendt, 1999: 231). Any prevalence of interest and 
identity is not theoretically relevant for this research, as what matters is the 
understanding that both identity and interests change and constitute the reality at the 
same time. Countries’ behaviour and perceptions about another state are based on 
both interests and identities - a singular co-constitutive phenomenon. What is more 
important is the understanding of European shared ideas, conceptions and meanings 
attached to energy security and the relations with other countries. In making sense of 
an actor’s perceptions and ideas about the world, the research recognises that actors 
affect the understanding of each other’s interests and identities. Constructivist 
contributions in the explanation of relationships between actions, interests and 
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identities of states, and in understandings of the ideational meaning of structure, threat 
perceptions and security, are especially pertinent for analysing EU-Russia energy 
interplays (Risse, 2004: 164-165).  
Deriving from the purpose of this research to explain the variety of energy threat 
perceptions in the EU, through the process of formation of interest and identities it is 
possible to induce how threat perceptions are constructed. Rousseau (2006: 6) 
underlined that ‘depending on the set of considerations, threat assessment can be 
altered by priming certain considerations, and identity plays a central and often 
determining role in the construction of threat’. However, the process of threat 
perception is neither straightforward nor one-dimensional. In addition to the 
acknowledgement of the importance of material factors, there is no consensual 
agreement between mainstream constructivist scholars about which ideational factors 
contribute to perceptions and attitudes between states. Drawing from the core 
constructivists foundations (Wendt and Friedman, 1995; Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002), the 
chapter considers that EU’s (and the EU MSs) threat perceptions of Russia can be 
shaped by two key factors:  
1) The previous process of interactions between the EU and Russia, and  
2) The constitution of interests and the identity of the EU and its MSs.  
While evolving through interactions (Wendt, 1992: 394; Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001), 
interests and identities create grounds for the formation of energy threat perceptions of 
the EU countries that ultimately lead to misunderstandings and other negative policy 
outcomes for EU-Russia energy relations. 
As threats per se are created in the process of interplays between actors (Wendt and 
Friedman, 1995: 141-144), the previous dynamics of those actors relations is important 
and can reveal energy interests of both parties. Through repetitive interactions, actors 
create perceptions of each other that often end up being stereotypes and prejudices. 
This sort of social learning (Zehfuss, 2002: 46) forces states to adopt a particular set of 
attitudes towards each other. Wendt (1999: 259-266) identified the spectrum of 
attitudes of one actor towards ‘the other’, based on three distinctive structural roles that 
‘the other’ can have: enemy (that pursues violent behaviour and represents an 
existential threat), rival (that threatens to revise the other’s ‘behaviour or property’) and 
a friend (Wendt, 1999: 261). These roles or images are created depending on the 
perceptions of the level of actor’s violence, antagonism, aggressiveness and the limits 
of the threat that it poses. Representing the ‘other’ as an enemy leads to a specific 
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‘foreign posture and behaviour, which in turn generates a particular logic of 
interactions’ (Wendt, 1999: 262).  
Drawing from the above, a range of material conditions in the EU-Russia relations, like 
previous economic embargoes, clashes of political values over a range of international 
affairs, energy dependence, can explain some but not all the specifics of the current 
energy perceptions inside the EU towards Russia. The problem is that even if the 
perceived antagonistic image of Russia created by the EU might not be necessarily 
‘real’ or fully justified (Wendt, 1999), it will still have negative implications for EU-Russia 
energy relations, resulting in disputes, politicisation and meaningless over-
securitisation of energy security. So, the nature of previous relationships between 
Russia and the EU (including its MSs) that creates grounds for future perceptions 
requires further investigation (which this research will accomplish in further empirical 
chapters).  
Being developed through interactions, the created perceptions about other actors 
become rather stable over time, but not permanent (Wendt, 1999: 21). Likewise, 
constructivism’s conception of anarchy, those images are not fixed. Identities slowly 
transform only through repeated interplays, allowing the actors involved to develop new 
expectations about each other, and therefore new perceptions (Wendt, 1999: 21, 328). 
Inter-subjective meanings of identities and interests alter in time, depth and scope, 
which affect changes in interests, behaviours, and perception-based policies of the 
state. However, such change in attitudes and perceptions is not a quick process. It 
takes time to change ones approach to generate more positive relations and to change 
ones shaped conceptualisation of identities (Wendt, 1999; Neumann, 1999; De 
Buitrago, 2012: XIV).  
Alongside the already mentioned importance of previous interactions between Russia 
and the EU, another factor affecting the European energy perceptions is the formation 
of European energy interests and identity. If understanding of energy interests can be 
derived from the analysis of actors’ energy policies as a materialisation of interest 
formation, then conceptualisation of country’s energy identity requires more theoretical 
scrutiny.  
As identified before, at the core of constructivist approach is the understanding that 
actors relate to each other within a landscape of socially constructed configurations 
when their interests and identity is hugely influenced by the process of interaction with 
other actors (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 393; Price and Reus-Smit, 
1998). During the continuous process of interactions not only actors’ attitudes but also 
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actor’s identities and interests are shaped and reproduced over time, based on the 
inter-subjective meanings that states attach to themselves and ‘the other’, making 
identities subjective and relational.   
In general, identity is a rather complex construction that consists of the meanings that 
an actor has about ‘self’ (the perception of their own identity) and the meanings 
attached by ‘others’ (Wendt, 1999: 224-225; Wendt and Friedman, 1995: 141-144) 
Checkel, 1998). From that view, identity consists of two parts: the internal identity 
(based on self-understanding) and external identity (based on inter-subjective 
understanding of other actors). Thus in the EU-Russia example, European perceptions 
of Russia as an energy actor would depend not only on the EU’s external perceptions 
but also on Russia’s own self-portrayed image. However, the aim of the research is not 
to analyse Russia’s self-identity formations and not to distinguish if Russian self-image 
corresponds to meanings attached by the EU and its MSs. Subsequently, the internal 
constitutive factor of Russia’s identity will be mostly treated as a given fact and referred 
to only briefly, leaving larger scope for exploring the ‘external’ perceptions of Russia 
from the European side. On the other hand, energy identity of the EU will be 
problematised from both internal and external perspectives (as mutually constitutive), 
with specific focus on the EU MSs, Poland and Germany. 
Understanding of EU’s identity derives from its internal and external perceptions. For 
example, ‘EU shapes its own normative setting through its political actions and, in turn, 
that the external actors’ perceptions (which are partly a result of the EU’s actions) are 
important for what kind of international actor the EU is’ (Larsen, 2014: 901). In addition, 
the conception of EU’s self-identity affects the way it perceives others. Hopf (2002) 
studied domestic factors in the external identity formation that help to understand how 
national interests are defined and what international policies they lead to. As Hopf 
(2002: 16) notes, the view of ‘self’ interest and identity makes it possible for countries 
to distinguish ‘the other’ as an antagonist or a partner (or other variations within the 
‘friend-enemy’ attitude spectrum). For instance, if the EU aspires to be a value-based 
energy actor with the supremacy of the rule of international law, liberal market and fair 
competition, then it is natural to expect to see the same approach from its key energy 
supplier Russia. The absence of similarities and shared understanding of energy 
security affects how the EU perceives Russian energy identity and behaviour. The next 
Section 2.2.2.2. expands on the EU’s energy identity and its capacity to act as a 
coherent energy actor.  
 
In addition, the conception of ‘self’ and its perceptions by ‘the other’ affect an actor’s 
identity both ways, becoming mutually influential. For instance, the way the EU views 
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Russia might coincide with Russia’s self-image, but such mutually shared views about 
one’s image might not always be the case. If they do not coincide it might trigger 
undesirable peculiarities in the formation of the Russia’s identity and negative 
implications for further interactions between these actors. Neumann (1999) presented 
an interesting historical account on how Russia’s identity has been shaped by ‘the 
other’ (meaning Europe). Europe’s consistent representation of Russia as a military 
and political threat since the Cold War era and a ‘tamed’ country that got stuck in the 
process of enduring ‘transition’ to become a Europeanised country is detrimental to a 
more positive creation of Russia’s European identity and its acceptance of European 
norms and values.  
The following example explains this idea further. Since the 2000’s Russia has tried to 
gain recognition as a strong policy-maker on the international arena, a great energy 
power and an influential economic and geopolitical actor (Yergin, 2011: 40; Nygren, 
2008). Supported by inconsistent and controversial energy policy-making for the last 
decade10, Russia’s self-image shaped negative perceptions of Russia within the EU11. 
Those European perceptions affect Russia’s identity and attitudes towards the EU, 
shaping a sequence. Since the states are involved in ‘critical self-reflection’ (Wendt, 
1992: 419-420), the perceptions of Russia’s energy stance by the EU might affect 
Russia’s conception of ‘self’ and have a transformative effect on the nature of its 
behaviour. The effect is commonly known as ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ (Wendt, 1999: 263) 
or ‘a desired effect’ (Zehfuss, 2002: 46) or ‘constitutive effect’ (De Buitrago, 2012: XV). 
By categorising Russia as a threat, an aggressive energy actor or an ‘energy 
superpower’ that often abuses its supplier’s position and violates the security of other 
countries (Klare, 2008: 66-76, 125-130; Smith, 2008; Baran, 2007; De Haas, 2010) 
endangers Russia adopting this image (De Buitrago, 2012). Such negative 
categorisation of Russia does not improve EU-Russia energy relations. Rather, treating 
Russia as a friend and an equal, as a mutually dependent and trust-worthy energy 
partner, might change the negative pattern in EU-Russia energy misunderstandings, 
producing a positive mirror-effect for their relations. According to the constructivist 
framework, ‘friendship’ or ‘partnership’ references in the EU-Russia energy domain 
would set up a non-violent and threat-free environment, which potentially would lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Inconsistencies and controversies are revealed in a rather selective approach to gas supplies 
and gas price-making depending on a country-consumer. That, in turn, produced energy supply 
disruptions to Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. The empirical analysis of Russia energy policy 
will be addressed in Chapter 5.  
11 Naturally, adaptation of the new social role would not just happen on the basis of other state’s 
perception, as other preconditions are vital (for more examples of the changes of actors’ roles 
from rivals to more cooperative identities, see Wendt, 1992: 419-422).  
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opportunities for team-work in dealing with security threats and the creation of level-
playing field.  
2.2.2. The EU’s Identity as an Energy Actor 
Since this thesis explores EU-Russia energy security and threat relations, and since 
threat perceptions largely depend on the actor that perceives Russian energy 
behaviour and identity as threatening, the problematisation of the EU’s energy 
actorness is the initial focus of analysis in this section. The analysis of EU energy 
actorness corresponds to the chosen theoretical framework of this thesis, as it 
accounts for both material factors (like EU institutions and resources to execute energy 
competences) and ideational factors, including threatening images, perceptions of 
identities and expectations (Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2015: 216).  
 
There is very little consensus among scholars of the IR school and in the area of EU 
studies about how to view EU identity in general. Therefore, theoretical 
conceptualisation of EU actorness starts with a broader IR state-centric debate that 
proves to be less valuable in analysing EU actorness in the energy domain specifically 
than does the perspective of EU studies on actorness, which is more nuanced and 
encompassing. The aim is to explore the complexity and incoherence of the EU’s 
contested nature in the process of building its internal and external energy image and 
explain the divergence of energy threat perceptions inside the EU, based on the 
framework of Jupille and Caporaso (1998). This will allow conclusions to be made as to 
why common European energy policy with respect to Russia is ineffective and justify 
the methodological choice of the research to continue the energy analysis on the level 
of the EU MSs. 
 
2.2.2.1 EU’s Identity in IR and EU Studies 
A wide array of the IR literature is concentrated around the EU having a state-like 
qualities and capabilities to act, based on external perceptions of the EU as an actor 
(Larsen, 2014). The analysis normally includes the debate about its realist hard-power 
nature as a political entity with a certain degree of state-like properties and ability to 
deploy military coercive force in pursuit of national interests and European security 
(Sjostedt, 1977; Wright, 2011) and the EU as a civilian non-military soft-power that 
possesses economic, cultural and diplomatic influence to pursue its policy goals 
(Duchene, 1973; Zielonka, 1998; Smith, 2000; Orbie, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; 2007; 
Niemann and Bretherthon, 2013)12. The IR scholarship discusses the EU’s material 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The line between the two is often fain and fuzzy (like with armed peacekeeping forces).  
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and non-material capabilities in the process of achieving its foreign policy ends (Wright, 
2011) within the spectrum between military and civilian power (Smith, 2005; Goldthau 
and Sitter, 2015b).  
Thus the IR debates are normally concerned about whether the EU should be regarded 
as a military power, a civilian power or a combination of both (Hill, 1993; Smith, 2000; 
Wright, 2011). A plethora of empirical examples on EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy and EU’s involvement in a 
variety of regional conflicts in Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and others (Greicevci, 2011; 
Freire and Simao, 2013; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015b) demonstrate EU’s relatively weak 
unitary state-identity and hard-power capabilities, undermined by the EU MSs. 
According to Goldthau and Sitter (2015b: 944) ‘the EU can deploy hard power only if all 
states agree (or agree to not block this), and a few of the big states in effect the UK or 
France will provide the necessary hardware’. Goldthau and Sitter (2015b) question the 
sufficiency of the military approach to scrutinise EU global actorness (as according to 
Hill (1993) military capabilities remain the centre of the realist approach). Hitherto, it is 
regarded that EU’s state identity and coercive capabilities would be rather restricted in 
a range of international domains, mainly common police and armed forces, and 
centralised military decision-making.  
The IR school traditionally considers EU’s actorness in state-centric terms, possessing 
the ability to perform ‘actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the 
international system’ (Sjostedt, 1977: 16). If this research chose to take the analysis of 
the structure of the EU down this nation-state route with ‘a clear inside and outside’ set 
of interests to be promoted and defended (Morozov, 2008: 45, 58), it would have meant 
that the EU’s state-sovereignty could have bean equally comparable and identity can 
be reproduced in relation to other state-actors (like the USA, Russia, India, China, etc.). 
However, the process of shaping EU’s actor capacity is complicated, because the 
Union consists of many independent sovereign ‘selves’ – EU member states – that on 
the national level already associate themselves with other state-actors. The EU in this 
case cannot be treated as an equally comparable state-actor with which Russia can 
build effective bilateral energy relations due to the limitations of the EU actorness (Hill, 
1993). Thus, by denying any form of collective interests and promoting a vary singular 
personality of a unitary and autonomous state (Walts, 1979), realism views EU as 
‘inherently weak as an international actor (if indeed it is one at all), capable at best of 
only limited or qualified autonomous action, and then only at the behest of the Member 
States, particularly the most powerful, who retain ultimate control’ (Wright, 2011: 11; 
Anderesn et.al., 2016: 51-52).  
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Outside military coercive capabilities, as a civilian power the EU’s political state identity 
seems more successful. Its power is executed through a well-developed mechanism of 
conditionality during the enlargement process of the candidate countries and further 
integration of its EU MSs. As Goldthau and Sitter claim that because of the EU’s:  
focus on markets and, as a corollary, as a result of its (limited) policy 
toolbox the EU is typically boxed into the category of an actor that almost 
exclusively exerts ‘soft power’ (Goldthau and Sitter, 2015b: 944).  
While being a relatively successful actor in the areas of markets integration, trade, 
humanitarian aid, environmental policies, agriculture, human rights and diplomacy 
(Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, 2015), the EU still has relatively restricted international 
potential in dealing with third countries as a civilian power in the field of energy 
security. For instance, the EU has little supranational energy competence to 
unanimously represent all members’ approaches to energy policy on the international 
level (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, 2008: 245). According to the Lisbon Treaty of 
2009 (Article 194), the key energy decision-making and external energy policies still 
predominantly belong to the competences of the individual EU MSs, in the shared zone 
of competences between the EU and its MSs (see Chapter 5.3.2. for more details). 
Thus according to Goldthau and Sitter (2015b: 961) ‘the EU’s power is often more 
effective with respect to companies than governments’ of producer states.  
With the development of constructivist IR and its cross-cutting debate with the EU 
studies, the latter mostly treat the EU as a normative power that utilises practices, 
ideas and spreads universal values in the process of the EU integration, enlargement 
and development (Manners, 2002; Mayer, 2006; Sjursen, 2006; Larsen, 2014). While 
the discussion about normative power ‘runs parallel to the literature about the older 
idea of the EU as a civilian power’ (Larsen, 2014:897; Sjursen, 2006), it provides a 
slightly different focus of soft-power influence through ideational factors rather than 
material economic capabilities. If the first two approaches analyse the EU as a global 
actor through material interests and military and non-military capabilities (which is not 
the ultimate focus of this research), normative power has more of a constructivist angle 
to it, suggesting that what the EU is, is as important as what it does (Manners, 2002: 
252; Wright, 2011: 8). However, the above reference to EU actorness within the 
normative power theory perspective simply illustrates a constructivist angle to studying 
EU identity. While adhering to normative elements13 rather than ideational accounts of 
interests and identities, normative power theory presents just an example of another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Including democracy, the rule of law, peace, liberty, human rights, social solidarity, anti- 
discrimination, sustainable development and good governance (Manners, 2002: 242-243). 
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possibility to explore EU actorness in ideational terms. Consequently, it will not be in 
the focus of this thesis as such.  
Instead, the constructivist approach to the EU actorness based mainly on its identity 
should be given a more specific explanation, which happens to lie in the context of the 
EU studies. The EU foreign policy approach, EU integration literature and most of the 
constructivist approaches to studying the EU almost univocally and ‘unquestioningly’ 
treat the EU as a sui generis phenomenon ‘of its own kind’, with a hybrid identity that 
needs special treatment, rather than a nation-state or an international organisation 
(Rhodes, 1998; Hill, 1993; Niemann and Bretherthon, 2013). Bretherton and Vogler 
(2006: 44) justified the limited insights from comparing the EU with other global actors 
specifically due to its sui generis nature as ‘a multi-perspectival polity whose 
construction reflects both the experimentation of policy entrepreneurs and the 
opportunities afforded by the changing structures of the international system’. Jupille 
and Caporaso (1998: 214) presented the most accommodating definition of the EU 
actorness as ‘an evolving entity, composed of numerous issue areas and policy 
networks, neither a full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign states, which displays 
varying degrees of “actorhood’’ across issues and time’. Based on their understanding, 
the next section provides a more nuanced constructivist conceptualisation of EU’s 
actorness in energy domain.  
2.2.2.2. Conceptualisation of the EU Energy Actorness 
Deriving from the above, this section continues to analyse the EU’s aggregate 
preferences and opportunities to act collectively in terms of propensity for having the 
qualities of a coherent energy actor with shared domestic energy approach and unified 
capacity of framing external energy policies (where individual energy trepidations of 
MSs are mitigated and shared by all the stake-holders inter-subjectively). The 
importance for actors of having an inter-subjectively shared interests and collective14 
identity was mentioned by many scholars (Adler, 1997; Christiansen et.al.,1999: 528; 
Wendt, 1992; 1999; Rousseau, 2006; 2007). Alexander Wendt claims that it can 
reduce the anticipation of conflict (Wendt, 1999), as the deeper the nature of conflict in 
the inter-state relations, the more actors will defend their interest and identities. Hopf 
(2002) attributes the existence of collectively shared identities to reduction of the 
security dilemma and ensuring ‘at least some minimal level of predictability and order’ 
(Hopf, 1998: 174). Rousseau claims that shared identity reduces threat perception and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Since this thesis will look at the EU identity in terms of energy actorness, it does not 
encounter the debates on the problem of collective action, identity formation and the ‘in-group’ 
and ‘out-group’ relationships (like the distinctions between egoistic and collective identities and 
the process of EU’s formation as a collective ‘self’), explored by Wendt 1992; Zehfuss 2001. 
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‘decreases the belief that the other has the intention to inflict negative consequences’, 
which simultaneously ‘increases the probability of support for interstate cooperation’ 
(Rousseau, 2007: 750, 766). 
Some authors argue that political relations in the EU trigger alterations in security 
identities and, consequently, in interests (Aggestam, 2004; Sjursen, 2007). Such a 
perspective fits with the constructivist philosophy of the mutability of identities (Dessler, 
1999: 123-137). This would mean that through active economic and political integration 
of EU energy markets, EU MSs should converge into one integrated gas market space 
and facilitate collectively shared energy actorness (at least on the internal level). In this 
way the role of the EU as a coherent collective energy actor with a shared sense of 
identity would emerge.  
Hence, hitherto the formation of the EU’s singular collective energy actorness is very 
much underdeveloped and remains in transition. The initial theoretical overview of the 
EU’s sui generis identity as a unitary energy actor determines that the EU struggles to 
have ‘a degree of autonomy from its external environment and…its internal 
constituents…that is capable of formulating purposes and making decisions’ 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 16-17). As Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. will empirically 
demonstrate, the individual EU MSs still dominate the direction of EU energy politics 
and disunity undermines the EU’s consolidated actorness (Howorth, 2010; Wright, 
2011; Anderesn et.al., 2016). Therefore, the EU shared identity of an energy actor 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Rhodes, 1998; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998) represents 
the conceptual level of analysis and provides understanding of the novel stand towards 
threats and energy security issues inside the EU (which will be complemented with 
empirical analysis of the cases of Poland and Germany in Chapters 6 and 7, exposing 
political variation around energy security processes among the EU MSs).  
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the EU’s international position 
and has produced a variety of conceptual approaches for accessing the EU’s 
actorness. Mainly, several attempts have been made to explore EU’s international role 
in almost all possible areas such as trade, humanitarian, civilian, environmental, 
military, foreign and security policy, common security and defence policy and monetary 
relations (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Rhodes, 1998; Orbie, 2008; Rosamond, 2005; 
Kratochvil et al., 2011; Gehring et al., 2013). For example, Bretherton and Vogler 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2006: 5, 24-35) operationalised EU’s constructed actorness 
through the analytical categories of opportunity (that includes external factors enabling 
or constraining actorness), presence (that describes relationships between internal 
development and external expectations) and capability (that is characterised by 
55 
 
capabilities to effectively respond to external expectations and opportunities). Rhodes 
(1998) analysed the EU through opportunities to influence abroad, capacity to act, 
legitimacy and responsibility and perceptions of other actors about the EU. Both 
literature pieces by Rhodes (1998) and Bretherton and Vogler (2006) considered the 
EU’s shared commitment to a set of overarching values; the ability to identify priorities 
and formulate policies consistently, as well as the ability and capacity to utilise policy 
instruments like diplomacy, economics and military force. Jupille and Caporaso (1998: 
214-219) presented four criteria for assessing EU’s actorness: recognition as 
‘acceptance of and interaction with the entity by the other’; authority as ‘legal 
competence to act’; autonomy as ‘institutional distinctiveness and independence from 
other actors’; and cohesion15 to ‘formulate and articulate internally consistent policy 
preferences’ and goals. Jupille and Caporaso’s conceptual approach to actorness will 
form the basis for the analysis of the EU’s energy identity for a variety of reasons 
presented below.  
The analysis of the most prominent theoretical debates on EU actorness concluded 
that the majority of definitions of EU actorness are similar or overlapping as ‘authors of 
this debate refer to the same termini without explicitly referring to each other’s writings 
in order to clarify differences in usage’ (Peters, 2016: 15). However, Jupille and 
Caporaso (1998: 213-214) proposed a rather broad but valuable conceptualisation of 
the EU as a collective actor based on the convergence of interests in a perpetual state 
of transformation. Their interpretation of actorness entails an assessment of the 
changing relations during the development processes in the system, in the EU as a 
polity and the EU as ‘an evolving entity displaying varying degrees of ‘actorhood’ 
across issues and time’ (Peters, 2016: 19; Groel and Niemann, 2013). This 
corresponds to the constructivist tenets for analysing threat perceptions through 
interests and identities that are changing in the process of states’ interactions under the 
changing structure.  
While the majority of actorness analysts consider it an important requirement of an 
actor to have ‘ability to formulate and implement external policy’ (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 2006: 218; Hill, 1993), Jupille and Caporaso (1998) mention the lack of clear 
criteria for determining the status of the EU as a coherent domestic actor (Groel and 
Niemann, 2013: 3; Niemann and Bretherthon, 2013: 6). In this instance, Jupille and 
Caporaso’s approach accounts for the domestic outlook of the EU actorness more 
profoundly. It focuses on the first pillar of the treaty of the EU based on community 
integration policies (that among others include single market, competition law and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Cohesion and coherence in this context mean the same and will be used interchangeably. 
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internal areas) rather than simply looking at the EU as a foreign policy actor in the 
international system (second pillar effectively). This, in turn, will allow understanding 
differences in national driven energy policies of the EU MSs and a variety of threat 
perceptions in a more consistent way, originating from EU energy policies and internal 
market liberalisation processes.  
Unlike recent developments of extensive empirical research of the EU collective 
identity being translated in foreign policy areas (Howorth, 2010; Greicevci, 2011; Freire 
and Simao, 2013; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015a; 2015b; Peters, 2016; Hebel and Lenz, 
2016), the analysis of the EU energy actorness on a domestic level or external energy 
relations with third countries is limited to a very few scholars. For instance, Belyi (2008: 
208-211) and Goldthau and Sitter (2012), Goldthau and Sitter (2015a) looked at the EU 
through the prism of energy governance and the EU’s ability to export its liberal 
economy acquis, regulatory norms and market rules to other countries, while Youngs 
(2009:15) tried to employ a more encompassing approach to EU energy actorness, 
linking energy, market and governance with Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) debates. Even from the initial overview of the EU empirical literature about the 
essence of the European energy policies it is possible to trace signs of disunity in 
energy decision-making among different EU member states and poor distribution of 
energy competences on the EU institutional level (Wright, 2011; Anderesn et.al., 2016). 
Howorth (2010: 457-460) and Kirchner and Berk (2010) argue that the EU is 
constrained by tensions between the EU level and its MSs.  
Although the four criteria are interconnected, the approach of Jupille and Caporaso has 
utility, not least because it is clearly structured and the specified criteria are 
‘operationalisable’ for empirical research. Nevertheless, the above empirical literature 
fails to apply the highlighted analytical actorness categories of Jupille and Caporaso 
(1998) systematically (if at all) to analyse and explain the EU’s energy actorness in the 
process of integration of the internal energy market and a collective energy approach in 
dealing with Russia. Neither does the empirical literature clearly point out that the 
success of the EU energy actorness can vary depending on the areas of its 
involvement in the explored areas (like towards Russia) and energy security-related 
subjects. That is why this thesis aims to rectify the lack of empirical research about the 
EU’s energy capacity to act by operationalising the EU’s energy actorness through 
Jupille and Caporaso’s approach based on the empirical scrutiny in Chapter 5 
(Sections 5.1. and 5.3.2.).  
While the terminological references for studying the EU actorness vary, most of the 
definitions point to the importance of the coherence in EU actorness as the key 
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requirement for united energy action. Cohesion is understood as the existing similarity 
and internally consistent policy preferences, compatibility of energy policy goals, rules 
and procedures in the internal and external dimensions of energy that were negotiated 
and agreed on (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 219-220). As confirmed by Niemann and 
Bretherthon (2013: 266), Jupille and Caporaso’s criteria of recognition, authority, 
autonomy and cohesion ‘are not absolute, suggesting that actorness is a matter of 
degree’ (Jupille and Caporaso 1998: 214; Niemann and Bretherthon 2013: 6; Groel and 
Niemann 2013: 3). Jupille and Caporaso (1998) divide cohesion into several 
dimensions. The minimum required level of cohesion is based on a similarity of basic 
goals (‘value cohesion’). However, if the goals are different but can be compatible 
through a variety of methods like ‘linkages and side payments’, it becomes a ‘tactical 
cohesion’ (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 219). Through institutionalisation, legal 
authority to act and consensus about how to deal with the conflicting situations the EU 
can reach ‘procedural cohesion’, and by articulation of common policies and pursue of 
collective actions successfully ‘the output cohesion’ is gained (ibid.: 219).  
The categorisation above represents various degrees of cohesion of the EU actorness 
that allows analysis of the EU’s internal and external energy identity within the ‘strong-
weak spectrum’ of the EU collective energy actorness. For instance, the EU can have 
less monolithic actorness in its external approach to other countries like Russia (due to 
shared competences with the EU MSs) and have more coherent interests in building its 
domestic energy market within the advantages of commonly shared EU internal energy 
market (as noted by Goldthau and Sitter, 2015a; Andersen et.al., 2016: 52 through the 
example of the developing EU Commission’s institutional regulatory competence and 
energy authority). The variations within the cohesion of the EU actorness can exist not 
only between the external and internal dimensions of the EU energy policies, but also 
within them. As Chapter 5, (Section 5.1.) will demonstrate, the external EU energy 
actorness can be regarded as more cohesive in the area of international multilateral 
energy initiatives like the Energy Charter Treaty negotiations, than in advancing the 
PCA in relation to Russia. Internally, in the process of building the integrated energy 
market the EU Commission occupies a stronger centralised position to commit the EU 
MSs to promote a united approach to energy diversification policies (like the 2011 
mandate from the EU Council to the EU Commission to negotiate the Trans-Caspian 
Pipeline) than it does in implementing certain energy regulations in the internal gas 
market (like the unbundling principle within Third EU energy package).  
However, despite the possibility to study the degree of EU’s energy actorness through 
Jupille and Caporaso’s framework and recognising that the weak and strong aspects of 
the EU actorness exist, it is sufficient for the research just to empirically identify that 
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there is an incoherence in the EU energy actorness as a factor that undermines the 
relations with Russia. The depth of the organising logic of the EU energy competences 
and the extent of the cohesion within the weak and strong spectrum of energy 
actorness will not uniquely provide direct answers to the key research question and 
explain how the interests and identities of the individual EU MSs trigger different 
energy threats and perception-based policies16. The thesis does not aim to fill in the 
theoretical gap in measuring the exact degree of EU energy actorness spectrum within 
different energy initiatives, nor does the research aim to provide a detailed in-depth 
view of the domestic and international EU energy competences and test the capacity to 
act of the EU institutions. The identification of a particular degree of coherence of EU’s 
energy actorness will not uniquely determine why some EU MSs feel more threatened 
than the others, as other factors should be encountered. Instead, any signs of found 
incoherence in the EU’s external and internal energy actorness through the prism of 
Jupille and Caporaso (1998) framework will serve an explanatory example to signify 
the existence of fragmentation in the EU’s perception-based energy policies and will  
explain possible variations in the consequences of the EU’s incapacity to act as a 
collective energy actor and reproduce its identity in relation to ‘the other’. The lack of 
cohesion in energy security policies allows this thesis to explore energy relations with 
Russia on the level of the EU MSs. 
A few authors attempted to establish relations between the level of coherence and 
effectiveness of actors’ actorness (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Thomas, 2012; 
Niemann and Bretherthon, 2013; Groel and Niemann, 2013; Delreux, 2014). They 
claimed that the EU can have limited coherence but still be an effectively functioning 
actor, underlying the variability in degrees of cohesion and effectiveness, because 
‘internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness to occur’ 
(da Conceiccao-Heldt, 2014: 991; Delreux, 2014). ‘Even when the preferences of the 
member states are heterogeneous, this is not necessarily a hurdle for the EU to be 
able to speak with a single voice’, as Delreux (2014: 1025) mentioned. However, while 
the ability of coherence to be translated into effectiveness might be the case in the EU 
environment policies17 (Groel and Niemann, 2013; Delreux, 2014: 1026), it is not the 
case in the controversial EU energy domain that is often driven by sovereign interests 
of states and national security. The EU energy policy can be successful only by being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The in-depth analysis of the strong and weak spectrum of the EU energy competences can 
be regarded as an area for future research. 
17  For instance, Delreux (2014: 1026) demonstrated on the example of the environment 
negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol and other environmental protocols that EU MSs were able to 
agree ’that quantitative targets for emissions reductions had to be included in the Protocol, but 
they disagreed on how strong these targets should be’. 
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united; otherwise the problem of EU energy security would not have been so acute on 
the EU agenda in the 2000s.  
As noted in the beginning of this section, internal coherence of the EU collective energy 
actorness is imperative for the EU to exert its influence abroad and pursue a successful 
energy security policy (Adler, 1997; Christiansen et. al., 1999; Roussau, 2006; 
Brotherten and Vogler, 2006). Energy is the area with the most controversial interests, 
where states are most likely to execute certain actions that will undermine EU’s 
effectiveness to act. So far, the relationships between the cohesion of the EU energy 
actorness and its effectiveness have not been empirically tested and lack substantial 
analysis in the literature, being poorly defined. In the constructivist terms of this thesis, 
it is the general coherence of the EU energy actorness based on shared interests and 
identity, which is significant for the analysis of the impasse in the EU-Russia energy 
relations. 
Therefore, in order not to further complicate this thesis, it will be held that the 
coherence of EU actorness and its effectiveness is directly proportionate to the level of 
EU energy security policy coherence and is undermined by the same set of factors. For 
instance, both cohesion and effectiveness in the energy domain are enabled or 
constrained by a range of external factors (such as the bargaining power or the impact 
of other important actors such as the US with rather different positions adversely 
impact on EU effectiveness in relations to Russia) and internal factors, like high degree 
of politicisation inside the EU that constrained the European Union’s ability to negotiate 
effectively (Groel and Niemann, 2013: 1).  
 
2.3. Copenhagen School of Security Studies: Beyond the Constructivist 
Boundaries 
Wendt’s constructivism created a trend for further study of the security processes, 
developed within the Copenhagen School of Security Studies 18 . The main 
representative of the Copenhagen School is Barry Buzan, who originates from the 
English School of IR and adds his constructivist ideas to the discussion of securitisation 
with his Danish colleagues (Ole Waever and Jaap De Wilde). During the last decade, 
the importance of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies in understanding of 
security has been increasing due to its references to the combination of realism and 
constructivism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Buzan (1991; 1998), Wilde (1998) and Waever (2003). 
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For instance, the realist dimension of the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998; 
Buzan and Waever, 2003: 44-46), would look at inter-state relations through centrality 
of material factors, geographical proximity of countries and power as the basis for inter-
state securitisation processes. It would encourage treatment of energy security issues 
in terms of the social capacity of actors to present energy supply as an existential 
threat, rather than nuanced and politicised understanding that a constructivist account 
allows. In addition, if the Copenhagen School was chosen as a key prism for analysis 
of EU-Russia energy interactions, it would produce different theoretical and conceptual 
benefits by addressing EU-Russia energy interdependent relations, threat perceptions 
of ‘friend and foe’, and the identities differently. Ontologically, the analysis would stem 
from territorial energy clusters (known as Regional Security Complexes) with threats 
travelling more easily over short distances. Thus through utilising Regional Security 
Complex Theory, the followers of the Copenhagen School like Kirchner and Berk (2010) 
were able to uncover the extent to which Russia and the EU are involved in conflicting 
or co-operating patterns of energy relations and how the EU Regional Security 
Complex transforms from fragmentation to feasible integration. Whilst this way of 
exploring energy security relations seems valid for studying mainly state-centric 
relationships and exploring close links between the members of the same complex with 
common securitisation/de-securitisation processes, it would be limited for the purposes 
of this research. It would leave little room for analysing the input of other non-state 
actors in threat creations (such as energy industries) and would be unlikely to reveal 
the constructivist substance of threat creation based on interests and identities, making 
no distinction between the effects of the domestic and external structural factors. The 
above confirms the weakness of the Copenhagen School realism-based approach in 
the analysis of threat perceptions (summarised limitations and conceptual gaps of the 
Copenhagen School are presented at the end of this section). 
However, while still partially adhering to the realist tradition of thought by denoting the 
threats to survival and a state-centred approach, the followers of the Copenhagen 
School of Security Studies adopt a largely constructivist perspective in presenting 
security and threats as referential practices (Buzan et al., 1998: vii; Buzan and Waever, 
2003: 4, 40-44; Buzan, 1991: 115). The conceptual importance of Barry Buzan’s works 
for this research lies in contributing to understanding the wider notion of security and 
security’s self-referential nature.  
The first value of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies is that it managed to 
transcend the constructed nature of security threats and broaden19 security studies into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 There exists another group of scholars which stands for deepening security studies to the 
level of individual (for instance, the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies mainly represented 
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sectors other than the military, illustrating that security threats can be observed in other 
non-exclusive sectors such as political, societal, economic and environmental (Krause 
and Williams, 1996; Buzan, 1991; Waever, 1995; Buzan et.al., 1998: 73; Buzan and 
Waever, 2003). The rationale behind the security sectors is to demonstrate that if 
security relates to an existential threat to survival, then ‘what constitutes an existential 
threat is not the same across different sectors’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 27).  
The same understanding of differentiating the constitution of threats is valid for energy 
domain that directly or indirectly cuts across all other sectors. Despite distinguishing 
four types of security, the Copenhagen School does not differentiate energy into a 
separate group. Instead, it locates energy threats within the economic cluster of threats 
as a security of supplies, with political underpinnings:  
The possibility that economic dependencies within the global market 
(particularly oil) will be exploited for political ends or, more broadly, 
questions of the security of the supply, when states abandoned the 
inefficient security of self-reliance for the efficient insecurity of 
dependence on outside sources of supply (Buzan et al., 1998: 98). 
Therefore, the above economic understanding of what constitutes a threat of energy 
dependence will differ, for example, from the environmental energy threat of climate 
change. The economic context of energy security threats is clearly relevant to the EU-
Russia relations, which are energy interdependent and bonded by export-import 
economic relationships. While the progress towards the EU’s common energy policy 
and the integrated energy market has been slow, there is a clear necessity for long-
term investment and security of supply systems (Buzan et al., 1998: 104). Given the 
EU’s role as a free market area committed to the pursuit of economic growth, and 
being heavily dependent on arguably unstable deliveries of gas from Russia, energy 
security undeniably becomes an utmost part of economic security for the EU. 
Since energy security is incorporated into several sectors should in theory indicate that 
energy-related threats do not have distinctive characteristic features. Energy threats do 
not meet ‘strictly defined criteria’ to be categorised as existential threats either, which 
‘distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 5; 
Waever, 1995: 54). The fact that security of supply does not represent a direct threat to 
survival makes application of energy security notion within this school indistinct. That is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by Booth, 2005 and others). Since the research does not explore the provision of human 
security with the individual and the society as referent objects, security will be mainly located at 
the level of state (with a few references to the state’s impact on energy companies). 
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why energy security cannot be adequately studied by the Copenhagen School and 
needs a more nuanced understanding within the constructivist theory.  
The second advantage of the Copenhagen School for constructivism is its definition of 
‘security’ and the interpretation of securitisation and politicisation processes. Thus 
‘security’ is understood as:  
a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue 
becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential 
threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 24).  
Attaching a certain value and meaning to security is vital as actors act and shape 
relations with others on the basis of what security means to them. A security threat 
does not have to be objective, but states may designate it as a security issue and 
accept the threat as being real. Such self-referential features of security possess 
substantial explanatory strength, since they allow the making of inferences from a 
variety of posited energy security threats and European perceptions.  
The procedure and the mechanism through which actors reach the status of a security 
threat is securitisation, that in constructivist terms, represents a ‘discursive practice’ in 
itself (Buzan and Waever, 2009). Barry Buzan argues that successful ‘securitisation’ 
should consist of three main steps: 1) identification of an existential threat (a 
securitising move – convincing the audience about the intention to tackle a problem 
and the necessity to act urgently); 2) emergency measures and effects on inter-unit 
relations by breaking free of rules; 3) attaching to a security issue an emergency 
priority, the issue is taken out of the domain of normal politics and the emergency 
actions are applied (Buzan et al., 1998: 25-26; Waever, 1995).  
The Copenhagen School articulates the importance of security as a political tool of 
attracting the attention of the population and delivering a message to the people 
(Buzan, 1991). Buzan et.al. (1998) conceptualise a ‘speech act’ as the way to articulate 
security, which involves language through which the security message is delivered. A 
target group or society subsequently recognises and authorises this speech act and 
believes that urgent measures required. Thus, ‘the subjective definition is not sufficient 
unless the understanding is inter-subjective’ and accepted by the audience (Rousseau, 
2006: 41). The acceptance of the speech act, in turn, provides the possibility and 
legitimisation for an actor to undertake particular policies and at times extraordinary 
measures, to ensure the protection of the object. Waver described the process as ‘by 
uttering ‘security’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific 
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area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block 
it’ (Waever, 1995: 55). Through the speech act, the Copenhagen School demonstrate 
that an issue can be constructed as a threat, rather than determining if the threat is real 
or imaginary. According to Waever (1995) securitisation has negative implications as 
the threat situation cannot be dealt with within ‘normal’ politics but has to be treated in 
the realm of ‘emergency politics’ or so-called ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). 
Securitisation has much more serious connotations than ‘politicisation’, as the latter 
presents the matter for political debate and ‘a part of public policy, requiring 
government decision and resource allocation’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). Politicisation lies 
within the realm of normal politics, when the negotiations about the issue is open to 
public discussion and political debate, a matter of choice, something that is yet to be 
decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility, in contrast to issues that either 
could not be different (laws of nature) or should not be put under political control 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Even though there is a distinction between the two terms, in 
practice distinguishing between them becomes more complicated. Simultaneously to 
having benefits for better constructivist understanding of energy security, the 
Copenhagen School also has weaknesses, as presented below. 
Whilst Copenhagen School followers seem to address some of fundamental security 
questions (like how to securitise or what successful conditions for securitisation should 
be) and grasp the constructivist definition of security, the school leaves some 
unanswered questions and has its limitations, to be explained in this section. There are 
still a few conceptual gaps in its securitisation analytical approach, specifically about 
the role of the audience and its relationship with the securitising actor, the choice of the 
issue for securitisation, the reasons and consequences of securitisation, and who is 
entitled to securitise (McDonald, 2008; Floyd, 2010; Balzacq, 2005; 2011). Some of the 
limitations prevent a comprehensive analysis of conditions underpinning the energy 
security concerns of the EU MSs as the securitising actors that should be more 
‘context-dependent, power-laden and audience-centred’ (Balzacq, 2005: 171).  
Firstly, for an actor to make references to energy security practices or securitisation 
processes, there should exist the perception of a threatening action from another state. 
According to the Copenhagen School, security issues should essentially represent an 
existential threat to state’s survival. However, in the current political environment a 
threat to survival and well-being is not inevitable in order to present something as a 
threat. The increasing variety and multi-dimensionality of energy related threats rather 
than simply the threat to survival and national security, mean that they serve a 
plausible ground for presenting themselves as a security issue without being 
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exceptionally existential (Stritzel, 2007; Booth, 2005). Looking beyond Buzan’s 
existential threats, it would seem that inter-state relations have moved to a different 
level, incorporating immaterial and more intricate grounds for insecurities than simply 
physicality of material supplies (Dyer and Trombetta, 2013). The amount of other 
important factors contributing to the feeling of insecurity is much larger and less 
obvious, which can include gas price disagreements between European energy 
companies and Gazprom, difficult contract negotiating processes, high level of import 
dependence on one source and the supplier of energy, mode of previous energy 
interplays, attitudes towards the identity of other actors and others. This makes the 
Copenhagen School definition of security issues too narrow for the analysis of 
European energy security. 
Secondly, the Copenhagen School aimed to theoretically distinguish between 
politicisation and securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24), hence in practical terms it is 
loose. Even if securitisation takes place, it is unclear how many incidents should 
happen before an issue can be regarded as a security issue. For something, in this 
case Russian energy supplies, to be presented as a threat, there should be a sufficient 
amount (in terms of quality and quantity) of plausible reasons or incidents related to the 
energy supplies from Russia. Larsson (2008: 262) encountered over 40 intangible 
energy supply threats and physical supply disruptions to the Baltic States and the ex-
Soviet Union countries from 1991 to 2008. The numerical list of energy disruptions from 
Gazprom can be expanded even more when accounting for years after 2008, adding 
up the gas interruptions to Ukraine in 2009, threat to cut the gas flow to Belarus in 2010 
and 2012, and supply interruptions to Poland and Italy in 2012. These are the most 
evident and calculable disruption incidents, when the actual amount of dedicated fuel 
was physically under delivered or terminated (mostly legitimised by technical faults, 
weather conditions or the breaking of contract obligations on the consumer’s side). 
Hence, it is the actor decides how much enough is enough, which makes the whole 
securitisation process very subjective. 
In addition, it is unclear how long should the process of securitisation last (since the 
reactionary urgent measures tend to be immediate and time constrained) before the 
energy issue becomes ‘public’ and ‘normal’ again. Due to securitisation presents an 
issue as a supreme priority and emergency requiring urgent measures, it is reasonable 
to think that this emergency situation will be relatively short and after dealing with 
negative consequences, the application of urgent measures will be stopped. Having no 
sufficient analytical guidance about the time limits for the securitising move, the thesis’ 
analysis would have needed to subjectively define how long the emergency energy 
situation lasts. For the last decade, the general line of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 
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and the development of gas relations stayed within the boundaries of ‘normal politics’. 
Only rare cases, mainly the Russian gas supply crisis of 2006 and 2009, could be 
considered as critical situations requiring urgent immediate decisions (like the energy 
diversification and redirection of gas flows from one EU MS to another). As Romanova 
(2010) stressed that after the 2009 crisis the Union tried to diminish its dependence on 
Russia and placed energy security issues  under the category of ‘panic politics’, hence 
it is unclear how long this condition should be imposed for. The empirical chapters will 
examine the European securitisation and politicisation practices in more details. 
Thirdly, the attachment of the Copenhagen School to the ‘speech act’ theory was 
criticised for simplicity, over-technicality, narrowness, shallowness and its limited 
capacity to analyse ‘real-world’ dynamics (Balzacq, 2005; McDonald, 2008; Stritzel, 
2007). The limit of the Copenhagen School lies in disregarding the role of the audience 
in the securitising move. The Copenhagen approach does not determine a persuasive 
or communicated way of pursuing the audience through the securitising move 
(including the speech act), and the audience’s acceptance of this move (for that see 
Balzacq (2011: 9-10) and Stritzel (2007: 363)). Similarly to Balzacq’s critiques, 
McDonald (2008) observes the construction of security beyond the Copenhagen 
School, arguing about the narrowness of the form of the speech act presented by a 
legitimate speaker as a form of representation (as it excludes other forms as images, 
etc.), context with the moment of intervention only and the nature of it in terms of the 
designation of threats to security. McDonald makes a pertinent distinction between ‘the 
construction of security and the narrower concern with the discursive positioning of 
threats’, suggesting that:  
the latter neglects the historical and social contexts in which designations 
of security and threat become possible, and the question of how 
particular voices within political communities are empowered or 
marginalized in speaking security (McDonald, 2008: 580).  
Lastly, by presenting an issue as a security problem in a given speech act, security ‘is 
done’ (Waever, 1995: 55). However, according to the critics, the speech act has 
constrained value, if no changes in the behaviour or the performance took place (Floyd, 
2010: 54). In other words, any given speech act is accompanied with a material reality 
with which it operates and which it changes. The triggered ultimate consequences and 
policy actions make security processes ‘performative’ (Balzacq, 2011: 1). In the EU’s 
approach to energy security, by announcing Russia to create energy threatening 
environment for some of the EU MSs with no particular security policies undertaken or 
legislative changes introduced, the speech act has little causal impact on the EU-
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Russia energy relations. Subsequently, through the constructive power of language the 
securitisation process could make explanatory case only if speaking security was 
accepted and followed by actions (Christiansen et.al., 1999: 235; Floyd, 2010).  
The above criticism of the Copenhagen School illustrates its limits in analysing energy 
security practices and threat perceptions. Despite trying to bridge realism and 
constructivism, the limitations of the Copenhagen School impede its utilisation as a key 
theoretical foundation for the analysis of energy threat perceptions. Likewise realism, 
those schools serve as a platform of departure for the constructivist research. 
 
2.4. Conclusion  
This chapter identifies the theoretical underpinnings and delineates the ontological 
boundaries of this research. On the one hand, this thesis recognises and accepts the 
added-value of realism in explaining the materialist nature of countries’ energy relations, 
mutually constitutive relations between structure and agents, security as an ultimate 
goal of stake-holders and its focus on actors’ perception-based policy-outcomes. It also 
acknowledges the importance of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies in 
providing a broad constructivist conceptualisation of security as a self-referential 
practice that should be inter-subjectively shared and the existence of politicisation and 
securitisation of energy issues. On the other hand, the research operates within the 
existing gap that is provided for the constructivist ideational understanding of threats 
and energy security, explaining why states construct threatening images (based on 
changeable endogenous interests that are derived from inter-state interactions and 
domestic policies rather than exogenously given), how they reproduce identities and 
construct energy behaviour in both material and ideational aspects. Stipulating from the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies, constructivism not only encourages 
considering a wider variety of threats and theoretically elaborates the securitisation and 
politicisation processes, but also provides an enhanced constructivist understanding of 
energy becoming a self-referential security issue per se. However, this thesis is not 
interested in the technical process of how something becomes and is accepted as an 
energy security threat (which the Copenhagen School focuses on in detail), but rather 
questions why it is happening in a certain country under particular circumstances.  
Constructivist immaterial theoretical perspectives allows us to understand and explore 
the differences in conditions and sources of threat creation in the EU MSs through the 
co-constitutive function of interests and identity and the previous history of interactions. 
By doing that, it facilitates a more profound explanation of the problems of EU-Russia 
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energy relations as a result of existing threat perceptions, and accounts for the 
negative implications they pose for the development of common energy approach in 
the EU relations with Russia.  
In addition to acknowledging that threat perceptions depend on interests and identities 
and the previous history of interactions, the current chapter problematised the nature of 
the EU’s identity as an energy actor. The theoretical operationalisation of EU energy 
actorness and its implications for the perceptions of Russia were highlighted. 
Understanding EU energy actorness provides an analytical insight into the four criteria 
of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) for characterising the coherence of the EU energy 
actorness (which is to be empirically scrutinised in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2.). The 
initially observed lack of EU cohesion in its internal and external collective energy 
approach and the unaccounted role of domestic factors of the EU MSs in 
understanding energy security threats justifies the methodological and analytical 
necessity to look at the energy stances of the EU MSs (case studies of Germany and 
Poland), rather than at the supranational EU level. 
In general, through references to security, politicisation and securitisation, and interests 
and identities as causal factors of perceptions, this chapter laid the foundations for 
developing the conceptual platform for analysing the tenets of energy security, 
vulnerability and threats. Consequently, the next chapter will introduce those specific 




Chapter 3. Analytical Approach to Energy Security and Threats 
There is little international consensus around the central conceptualisation of ‘security’ 
in the existing literature and even less so about ‘energy security’, as various theoretical 
schools bring a variety of values and understandings to the debate. During the second 
half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, the concept of energy security20 
has been refined, whilst evolving, improving and altering in its substance, meaning and 
theoretical application.  
In traditional positivist sense, the most popular academic debates about the notions of 
energy security and threats of the last century evolved within the school of IR. 
Following the logic of the previous theoretical chapter, the evident dominance of 
military, economic and geopolitical hard-power references to energy threats occurred 
within a broad IR school of realism and security studies, where energy security is 
‘saturated with the language of security’ (Ciuta, 2010: 124). While the former would 
treat energy in material terms as a strategic resource, instrument of power and physical 
necessity for a state-actor, framing energy security in terms of being a causal source or 
a weapon of conflict (Yergin, 1991; Baran, 2007; Smith, 2008; Klare, 2008; Cherp and 
Jewell, 2011; Aalto, 2012), security studies, being represented by the Copenhagen 
School of Security Studies (Buzan et.al., 1998; Waever, 1995), referred to energy 
security as the result of the political interpretation of threats through the theory of 
securitisation and relationships between referent objects, target audience and 
existential threats. According to Ciuta:  
both approaches have fixed definitions of security; as a result, they afford 
only a limited understanding of the effects security and energy exercise on 
each other, and in particular of the fact that the domain of energy 
produces mutations and multiplications of the meaning of security, not just 
the multiplication of threats, subjects and objects of security policy (Ciuta, 
2010: 125).   
Initially grounded in foreign policy and hard-power connotations and security language, 
the nature of the energy security and threat paradigms during the last two decades has 
been expanding and shifting from merely existential material threats towards a more 
specific ideational dimension. Ultimately, energy security has become more profound 
than simply being a consolidated part of a country’s national security as an existential 
threat or any other materialist threat. Consequently, framing energy security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Some of the scholars reject the existence of the energy security concept as such, calling it an 
‘elusive’ concept and ‘a myth’ (see Noel, P. 2008. Challenging the Myths of Energy Security. 
Financial Times. 10 January 2008.) 
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relationships within a specific singular theoretical perspective (like it used to be with 
realism in the 20th century) became too superficial and could result in a failure to 
capture the full essence of energy security interpretations in different contexts.  
The attempts to contextualise energy issues in pure realist military terms can lead to a 
mis-conceptualisation of energy security as a by-product of weapons development, 
which overlooks the wider complexities and nuances inherent in the field. For instance, 
the possession of nuclear materials in particular countries, such as Pakistan or North 
Korea, sends a message of an existential threat for other countries. In contrast, the 
shortage of gas or oil in Central and Eastern Europe is perceived as a non-military and 
non-existential threat to political or economic welfare. Depending on the nature of 
actions, the type of energy resource and the referent object, the conceptual 
connotations and interpretations of energy security can be different. Any efforts to 
amalgamate energy-related threats into one conceptual realist basket are therefore 
likely to result in confusion and over-simplification of this concept.   
The recent debates indicate that understanding of materialist interest-based 
dimensions of energy security and ‘threats’ are often complemented with a 
constructivist theoretical interrogation of ‘threat perceptions’. Whereas a ‘threat’ 
represents a perceived practice that is empirically discoverable and reveals cases of its 
referent object, a ‘threat perception’ is an abstract analytical concept that allows 
investigating and identifying empirical instances of perceived threat, using the 
conceptual tools to guide this investigation. Underlying the socially constructed, 
politicised and discursive nature of the energy security and threat concepts, the 
constructivist account understands their meanings as defined by countries’ discourses 
(being shaped by actors’ interests and identities), which can be explored in the 
empirical case studies. The political construction of threat perceptions is regarded as 
inter-subjective fears that result in actors’ perceptions-based policies, and provide 
explorable material conditions for those social constructs of threat perceptions. 
Constructivism allows the thesis not only to go beyond the understandings of solely 
material energy threats to survival and economic risks associated with energy supplies, 
but accounts for the complexity and multi-dimensionality of energy security 
conceptualisation by providing substantive analytical tools for exploring the 
construction of energy threat perceptions in the EU-Russia domain (Chester, 2010: 40; 
Zeniewski et al., 2013). The ambiguities and discrepancies in understanding energy 
security threats among scholars, especially when applying them to the EU-Russia gas 
relations, justify the need for theoretically defining and analytically operationalising the 
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concepts of ‘energy security’ and ‘threat perceptions’ in practice through the empirical 
case studies.  
Emphasising the constructivist standpoint regarding key concepts created by state-
actors, interpretivism allows the researcher to discover how actors define and perceive 
energy security threats (which were constructed by them) by pursuing an empirical 
exercise with a flexible conceptual framework, rather than imposing external constructs 
on states’ perceptions. Through gathering needed evidence from the interview 
responses and the document analysis, it is possible to operationalise energy security 
and threat perceptions of Poland and Germany by disclosing meanings attached by the 
actors. 
Therefore, this section links a constructivist theoretical approach with the particular 
conceptual understanding of the terms ‘energy security’ and ‘threat perceptions’. The 
previous theory chapter has already indicated that interests and identities are the main 
socially constructed determinants of states’ behaviour, on which judgments and threat 
perceptions rest. In this way, interests and identities have already analytically enriched 
understandings of threat perception phenomena by demonstrating a clear causal effect 
on energy threat perceptions, making the latter constructed and a matter of 
interpretation. To complement the comprehension of EU-Russia energy security 
relations and European threat perceptions this chapter needs to define additional 
analytical categories of energy security, energy threat and energy vulnerability. The 
choice of those notions stem from the understanding that ‘the dynamics […] of security 
arise from the interplay of the threats and vulnerabilities’ (Buzan et al., 1990: 3).  
Most of the above categories are used in security studies, but remain ambiguous, 
poorly defined and have little analytical potential in constructivist literature. The nature 
of energy security and threat perceptions remains under-theorised and empirically 
under-explored. This chapter explains new energy security narratives about countries’ 
perceptions of threats and outlines specific meanings of energy security and energy 
threat perceptions, coherently applying those elements to European understanding of 
energy security. Only systematic application of the aforementioned concepts, once 
properly defined, to the specific case studies, can ultimately provide an insight into the 
source of energy problems and implications for the development of EU-Russia energy 
relations for the last decade. Therefore, this section confirms the centrality of threat 
perceptions as a prime operational concept to understand energy security, which EU-
Russia relations are driven by. The evidence of threat perceptions will derive from the 




3.1. Conceptual Definition of ‘Energy Security’ 
Similarly to the general notion of security that has been described by Gallie (1956: 167) 
as an ‘essentially contested concept’, identification of energy security threat remains 
problematic due to its broadened and deepened variety of transcended meanings and 
origins in the last decades. Energy security remains a multi-layered, complex and 
dynamic concept, which provides enormous potential for multiplicity of cross-theoretical 
and conceptually intersecting scholarly debate. There exist a number of attempts to 
define ‘energy security’ in the literature. Sovacool (2011) for instance, encountered no 
fewer than 45 overlapping definitions of energy security, developing around the 
emergence of new energy challenges and a diversity and commonality of 
characteristics that energy security acquires. Fundamentally, most of the definitions of 
energy security are concentrated around the type of energy (security of gas, oil, 
nuclear, coal, etc.), time scope for energy threats (short-term, medium-term and long-
term security), the securitising actor or the referent object (security of energy demand 
for the producer and the security of energy supply for the consumer) and the level of 
analysis (global, national, company’s and individuals’ energy security). 
Despite the abundance of the existing energy discussions, there is neither widely 
accepted, over-dominant or integrated definition of energy security and nor the 
conceptual clarity of the nature of energy security so far (Haghighi, 2007; Chester, 
2010; Sovacool, 2011). Ciuta (2010: 123, 127) claims that ‘energy security has 
received remarkably little conceptual attention, despite an abundant literature in which 
various meanings of the term proliferate, together with a copious proxy terminology’, 
being undermined by a variety of ‘frequent terminological substitutions’, ‘categorical 
controversies’ and ambiguity. Imprecise references and terminological transpositions 
often occur within the realist references, where energy is subsumed as oil and security 
is equated to geopolitics (Ciuta, 2010: 127, 131).    
The absence of analysis of the relationships between energy and security and lack of 
consensus about providing ‘precise categorical and political boundaries to delineate 
energy security’ (Ciuta, 2010: 127) provides scope for endless debate by scholars and 
practitioners. Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) defines energy security 
as an ‘umbrella term’ that covers many economic and political issues: security of 
infrastructure, supply diversity, price, investment regime, security margin and revenue, 
security of supply, access to new reserves, energy as a weapon and risks of terrorism 
and war. Those issues, linking energy, political power and economic growth, are 
important to the suppliers and consumers of energy resources in multiple ways (CERA, 
2006: 8-9). As Aalto and Korkmaz Temel noted: 
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energy security is not a narrow or sectoral policy domain as it extends from 
natural resources and transport to the functioning of markets, and further to 
institutional regulation and co-ordination, diplomacy and indeed to the 
associated environmental consequences...Energy security is a genuinely 
cross-sectoral (Aalto and Korkmaz Temel, 2014: 760). 
Cherp and Jewell (2011; 2014) embarked on identifying the conceptual meaning of 
energy security concept from different angles. Thus, in 2011 they organised the 
scholarly discourses on energy security into three distinct perspectives: ‘the 
‘sovereignty’ perspective with its roots in political science; the ‘robustness’ perspective 
with its roots in natural science and engineering; and the ‘resilience’ perspective with its 
roots in economics and complex systems analysis’ (Cherp and Jewell, 2011: 5-6). All 
three perspectives are intertwined with overlapping energy threats and security 
concerns, such as ‘political embargoes’, ‘malevolent exercise of market power’, 
‘regulatory changes’, ‘energy market volatility’, ‘failures of energy infrastructure’, 
‘demand outgrowing supply’. In 2014 Jewell and Cherp (2014) tried to induce 
coherence of the concept of energy security with the content of ‘4As’ conception - 
availability, affordability, acceptability and accessibility. However, they managed only to 
summarise ‘developments from the emerging science of energy security’ rather than 
clarifying what constitutes this complex, multi-faced and dynamic political concept, 
which depends on political constructs and has ‘different meanings in different contexts 
and for different actors’ (Jewell and Cherp, 2014: 420). Monaghan confirms that: 
defining energy security is […] complicated by the variety of views of 
what is at stake. To some it means protecting against politically induced 
supply disruptions or technically induced supply problems, to others it is 
facing the challenges of terrorism, and to yet others, it means addressing 
the issue of global warming by changing consumption patterns 
(Monaghan, 2005: 2).  
According to Stern (2008) contemporary policymakers are so deeply involved in 
practical energy security issues and implications that they have even lost their focus on 
the meaning of the term. By attaching a specific meaning to the notion of energy 
security in political discussions and negotiations would considerably improve the 
efficiency in dealing with an increasing range of energy security issues.  
However the aim of this interpretative-based research is neither to create an objective 
definition of energy security nor to conceptualise the exact relationships between 
energy and security. Neither the goal is to come up with a workable framework to 
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analyse and quantifiably measure energy security. Rather by outlining the variety of 
meanings, this section aims to emphasise that any attempts of conceptualise energy 
security in generic terms will fail, unless energy security is connected to specific actor 
and context. The significance of the arbitrarily chosen range of energy security 
definitions is limited, unless applied to a particular case study and specific 
circumstances (Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Ciuta, 2010: 124). By empirical application 
of energy security to the EU’s conceptualisation in Section 3.3. will allow to discover the 
socially constructed nature of energy security and reveal new features, presenting the 
empirical underpinnings for deepening and expanding the conceptual meaning of 
energy security as such. 
 
3.2. Understanding the Basis of a ‘Threat’ 
Similar to the concept of security, a threat conceptualisation has been at the core of 
security studies and international relations, frequently used by realists, game-theorists 
and other positivists in relation to hard-power, political and military issues (especially 
during the Cold War). A very basic understanding of a threat is associated with a 
situation when one actor has a capacity or intention to harm or produce negative 
outcome for another actor. According to the Global Energy Assessment report (2012) 
threats include intentions to harm (that is a very popular IR perspective), uncertainty 
(due to the lack of full and credible information) and probability (based on tentative 
forecasts). Threat perceptions derive from concerns that arise about the described 
above (GEA, 2012). 
Trying to avoid major realist geopolitical implications, some authors and policy-makers 
substitute the conception of ‘threat’ with ‘risk’ (Gullner, 2008; GEA, 2012), endowing it 
with economic and market features (Mitchell, 2009; Baumann, 2008: 6). Since energy 
is largely attributed to both political and the economic dimensions of security (Buzan 
and Waever, 2003) the research can refer to energy ‘risks’ while discussing 
perceptions over economically grounded issues (like energy market investments, profit 
loss, etc.), and ‘threats’ while referring to politically constructed perceptions of the 
probability of loss and occurring costs for the country. In principle, they are two sides of 
the same coin as both share adverse connotations and produce a negative anticipation 
of unfavourable outcomes for actors. The only visible difference between the two is the 
possibility of quantitatively calculating and measuring economic energy risks as 
opposed to qualitative theoretical definitions of energy threats in politics. Hence, one 
thing should be emphasised, that the nature of energy threat is hardly tangible and can 
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be assessed only based on previous experiences, practices and interactions. Therefore, 
taking into account that energy security is both economically and politically grounded, 
both notions of ‘threats’ and ‘risks’ can be used interchangeably if applied to energy 
security discourse.   
Likewise with the conceptualisation of energy security, there is no agreed upon and 
overarching definition of threat or threat typology. The concept of energy security 
cannot list all possible threats and vulnerabilities (Jewell and Cherp, 2014: 418), 
including material and ideational threats. Threats may vary depending on their type, 
origin, level of analysis, referent object, intensity with which a threat operates and other 
factors (Buzan, 1991: 134; Sovacool and Brown, 2010; Cherp and Jewell, 2011). The 
EU studies literature on energy threat typology resembles the classification of energy 
security and varies from author to author, depending on a threat nature, its value and 
who poses it (Jewell and Cherp, 2014). The conceptual understanding of security 
relations between countries can include the identification of a threatening actor, the 
referent object, intention to harm and arguably measurable capacity to pursue harmful 
actions (Daase, 2007). For example, Mitchell (2009: 3) presents a multidimensional 
typology of energy risks: 1) geological risks, connected with the exhaustion of energy 
sources; 2) political concerns about the interruption of deliveries because of deliberate 
policies of disruptions, wars, and terrorism; 3) economic risks related to price 
fluctuations due to the increasing gap between demand and supply; 4) environmental 
risks due to accidents and CO2 emissions. Hence, the author recognises that the 
‘combination of risks affecting EU energy supply, their possible causes and impacts, as 
well as their duration and future probability is different from sector to sector’ (Mitchell, 
2009: 4). Baumann (2008) and Mankoff (2009) distinguish between internal and 
external energy security risks. External energy security risks are related to involvement 
of third parties and associated with import dependence on energy suppliers and 
transiting non-EU states, disruptions of gas flows, upstream production and cross-
border transit issues. Internal energy security risks are commonly connected with 
domestic downstream infrastructure, uncertainties about the continuity of domestic 
European energy demand and local energy market instability. 
The underlining features of the threat-categorisation above demonstrate that there 
exists a broad-spectrum of energy uncertainties, irrespective their origin and what they 
imply. The last few decades illustrated the transformation of the nature of the threat-
paradigm, from being ‘direct, intended and calculable’ to becoming ‘indirect, unintended 
and incalculable’ (Daase, 2007: 4). The shift can be translated in the transition of 
material understandings of threat into ideational dimension of perceptions. There is little 
objectivity to identifying a threat as a matter of the perception of the intention to harm, 
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which is rather probabilistic and subjective that may be real or not. Jervis characterised 
perceptions as ‘automatic and not under conscious control’, being an ultimate aspect of 
decision-making process (Jervis, 1978: 10). In other words, the perception of a threat 
can be affected by a number of subjective features, among which are the availability of 
reliable information and knowledge, the historical experience of previous interactions, 
political and public discourses, and the divergence of cultural factors, norm and values.  
Both realism and the Copenhagen School presented security politics as a linier process 
in merely reactionary terms, meaning that securitisation and a response to a threat 
takes place only once a threat has been identified and assessed (Schweller, 2004; 
McDonald, 2008). Most political analysis is focused on the last stage of the responsive 
reaction to a threat, often underrating and misinterpreting the stages of threat creation, 
detection and assessment. This research encounters not only perception-based energy 
policies as a responsive reaction of the EU and its MSs, but through constructivist 
premises explores threat identification and threat creation (meaning threat perceptions). 
According to Kitchen (2010: 133), ‘the response as understood through the prism of 
ideas can then account for both overreaction and underreaction, as well as for the 
pursuit of goals unrelated to the notion of threat’. Those different approaches are 
related to threat assessment, when actors evaluate their vulnerability in terms of the 
scale and imminence of a threat. The importance of Schweller’s (2004) and Kitchen’s 
(2010) findings in this respect lies in bringing to the surface a frequent political dilemma 
that states can misinterpret and overestimate the extent of Russian energy threat to 
their energy security. Not every threat perception can be a part of an accurate and 
genuinely subjective process, depending on intentional or unintentional ideas of policy-
makers. For example, countries might present threats as such for justifying their 
political goals. Jervis (1976: 382, 406) notes that when a party wants to act in a 
particular way, it might need to justify its behaviour by creating a threat. For instance, 
Russia can be presented as an external energy threat (not necessarily a real one) that 
triggers the justification of the EU’s intentions of dealing with it collectively through the 
centrally introduced internal and external energy policies. However, it is for the case 
studies and empirical data to illustrate which energy threats trigger actor’s perception-
based reaction, as the subject for the securitisation is likely to be different, depending 
on which actor securitises what aspect of energy security. Only putting in context can 
explain how threats are constructed and what implications energy security threats have 
for the EU and its MSs relations with Russia. 
In conclusion, the fact that neither universal hierarchy in the underpinnings of threat that 
would vary from case to case, nor clear definition of energy threat exist, allowing for a 
variety of threat perceptions, which in turn triggers misunderstanding about energy 
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security among different actors. Since this thesis focuses on the European angle of 
studying energy threat perceptions, the next Section 3.3. provides an understanding of 
EU’s definition of the energy security, on which the perceptions are grounded.  
 
3.3. Understanding of Energy Security and Threats in the EU-Russia Nexus  
On the EU-Russia level of analysis the energy security should be characterised from 
the perspective of security of what (meaning a type of supplied fuel) and security for 
whom (meaning the referent object or the securitising country), as Jewell and Cherp 
put it (2014). Regarding the type of fuel, natural gas is the most frequently mentioned 
resource in the EU’s energy security discourse. Section 1.2. of the Introduction chapter 
of this thesis, has already provided an extensive outlook of why gas is predominantly 
the focus of attention in this thesis. Therefore energy security can be narrowed down to 
gas security. From the referent object point of view, the conception of energy security 
should be different for the energy producer and the consumer. While the security of 
demand for the producer will be explored briefly in Chapter 5, this research adheres to 
the European definition of energy security, with the precise focus on security of gas 
supplies. For the EU, the general identification of security of energy supply stands as 
‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (European 
Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b). Section 5.4.2. of this thesis will divide the above 
definition, accepted by the EU Commission, into two analytical parts - physical security 
of supply and price security. This will serve the basis and the point of reference in 
analysing energy threat perceptions for the EU and its MSs in relations with Russia.   
In general, European energy supply concerns include a wide range of issues that 
contribute to perceptions of an energy supply threat. Among those are high energy 
import dependence, technological supply failure, transit dependence, increasing global 
competition for gas, energy supply incidents, political blackmail, price hikes, 
underinvestment, regulatory changes, terrorist attacks, export restrictions, the 
vulnerability of consumer’s bargaining position during contract negotiations and others 
(Mitchell, 2009; Stern, 2002; Yafimava, 2011; Goldthau and Sitter, 2015a). Those 
aspects of European supply security can be classified into material security of supply 
that include structural questions of EU’s domestic energy sector and physical energy 
dependence of actual gas deliveries and non-material security of supply that arise from 
unpredictability and perceptions of growing dependence on the external gas supplies 
from politically unstable suppliers. The latter is shaped by the ideational dimension of 
threat perceptions and has an inevitable impact on relations between the EU and 
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Russia. However, not all of those issues are equally important for individual EU MSs 
and the above definition should not be generally treated. Chapters 6 and 7 will 
empirically tackle variations in understanding of energy threats for Poland and 
Germany individually, based on the nature of their energy interests and identities. 
In order to understand why threat perceptions are important in the EU-Russia energy 
impasse, it is essential to explain the causal impact of threat perceptions on inter-state 
energy relations in general. As was highlighted previously (in Chapter 1), EU MSs’ 
threat perceptions in the EU-Russia energy domain originate from a variety of material 
and ideational sources, broadly including Russia’s foreign energy policy approach, 
EU’s growing reliance on gas imports and the new energy gas market regulations that 
are imposed on MSs, geopolitical, economic and energy circumstances of each 
individual EU MS, and the formation of the EU MSs’ energy interests and value-based 
identities. A variety of those material factors and path-dependent negative experiences 
of previous interactions with Russia have a causal impact on countries’ threat 
perceptions, leading to negative expectations and the anticipation of adverse outcomes, 
forming prejudices and stereotypes. Linking it to the constructivist’s premises about the 
importance of the amount and the quality of previous energy interactions, provides a 
theoretical explanation for how threats and prejudices affect attitudes towards another 
country. The more negative contacts the state has had in the past, the more likely 
those states will have grounds for trepidations and perceived threats in the future.  
The causal link exists between threats that form perceptions, prejudices and negative 
attitudes that undermine EU-Russia energy relations and lead to particular energy 
security policies. Prejudices underpin almost all the political categories, playing ‘an 
increasingly large and legitimate role in the political, public arena’ (Arendt, 2005: 151), 
which leads to the creation of the ideology, worldview, attitudes and negative 
perceptions. Since prejudices are almost ‘always anchored in the past’ (Arendt, 2005: 
101), it makes the history of the EU MSs and Russia’s energy relationships vital. 
Threats from the past might be projected to the future, providing grounds for subjective 
attitudes and inaccurate perceptions, instigating further deeper conflict. For example, 
the episodes of gas supply disruptions from Russia for a variety of reasons accumulate 
anticipations of the countries that have already suffered from those before and spill-
over to other states in a form of possible negative expectations. Running ahead, the 
empirical examples of how and why threats are shaped is best shown in the case of 
Poland, where attitudes and perceptions of Russia seem to produce sensitive and 
prejudice-based reaction about energy security threats (which derive from both foreign 
policy and energy past relations). Consequently, this research demonstrates the 
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vicious circle of threat constructions in EU-Russia political, economic and energy 
relations.  
 
3.4. Categories of Energy Sensitivity and Vulnerability 
Energy security features on a state’s agenda if there is an issue of insecurity and the 
state ‘feels’ vulnerable. Being connected through economic producer-consumer ties, 
the EU and Russia are heavily energy interdependent in the politically sensitive energy 
market. This section illustrates underpinnings of energy insecurity that is based on the 
probability of material and immaterial costs of changing relationships between mutually 
dependent Russia and the EU.  
Energy interdependence might play a positive role for the actors involved, by uniting 
countries with different identities and interests, or it can have a negative role in 
perpetuating risks, apprehensions and mistrust. In both ways interdependence involves 
material and non-material ‘costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy; but it is 
impossible to specify a-priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed the 
costs’ (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 9). The ways in which countries view and deal with the 
costs of interdependence affect the mode of relationships with others. Energy 
interdependence between Russia and the EU has so far demonstrated a conflicting 
nature of interactions, creating confrontational situations for stakeholders. Specifically, 
the EU’s problematic energy ‘actorness’ and the asymmetric energy import 
dependence of its MSs on Russian gas supplies produce an uneven distribution of 
benefits and costs for different EU MSs. Such uneven distribution makes the insecurity 
of countries to external and internal shocks vary. Energy insecurity characterised by 
the IEA occur due to economic energy dependence on Russian gas supplies and the 
‘unprecedented uncertainty’ of world energy markets (IEA, 2010). Triggered by the 
energy policy of EU MSs and the actions of the government of Russia, regulatory 
changes related to market functioning and unpredictable energy policies among other 
factors underwrite energy uncertainties (to be explored in the following chapters). 
There exist various degrees of energy insecurities that will define a country’s threat 
perceptions towards Russia’s energy stance. The energy security of EU MSs can be 
observed on the basis of the ‘feeling’ of sensitivity or vulnerability towards energy 
threats that are cost-related. Sensitivity is associated with a country’s responsiveness 
and ability to adapt to changes in other states, and relative costliness of the response 
to these changes and available alternative solutions (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 11). 
Keohane and Nye (2001) relate the sensitivity-vulnerability nexus to the immediacy and 
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the intensity of costs. Sensitivity evolves during the ‘interactions within a framework of 
policies, when the state suffers from negative consequences of others ‘before policies 
are altered to try to change the situation’, whereas vulnerability applies ‘even after 
policies have been altered’ (Keohane and Nye, 2001: 12-13). Vulnerability is the ability 
to compensate the evolved costs and to adjust to the outside change or external 
circumstances. That means that vulnerability is time dependent as the repercussions 
appear after the event has happened.  
Technically, sensitivity is a lower degree of vulnerability and its logical precondition, 
followed by the feeling of being threatened. Different EU MSs might be sensitive to 
Russia’s energy policies, but not inevitably feel vulnerable or threatened (as 
vulnerability would mean no alternative or the escape route). Therefore, since the early 
2000s the EU MSs have been sensitive to a range of security issues such as world 
energy price fluctuations, a decrease in the world production output, an increased 
competition for demand and growing European import dependence on Russian gas 
supplies. Sensitivity seemed to trigger politicisation of the energy issue and brought the 
issue to political discussion in the public domain (for instance, through the framework of 
the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue). Having enough time for making political choices, 
calculate the costs of alternative decisions and being able to adjust to the routinely 
changing environment allowed the EU MSs to retain in the energy sensitive 
environment, with no major crisis-solving mechanisms being needed.  
In the aftermath of several episodes of gas disruptions, the EU had to adjust its 
European energy policies to deal with the lack of viable alternatives to Russian 
supplies and cost of the disruption consequences. For instance, after 2009 gas crisis 
the EU introduced the EU-Russia Early Warning Mechanism that was aimed for threat 
evaluation and prediction. The EU also started to vigorously sponsor and build costly 
interconnectors between the EU MSs (which might or might not be used during 
possible episodes of the supply disruptions) to enhance the internal security of the EU 
common energy market. At the meantime, the EU MSs activated the search for 
different non-Russian energy routes (like Nabucco-West pipeline from Azerbaijan, 
Trans-Adriatic pipeline from Turkey or Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline from Turkmenistan) 
and energy sources (shale gas, nuclear and renewable energy). The securitisation of 
energy (or panic-politics as Waever (1995) would refer to it) resulted from vulnerability 
and an immediate responsive reaction to the peak of energy supply crisis with Russia 
in 2009. Those are only several examples, providing a brief outlook of the EU policy 
steps as a reaction to occurred energy supply threats and prevention of the others. 
Since the perception of a country’s energy vulnerability is actor-dependent and context-
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dependent, a more profound analysis on the EU and its MSs trying to deal with energy 
vulnerability will be presented in further chapters.  
If for Nye and Koheane (2001) the intensity of vulnerability depends on the costs of 
adjusting to changes, then for Buzan (1991: 112-116) vulnerability is related to the 
relative capabilities of states. The vulnerability of being manipulated can be eliminated 
if the country is more commercially stable or has some kind of counter-leverage. For 
instance, transiting states have a mechanism of transiting fees that can be raised in 
case of price hikes, or the country-consumer has an important resource and 
technological advancement that the supplier is in need. Such ‘threat-free’ mutually 
dependent balance might be preserved for a long time, unless crisis happens 
(Mascotto, 2010). Thus, the most damaging crisis of gas flow termination to Europe in 
2009 was a turning point when energy supply security escalated to the highest degree, 
showing vulnerability of some of the EU MSs more than others and breaking the 
interdependence balance with Russia on the EU MSs’ level.  
Thus vulnerability is illustrated as being external to the actor and often the feeling 
relates to other actors. In the situation of interdependence, the parties can be 
asymmetrically dependent on each other. Larsson (2007b) highlights that if the supplier 
and consumer are radically different politically and economically the more vulnerable a 
country feels. In other words, if gas supply is the subject of manipulation and disruption 
due to embargoes, political decisions, wars, terrorism or other unforeseen events, and 
if the commodity has no other substitutive alternatives in a country-consumer (2007b: 
68) then this all contributes to a feeling of vulnerability within the country-consumer. 
The EU-Russia imbalance of interdependence based on asymmetric relationships 
between the producer and the consumer and the implications of EU’s energy import 
dependence specifically will be explored in Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1. 
However, it still remains unclear from Nye and Keohane’s approach whether states 
individually define the borderline between these two positions (making the 
vulnerability/sensitivity conceptions relative and subjective) or whether they do it in 
relation to the changes that simultaneously happen at the structural level. Crescenzi 
(2005: 28) points out the weakness of Nye and Keohane’s distinction, claiming that 
without understanding the conditions that produce the adjustment costs it is difficult to 
identify vulnerability systematically.  
In general, the definitional distinction of European energy insecurity in the sensitivity 
and vulnerability debate in this section served the purpose to understand how and why 
a country might perceive threats in the interdependent energy relationships. It 
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explained that the degree of the feeling of insecurity is affected by the turning points in 
the EU-Russia energy relations. Through demonstrating the connection between the 
feeling of sensitivity leading to the energy politicisation and the feeling of vulnerability 
leading to energy securitisation, this section is able to affirm that changes in the 
feelings of sensitivity to vulnerability correspond to the shift in the EU energy security 
debate.  
Notwithstanding, the EU-Russia energy security interdependent relations are 
underpinned not only by the definitional distinction between the degree of sensitivity or 
vulnerability, but also the conceptual understanding of those terms. Nevertheless, the 
elaborate conceptual sensitivity/vulnerability debate offers little added value to this 
particular research. The reasons for this are, firstly, regardless of the degrees of costs 
or available alternatives, a country might be sensitive or vulnerable for many other 
reasons (such as experience of previous negative patterns of interactions, or deliberate 
presentation of itself as being vulnerable in reaching certain political goals, etc.). 
Secondly, the circumstances of energy vulnerability are not necessarily external, that is, 
caused by detrimental actions of another state. It can be internal to the actor’s identity 
and interests (depending on the level of energy security ‘at home’, domestic market 
policies, governmental support of energy markets or other internal factors). Finally, the 
country will have some kind of threat perceptions in both dimensions of sensitivity and 
vulnerability if it feels that it is unable to control and deal with energy related difficulties 
and adverse energy events, regardless of the nature of origin of the costs. Since the 
research is not aimed to objectively calculate the costs of changing energy 
circumstances in interdependent relations or to economically measure the level of 
energy vulnerability, this thesis amalgamates various degrees of vulnerability and 
sensitivity feelings into general sense of insecurity. Insecurity will be empirically 
scrutinised in each individual case study of Poland and Germany on the basis of 
changing internal and external energy circumstances during 2004-2012. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Relying on constructivist theoretical inferences, this chapter explored the most 
significant analytical conceptions of energy security, threats and vulnerability, which are 
all essential components of the broader threat perception phenomenon.  
Firstly, drawing on the diversity of approaches to study security, this chapter reached 
its aim to convey the lack of conceptual clarity about the notions of energy security and 
energy threat, explicating their intricacy, multi-dimensionality, subjectivity and 
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complexity. As a result of conceptual analysis, this section emphasised the necessity 
for contextualising energy security and ‘drawing credible boundaries of the field, 
formulating credible research questions and developing a methodological toolkit’ to 
study energy threats (Cherp and Jewell, 2011: 1). This was completed on the example 
of the EU by conceptualising the energy security in terms of the European security of 
gas supply that should be uninterrupted, available and at an affordable price (European 
Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b), which will be further empirically explored in Section 
5.4.2. This narrowed perspective of threats to European security of energy supplies 
seem to be directly related to gas dependence on other actors that lead or can lead to 
negative political and economic policy outcomes for EU MSs. However, this section 
demonstrated the need to explore how individual EU MSs understand energy security 
challenges within the above European general definition. As different elements of 
availability, affordability and price might matter different things for various EU countries. 
By clarifying that only by attaching the meaning of ‘security of what’ and ‘security for 
whom’ this thesis can succeed in identifying new subjective and politically constructed 
features of energy security and opportunities to develop areas that have often been 
under-examined and overlooked in the conventional security literature (like the 
constructed basis for threat perceptions and their implications for inter-state 
relationships).  
Secondly, recognising the interdependence between Russia and the EU, the chapter 
embarked on the explanation of energy vulnerability that is based on the costs of 
country’s role in the interdependent relationships. In other words, exploring energy 
security and threat perceptions is hard without comprehending why the country feels 
vulnerable in relation to its interdependent counterpart. By acknowledging that the 
feeling of insecurity is situational, time-defined and agency-dependent, closely related 
to policy choices that states are eager to make, vulnerability should be understood 
through the lenses of actor’s subjective perceptions. In a nutshell, even if energy 
security can be clearly contextualised and applied to the case studies, it does not 
eliminate politically constructed nature of threat perceptions that needs to be 
empirically studied in every individual case.  
Thirdly, inter-state relationships might become conflicting and provocative, when 
countries are making subjectively grounded choices and implementing them in policies. 
According to constructivist tenets, energy security issues evolve through discursive 
politics and have a self-referential nature. Frequently the process of threat identification 
as a security issue ‘is a matter of political choice rather than objective fact’ (Buzan, 
1991: 115). The subjectivity element is at the core of energy threat perception analysis, 
since the identification of threats is not impartial. The purpose of this chapter was to 
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demonstrate the politically constructed nature of the key conceptual elements of the 
analytical approach, and to show that some threats can have a real basis in essential 
characteristics of vulnerability, while some might be construct exaggerated, 
misperceived or based on prejudicial attitudes. Regardless, both kinds of threats 
negatively affect the relations between the countries and provoke European threat 
perception-based responses to Russian energy behaviour (like steps for securitisation). 
If interests and identity, the feeling of vulnerability and the security policies at large 
constitute threat perceptions, then threats have been proven to have a capacity to 
trigger prejudices, negative attitudes and as a result – conflicts (Roussau, 2007; 
Dovidio et. al., 2009).  
To conclude, comprehension of energy security in the EU embodies a variety of 
features and interlinked explanations. The amount of controversy amongst the actors 
regarding how to define energy security might be related to the fact that ‘energy itself is 
a politicised and multifaceted concept’ (Sovacool, 2011: 6). Since there is no universal 
understanding of what energy security or threats entail, countries conceptualise those 
differently, making energy security and threat perceptions be a subject to interpretation. 
Thus the definition of energy security has constructivist connotations of being attributed 
to the perceptions of energy threats of each individual actor in each particular 
circumstance. Consequently, examining the sufficient conditions to present a gas 
supply as a security threat in the empirical cases of Poland and Germany will explain 
further how energy security can be understood, interpreted and exploited (as opposed 
to measured with the range of econometric indicators and indexes like many scholars 




Chapter 4.  Methodology and Methods 
Following from the above theoretical setting and analytical framework, the appropriate 
methodological underpinnings guiding the thesis are to be noted in this chapter. The 
previous theoretical chapter demonstrated that the thesis relies on the constructivist 
approach, which argues for the inter-subjective understandings of social phenomenon 
that creates identities and shapes actions (Wendt, 1999; Adler and Barnett, 1998; 
Checkel, 1998; Zehfuss, 2002). Constructivism rejects fixed relationships within the 
phenomena and favours the social construction of reality, unveiling the creation of 
intangible practices (like threat perceptions) and demonstrating how these meanings 
produce detectable energy policies. Together with the theoretical foundations of the EU 
actorness, the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 highlighted the conceptual 
elements selected to understand European energy security and threat perceptions. 
This, in turn, affected the choice of methodological approach, but also helped to shape 
the focus to data collection and analysis. 
Determined by specific research questions of this thesis and underlying setting of 
constructivist theoretical assumptions, this chapter explains the case study qualitative 
methodology based on the interpretativist approach that looks at constitutive and 
causal explanations of reality (Stake, 1995; Tellis, 1997; Neuman, 1997; Klein and 
Myers, 1999; Flick, 2002; Andrade, 2009). The case studies of Germany and Poland 
are expected to grasp the multidimensionality,  ‘particularity and complexity’ of the 
European Union’s construction as an energy actor (Stake, 1995) and capture the 
‘nature’ of the perplexing EU-Russia energy phenomenon (Yin, 2009). The chosen 
interpretative epistemological stance accounts for the socially constructed reality on the 
basis of meanings that actors attach to it (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Yanow, 2003: 
11). The constitutive and causal nature of constructivism will allow accounting for the 
subjectivity of the socially constructed energy threats and enable understanding of how 
the meanings of energy security are shaped in the EU and result in threat-based policy 
outcomes (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998; Andrade, 2009).  
The case study method allows for the combination of various sources and techniques 
of data collection (Stake, 1995). In this respect, the research is informed by data 
collected mainly from semi-structured political elite in-depth interviews and 
supplemented with a range of primary and secondary documentary sources21. Such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 By primary sources, the research will understand as original and firsthand research (like 
interviews, EU documents, political statements, etc.), and by secondary – resource that provide 
‘expert compilations, analyses, and interpretations of primary information’, mostly in scholarly 
books and articles (see Charles, C. and Mertler, C. 2002. Introduction to Educational Research. 
4th. ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.) 
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research design is fully in line with the constructivist standpoint and the interpretative 
epistemology of this thesis standing for the constructed reality, relative truth and 
subjective perceptions. The methodology section considers the rationale, contribution 
and potential challenges of the selected research design with references to the 
constructivist theory literature. The complimentary discussion about the practical 
fieldwork and ethical issues, limitations during data collection and data analysis are 
also included.   
 
4.1. The Case Studies Research Design 
4.1.1. Why Case Studies? 
Thus, a case study is ‘research strategy’, representing an ‘empirical enquiry’ allowing 
the researcher to contextualise knowledge and ‘investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth’ preserving its holistic and meaningful characteristics, patterns 
and relationships, especially where the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
context are unclear (Hartley, 2004, 18; Yin, 2009: 4; Pierce, 2008). The construction of 
real and/or imaginary energy threats in the historically contingent EU-Russia domain is 
an ideal environment for the case study, as the context and the phenomenon of 
constructing the energy threat perceptions are hardly distinguishable. Attaching the 
EU-Russia energy interplays to a time frame (a period from 2004 to 2012), 
concentrating on gas relations (rather than the entire energy mix) and more importantly 
narrowing the research down to particular case-countries (Germany and Poland) are 
set to create the essential grounds for exploring the structure, depth and context of the 
phenomenon. 
Serving the purpose of understanding EU-Russian energy relations the research 
pursues an open-ended question-driven approach that allows describing the 
relationships between actors (Burnham et al., 2004; Yin, 2009). Using certain research 
questions of how and why energy threat perceptions are constructed in the EU will help 
to advance the case study approach:  
"How" and "why" questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the 
use of case studies, histories, and experiments as the proffered 
research strategies. This is because such questions deal with 
operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence (Yin, 2009: 9). 
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Analysing the European Union as a complex entity that is involved in dealing with third 
countries is challenging. The reasons for that are the indefinite status of the EU, the 
relationships between the European MSs’ level and pan-European level, the amount of 
actors and interests involved in shaping the EU’s energy behaviour and policy-making. 
The case study research design with the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions has been 
deliberately chosen to account for the complexity and the possibility of drawing wider 
implications of the research (Ragin, 1989: viii; Stake, 1995; Andrade, 2009: 42).  
Having explained the appropriateness and value of the case study design for this thesis, 
this section proceeds with the constructivist epistemological foundations of the 
methodological case study approach. Broadly, case studies fall into two similar 
categories mirroring positivist and post-positivist constructivism, which were previously 
elaborated in Section 2.2. (Risse, 2004; Checkel, 2006). In methodological terms, 
positivism-based case studies are widely advocated by Yin (2009), who based it on the 
use of hypothesis and propositions that aim to test and validate a theory or 
relationships. Interpretative case studies treat reality as socially constructed and thus 
cannot be quantifiably measured or tested.  
Some authors such as Stake (1995: 60) amalgamate qualitative and interpretative data, 
using them interchangeably. However, qualitative research represents broad and 
encompassing method of gathering information from a variety of data sources (like 
interviews, surveys, focus groups, etc.), which are not necessarily all needed for the 
interpretative type of research (Walsham, 2006: 323). Klein and Myers (1999: 69) reject 
the equity and interchangeability of the qualitative and interpretative researches. In this 
thesis an interpretative approach will be regarded as a narrowed subtype of qualitative 
research that has specific features. Thus an interpretative approach does not have the 
proposed answer or hypothesis from the beginning of the research, but produce 
findings alongside with the investigation (Walsham, 2006; Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 
404; Neuman, 1997). In addition to providing the description of the phenomenon, the 
interpretative case study approach argues for the researcher’s important and active 
part in the interpretations of the constructed reality (hence with relatively constrained 
intervention in researcher’s positioning in the studied phenomenon).  
Therefore, without repeating what has been already said in Section 2.2. regarding 
constructivist ontology and epistemology, the research adheres to interpretative case 
studies with the combination of causal and constitutive explanation for actors’ 
behaviour. It aims to uncover the attached meanings and definitions of the constructed 
energy security practices and understand the perspectives of the participants in the 
case-countries about the EU-Russia energy threat phenomenon (Price and Reus-Smit, 
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1998). The goal of the interpretative methodology is not to test or validate whether the 
perception of Poland and Germany about Russian energy threats is an objective fact or 
an imagined threat presented as real, but rather to understand what are the bases and 
the conditions underlying their particular perceptions of Russia and how those 
countries utilise them for reaching specific political outcomes.  
Nevertheless, the case study design faces a range of challenges. Firstly, one of the 
most frequently mentioned criticism is related to validity and reliability of the findings of 
the case study approach (Yin, 2009: 40-45; Andrade, 2009: 42).  However, the validity 
and reliability are the attributes of the objective reality of the positivist research, which 
constructivist research rejects. The interpretative methodology helps to avoid this 
problem as it defines quality of the research in terms of plausibility of the story and the 
overall compelling argument rather than validity and reliability (Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001: 404; Andrade, 2009). Second issue concerns generalisation. The main positivist 
assumption is that case study should provide opportunity for generalisation and 
replication to other cases. Drawing broader general inferences about threat perceptions 
and energy supply security for other EU members of the region or a wider world can be 
revealing but does not have to be the ultimate goal. According to interpretativism not 
every research can be statistically replicated and should have generalising effect ‘as a 
goal’ (Denzin, 1983: 133). 
The aim of the research and the stipulation of formulated research questions do not 
require any empirical or statistical generalisation in terms of conventional philosophy of 
science (Yin, 2009: 39). The research findings are not applicable to any other EU 
countries-importers beyond the indicated two case studies (as the energy interplays 
between Russia and individual EU MSs are unique and non-transferable). The 
European Union, as a particular and a fragmented entity, has been shaping, widening 
and deepening its energy policies in different time intervals and incorporating countries 
with different political and economic backgrounds and relational links with Russia. From 
the social constructivist position the phenomenon of threat perceptions and 
constructing of energy policies are context-specific, time-framed and can have multiple 
attached meanings to the same situations (Yanow, 2003; Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 
110). 
However, that does not mean the pursued analysis will not have any generalising 
value. Specifically, the research provides analytical generalisation of energy security 
and threat perceptions. Providing generalisation to a broader energy security 
phenomenon (Becker, 1990; Yin, 2009: 38-39, 43), the case study results contribute to 
the indication of gaps, the need for additional data generation and provision of further 
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research horizons of the dynamics of the energy security concept and threat 
conceptualisation. Since the analysis is based on the attached meanings to energy 
security and threat in relations with Russia, ‘meanings are not, as a rule, accessed 
directly: they are too abstract, and inquiring about abstractions leads to abstract 
generalizations, rather than situation-specific usages and practices’(Yanow, 2003: 11). 
According to George and Bennett (2005: 272-273) and Ragin (1992) the case study 
method is commonly used for producing policy-related knowledge and constructing a 
theory through generalising from the evidence. The research findings and their 
analytical generalisation will not necessarily lead to a theory generation, but rather an 
elaboration of some of the conceptual elements (like clarifying the meanings of energy 
security or expanding the threat perception analysis with the example of energy) that 
could be applied to other contexts. In other words, analytical generalisation can serve 
as a foundation for wider investigation of the gas securitisation practices and threat 
perceptions, by encouraging similar kind of analysis, for instance with the different 
types of fuel (oil, coal, electricity, or nuclear) or other energy suppliers (the Middle 
Eastern or African countries). 
Alongside challenges with the generalisation of the case study design, special attention 
should be given to the sufficient number of case studies. Yin (2009: 52-56) specifies 
that single case study findings lead to profound understanding of the case but narrow 
generalisation capacity of the research, whereas multiple cases negatively affect depth, 
by substituting quality with quantity of the researched cases. The interpretative 
research method justifies a single case study that is very common for testing a well-
established theory and can produce plausible explanatory findings due to its in-depth 
and encompassing approach (Stake, 1995: xi; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006: 77). 
However, the goal of this thesis is to describe a variable phenomenon and to find a 
middle ground in the research design for that purpose. It can be reached by adopting a 
balanced two case study approach, allowing the illuminations of the construction of 
energy threats for Poland and Germany in-depth. The reasoning behind choosing 
Germany and Poland as case studies will be provided in the next section.  
4.1.2. What are the Cases of?  
The choice of the case studies follows from the theoretical analysis of EU actorness 
and the provisional literature overview that identified particular problems with the 
coherence of the EU unitary actorness and causal role of the EU MSs in it (Howorth, 
2010; Wright, 2011; Peters, 2016). The Introduction Chapter 1 already briefly 
highlighted the importance of exploring energy security and threats on the level of the 
EU MSs. Therefore, despite the analysis starting with looking at the general EU level in 
89 
 
its energy relations with Russia (in Chapter 5), it would be incomplete and somewhat 
superficial to observe the EU-Russia energy interplays just on the European 
supranational level. With this in mind, the thesis moves towards the individual EU MSs 
of Poland in Germany in the empirical case study Chapters 6 and 7.  
The cases for the research can be determined on the basis of their comparability of 
some way or the individuality of the parameters. No matter what the choice is as long 
as it can maximise what the researcher can learn from them and provide available 
information for answering the research questions (Stake, 1995: 4). Relying on the 
purpose of the study to understand how countries react to similar energy challenges 
and define energy threats, the cases of Poland and Germany were chosen to a number 
of reasons, detailed below. 
In the plethora of empirical scholarly research, Germany and Poland have been 
historically, geopolitically and economically allocated to two different camps of a 
symbolically ‘divided’ European Union. Arguably, the distinction rests on the time of the 
EU accession making the first 15 countries composing the EU as ‘old EU MSs’ and the 
rest as ‘new EU MSs’ and the geographical and historical connotations dividing states 
into the Western vs. Eastern EU clusters (Aalto, 2008: 112-114; Braghiroli and Carta, 
2009; Bozhilova and Hashimoto, 2010: 630; Sherr, 2010: 58-59). 
Germany is known for its historical connections, strategic energy and trade cooperation 
and ‘special relationships’ with Russia (Helm, 2006). Having built the first gas pipeline 
from the USSR in 1970’s and being the first to exchange energy assets with Russia 
and develop energy import dependence (Aalto, 2008: 94), Germany has a strong 
interest in good relationships with its main energy supplier. Close political ties 
cemented Germany as a key lucrative consumer of Russian gas through Yamal-
Europe and Nord Stream pipelines, often enjoying preferential contract conditions for 
gas supplies. Germany’s case study will represent the member from the Western and 
older cluster of the EU, which remains a very prominent energy actor and influential 
opinion-maker in the EU. 
The Eastern camp of ‘newly’ joined EU MSs is best represented by the Polish case 
study, which has been an important trend-setter in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the biggest energy importing country in the CEE region. Being left out from 
some of the major pipeline energy projects (mainly the Nord Stream pipeline), Poland 
has a different sentiment and rhetoric in the EU regarding Russia’s energy policy. 
Diminished political leverage on the evolving European energy security policies and the 
loss of fees from the transit through its territory provides Poland with many incentives 
and energy trepidations towards Russia (Larsson, 2007a; Larsson, 2007b).  
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The categorical distinctiveness of the EU MS’s attitudes to Russia was summarised in 
the analysis of Leonard and Popescu (2007) and Braghiroli and Carta (2009), which 
demonstrated the fragmentation of the European power and differences in European 
members’ attitudes towards Russia22. According to their analysis, the spectrum of 
attitudes towards Russia ranges from friendly and partner-like relationships (where 
Germany sits) and hostile and antagonistic attitudes (as in the case of Poland).  
However, the choice to look at Germany and Poland was based on the intention to 
understand how and if their energy positions and reactions are considerably different, 
while being exposed to similar energy challenges and energy supply conditions. For 
instance, both countries have been fully-fledged members of the EU since 2004, both 
underwent changes in energy policy-making under the EU intentions to build integrated 
gas market (including the diversification policies, etc.), and both remain with the highest 
level of energy import dependence. In addition both function in a time of international 
‘unprecedented uncertainty’ (IEA, 2010) that incorporates growing heavy energy 
dependence on Russian gas supplies, the supply terminations, gas price hikes and 
others material-based energy security challenges. Both energy dependent and having 
a variety of energy interactions with Russia, the comparability of these cases is based 
on event-dependent comparison with similar events and processes (like the gas crises), 
that trigger a variety of threat perceptions and reactions in the EU.  
 
4.2. Data Collection Methods 
Another advantage of using a case study approach is the possibility to combine 
methods of data collection for developing a picture of the empirical content of energy 
policies and attitudes of the EU MSs (Yin, 2009). Ragin refers to data collection as 
linking ‘the ideas and evidence’ (Ragin, 1992: 225). In fact, the concept of energy 
security can be studied in two methodologically different ways. Quantitatively, energy 
security can be analysed through various risk-assessment mathematical techniques 
and statistical econometrics. However, the quantitative approach, which utilises 
statistical data and aims to portray factual reality, fails to study subjective side of threat 
perceptions. Qualitatively, the energy security conception can be presented through the 
lenses of expert judgements and academic evaluations. Coming from the interpretative 
epistemological stance, the research utilises a qualitative approach due to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For example, Braghiroli and Carta (2009) categorised EU members into four groups of 
countries, according to economic relations and trade with Russia, reliance on Russian gas and 
energy dependence, the accession of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO, religious differences and 
the presence of significant territorial, diplomatic, commercial and other direct disputes.  
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discursive value and the interpretative focus on threat perception. In particular, the 
case study research design determines the main sources of evidence – semi-
structured political elite interviews and document analysis. The research scope is 
concentrated around the questions about the conceptual understanding of energy 
security and the energy threats for Poland and Germany as well as the factors 
contributing to the feeling of vulnerability in relations with Russia and possible 
implications for the EU-Russia energy relations. Such comprehensive approach to data 
collection correlates to the nature of the suggested research questions and the 
theoretical framework.  
4.2.1. Elite Interviewing  
Regardless the research relying on the state-centric approach, yet not exclusive state-
centric theorising of countries’ perceptions is applied when it comes to the choice of 
methods for data collections. Thus the methodological commitment of the thesis 
includes a broader account of a state, encompassing other trans-national economic 
actors, energy companies and decision-makers (Peters and Westphal, 2013: 109-110), 
which are complimentary, but not ultimate contributors to the creation of threat 
perceptions. Through exploring, which meanings actors and policy-makers attach to 
energy events and circumstances, allows analysing general energy positions of state-
actors. 
As stated earlier, interpretativist research justifies looking at acts and interactions 
through underlying meanings, which according to Walsham (2006: 323) and Yanow 
(2003: 11) can be assessed through interviews. Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
were chosen as the best way to answer the open-ended research questions and 
understand what stays behind country’s policies and shapes their perceptions (Yin, 
2009: 107). For the purpose of obtaining empirical data, the primary data collection was 
organised during the fieldwork to Brussels (to get the idea of the EU energy policies 
and strategies), Berlin in October-December of 2011 and Warsaw in September of 
2012. The majority of the time was spent in Brussels, which provided more open 
access to governmental officials, political elites and policy-makers on both European 
and the EU MS’s levels (for instance, being there in October-December 2011 allowed 
me to get access to Polish officials during Poland’s Presidency in the EU Council at 
that time).  
Unlike Neuman’s (1997) advocacy for the ‘random’ and  ‘large’ sample size, the 
interviewees for this research were deliberately selected on the basis of their relevance 
to the topic, knowledge and expertise in the EU-Russia energy relations, ‘whose 
combined views present a balanced perspective’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 64-67; 
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Pierce, 2008). Targeted interviewees’ governmental positions were identified, while 
pursuing online search databases and other relevant sources.  
Notwithstanding that the research is focused on states’ policies, the aggregate energy 
stance of German and Polish policies, decision-making and perceptions are based on 
the influential opinions of a variety of energy actors (such as political elites, energy 
companies, experts and individual policy-makers). The number of the selected 
interviews should be sufficient enough to be able to reflect controversial and 
overlapping perspectives on the researched phenomenon (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). 
The 45 recorded interviews conducted with high profile political elites and policy-
makers were organised mostly in person or through verbal communication, 
supplemented by a range of unrecorded snow-ball chats, follow-up interviews and 
attending conferences and plenary sessions. The majority of those interviewees 
provided their permission to use obtained information within this research project under 
the circumstances of confidentiality. Hence, a few of those interviewers allowed the 
researcher to utilise their responses only in terms of understanding the context of the 
researched issues due to their sensitivity, without direct mentioning of those 
interviewees in the thesis. Consequently those interviews were used as a background 
for the topic and foundation for formulating more specific questions for other 
interviewees. That explains why only 23 interviews were extensively relied upon as the 
researcher managed to extract ‘off the record’ information and specify it in the 
questions to other interviews. 
The pan-European perspective on energy relations with Russia was initiated from the 
interviews with public officials from the key Brussels institutions (the EU Commission, 
mainly the DG Energy; the Council General Secretariat), the Energy Charter 
Organisation and energy experts from think-tanks. The national view points from the 
member states of Germany and Poland were obtained from officials of the Permanent 
Representations to the EU in Brussels, as well as national political elites and countries’ 
official sources from the ministries, governmental research organisations and think-
tanks in Berlin and Warsaw. These were specifically the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology in Berlin23, German Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP), the Ministry 
of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, Centre for Eastern Studies 
in Warsaw, BASF/Wintershall employee, Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and 
Understanding in Warsaw, former Nord Stream EU Representation officials) and a 
range of independent energy experts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 During the time when the field work was pursued in December 2011, BMWi stood for the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, whereas later it was renamed into the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy.  
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Although this thesis is not focused on the Russian perspective on energy security and 
gas relations with Europe, it was crucial to comprehend both parts of the EU-Russia 
energy equation. Thus for better understanding of the essence of the problems, the 
researcher pursued seven interviews with Russian political elites and energy-related 
experts (mainly, Russian officials from the Energy Charter Organisation, academics 
and scholars from Moscow High School of Economics and Energy Research Institute 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Since some of the key information from the 
Russian official perspective was provided under the condition of anonymity or ‘off the 
record’, to avoid ethical implications the knowledge received was used for general 
analytical purposes of the researcher, background setting and the contextualisation of 
the EU-Russia energy problems. 
Deriving from a constructivist mind-set, elite interviews are used to analyse actors’ 
perceptions and shared assumptions of the world or the event (Burnham et al., 2004: 
274). The access to in-depth analysis of the expert opinions of elite interviews, 
provided the opportunity for clarification of controversial and complex energy policies. It 
was especially important for the identification of pertinent official legislative documents 
and directives of the European institutions and the clarification of at times perplexing 
texts. As Harrison (2001: 93-94) stressed ‘interviews may also help in the process of 
identifying which documents have been deemed to be important, read and acted upon’, 
expanding and explaining beyond dry and publicly-adapted edited texts of the 
documents (Yin, 2009). While recognising the advantage of the interview data 
collection, the intrinsic limitations and ethical concerns of the interview method will be 
mentioned in Section 4.4.  
4.2.2. Documents and Secondary Data 
The research is supplemented by various primary and secondary sources and 
documents constituting the EU-Russia energy relations since the 2000s and the overall 
energy interactions. Documents and official speeches by politicians created the 
framework for the interviews that allowed the building up of ‘novel accounts and 
interpretations of significant events’ (Burnham et al., 2004: 184). The analysis of 
documents and political statements made by the EU bureaucratic administration and 
officials is aimed at highlighting the conflicting areas between what is written in the 
European energy documents and what is meant by them (that can be drawn from the 
conducted interviews). This, in turn, will contribute to understanding the constructed 
nature of energy security and allow the making of inferences, leading to exposing 
threat perceptions within the EU.  
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The EU-Russian energy relations were observed on the basis of the energy documents 
and regulations from Brussels. Most of the EU official energy security documents focus 
on the construction of a common energy market and producing a common foreign 
energy policy towards third-party countries such as Russia. Among those documents 
are the EU Electricity and Gas Liberalisation Packages, Energy Action Plans, individual 
energy strategies of the EU MSs, the Energy Charter Treaty, and Green Papers of the 
European Commission. Utilising primary official publications of the legal documents of 
the EU institutions such as energy regulations, directives, communications, strategies, 
energy and climate packages not only served the purpose for cross-checking the 
interviewees’ responses but also facilitates the contextualisation of knowledge 
(Burnham et al., 2004: 188). The country case study documents included German and 
Polish energy and national security strategies that predominantly enhanced 
understanding of the countries’ priorities in foreign energy policy. The majority of 
documentary sources are available electronically in the website of the European Union, 
governmental and ministerial websites and did not require archival browsing.  
Due to the popularity of the research topic, there exist a plethora of secondary 
analytical material, produced by academics, think tanks and the research 
organisations. Thus it would be somewhat short-sighted to disregard the added value 
of political briefings, newspaper periodicals and journal articles, scholarly and 
academic articles, secondary interviews and other research studies. Despite the 
concerns about the accuracy, bias, reliability and honesty of secondary documents 
(Mason, 2002: 110; Yin, 2009: 102) the contribution of the IEA country’s reports, 
National Reports of the European Commission, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies and 
many others is invaluable for understanding of the broader context and scope of 
energy interplays between Russia and the EU. In addition most of the reports and 
articles contain illuminating numerical information and statistics, which can be utilised 
as a source of secondary data (representing the analysis of primary data).  
 
4.3. Data Analysis 
While the available tools and methodological approaches for data collection can be 
similar for constructivists and the researchers from other schools of thought, the 
approach to studying constructivist’s inter-subjective meanings and analysing the data 
vary, leading to different interpretations and conclusions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 
395; Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 18). The constructivist assumption indicates that the 
combination of discourses, meanings and language constitute the relationships 
between actors and helps to understand how processes and meanings are constituted 
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(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 394; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). Therefore, discourse 
analysis would represent interpretative epistemology and would be the most ‘obvious’ 
choice for constructivist research (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Waever, 2003; 
Burnham et al., 2004; Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 19)24. However, the discourses remain 
limited to rhetorical value with limited generalisability (Powers, 2001: 64-65; Hook, 
2001: 38). It fails to explain situational changes, power relations and how the meaning 
and the value are allocated to the actor’s identity or behaviour. Traditionally focusing on 
the language and linguistics (Powers, 2001: 74), mainly ‘how things are said or written’ 
rather than ‘what is said’, the discourse analysis is too technical and terminology-
focused for this research. This in turn will lead to overlooking the content and meanings 
that actors attach to energy security and threats. 
Thus the constructivist ontology of threat perceptions in this thesis goes beyond the 
linguistic and discursive nature of the Copenhagen School’s speech act theory and the 
language constructions. It focuses on the broader understanding of the threat 
perception phenomenon by asking relevant questions to the involved parties about the 
meanings and the interpretations they put into understanding the phenomenon. The 
analytical approach of this thesis encounters the historical, social, political and other 
contexts for constructing energy threats. Whilst the vulnerability can be partially 
explained by the relatively quantifiable economic indicators (such as costs and the risks 
that are measured frequently through import dependence), the other analytical 
elements of its conceptualisation such as energy security, threats and perceptions of 
identity and interests are intangible and hardly quantifiable. Therefore, to understand 
the EU-Russia energy threat phenomenon, a more invaluable, in-depth and 
encompassing approach used in this research that justifies the use of interviews and 
document data, which are analysed through the prism of the research questions and 
literature review.  
The case study research design and its adherence to a variety of analytical techniques 
are consistent with the chosen conceptual approach. It enables a researcher to 
overcome the methodological concerns and weaknesses of each singular source of 
data and combine the interviews and document analysis. Additionally, using the data 
triangulation technique (Neuman, 1997; Yin, 2009), interview statements about the 
same phenomenon can be confirmed and cross-checked through other evidences from 
multiple sources, like primary documents and secondary data (Denzin, 1983; Pierce, 
2008: 89; Yin, 2009: 103, 116).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Copenhagen School followers advocate discourse analysis since the ‘criterion of security 




In general, triangulation is aimed to strengthen the research findings and amplify 
validity and reliability of the research (Neuman, 1997; Yin, 2009). However, it 
contradicts the interpretative epistemology as validity and reliability imply objective 
reality, which mainstream constructivism reject. Constructivists claim that the research 
involves interpretations and explanations, therefore cannot be entirely objective or 
impartial, therefore rejecting the ‘validity of analytical and ethical knowledge claims’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001: 395). Persuasiveness and consistency of the 
interpretations can exist and be pursued through convincing legitimacy and drawing 
conceptual implications from the findings. It can also vary depending on the collected 
evidences and the plausibility of empirical analysis (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998).  
Through triangulation, the public speeches recorded and interview responses obtained 
can be checked for consistency and the integrity of the drawn inferences with other 
data sets of secondary sources and primary documents. For instance, the majority of 
the interview data (collected opinions of the political elites from Brussels and the case 
study countries) is verified with the policy documents of different Ministries, the DG 
Energy, available public speeches and a variety of secondary research. Thus a senior 
expert from the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw (Interview 15) and the 
official from the Ministry of Economy in Poland (Interview 10) admitted Russia’s 
‘blackmail’ and elaborated the weakness of the Polish bargaining position with Russia 
during the gas contract renegotiations in 2010. The pressure of the Russian side during 
the negotiations with Poland was confirmed from the secondary source of the interview 
of the former head of Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNIG) energy company in 
Poland Michal Shubskij given to the Vedomosti newspaper (Shubskij, 2011). The 
attached meaning to this event and the language utilised by the primary interviewers 
and the secondary newspaper sources were identical, allowing concluding about the 
trustworthiness of the shared observations.  
Triangulation can also work the other way around, when the interviewers explain the 
meaning and clarify dry texts of the documents and governmental policy papers, 
confirming and denying the researcher’s interpretation of this documents with one of 
the interviewees’ perspectives (like in the example in the Chapter 7, Section 2.3.1.).  
 
4.4. Limits, Limitations and the Ethics of the Research 
Recognising the nature and the scope of the thesis, a number of practical constraints of 
the research and the fieldwork experience should be identified (although they often 
appear to be advantages in the interpretative research). 
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First and foremost, the purposefully made boundary of the research is that it mainly 
explores only one type of natural resource, which is natural gas. The focus on natural 
gas, as the invaluable EU priority that binds suppliers and consumers in a rigid network 
and provides major grounds for the EU-Russia energy conflicts, has been thoroughly 
explained in the Introduction chapter, Section 1.2.2. However, adhering to the gas 
sector analysis rather than the energy mix imposes some limitations. For instance, 
changes in the gas market are hugely influenced by oil market developments, as the 
gas formula for the EU customers is indexed to oil products and it fluctuates according 
to changes on the world oil market. This thesis acknowledges the importance of the oil 
global market and energy mix for understanding energy security, which will be treated 
as an external structural factor affecting gas relationships between the states. The 
research specifically focuses on the most geopolitically and economically problematic 
type of fuel in the EU-Russia energy relations (that does not fully belong neither to 
global energy market nor to the evolving European regional market for gas just yet).  
Secondly, since the scrutiny of the research object (in this case European energy 
security relations with Russia) is presented as ‘a well-defined aspect of a historical 
episode’ (George and Bennet, 2005: 18), the timeline of the thesis is a natural limitation 
of any research. The thesis had already specified and justified the reasons for 
establishing the boundaries of the time frame for this research - the period from 2004 
until 2012 (see Section 1.2.5.). 
Thirdly, another limitation of the research is the choice of Germany and Poland as 
specific case studies to demonstrate the reasons for, and implications of, differences in 
threat perceptions. Regardless of the fact that that those countries were exposed to 
similar gas supply challenges during the observed period of time, it is essential to 
remember that the argument might not hold its value if the energy circumstances of 
other EU MSs and their political context are scrutinised. For instance, for Spain and 
Portugal, which are focused on renewable energy, LNG and relatively import 
independent of the Russian gas, the energy supply challenges and the security threats 
are likely to be associated with supplies from Algeria, Nigeria and Qatar and the 
adverse lasting effects of the global economic crisis (like the lack of foreign investment 
into the development and liberalisation of energy markets). Whereas in Bulgaria and 
Lithuania, which, like Poland, are heavily import dependent on the Russian gas 
supplies and vulnerable to its gas price-making, the argument would likely to stand if 
they are exposed to identical circumstances in dealing with Russian energy policies. 
That brings back the limitations of statistical generalisation of interpretative research 
into other EU MSs, but provides opportunities of analytical generalisation due to EU 
MSs being affected by stable structural circumstances and a rather consistent 
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international social-political reality (like the increasing international energy demand, the 
burdens of tackling the climate change issues, uncertainties about availability of energy 
reserves, etc.).  
Fourthly, the key level of analysis that deals only with states as unitary actors imposes 
boundaries as it disregards other energy stake-holders that may have strong impact on 
threat perceptions and energy policies. Thus only limited scrutiny of other energy 
actors (like particular energy companies, energy interest groups, lobby groups, 
international energy corporations and multi-national energy companies and individuals) 
will be provided. For instance, the close relationship between the individuals of Vladimir 
Putin and Gerhard Schroeder, who was chosen to be the head of ‘shareholders 
committee’ of the Nord Stream project (Benoit, 2006), contribute greatly to shaping the 
energy interests of the German state in the European space. Albeit, the importance of 
those actors is incontestable, it exceeds the limits of the state-centric research scope 
and will be accounted for indirectly, in terms of broader understanding of states’ energy 
interests. 
Fifthly, EU-Russia energy relationships cannot be fully understood in isolation from 
other important state energy players such as the USA, China, India (as the biggest 
energy consumers), and the energy exporters from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Iran, Kuwait and others). Their impact on the architecture of the global energy 
markets, its changes and the establishment of the oil prices (according to which the 
gas price fluctuates) might be important but not prevalent in this research. Hence, since 
it has indirect influence on bilateral gas politics between the EU MSs and Russia, this 
factor will be mentioned only as the wider international context for the EU-Russia 
energy security in the Conclusions final chapter. 
Finally, due to the interpretative nature of the research some ethical issues related to 
data collection and analysis during the fieldwork should be encountered. In the process 
of data collection, a common problem occurs when high-profile political elites and 
policy-makers refer to a common knowledge and well-known public opinions and 
interpretations. This can be regarded as a general flaw since it provides repetitive 
information and reduces the possibility to drive new implications. Hence, this research 
chooses to treat it as a positive outcome as it confirms commonly shared 
understanding of energy events and processes (which can be systematically analysed, 
cross-checked and triangulated with other available sources).  
The research recognises the constraint that the representation of the interviewee 
selection might not be sufficiently comprehensive and will be, due to practical reasons, 
limited to the availability of eligible officials in power with which the researcher 
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managed to secure an interview. This, in turn, puts endemic constraints on the 
perspectives received from the officials due to their political persuasions, party 
membership or the boundaries of the occupied positions in the governmental structure 
at that particular moment of time. Likewise, most of the interviews were referred mostly 
to the recent events (like the EU energy misunderstandings with Russia around 2009-
2010 rather than earlier years of 2000s). This is an unavoidable characteristic of the 
human nature, as the officials might not have been in office during earlier time or not 
possessing the sufficient knowledge about the energy-related events. To compensate 
for those gaps, references to other analytical literature and documents’ screening were 
applied. 
In respect to data analysis, the interpretative approach allocates the active role for the 
researcher in data collection, analysis and its interpretations (Burr, 1995: 161; Klein 
and Myers, 1999; Andrade, 2009: 43-35). The researcher becomes a part of the 
constructed reality and contributes with his knowledge to understanding the observed 
phenomenon. However, not only can the researcher’s involvement raise some ethical 
concerns (to be explained below), it can also be regarded as a weakness, as it adds 
even more subjectivity to the observed phenomenon. However, the research is not 
positivist-based, so the presence of subjective elements in the interpretative research 
is not as damaging and even more so inevitable due to its nature (Yanow, 2003: 12). 
Drawing inferences from the work of Robert Jervis ‘Perceptions and Misperceptions’ 
(1976: 7-9), there is not an easy way of determining the accuracy of a state’s 
perception of another state. Given the complexity and ambiguity of information in 
international relations, perceptual decision-making errors will always be common 
(Jervis, 1976: 10). Since it is up to the researcher to identify and measure if threat 
perceptions are plausible or exaggerated or understated, then the problem of bias and 
subjectivity in analysing data might occur, both from the interviewees’ and the 
researcher’s perspectives. The most obvious potential risks of interpretative research is 
in face-to-face communication, where there is a possibility for the interviewer to 
influence the interviewee to produce the expected response (Burnham et al., 2004; 
Pierce, 2008: 83), as well as the creation of personal narrations as opposed to 
representing the country’s perspectives (Boobbyer, 2000: 557). However, this research 
adopts the view that considers subjectivity as an advantage (Andrade, 2009: 45) that 
can enhance the delivery of analysed findings to the readers as only the researcher 
knows the problem in-depth enough to be able to produce the expected outcome.  
Recognising that interpretative research does not require proof of validity or reliability, 
there is a way to mitigate arbitrariness and speculative responses and the researcher’s 
bias in evaluating states’ perceptions. Anticipating the above research challenges, 
100 
 
consistency of responses was increased by replicating or asking the same ‘questions 
to different people in separate roles’ during interviews or ‘same questions in different 
ways’ (Rubin and Rubin, 2005: 73). It is possible to compare and cross-check the 
perceptions of different actors about the same energy threat and security issue either 
within the country (by asking for the interpretations of other policy-makers and 
interviewees from the same case country) or the intra-state perceptions (like other 
members of the EU) or through finding relevant positions in the official speeches and 
documents (according to the described above triangulation technique). In addition, the 
described above triangulation technique of data analysis solves the bias issue. The 
researcher’s bias is initially minimised by the fact that the researcher does not come 
from either of the observed countries, limiting the incentive to have preconceived 
judgements. 
Due to the versatile nature of the research project, the researcher had to account for a 
variety of ethical issues during the fieldwork. The ethical issues, while writing the 
project and doing the fieldwork, were intellectual property issues, confidentiality, 
protection of data and the receiving informed consent from the interviewees. Despite 
the fact that the research does not include interactions with vulnerable groups of 
society, dealing with high-profile public officials, political elites and policy-makers 
require sensitivity to their position and consideration in utilising the obtained responses 
properly. According to the University of Leeds regulations the interviewer was required 
to obtain interviewees’ consent about utilising the information participants provided 
(which was successfully accomplished). This was achieved by providing the 
participants with a clearly stated information sheet about the nature of this study and 
the aims of interviews contributed to a prejudice-free attitude towards the researcher 
and helped to obtain participants’ formal consent. Thus the issue of confidentiality and 
anonymity was successfully dealt with by providing a choice for the interviewees to 
remain anonymous (Walsham, 2006: 323-327). Knowing that specific views will not be 
attributed to interviewees’ names and organisation enabled more open and revealing 
opinions and reflections.  
While pursuing the research on the ground, a researcher comes across with a range of 
challenges. Due to the fact that the interpretative research design was based on the 
interviews with high-profile and senior political elites, some of the interviewees in 
Poland and Brussels were reluctant to agree for the interview due to the ‘sensitivity’ of 
the topic (which already indicates insecurity of discussing energy relations with Russia). 
For instance, the access to the officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw 
was difficult as officials claimed that they are restricted from discussing energy security 
issues. While there is nothing the researcher can do against the adopted organisational 
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culture and regulations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the researcher managed 
secure a few interviews with other political elites from the think-tanks and organisations 
working close with the Ministry. The fact that there were no political or career-related 
consequences, those interviewees were more open, upfront and efficient in answering 
the questions. This appeared to be very beneficial for this research as the advisers to 
the Ministries or other research organisations possess very deep and up-to-date 
knowledge of the issue. This in itself is a massive indication of how the issues of 
energy security and relations with Russia are treated by country’s officials, 
characterising emotional and overly sensitive grounds for discourses and perceptions 
in Poland.  
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this methodology section was to establish the utility of analytical methods 
that this research adopts and to justify the choice of exploring energy security relations 
on the level of the EU MSs. Deriving from the constructivist theoretical foundations with 
its adherence for a constructed reality (but not denying the importance of material 
factors), the chapter explained the choice for the interpretative research design. By 
utilising the interpretative case study method with the focus on constitutive and causal 
explanation of countries’ energy approaches, the construction of European energy 
threats and energy insecurities are observed through the examples of Poland and 
Germany as the key energy dependent importers of Russian gas in the EU. Through 
exploring the energy stances of those cases, the findings seek to contribute to the 
bigger picture of the EU-Russia energy relations. The data collection relies on two main 
sources of the interpretative research design – the interviews and document analysis. 
Those primary sources are important for unveiling the variety of meanings that actors 
attach to energy security and threat perceptions, causing broader implications for the 
EU-Russia energy interplays.  
Supporting the case studies research design with the fieldwork findings makes the 
cases sufficiently encompassing and effectively comprehensive, thereby allowing one 
to distinguish whether differences or shared insecurities have a bigger impact on threat 
perception discourses in the EU and the EU-Russia energy relations. Furthermore, the 
methodological approach provided insights of possible implications for the 
constructivist theoretical framework by unveiling the conceptual gaps in the 
constructivist theoretical base (like specifying the understanding of energy security 
tenets and implications of interests and identities on countries’ threat perceptions). It 
aims to add understanding and clarity to the main conceptions of threats, energy 
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security and vulnerability contextualised in the EU-Russia energy domain, introducing 
another level of the member states’ perceptions. Whilst the majority of literature on 
inter-state energy relations inherits positivist ontology and relies on pre-defined 
hypotheses and theory testing methodological approaches, the approach in this thesis 
diverges from the mainstream position of combining positivist and post-positivist 
constructivist stances. It allows the examination of the in-depth issues in the specific 
context, relative flexibility of interpretation of policies and the events and accounts for 
unforeseen findings and bringing up different perspectives. 
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Chapter 5. The Peculiarities of EU-Russia Energy Relations  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the essence of the EU-Russia energy cooperation 
and explicate key ‘stumbling blocks’ in their interplays during 2004-2012 period, as well 
as to analyse the European quest for energy security and the nature of Russia’s and 
the EU’s identities as energy actors. This, in turn, facilitates answering of the first 
research sub-question regarding general factors that undermined energy interactions 
between Russia and the EU and considers conditions and origins of the creation of 
threat perceptions in the EU and among its MSs (which is also a partial answer to the 
second research sub-question of this project).  
This chapter commences with the analysis of a number of multilateral and bilateral 
normative energy initiatives, which provide the basis for EU-Russia energy cooperation. 
Although some attempts to build a strategic energy partnership are evident, Section 5.1. 
argues that the EU struggles to create a well-functioning normative energy platform 
that would effectively bind EU MSs and regulate the EU-Russia interplays and enhance 
mutual energy cooperation. Hitherto, their energy relations have been, and remain, 
unstable with lack of mutual trust, and acceptance of the differences and political will to 
compromise on their energy interests. A relatively little success to commit Russia to 
European energy security values and initiatives effectively creates doubts about the 
coherence and the success of the EU energy actorness, initiating its further empirical 
scrutiny (in Section 5.3.2.). 
The need to understand Russia’s role in European perception of energy insecurity 
leads Section 5.2. to demonstrate Russia’s assertive domestic energy stance through 
the example of Gazprom as a consolidator of Russia’s energy interests and 
expansionist international energy policy towards transiting states of Belarus and 
Ukraine, resulting in gas supply disruptions. These examples had a negative impact on 
European threat perceptions of Russia and serve as an explanatory illustration of how 
the conceptualisation of energy security changes in the EU and the unified approach to 
dealing with external threats becomes more prominent. The energy disruption 
trepidations are being projected into energy dependent EU, causing the policy of EU-
Russia energy securitisation to be applied.  
Trying to commit the EU MSs to the principle of ‘solidarity’ since early 2000s (Section 
5.3.1.), European energy security policy includes internal (mainly the development of a 
single energy market) and external dimensions (such as energy diversification and a 
mutually shared European energy approach to dealing with other countries). The 
analysis of the EU’s energy policy and the implications of Russian energy politics for 
the EU provides background for the second research sub-question about external 
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material conditions for existence of threats in the import dependent EU. However, 
finding asymmetric energy import dependence of its individual MSs on Russia as not 
sufficient enough to justify the variety of existing threat perceptions in the EU, the 
chapter points towards the need to examine other aspects of energy insecurities of the 
individual level of the EU MSs. The resistance of the EU MSs’ to give up control over 
energy issues creates inferences to consider the impact of EU integration of its energy 
market as being problematic for some of the EU members. This provides the initial 
setting for the second sub-question about the conditions of insecurities for Poland and 
Germany originating not only from the aggressive Russia’s energy stance, but the EU 
energy policies (which will be profoundly explained in Chapters 6 and 7).  
The lack of a commonly shared understanding of energy security in the EU, and weak 
solidarity between the EU MSs in respect to the European energy goals, had created 
problems in the formation of EU’s identity as an energy actor. Applying the conceptual 
framework of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) for empirical scrutiny of the EU’s energy 
actorness (Section 5.3.2.), helps to explain why the EU has difficulties being a coherent 
energy actor. It also provides incentives to observe energy security policies and threat 
perceptions on the level of individual EU MSs (which suits the objectives of this 
research).  
Finally, Section 5.4. concludes the chapter with analysis of the key energy stress points 
between the EU and Russia, denoting how divergence of strategic energy interests 
between Russia and the EU produce European negative perceptions of Russia. While 
the Union introduces new internal energy market liberalisation principles (which Russia 
is expected to respect) and searches for non-Russian energy routes and sources, such 
policies instigate resentment from the Russian side and trigger misperceptions 
between the parties (research sub-question 1). Starting with the analysis of diverse 
attitudes between Russia and the EU towards energy interdependence and 
understanding of energy security, energy diversification policies, and the EU’s gas 
market liberalisation policies, this section provides the examples of Poland and 
Germany’s asymmetric of gas import dependence as the a platform for further analysis 
of their threat perceptions in the next Chapters 6 and 7. The main grounds for 







5.1. Multilateral and Bilateral Platforms for the EU-Russia Energy Interplays 
Leaving aside positivist explanations of EU-Russia energy relations generally being 
based on factual economic and trade indicators (such as European import dependence 
on Russian gas supply, supply-demand nexus, and energy market shares), this chapter 
accounts for the ideational grounds for the EU-Russia energy interactions. Ideational 
structures are more focused on uncovering a particular nature of the EU energy identity 
through principles that underlie energy interests, political will and cooperative 
incentives. Those are useful for studying the coherence of the EU’s energy actorness 
through the development of energy initiatives and regulatory regimes in dealing with 
Russia (Wright, 2011: 16-17), specifically by evaluating the success or failure of the 
normative grounds for EU-Russia energy interplays. European relationships with 
Russia can be characterised by a long history of endeavours to incorporate Russia into 
a range of energy related initiatives. The analysis below illustrates the multilateral and 
bilateral attempts of the EU and Russia to fulfil the existing normative and regulatory 
vacuum in their energy relations that often creates grounds for manipulation and 
political distrust, undermining energy security for both parties.  
Multilaterally, since the 1990s the EU has been acting as a united actor under the 
single umbrella of the Energy Charter organisation, functioning in line with the 
principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). By Russia’s signing and 
provisionally applying the key Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its supplementary 
Protocols (Energy Charter Treaty, 2004), there was an existing expectation within EU 
MSs about Russia’s ratification of the ECT and joining the WTO. The ECT and its 
Protocols tried to unite a large number of states’ economic energy interests, focusing 
on market, trade and transit, energy investments, efficiency, and dispute resolution. For 
instance, they were believed to solve a range of energy supply and investment 
uncertainties and create a politically stable climate and regulatory environment in the 
relations between Russia and the EU.  
According to the high-level official from the Energy Charter organisation, ‘the Charter is 
an alphabet in which Russia and the EU talks and the instrument of energy 
diplomacy…but its development stops at this stage’ (Interview 1). The energy 
disruption crisis between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 illustrated the failure of the ECT 
to assign the mediator that would set the gas volume and tariffs during the gas conflict 
and to resolve the confrontations between the supplier and the transiting state (Pirani 
et al., 2009:4). The fact that the largest energy producers like Australia, Canada or 
Norway (including the USA that is one of the key founding members) never ratified the 
ECT, reinforced Russia’s doubts about its effectiveness and propensity to consider the 
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balanced interests of energy exporters, transit states and importers. Russia’s problems 
with the Transit Protocol evolved around not only opening its gas transporting pipeline-
systems to third parties like Central Asian competitive exporters that threatened 
company’s monopoly rent (Gotz, 2008: 69; Bohme, 2011: 46), but also came in 
contradiction with Russia’s acceptance of EU’s identity as a united front. Thus, newly 
joined EU MSs (mainly Poland) has been traditionally treated by Russia as ‘the 
transiting state towards Western energy markets’ (Hadfield and Amkhan-Bayno, 2012; 
Interview 2). The reason for treating Poland still as a transit country for the Russian gas 
is because Gazprom traditionally insured the gas supply to ‘the Polish-German border’, 
where Germany is the main targeted gas market for Russia (Interview 4). Russia still 
has problems with accepting the EU energy collectively shared identity as an 
economically integrated region with free energy transit regardless of the country of 
origin or destination or ownership of the pipeline. In addition, the Protocol is believed to 
breach Russian access, volume and tariff policies towards the Polish part of the Yamal-
Europe pipeline (according to Article 10 and Article 8.4 of the Transit Protocol). 
Strongly opposing the ECT and its Transit Protocol for a variety of controversial 
economic and legal reasons (like transit issues and trade-related investment provisions, 
compensation for loses, non-discrimination of transport networks, third party access to 
pipelines and others) Russia stopped its provisional application in October 2009 (for 
more information about Russia's frounds to reject the ECT and the Transit Protocol see 
Konoplyanik, 2009: 279-282; Hadfield and Amkhan-Bayno, 2012)25.  
Discarding the effectiveness of the Energy Charter Treaty, former Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev in April 2009 proposed a modified set of legal rules for energy 
cooperation, referred to as the ‘Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for 
Energy Cooperation (Goals and Principles)’ (President of Russia Official Web Portal, 
2009). Russia’s energy initiative contained the main regulatory positions of the Energy 
Charter Treaty, but with amendments to incorporate interests of producing countries 
and the transiting states26. The EU has been very slow in responding to the initiative 
and no visible steps were made to reach a mutually beneficial agreement, indicating 
the lack of political interest of the EU and Russia to actively promote it. Thus despite 
reaching relative success in acting as a united bloc and being a coherent part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Hence in 2015, investor-to-state arbitration clauses of ECT successfully resolved the ‘Yukos 
case’ of property expropriation in the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration. The fact that 
Russia was bound to pay around 50 billion US dollars for seizing Yukos assets in 2006 shows 
that commercial arbitration provisions of the ECT are working. 
26 Including, a better recognition of the security of supply and demand, adjusting the investment 
protection regime and the modernisation of the mutual infrastructure between the transiting 
countries, producers and suppliers. 
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multilateral agreements, the EU has been weak and indecisive regarding facilitation of 
Russia being an active part of the ECT or any other similar agreement. 
Another tool to commit Russia to international trade regulations was Russia’s joining 
the WTO in August 2012. The positive effect of the mutually binding energy trade 
agreements within WTO remains complex and uncertain. The reason for this 
uncertainty is that the variety and complexity of energy relations seems to lie largely 
outside the WTO commitments. Only general rules on trade, transit and tariff operate 
within the WTO framework, hence such issues as the creation of new infrastructure or 
the solutions for transit related disagreements are not explicitly dealt with through the 
WTO (for more information see Milthorp and Christy, 2011: 259-266). There has been 
a lot of uncertainty about whether Russia’s joining the WTO is likely or unlikely to 
change much in Russia’s energy policy in the energy sector. As the WTO is a relatively 
new legal precedent with Russia being a member (in relation to the time frame of this 
thesis), there have been very few energy interactions between Russia and the EU 
under the WTO regulations, making it difficult to evaluate possible implications of the 
Russian membership for EU-Russia energy trade relations27. 
In addition to the above, the last two decades were marked by bilateral EU-Russia 
attempts to promote energy security and cooperation, which are more important for the 
EU as an immediate and interdependent neighbour of Russia. While the EU has been 
pre-occupied with the construction of a liberalised energy market, Russia has been 
involved in privatisation and then nationalisation of energy assets, liberalisation of oil 
and coal markets, launching new infrastructure projects and modifying the energy 
regulations. As a result, plentiful opportunities for energy cooperation were opened. 
The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) (Council of the European 
Union, 1997) followed by the creation of EU-Russia Common Spaces in 2003, EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue (2000) and Partnership for Modernisation (Council of the 
European Union, 2010) laid the grounds for relationships, including energy 
relationships, to create certain normative obligations between the EU, its MSs, and 
Russia.  
The above-mentioned bilateral agreements with Russia underwent a range of 
controversies. To start with, the PCA have been steadily working for the first 10 years 
since 1997 in the area of trade, investments, human rights and competition, presenting 
systematically organised approach to bilateral relations. Hence, energy was not in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 So far, since 2012 Russia and the EU have been involved into just a few official WTO 
consultations including three cases about non-energy related trade issues and one energy 
related case. The only ongoing energy case between the parties since 2014 is in regards to 
discriminatory certification for third countries within the Third Energy Package. 
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time a substantial and individualised section of either PCA, nor was in the precise focus 
of the EU-Russia Common Spaces (since energy area was attributed to the Common 
Economic Space).   
The growing importance of energy interactions between Russia and the EU facilitated 
the need for the creation of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue launched on the 30th of 
October 2000 during the 6th EU-Russia Summit in Paris. Through a variety of Thematic 
Groups28 and the involvement of policy makers and energy experts upon which the EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue was built, the parties cemented their ambitious intentions to 
ensure stable energy markets and improve investment opportunities, enhance energy 
security, to modernise the energy sector and develop energy efficiency (EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue, 2001).  
As was noted by Hadfield (2008: 237) ‘Energy Dialogue was based from the outset not 
upon common values but rather ‘questions of common interest’’, one of the key 
interests of which was to build ‘a strategic energy partnership’ (EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue, 2001: 1). The strategic partnership in energy would mean that the two 
countries share the same energy interests, long-term security of supply goals and 
values about energy cooperation, which is built ‘on the basis of mutual trust, symmetry 
and equality’ (Adomeit, 2012: 13). Overall energy partnership can be cemented through 
sharing information about the developments in their economic, legislative, technical, 
environmental and other energy related areas. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue in the 
ten-year anniversary publication described its aim in the following way: 
Its objective was and is to strengthen the EU-Russia relations, to 
increase confidence and transparency, and to provide reliability, security 
and predictability of our energy relations based on market economies. 
The Dialogue is also a fundamental tool to further strengthen the overall 
EU-Russia relationship (EU-Russia Energy Dialogue: The First Ten 
Years, 2011: 23).  
Despite the importance of the Energy Dialogue for the EU mentioned in the official 
stipulations, there are obvious controversies and a divergence of ideas inside the EU 
institutions of what the Energy Dialogue is about. In the EU bureaucratic quarters there 
is little clarity among the officials about who started it, the reasons behind the time of its 
creation and the exact grounds for initiating the Energy Dialogue in the early 2000s 
(rather than later or sooner). The official of the Council General Secretariat and some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Including the modified and established in 2009 ‘Energy Strategies, Forecasts and Scenarios’, 




sources of the European Commission treat it as a ‘bottom-up’ initiative (Interview 3; 
Interview 4), referring to a variety of participating actors like states, energy companies, 
international financial institutions, academics and private actors (EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue, 2001: 3). Hence, other officials of the DG Energy support the ‘top-down’ 
launch of the Dialogue, emphasising involved personalities and the desire of both sides 
for energy cooperation on high political level. The cooperation within the Energy 
Dialogue ‘was triggered by growing energy dependence and price uncertainties’ 
(Interview 5), mainly facilitated by ‘the political architecture that affected the growth of 
energy prices’ (Interview 4).  
Official sources from the Council of the EU (Interview 3) characterised the framework of 
Energy Dialogue as a political ‘attempt to incorporate third countries like Russia and 
other newly independent states into a broader energy architecture and to advance the 
progress of the PCA on the ground’. In addition, after the EU enlargement of 2004, the 
PCA was extended to incorporate 10 new EU members. If Energy Dialogue was 
believed to advance the implementation of PCA provisions in economic and political 
agendas, as the 5th Progress Report mentions (EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, 2004), 
then it seems plausible to choose energy as the common denominator for EU-Russia 
relations due to the vital role energy plays in the their interdependent relations. 
Nevertheless, the situation with the PCA re-negotiations and the inclusion of the 
chapter on energy in the new agreement was far from being straightforward or easy. 
After the expiry of a 10-year period of the PCA, it should have been renewed 
automatically in 2007, if either of the parties had no objections. When the modification 
of the PCA was planned, its re-negotiation was blocked from the side of the EU, when 
the EU failed to come up with a supranational coherent approach to it.  
Other political issues triggered by the EU MSs negatively affected the PCA re-
negotiations. An example would be Poland’s veto to the opening chapter of the PCA re-
negotiations in 2006, as a protest to a Russian embargo on Polish food products in 
2005 (Copsey and Pomorska, 2010: 194; Szczerbiak, 2012). As a result, the deadlock 
with the PCA successor agreement appeared to be ignored in biannual EU-Russia 
summits and meetings within the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue framework. Ignoring of 
the PCA renegotiation lasted until 2008, when the Commission got a mandate from the 
EU Council of Ministers to proceed with the PCA. Since 2008, no notable progress has 
been achieved and the agreement is still not in place. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 
progress reports focus very little on the PCA and suggest no practical steps to advance 
the only plausible regulatory framework in the EU-Russia relations. The disagreement 
on the addition of the energy chapter into the Common Economic Space of the 
modifying PCA proved energy to be an obstacle, straining EU-Russia bilateral 
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cooperative intentions, rather than acting as a unifying and accelerating factor. Hadfield 
(2008: 239) summed it up that the demise of the Energy Dialogue persists due to its 
focus ‘on practical cooperation while avoiding politically sensitive areas’, which are 
imperative to be discussed and agreed on. Hitherto, it is rather difficult to evaluate the 
actual progress ‘on the ground’ with important issues evolving in the process of the EU-
Russia energy interplays. Fraser Cameron from the EU-Russia Centre mentioned that 
in 2011 the EU-Russia Dialogue was ‘going nowhere’ (Interview 23).  
The above examples illustrated that not only Russia’s approach to energy security is 
politically driven, but also how politicised the EU approach to energy security is, being 
undermined by individual EU MSs. Despite EU’s and Russia’s intentions to de-politicise 
their energy interactions, EU’s political elites in Brussels realise that it is impossible to 
completely eliminate political dimension of energy security due to the existence of 
political shocks instigated by Russia or occurring with Russia’s participation. Thus EU 
official claimed that: 
Politics is there and will be there, but the approach should be responsible 
and creating good framework conditions for energy market 
development…Politics should create and maintain the conditions for the 
creation of level-playing field (Interview 6). 
The examples also revealed the lack of mutually shared understanding in the EU 
apparatus and disunity of ideas and common approached, leading to poor outcomes 
and misunderstandings. The inability of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue to reflect on 
important and contemporary energy issues29 and the lack of importance attached to 
renewing the PCA, have negative implications for the EU-Russia energy climate. The 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue as a tool for their strategic energy partnership lost its 
momentum, demonstrating the lack of concrete mutual steps and political will to modify 
the PCA, advocate for a new version of the Energy regulatory framework, or upgrade 
the Energy Charter Treaty Agreement. In broader terms, these failures mean that so far 
the Union as a coherent energy actor struggles to pursue energy cooperation with 
Russia on a bilateral level as both major energy initiatives proved to be 
uncompromised and ineffective. Thus rather than becoming a common energy security 
denominator between Russia and the EU, Energy Dialogue remains just a ‘forum in 
which the diplomatic fallout between the two is most acute’ that lacks ‘substantial policy 
output’ (Hadfield, 2008: 233).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The only visible achievement of the parties to react on the energy disruption events was the 
creation of the Early Warning Mechanism. 
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Partnership for Modernisation (2010) is another initiative proposed to complement 
Common Spaces in the area of trade, cooperation, energy security and efficiency, 
human rights, and investments. In this way Europe provides technological, energy, 
financial and institutional modernisation of Russian sectors. Reinforcing the strategic 
partnership between the parties, former President of the European Council Herman 
Van Rompuy noted that parties need not the ‘reset’ of their relations but a ‘fast forward’ 
through modernising Russian economy (Van Rompuy, 2010). The recognition of 
inefficiency, lack of dynamism and slow motion of the decision-making in their 
relationships serve as the basis for yet another cooperation agreement, in the form of 
the Partnership for Modernisation. It is unclear how the parties can justify the amount of 
similar ‘sectoral’ approaches dealing with identical issues, just under different 
normative titles. Outwardly, parties aim to substitute the poor quality of their relations 
with the quantity, postponing the need to make substantial steps forward and solve 
contentious issues. 
In conclusion, EU-Russia energy relations represent a ‘partnership without a strategy’ 
(Butorina, 2013), which is not sustained by solid policy steps and a shared energy 
vision. Rather it is simply an aspiration for the futuristic long-term goal of building an 
elusive strategic energy partnership, which, regardless on the mutual public references 
as strategic partners, is still on the embryonic level.30 Director of the EU-Russia centre 
in Brussels Fraser Cameron called the EU-Russian strategic partnership ‘meaningless’ 
as the EU does not share main strategic interests, values, views or goals with Russia 
(Interview 23). Hitherto, the basis for the EU-Russia instrumentalisation framework of 
the EU-Russia energy relations is missing. The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue continues 
to have a discursive nature, being the platform for discussions of policy steps and 
future energy strategies, rather than constructive policy-making instrument. As Hadfield 
(2008: 237) stated, ‘while the EU engages in dialogue in which energy is a discursive 
element, Russian participation is based on energy as a foreign policy instrument 
accompanied, rather than underwritten, by dialogue’. Since Russia has no intention of 
joining the EU and does not adopt EU norms, world views and conditionality (Manners, 
2002), the Union has little normative power to commit Russia providing security of gas 
supply to the EU, beyond the observed energy initiatives. The European Commission 
characterised EU-Russia energy relations as an ‘anomaly’, since ‘Russia knows how to 
play weak hand hardly and the EU knows how to play strong hand weakly’ (Interview 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For more information on the EU-Russia strategic energy partnership see Repyeuskaya, O. 
2012. The Construction of the EU-Russia 'Strategic Energy Partnership': Clash of Identities or 
Where Do the Interests Come from? International Journal of Energy Security and Environmental 
Research. 1, pp.33-46. 
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4). Political elites from both sides fail to recognise those two incommensurable 
approaches to energy.  
 
5.2. Russia as an International Energy Player 
In addressing the first research sub-question about factors that undermined the EU 
relations with Russia, this section explores Russia’s domestic and international energy 
policy as the most obvious and widely acknowledged reason for EU’s energy insecurity. 
Commonly entitled an ‘energy superpower’ by the West (Rutland, 2008; Klare, 2008), 
the Russian energy foreign policy and approaches towards Belarus and Ukraine in 
early 2000s were interpreted as threatening by the EU and facilitated energy policy 
implications for the EU and its MSs. Therefore, analysing Russia’s dominating 
behaviour on energy markets and the particular economic and political tools it uses to 
increase its international presence, will allow an understanding of the change in 
European energy thinking and explain the shift towards energy securitisation.  
5.2.1. The Development of Russia’s Energy Foreign Policy Identity 
After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia underwent a period of huge political and 
economic challenges, affecting its international image. In the 1990s Russia went 
through economic stagnation (marked by the range of ineffective structural economic 
reforms, financial default, increase in the rate of poverty, hyperinflation and foreign debt) 
and political inefficiency (aggravated by high levels of corruption of the political elites 
and governmental apparatus, mismanagement and power centralisation, and a 
constitutional crisis with failed democratisation reforms). The energy-related sector’s 
sustainability was undermined by ineffective energy production, cheap export, 
fragmentation of energy industries and radical privatisation of energy assets. In 
addition, much of the country’s mineral wealth and energy assets were concentrated in 
the hands of a narrow circle of people (oligarchs) with short-term rent-seeking interests.  
From the year 2000 onward Russia entered a contentious period known as ‘Vladimir 
Putin’s era’ (Lucas, 2008: 38), who’s undemocratic rule, breaching human rights at the 
domestic and international level and uncompromising foreign policy stance hugely 
undermined the opinion of the international community of Russian energy intentions 
(Hashim, 2010; Trenin, 2007). Vladimir Putin, is a political figure and the ultimate 
energy decision-maker, who occupied the country’s major posts as the President 
between 2000 and 2008 and the Prime Minister afterwards, returning to the Presidency 
in 2012. Vladimir Putin took an affirmative course to overcome international 
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‘humiliation’, facilitating a resurgence of Russia’s weight in foreign politics and 
economics, based on the development of energy industries and their financial, 
technological and other capabilities. The energy prices and the growing international 
demand for gas during mid-2000s favoured Russia’s goals and put it in an 
advantageous position as the main gas exporter to Europe (until 2015 when oil prices 
dropped considerably).  
Under President Vladimir Putin energy became a core of Russia’s foreign policy 
agenda and the essence of Russian national interests abroad (Klare, 2008; Rutland, 
2008). Russian references to energy security are reflected in key Russian official 
documentation: three Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation (adopted in 
June 2000, July 2008 and February 2013), the National Security Concept of the 
Russian Federation (approved in January 2000) and the National Security Strategy of 
the Russian Federation until 2020 (adopted May 2009). All of the above documents 
point to energy security as one of the country’s general priorities of strategic policy 
making31.  
Consequently, Russia’s ways to increase its international energy dominance through a 
range of geoeconomic tools that are used for political purposes (resulting in supply 
disruptions and selective price policies with individual countries that are to be 
discussed further) gradually contributed to Russia’s title as an ‘energy superpower’. 
The term ‘energy superpower’ is applied to energy-endowed Russia and often has 
historical connotations with aggressive and coercive intentions, military power and 
nuclear contestations (Klare, 2008; Larsson, 2006; Rutland, 2008; Milov, 2006b; Baev, 
2008; Smith, 2011). According to Klare (2008: 88) ‘Nothing better exemplifies the 
altered power relationships of the new international energy order than the emergence 
of Russia as an energy superpower, capable of leveraging its extraordinary resource 
abundance into immense geopolitical influence’. 
Translating Russia’s superpower energy policy image into the wide array of positivist 
academic literature, Western scholars describe Russia’s energy policy in terms of: 
Russian economic imperialism and energy geoeconomics (Smith, 2004; Baev, 2008; 
Wigell and Vihma, 2016), divide and dominate approach (Smith, 2008; Baran, 2007: 
131), strategic manipulation (Stulberg, 2007), energy ‘mercantilism’ and power 
greatness (Baev, 2010), energy weapon and a foreign policy tool (Lucas, 2012; Aalto, 
2012; Smith, 2011), and instrument of power (De Haas, 2010). Much of the 
identification of the Russian international energy behaviour stems from the Soviet era 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




and the geopolitics of the Cold War. Mey (2004: 73) projected Russia’s behaviour 
aimed to regain its role as the Eurasian great power could be spilled-over to other 
historical spheres of influence as CEE countries. Thus, Russia’s attitude towards the 
European gas market can be characterised by a three-fold approach, consisting of:  
co-optation - cultivating partnerships with certain countries, political 
leaders and corporations as levels of its interests; pre-emption - using 
upstream [involved in exploration and extraction] power and Russian 
diplomacy to manipulate situations downstream [corporations that process 
the raw material] and to scoop up assets; and disaggregation – splitting 
the EU through bilateral deals (citation of Robert Amsterdam in Malhotra 
(2007).  
Energy related supply disruptions from Russia in the mid-2000s significantly 
contributed to a growing academic consensus that ‘Russia employs non-transparent, 
monopolistic and coercive energy politics to expand political leverage over near 
neighbours and key EU states (Tardy, 2009: 103). This scholarly image corresponds to 
the conceptualisation of Russia that exists in the EU (with slight variations in-between 
the EU MSs and on the pan-European level in Brussels). A variety of official speeches 
and publicly available information reinforce this shared perception in the EU institutions 
about energy being used as a political tool (Oettinger, 2011; Interview 4). Similarly, 
European Parliament Resolution (2012) confirms the existence of ‘external pressures 
and attempts to use energy supply and prices as a tool of foreign policy pressure’.  
According to Misik (2015: 210), ‘Russia favours a situation where it can negotiate with 
member states on a bilateral basis as it has greater influence that way’ and gain better 
bargaining positions. In addition, through utilising negative tools of influence (such as 
direct supply disruptions or use of high gas prices) and appealing ‘rewards’ for the EU 
MSs (including mutually beneficial bilateral energy deals with individual EU MSs or 
asset swaps) Russia creates ‘divergent pressures on EU members and thus weaken 
the cohesion of the EU’ (Wigell and Vihma, 2016: 611). As Wigell and Vihma noted:  
A geoeconomic operation, if applied successfully, can be expected to 
generate a more dispersed threat perception in a target country or 
coalition than a geopolitical operation (Wigell and Vihma, 2016: 611).  
By using the above geopolitical and geoeconomic tools, Russia also opposes the EU’s 
growing normative power hegemony and its pan-European constituency. Russia tends 
to get on board the most prominent and ‘pragmatically-minded’ EU MSs (like Germany) 
based on the difference of their identity from other EU MSs (Morozov, 2012: 42). In 
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particular, relationships with Germany were chosen as the key door towards influencing 
the EU policy-making, making Germany ‘a target of Russia’s carrot-orientated gas 
policies—or wedge strategy—which has resulted in German politicians not favouring 
EU unity in external energy security issues’ (Wigell and Vihma, 2016: 616). It also 
means that the EU normative power aspirations fail when it comes to energy security, 
which for some EU MSs is a part of national security, as the EU MSs follow their own 
route to energy relations with suppliers. Regardless of whether Russia has a cliché of 
an energy superpower identity, or just the identity of a prominent country with a defined 
set of energy interests, it is still perceived as alienated, being ‘the other’ for the EU 
(Morozov, 2012: 41-42), against which the EU can relate itself (Neumann, 1999; De 
Buitrago, 2012). Casier (2011: 538) attributed the EU-Russia energy disagreements 
deriving from changing EU and Russian identities rather than unexpected insecurities, 
which will include not only energy identity and interests, but a broader aspects of 
Russia’s foreign policy position. 
Is seems that EU’s perceptions of Russia are often influenced by not necessarily 
Russian energy policy, but rather its general foreign policy image. Belov (2012: 83-97) 
stated that multifaceted historic events and the past trigger external perceptions about 
the image of the country. Such subjective images and stereotypes of a country’s image 
are shaped gradually. It is not always possible to separate the general foreign policy 
perceptions of a country from the energy economic dimension as energy has become a 
widely used political issue, therefore the meanings are often intertwined and blurred, 
especially in the Russian case. Rigmar (2002) explained the Russian foreign policy 
course as being based on other countries that accept its image. Energy superpower 
identity Russia seems to be an example of how the external perception of Russia is 
constructed (Wendt, 1999), bringing historical stereotypes of the Cold War and 
negative collective memories of the power struggle to generate such an image (Rutland, 
2009: 187), especially in Eastern European countries. 
Russian authorities do not share the negative ‘superpower’ image and EU’s 
‘generalised stereotypes’, trying to oppose EU’s political constructions and putting 
labels. Hence Russia does not deny the country’s might and leadership either. One of 
the main critics of putting any label of the concept of ‘energy superpower’ on Russia is 
Vladimir Milov, the head of the Institute of Energy Policy and a former Russian Deputy 
Energy Minister, who calls it an ‘illusion with no basis in reality’ (Milov, 2006b). 
President Vladimir Putin referred to superpower as:  
the word we used during the Cold War. And the Cold War is over. I 
have never referred to Russia as an energy superpower. But we do 
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have greater possibilities than almost any other country in the world. If 
put together Russia’s energy potential in all areas, oil, gas, and nuclear, 
our country is unquestionably the leader (Yergin, 2011: 40).  
Regardless, the negative claims about Russia posing political threat to other countries 
are contradicted by OECD risk assessment research. In the OECD ‘Country Risk 
Classification’32 based on a progressive scale from 0 (no risk) to 7 (highest level of 
political risk), Russia consistently scores 3-4 since mid-2000s compared to other gas 
suppliers like Libya or Iran whose position fluctuates around 6-7 (OECD, 2014a). The 
median positioning in the political risk-scale helps to believe that the dangers of energy 
assets expropriation and concerns about doing business with the Russian energy 
companies are a much lower risk that some EU MSs believe. Some scholars are also 
less critical about Russia’s energy actorness. For instance, Henry (2010: 3) presented 
a rather tolerant view of Russia as a potential energy threat. He stated that possibilities 
of source risks (connected with resource nationalism and armed conflicts) and transit 
risks (disruptions) in Russia are low and medium (respectively) compared to the 
Central Asian region or the Middle East.  
Hitherto, the Russian energy foreign policy image remains contradictive and much 
speculated about, which ultimately impacts Russia’s relationships with the EU. In 
addition, cultivating Russian superpower identity endangers the prospective of partner-
like energy relations with the EU and its members as it impacts Russia’s self-image, 
through the constructed effects of a self-fulfilling prophecy, described in the theory 
chapter (Wendt, 1999: 263). As a result, it can only increase Russia’s ‘temptation’ to 
legitimise and justify its behaviour by the image that has been constructed in the EU 
and imposed from abroad (Interview 2). 
5.2.2. Gazprom as a Consolidator of Russian Energy Interests 
In the period of 2004 and 2012, the best way for Russia to reach its strategic energy 
goals was through the concentration of energy assets in the hands of the state. 
Contradicting Friedrich Hayek’s western neoliberal ideas about the fatality of 
governmental intervention into business and the lack of economic virtues of the state-
owned companies (Hayek, 2001), Vladimir Putin’s intentions were marked by a rather 
harsh re-nationalisation of the energy resources, assets and strategic energy 
companies (Klare, 2008; Perovic and Orttung, 2009), like in the example of the famous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The country risk is composed of transfer and convertibility risk (i.e. the risk that a government 
imposes capital or exchange controls that prevent an entity from converting local currency into 
foreign currency and/or transferring funds to creditors located outside the country) and cases of 
force majeure (e.g. war, expropriation, revolution, civil disturbance, floods, earthquakes). 
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Yukos case. Governmental control was established over earlier privatised energy 
resources, businesses and most of the energy assets, including the two national 
energy giants – oil company Rosneft and gas company Gazprom.  
Gazprom is a vertically integrated company33 that holds a monopoly on energy export34, 
with the state controlling 50.002% of company shares. Despite the number of other 
domestic energy players on the Russian gas market (like Novatek, TNK-BP; LUKoil, 
Bashneft; ITERA, Surgutneftegaz and others) Gazprom holds the majority of upstream 
production and gas export to Europe (Table 1). 
Table 1: Key Energy Indicators of Russian Gas Industry, 2004-2012 
Years Domestic Gas 
Production in Russia, 
bcm 
Domestic Gas 
Consumption in Russia, 
bcm 
EU Primary Gas 
Imports from Russia, 
% 
2004 573.3 393.1 43.6 
2005 580.1 400.3 40.7 
2006 595.2 408.5 39.3 
2007 592.0 422.1 38.7 
2008 601.7 416.0 37.6 
2009 527.7 389.6 33.0 
2010 588.9 414.1 29.5 
2011 607.0 424.6 31.0 
2012 592.3 416.2 32.0 
Source35: BP (2013: 22-23) and (Eurostat, 2014c)  
In the attempts to diminish the negative effects of a resource-based economy, also 
known as the ‘resource curse’ (Ahrend, 2005; Ellman, 2006), the new Russian 
government took a course towards the development of the carbon economy based on 
oil and gas production and export. Russia remains the biggest energy endowed country 
in the 21st century, remaining one of the key energy producer and exporter in the world. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A vertically integrated company is a firm that participates in more than one level of a supply 
chain (e.g. import/production, supply, transmission, distribution). 
34 Since Gazprom is governmentally owned and has monopoly on gas export, it is often used 
interchangeable with the ‘Russian state’ in the mass media and the energy scholarly debates, 
which is a social construction in itself.  
35 There exist differences between statistical approaches in Russia and international standards, 
as Russian statistical indicators are considerably higher. For instance, according to the ‘Central 
Dispatch Administration of the fuel and energy complex’ (SE "CDU TEK") in Russia, the 
production of gas in 2010 was on the level of 620 bcm (which is considerably higher the BP 
data of 588 bcm). However, the trend in fluctuations of the indicators tends to be comparable.  
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In 2012 Russia contained 17.6% of proven natural gas reserves in the world, making it 
the world’s second largest gas endowed country (BP, 2013). The largest part of these 
proven reserves is controlled by the state-owned company Gazprom, either directly or 
through joint ventures.  
The unified gas supply system in Russia, inherited from the Soviet time and newly built, 
includes around 162 000 km of pipeline grids and 25 underground gas storage (UGS), 
mainly owned by Gazprom (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2011). The 
developed pipeline infrastructure enables the country to export gas to almost all the EU 
MSs, making energy supply the main basis for cooperation (and consequently 
disagreements) with other countries. Countries of the former Soviet Union occupy the 
first destination for Russian gas, followed by Europe, Turkey and Asian countries. In 
fact, Germany is the main gas importing country in the EU and so far has been the key 
Russian energy partner.  
Predictably, Russia uses its advantageous energy endowed position to provide 
economic sustainability and financial development for the country. The primary way to 
achieve these ends is through state-owned and state-controlled national energy 
champions. Therefore, the Russian government uses Gazprom as a mean for reaching 
its macro- and micro-economic targets as well as foreign policy goals (Smith, 2008; 
Rosner, 2006). ‘Gazprom’s market capitalisation has become a key indicator of 
Russia’s international status’ (Baev, 2008: 117). 
Since Gazprom is an economic and political hybrid it has a difficult task to balance the 
commercial interests of investors (maximising profit and pursuing a cost-effective policy 
as an Open Joint Stock Company), and the legitimately strategic political goals of the 
state, as the state is the key shareholder of Gazprom. Such a multi-faceted position 
provides Gazprom with the flexibility and leeway to act accordingly, justifying its 
selective policies on either economic or political grounds. This logic drives Gazprom to 
pursue a rather politically biased course of action, according to the rules and norms 
that are perceived proper and legitimate in a particular situation, substituting its role as 
a commercial actor and a state security provider, when needed36. 
As a profit-driven company, Gazprom remains the main financial tax-paying source into 
the country’s budget and a major source of employment (Dergunova, 2008: 88). Under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For more information about Russia’s behaviour in the logic of appropriateness see March, J.G. 
1994. Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen. New York: Free Press.; Sending, 
O.G. 2002. Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the `Logic of Appropriateness' and 
its Use in Constructivist Theory. European Journal of International Relations. 8, pp.443-470. 
119 
 
the commercial logic, the company pursued a rather ‘successful’37 international energy 
approach of expanding its gas export portfolio in Europe and the rest of the world, 
diversifying the transmission routes and maintaining security of demand (Gazprom, 
2013). Gazprom’s strategic goal is to ‘become a leader among global energy 
companies by developing new markets, diversifying business activities and securing 
the reliability of supplies’ (Gazprom, 2012c). That is how Russia often constructs and 
‘justifies’ its incentives for getting access to downstream activities, pipelines and UGSs 
in other countries, as well as significantly increasing gas prices for previously 
subsidised post-Soviet countries like Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia to bring them in line 
with market process. Since 2002, Gazprom’s export strategy has been based on profit 
maximisation (focused on high gas prices rather than volumes of sold gas), control of 
upstream production, access to downstreams and the end-customers in Europe. It also 
included gas take-or-pay38 contracts with the energy industries from the EU MSs (that 
were often supported by the inter-governmental agreements (IGAs)), and diversification 
into direct routes to the EU, circumventing transiting states (Mitrova, 2012), that are  
believed to be beneficial in the long-run due to the non-existing transit fees.  
Meanwhile, Gazprom’s expansionist energy strategy has been largely perceived as 
menacing and dominating in the EU, since Gazprom buys energy assets, shares in 
companies, interconnectors, pipelines, downstreams, UGS and possible energy 
projects in EU countries (Oettinger, 2011; Interview 4). Already in 2006, Gazprom had 
significant stakes in the majority of the EU-27 companies, such as 50% of Wintershall 
Erdgas, 49% of Ditgaz, 100% of Zarubezgas Erdgashandel in Germany and ownership 
of up to 50% of shares of gas companies in Poland, France, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Greece, and Bulgaria (Kupchinsky, 2006). Until recently, it has been controlling the 
whole process from production to delivery to end-consumers (Tardy, 2009: 103-104).  
Regardless of the validity of the economic arguments and the rationalisation behind 
Gazprom’s gas policy-making in relations to its European partners, there has been 
always an element of political involvement. For a long time the state-owned and state-
operated company was subsidising its domestic energy market with low gas prices (by 
that protecting country’s national interests in chemical and steel industries) and was 
actively involved in regulating the gas wholesale prices and tariffs for pipeline 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 However, some energy analysts raise doubts over the route choice and commercial viability 
of the Nord Stream, as well as criticise Gazprom’s wasteful sponsorship of irrelevant enterprises 
and events (like football championships, Olympic Games 2014) not mentioning corruption in the 
gas industry. 
38  ‘Take-or-pay’ is a provision in the contract between supplier and consumer, that the 




transportations. Furthermore, under direct political guidance Gazprom has been 
involved in the economic diversification strategy by creating pipeline overcapacities in 
the European direction (through mainly costly offshore pipelines like the Blue Stream, 
Nord and South Streams and recently the Turkish Stream) to avoid political conflicts 
with the transiting states (Gotz, 2008: 59-61). Gazprom also attempts to diversify its 
energy supply away from the lucrative and well-established European markets to the 
new Asian markets, having signed the biggest 30-year pipeline gas supply contract 
with China in 2014 (Gazprom, 2014a). 
In legislative terms, the Russian state shapes Gazprom’s business strategy through 
legislative acts, trying to assist country’s economic development (Gazprom, 2012c). 
Just a few indicative examples can be presented. One of the first steps was to allocate 
exclusive gas export rights to Gazprom through adopting the Federal Law ‘About gas 
export’ in 2006 (President of Russia, 2006), that was modified in 2013, allowing more 
companies to export LNG. Another example of promoting Gazprom’s domestic 
governmental control was the law, which restricted private and foreign companies from 
developing upstream oil and gas reserves (under the explanation of difficulties in 
guaranteeing the investments)39. Thus, in 2008 the government and parliament agreed 
on a law, allowing the government to allocate strategically important energy deposits in 
off shore reserves without auction. Since only state-owned and 5-year experienced 
companies could be considered legitimate to develop the Russian continental shelf40, in 
practice it meant that two national industries Gazprom and Rosneft have monopolised 
this exploration. 
In addition, the protective governmental stance was openly and legitimately 
acknowledged by Vladimir Putin’s Executive Order of 11 September 2012 ‘On 
Measures to Protect the Interests of the Russian Federation during Engagement by 
Russian Legal Entities in Foreign Business’ (President of Russia, 2012). The new law 
prohibits open joint stock companies undertaking any activities that might damage the 
economic interests of the Russian Federation. Consequently, Gazprom is restrained in 
disclosing such information to foreign authorities, selling their strategically important 
assets to foreign companies, or amending energy contracts without governmental 
approval. The above examples highlight the national importance of energy resources 
for the Russian state and the political means that the Russian state uses to follow its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 With a few exceptions of Lukoil that got a share in the Caspian sea exploration; Novatek that 
has easier access to licences, upstream assets, tax exemptions; French Total and Norway’s 
Statoil are involved in the off shore project in the Barents Sea; and Royal Dutch Shell signed an 
agreement on the 8th of April 2013 about cooperation in the Arctic region. 
40  It includes Sakhalin II and III; Shtokman; Prirazlomnoye and Dolginskoye; Severo-
Kamennomysskoye and Kamennomysskoye-Sea fields. 
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energy strategic interests (Yergin, 2011: 32-42; De Haas, 2010: 66-67, 125-130; Aalto, 
2012).  
5.2.3. Russia’s Energy Conflicts with the Transiting States: Implication for 
the EU 
Russia’s quest for assertiveness and its aspiration for international recognition under 
Vladimir Putin led the country to use energy as political and economic instruments, 
demonstrating its authority to the whole world. The country uses a variety of 
approaches (such as price increase, supply termination and purchase of the key 
energy assets and energy company shares) to establish its presence and influence in 
former Soviet Union countries, which Russia considers to be its area of pronounced 
geopolitical and privileged interests.  
The perceptions of Russia’s energy approach vary among Russian and Western 
scholars and analysts, as well as in the official statements of the involved parties, 
which have radically different perspectives on the gas disruption events. Since conflicts 
between Russia and the transiting states have been thoroughly analysed by many 
scholars (Smith, 2004; Balmaceda and Rosner, 2006; Balmaceda, 2008; Pirani et al., 
2009; Yafimava, 2011), the chapter offers just a brief overview of the nature of these 
energy transit disputes. The aim is to explain European vulnerability to physical 
disruption in gas supply as an energy security threat and discuss repercussions on the 
energy security perceptions in the EU. 
The importance of Ukrainian and Belarusian transit routes for Russian gas to Europe 
can be inferred from the statistical evidences. Until the Nord Stream was built, around 
80% of Russian gas flows went through Ukraine (through the Soyuz and Brotherhood 
that is also known as Druzhba pipelines), with the remaining 20% through Belarus, 
which is a part of Yamal-Europe transmission system (Stern, 2006; Aalto, 2008). There 
are several major export pipelines that deliver Gazprom’s gas to its main consumers in 








Figure 1: Russia’s Pipeline Network to Europe 
 
Source: (The Economist, 2009)  
The major transit risks were revealed all the way through 2000s, when energy 
disruptions to Europe occurred due to Russian conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus. 
Being Russia’s diplomatic allies in the Commonwealth of Independent States, since the 
dissolution of the USSR, Russia supplied gas to these countries at lowered prices, 
subsidising their economies for a range of economic and diplomatic concessions, and a 
Moscow-loyal political course (Klare, 2008; Baev, 2008: 73). 
In the Belarusian case, the long-term strategy of purchasing energy stakes in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States reached Belarus in 2000s, when Russia 
became interested in purchasing the gas infrastructure company Beltransgaz (which by 
2011 became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gazprom). Both Belarus and Russia were 
involved in the protracted political and economic manipulations in 2004, 2007 and 2010 
during energy contract re-negotiations. The manipulations included mutual concessions 
and power games of ‘sticks and carrots’, threats of non-payments for the gas, 
possibilities of cutting off energy transit routes to Europe through Yamal-Europe 
pipeline and the increase of the gas transit fees (Balmaceda and Rosner, 2006; Nygren, 
2008; Yafimava, 2011). The failure of Belarus to fulfil its contractual obligations, energy 
price payment disputes between Russia and Belarus and Russia’s reluctance to 
123 
 
provide further concessions resulted in temporary energy disruptions to the country. 
These included gas disruptions in January-February 2004, oil interruptions through the 
Druzhba pipeline that leads to Europe41 in January 2007 and gas conflict in June 2010 
due to Russia’s failure to pay the increased revised transit fees through Belarus to 
Europe (that posed temporary concerns of the Baltic States).  
In the meantime, similar confrontations but on a bigger scale occurred during energy 
contract renegotiations with Ukraine, escalating in the winters of 2005-2006 and 2008-
2009. The misunderstandings and conflicts between Ukrainian and Russian political 
elites, triggered by anti-Russian and pro-Western changes in the Ukrainian government 
during the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005, spilled over into energy disputes in 2006 
and 2009. The officially stated grounds for disagreements were the increased price for 
Russian gas; the inflexible volume of Russian gas that Ukraine has to buy; Ukraine’s 
non-fulfilment of its contractual obligations to pay the increased price; Ukraine’s 
decision to withdraw unauthorised fuel from the shipments destined for the EU after 
Russia cut the gas supply for Ukraine, and Ukraine’s attempt to raise transit fees 
(Pirani et al., 2009; Yafimava, 2011). In the aftermath the 2009 crisis, Ukraine and 
Russia signed two separate agreements, distinguishing between the transit gas 
deliveries to the EU from supplies to Ukraine for the internal consumption (Gazprom, 
2014b), which aimed to enhance certainty in supplies to the EU. Hitherto, Ukraine 
keeps struggling to pay the established gas price, taking loans from Gazprombank and 
Internationally Monetary Fund 42  as well as since recently trying to organise gas 
supplies from Europe through the reverse energy flow. 
Interestingly, the most significant energy disruptions to European countries took place 
in autumn 1992 and February 1994, when for more than a week German supplies were 
decreased by almost 50%, and Italian and French customers under-received up to 20% 
from the amount indicated in their contracts (Stern, 1995: 60-61). Nevertheless, energy 
supply issues were not brought to the wider public attention and the process of energy 
securitisation or even politicisation did not start then and there in early 1990s, when 
Russia was politically and economically weak and insignificantly important on the 
international stage. Stern (1995) believes that another reason for non-securitisation 
and non-politicisation of energy flows in the 1990s was that the disruptions occurred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Mainly to Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Germany. 
42 Despite the time-frame for this research ending at  2012, the years of 2012 and 2014 were 
characterised by the continuation of the gas price disagreements, exacerbated by Russian-
Ukrainian political tensions around the Crimea annexation to Russia in 2014 and escalation of 
the conflict to the Eastern parts of Ukraine. Having an additional gas discount from Russia in 
2012 until 2015, Ukraine had still failed to comply with its contractual supply obligations, 
accumulating significant debts for Russian gas. On the basis of strict gas contract provisions, 
Russia raised the prices for gas to Ukraine in April 2014.  
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not during the peak winter periods, when stable energy supply is more salient. Thus the 
EU countries managed to deal with the economic consequences swiftly and relatively 
pain-free.  
Energy security became initially politicised in the Copenhagen School terms in the first 
half of the 2000s (Waever, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998) by becoming a frequent topic on 
political agenda at EU summits and the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue meetings. Hence, 
there were no grounds for securitisation steps in early 2000s. Russia at this point had 
not been viewed as an energy threat but rather, ‘despite difficulties… always fulfilled its 
supply obligations under its long-term contracts with the European Union’ (European 
Commission, 2000: 23). According to Jonathan Stern from the Oxford Institute of 
Energy Studies, in 2004 there was a ‘surplus of supply’, ‘slow growth in gas demand’ 
and ‘little problem about the general availability of gas in European Union countries’ 
(Stern, 2004).  
In 2000 in the Green Paper ‘Towards a European strategy for the security of energy 
supply’, the European Commission noted growing external European energy 
dependence and the inadequate attempts of EU MSs for quantitative minimisation of 
the reliance on external energy sources in the aftermath of the first oil crisis (European 
Commission, 2000: 28-29). Initially, the emphasis was that European ‘security of 
supply does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, 
but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence’ (European Commission, 2000: 
3). Growing reliance on energy imports from non-EU countries and the high oil prices of 
the late 1990s were presented as a potentially evolving problems and new concern for 
security of supply in the future (European Commission, 2000: 61), but not as an acute 
current issue needing urgent actions. In order to enhance long-term energy security in 
the EU, the Commission advocated for the ‘Community dimension’ of EU common 
energy interests (European Commission, 2000: 3, 28). 
In Brussels, alertness to the security of energy supply has been gradually growing after 
the first supply incidents between Russia and the transiting states in mid-2000s, 
becoming reflected in EU official documentation and strengthened security language in 
the EU public discussions (Council of the European Union, 2004; European 
Commission, 2006: 7-9). The Directive of the EU Council 2004/67/EC ‘Concerning 
measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply’ reinforced EU security of supply 
concerns, which were accelerated by EU enlargement of 2004 and expanding its 
borders to more energy dependent and vulnerable countries (Council of the European 
Union, 2004). The same Directive finally defined the meaning of ‘major supply 
disruption’ as when ‘the Community would risk to lose more than 20% of its gas supply 
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from third countries and the situation at Community level is not likely to be adequately 
managed with national measures’ (Council of the European Union, 2004: 127/93). As 
an additional step, in May 2007 the European Commissioner for External Relations and 
European Neighbourhood Policy and EU Energy Commissioner launched a 
mechanism for enhancing the EU’s external energy security, called the Network of 
Energy Security Correspondence (NESCO). NESCO was endorsed in 2007, aiming for 
‘collecting and processing existing geopolitical and energy related information and to 
provide an early warning tool to support the Union's overall strategy with the aim of 
ensuring the security of energy supply’ (Council of the European Union, 2006b: 15).  
The anticipated threat of energy supply disruption in mid-2000s became a reality for the 
EU during the crisis of 2009 between Russia and Ukraine, when immense cross-border 
supply disruptions for many EU MSs occurred. Subsequently, due to Russia-Ukraine 
misunderstandings in 2009 the gas flow was interrupted to 18 European countries in 
the winter of 2009: Bulgaria did not receive 100% of its gas, Slovakia under-received 
97% of its normal supplies, Czech Republic – 71%, Austria – 66%, Slovenia – 50%, 
Hungary – 45%, Poland  - 33%, around 60% of German Southern corridor, comprising 
10% overall for Germany (Westphal, 2009: 22-23). For many EU countries it was 
definitely more than 20% of gas disruption identified by the EU Council Directive 
2004/67/EC. The energy crises jeopardised the EU’s short-term and mid-term 
perceptions about Russia, contributing to the negative image of it being an unreliable 
and non-credible gas supplier (Baev, 2008: 157), using energy as a foreign policy tool 
(Smith, 2008; Lucas, 2012). The 2009 gas crisis triggered EU energy concerns about 
Russian energy policy tactics, accelerating anti-Russian rhetoric within the EU. 
The key trepidations within the EU MSs were that Russia might apply the same political 
tool to deliberately disrupt the supply to Europe, from which the most energy import 
dependent CEE countries will suffer. The EU official commented on the situation by 
saying that ‘sometimes you are afraid of something to happen and it happens because 
you are afraid’ (Interview 6). At times, the anticipations of the negative effect might 
instigate the negative dynamics of energy crises. In other words, what the possible 
future material effects will be from a situation that has not yet come to be. Thus while 
the ultimate effects might be material, the perceived uncertainty about future threats, 
risks and insecurities are ideational (Buzan et.al., 1998). The same EU official clearly 
attributed the European energy security ‘paranoia’ coming from a perception that there 
is a vulnerability of the MSs as ‘the examples of supply interruptions projected its effect 
on member states that have not suffered yet’ (Interview 6).  
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The energy crisis exposed many salient weak points in European energy policy and 
was destined to become a turning point from energy politicisation, in the Copenhagen 
School’s terms, into the area of ‘panic politics’ and securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998). 
The stage of politicisation was aggravated and transformed to the level of securitisation 
of energy supplies from Russia, presenting it as a threat. The EU Declaration on the 
Russia-Ukraine Problem and Energy Security 2009 by the EU Council, reinforced the 
importance of solidarity within the Union and referred to gas interruptions as ‘a problem 
for the EU as such’ and not just individual EU MSs, causing European energy 
insecurity. The crisis indicated the need for binding ‘internationally recognised 
principles’ and the ‘conditions for a long term solution’ (Council of the European Union, 
2009). Therefore, supply disruptions confirmed the necessity for the EU to be unified 
and institutionalise energy solidarity principle in the EU legislation (to be discussed in 
Section 5.3.1.). 
Energy supply vulnerability triggered a range of immediate crisis responsive reactions, 
legal procedures and reactionary and preventative measures for EU MSs to enhance 
internal and external energy security and some gradually planned policies. The 
adopted Gas Supply EU Regulation concerning measures to safeguard security of gas 
supply 994/2010 (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010), 
was focused on the creation of the Gas Coordination Group. It raised the importance of 
EU interconnectedness and the reverse flow to take gas to where it is most needed, 
and enhanced common infrastructure and supply standards, introducing obligatory 30-
day storage of natural gas for energy EU MSs in case of unexpected gas disruptions. 
The EU MSs were obliged to develop the Preventive Action Plan and Emergency 
Action Plan in accordance with the same EU Regulation 994/2010. Those measures 
were directed to assess the risk of disruptions and prevent or mitigate the 
consequences and costs of energy supply risks. In addition to that, in 2011 the 
Information Exchange Mechanism was established by the Decision of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (994/2012/EU). This Mechanism covered new and 
existing bilateral IGAs with other countries in the field of energy that have an ‘impact on 
the internal energy market or on the security of energy supply in the Union’ (2012: 13).  
In 200943 the EU and Russia agreed a memorandum that introduced the Early Warning 
Mechanism that would provide joint actions and a rapid reaction in case of any energy 
supply emergency situation, or even a threat of such situation (European Commission, 
2011d). This Mechanism defined an emergency situation as a threat of disruptions from 
Russia. The amount of emergency securitisation measures introduced in the short-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The Early Warning Mechanism was updated in 2011. 
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term, but with the intention of having long-term effects, indicates that security of energy 
supply became an acute problem for the EU, accelerated by the 2009 gas crisis, rather 
than the illusive possibility as was regarded before.  
 
The analysis of Russia’s energy interests and identity presented in this Section 5.2. 
was pursued for the purpose of revealing the key external factor to EU’s energy 
insecurity. Being built as a part of its foreign policy approach, Russia’s energy policy 
towards other countries influenced European energy security and created energy threat 
perceptions of the EU MSs. As a reaction to the external energy threat, the EU pursued 
a variety of securitisation steps, which became a large part of perception-based 
policies and a broader EU energy security approach. The latter will be supplemented 
with the EU’s internal incentives to maintain its energy security mainly through the 
development of EU’s common domestic energy market and commonly shared principle 
of solidarity (Section 5.3.1.). 
 
 
5.3. The Formation of European Energy Security Interests and Identity between 
2004 and 2012 
Being affected by changes in the international energy environment and a range of 
already explored material factors (like energy source endowment, level of energy 
import dependence, and external energy threats posed by Russia’s energy policies), 
the EU has been trying to create a European energy policy, placing energy security at 
the heart of political and economic debates domestically and internationally. The Green 
Paper of 2006 ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’ 
presented the multi-dimensional three-fold key objectives of the European energy 
policy, focusing on sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply (European 
Commission, 2006). In accordance, energy security challenges included growing 
energy import dependence, the urge for investments in energy infrastructure, higher 
prices, increased global demand for energy and the competition for scarce resources, 
threats to the security of energy supply and changes to Europe’s climate (European 
Commission, 2006: 3-4). Followed by the 5 year Action Plan for Energy Efficiency and 
the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan of 2008 (European Commission, 
2008), the idea of energy security encompassed a whole range of climate and energy 
efficiency targets that should complement the objective of secure energy policy for 
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Europe44. However, since security of energy supplies is the precise focus of this thesis, 
and a growing concern for the EU, other dimensions of EU energy policy will be 
referred to indirectly.  
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the thesis utilises a general definition of the European 
security of energy supplies that was described by the EU Commission as ‘uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (European Commission, 2006: 6; 
IEA, 2013b). One of the most salient messages the EU has been delivering to its MSs 
is that reaching overarching EU energy security can be possible only through acting 
under the commonly shared principle of solidarity. Therefore, Section 5.3.1. explores 
the EU’s attempts to promote solidarity in the external and internal dimension of energy 
policy as an essential precondition to domestic and international energy security 
(European Commission, 2006; Council of the European Union, 2004; European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010). Through a variety of 
compulsory gas and electricity directives and other imposed legally binding goals, the 
EU directly and indirectly facilitates and constraints the development of the energy 
market and the security of supply of its MSs. Nevertheless, since most of the energy 
decision-making power is still concentrated under the EU MSs competences, the 
Union’s efforts to promote solidarity on the domestic energy market and the 
‘Community dimension’ of the EU common energy interests (European Commission, 
2000: 3, 28) are slowed down by the individual member states (Howorth, 2010). 
Therefore, problems with solidarity in this section are treated as a reflection of the EU’s 
incoherence of its interests and policies, which are empirically examined as a 
constituent part of the Jupille and Caporaso’s actorness framework in Section 5.3.2.  
5.3.1. Solidarity as a Precondition to European Energy Security 
The European Community has tried to bring the MSs together to treat each other in the 
‘spirit of solidarity’ from the early 1950s, be it in relation to external threats, foreign 
policy, economic relations or the energy market. In the aftermath of World War Two 
countries in Europe looked for ways to provide effective energy cooperation and mutual 
dependence within present EU borders and beyond (mainly through the foundation of 
the European Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM). Since then, the use of the 
term ‘solidarity’ was widely present in most of the EU official documents and treaties. 
Starting from the Treaty of Rome (1957) the solidarity notion was used in general terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For instance, as a causal explanation of the imposed challenges of EU internal legislation on 
the MSs and implications for choosing specific energy mixes in Poland and Germany, binding 
20-20-20 climate energy targets should be mentioned. The EU aims by 2020 to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20%, increase by 20% energy efficiency, and to reach 20% of 
renewables in total energy consumption in the EU. 
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that united Europe, then it found its reflection in the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union, where solidarity was referred to Union’s external and internal security policy, 
supporting it ‘actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’ (1992: 
Article J.1). The Treaty of Amsterdam also mentioned the enhancement of political 
solidarity (1997: Article 11 (ex Article J.1), as well as economic and social cohesion 
(1997: Article 2). Finally, the modified Constitutional Treaty – the Treaty of Lisbon in 
2009 has legally bound the EU and its MSs in the ‘Solidarity Clause’ to ‘act jointly in a 
spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a 
natural or man-made disaster’ (2007: Article 222). The former President of the 
European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, during his speech at the Conference on solidarity 
(Buzek, 2011), defined solidarity as the ‘will of acting together’, calling it ‘almost a 
constitutional principle’, as the term ‘solidarity’ was used more than a dozen of times in 
the quazi-constitutional Lisbon Treaty.  
Thus the context denoting solidarity in the EU has been evolving around economic, 
political and external security. However, it was the Lisbon Treaty (mainly its 
Consolidated version) that brought the solidarity principle to the community level, 
emphasising a commonly shared rather than individualistic approach to energy issues. 
For the first time, this principle was normatively present in direct application to energy 
through the ‘creation and functioning of the internal energy market, security of energy 
supplies, interconnectedness of the networks and energy efficiency’ (European Union, 
2010, Article 194: 134). The principle of energy solidarity was related to the goals of 
enhancing domestic and international energy security.  
Therefore, solidarity of the EU MSs in both internal and external dimensions of EU 
energy policy was a precondition to energy security. Internally, energy solidarity aimed 
to unify the EU MSs in the creation of efficient, well-functioning and inter-connected 
energy market (with the deadline for the EU MSs to transpose the Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC into national law until the 3rd of March 2011), develop network 
interconnectedness inside the EU and promote energy efficiency. Whereas externally, 
mutual energy solidarity dealt with energy supply disruptions by introducing a coherent 
energy approach towards third countries,45 diversification of supply sources and routes, 
market integration with neighbouring states and security of gas supply (European 
Commission, 2011a). Brussels strongly believed that external energy policy was crucial 
to completing the internal energy market (Oettinger, 2010a). The intertwined nature of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For more information about the initiatives launched by the EU on developing an  EU external 
energy policy after 2007, see European Commission. 2007. Developing External Energy Policy 




the internal and external European energy approach is imperative to understanding the 
challenges the EU has been facing in its interactions with Russia.  
So far the EU struggled to become a prominent international energy actor with 
coherent and commonly shared energy interests among all the EU MSs. Hitherto, the 
Union was unable to incorporate third countries beyond current EU borders in the 
promotion of energy security. Section 5.1. clearly demonstrated the lack of multilateral 
frameworks and poor performance of bilateral EU-Russia frameworks that would 
provide a basis for regulating relations between energy producers, transiting states and 
consumers that could cover the energy interests of all the involved parties. Given the 
unremarkable external energy policy achievements of the EU and poorly performed 
foreign policy dimension of energy security (Youngs, 2009: 4), the escalating impasse 
in EU-Russia mutual understanding over energy and a failure to deal with the external 
energy supply crises, the EU has been searching for internal solutions. The Union 
realised that security of supply would be inefficient anyway if there is insufficient 
underground storage, technical infrastructure to re-organise energy flows within the 
EU, and commonly shared market-based principles (European Commission, 2011b: 
13). The most plausible approach the EU has chosen was to commit the EU MSs to the 
development of the internal energy market with a wide network of interconnectors and 
commonly shared energy market rules. By engraving the general principle of solidarity 
in the Lisbon Treaty and by implementing the more detailed three-fold legislation of 
energy market liberalisation packages, the Union seems to have an ultimate aim to 
create internal economic ‘rules of the game’ for not only the EU MSs, but also to a 
wider Europe. By ‘exporting’ its domestic energy market rules and the EU principles to 
other countries (European Commission, 2011a; Youngs, 2009:19, 30; Aalto and 
Korkmaz Temel, 2014: 761), the EU hoped that non-EU countries like Russia will have 
to consider this in cross-border gas trade, and will have to comply with liberalised 
internal European market principles. The prospect that Russia will eventually agree on 
the new provisions of the liberalised EU gas market would be a bonus for external 
European energy security.  Therefore, internal solidarity and the commitment of EU 
MSs to build common energy market would facilitate changes in the external dimension 
of the EU foreign energy policy. Delivery obligations, competition in price formation and 
regulations about energy asset ownership are seen to improve the predictability of EU-
Russia energy relations, provide greater EU control over energy supplies, and enhance 
energy security in general. 
The objective to create a European single energy market has been on the agenda for a 
long time, since the creation of the European Union in late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Directive 94/22/EEC (Council of the European Union, 1994) mentioned market opening 
131 
 
and provided a common set of rules for non-discriminatory access to the exploration 
and production of gas (upstream). The ‘White Paper on Energy Policy for the EU’ 
(European Commission, 1995), published by the Commission in 1995, emphasised 
market integration and deregulation, protection of consumers and suppliers and 
sustainable development as integral parts of a comprehensive energy policy. After the 
publication of the Green Paper in 2000, the legal basis for the creation of the internal 
market and energy supplies were provided in the Treaty of Nice (2001: Article 95 and 
Article 100 respectively).  
On the route to integrating the gas market in the EU, and guaranteeing security of 
supplies, the implementation of key gas directives accompanied this gradual 
transformation of energy market opening and liberalisation. Brussels had the ultimate 
aim of advancing the construction of the gas market by implementing three EU energy 
packages, facilitating open access to energy networks, supporting free competition, 
and building interconnectors. The First Gas Market Directive 98/30/EC (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 1998) was aimed to allow third 
party access to owners of natural monopoly infrastructure, transmission networks, 
storage and LNG facilities and to introduce the choice between the negotiated and 
regulated access to infrastructure at the early stage (with compulsory prospects to 
move towards regulated access). In the second stage, the Second Gas Directive 
2003/55/EC (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003) 
opened national gas markets to fair competition; allowed for industrial clients and 
domestic customers to choose their suppliers; and provided third-party access to gas 
infrastructure, interconnectors, LNG and storage facilities (with the possibility of 
exempting new infrastructure from this rule, Article 22). The Third Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009b) 
introduced the unbundling principle that presumes structural separation between 
generation, production and supply activities on the one hand, and the transmission 
processes on the other. The expectations were that non-EU companies unequivocally 
comply with the same level of unbundling as the EU companies (reciprocity clause) and 
the EU and non-EU investors will have equal status in the transmission companies.  
The Third Gas Directive (2009) grants MSs three possible ways for unbundling: 
Ownership unbundling (the transmission operator owns and manages the network 
separately from the supplier); Independent System Operator (the supplier owns the 
transmission network that is leased to the independent system operator that manages, 
operates and controls it, deciding on investments); and Independent Transmission 
Operator (the supply company owns and operates the network, but the management of 
the network is done by the subsidiary of the parent company). The Commission’s initial 
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proposal was a compulsory ownership unbundling of TSO and DSO, but due to the 
opposition from the MSs it had to compromise towards the above three models with 
gradual aim to reach ownership unbundling with remaining only mandatory TSO 
ownership unbundling.  
The last two gas directives were mainly intended to prevent a conflict of interests 
between involved companies, eliminate the vertically integrated energy markets of the 
EU MSs, improve security of gas supplies in the framework of the integrated internal 
gas market, defining ‘security-of-supply policies that are transparent, solidarity-based, 
non-discriminatory and consistent with the requirements of a single market in gas’ 
(Europa, 2014). The integrated market cannot be achieved without trans-European 
networks in the area of energy infrastructures, which the EU aims to develop and 
support mostly through the Cohesion policy funds (European Union, 2010, Article 172: 
125). According to the DG Energy, ‘the security of internal energy supplies is 
undermined by delays in investments and technological progress’ (European 
Commission, 2011b: 5-6) and the fragmented energy markets. Hence, these intentions 
were undermined by the reluctance of some EU MSs to unbundle their energy national 
champions (Vaisse and Kundnani, 2011: 52) as well as confrontations with Russia, 
which is negatively affected by the new regulatory changes. 
In spite of Brussels aiming to advance the construction of the gas market by 
implementing three EU liberalisation energy packages, the whole liberalisation process 
encounters some challenges with transparency and commitment on the part of EU MSs 
to comply with regulations effectively (Howorth, 2010). Differences in the structures of 
domestic gas markets, a variety of market player ties, and resistance from the MSs to 
give up their national competences to the EU supranational level, all slow down the 
liberalisation and de-regulation processes (for details see case study Chapters 6 and 7). 
Having poor performance in the external energy arena, the EU also struggles to 
promote internal energy solidarity. The Section 5.3.2. below provides an analysis of the 
EU’s internal coherence as an energy actor, highlighting challenges with energy 
solidarity. 
5.3.2. The Analysis of the EU Energy Actorness 
Following from a number of correlated and intersecting characteristic features of 
actorness indicated in theoretical Chapter 2, EU energy actorness explains how the 
EU’s capacity as an energy policy maker is shaped ‘in practice’ and indicates how the 
EU’s fragmented energy interests prevent a collective solidary approach to dealing with 
Russia. In doing so, this section utilises the concept of actorness by Jupille and 
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Caporaso (1998) that scrutinises the EU’s capacity to act through the benchmarks of 4 
interconnected factors: recognition by other states, authority to act, institutional 
autonomy in energy policy-making and cohesion of decisions within the EU MSs (1998: 
215-221). To remind, the Section 2.2.2.2. explicated the benefits of Jupille and 
Caporaso (1998) approach to analyse both external position of the EU as a global 
energy actor and the EU’s domestic energy actorness. The empirical analysis 
presented here develops an overview of the EU’s generally weak international actor 
capacity (that was already touched upon in the examples of the EU-Russia multilateral 
and bilateral initiatives in this Chapter, in Section 5.1.) and focuses on the scrutiny of 
not least problematic EU’s internal structure of its energy actorness.  
The first criterion of recognition by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) is strongly connected 
to the formation of the identity of the EU. It falls into the category of de jure and de 
facto recognition of EU’s energy identity. Thus, the EU might not be recognised under 
international law de jure as a sovereign state, whereas de facto the recognition exists 
due to the decision of third states ‘to interact with the EU implicitly confer recognition 
upon it’ as opposed to or in addition to having one-to-one relationships with individual 
EU MSs (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 215). The number of interactions matter, as 
through them the EU’s relational identity and energy interests are shaped and 
transformed (Wendt, 1992). As noticed above, the EU and Russia have been involved 
in a variety of energy initiatives (the PCA, Energy Dialogue and Partnership for 
Modernisation), during which the fluid identity of the EU has been developing. However, 
the amount and quality of energy interactions Russia pursues with the individual MSs, 
through gas contracts on the inter-company, individual diplomatic levels and through 
intergovernmental agreements on the state-level, has been significantly larger than 
with the EU as a supranational collective entity. The indicator of preferring to deal with 
the individual EU MSs partly explains Russia’s grounds for rejection of the Transit 
Protocol of the ECT. Russia’s attitude was caused by resentment about treating CEE 
countries as an ultimate part of the European block (Interview 2). Russia still favours an 
individualistic energy approach to the EU MSs, trying to disregard and avoid dealing 
with the EU as a whole (TheEFDGroup, 2012; Wigell and Vihma, 2016).  
The other benchmark for a successful energy actor would be having authority as the 
legal competence, authorised by the treaties and EU MSs to represent their interests 
(Jupille and Caporaso, 1998: 216-217). A capacity and authority to act enables other 
countries to recognise the actor as an energy player. Since its beginning, the European 
Community, and later the EU, has been trying to gain ‘a single legal personality’. The 
introduction of the legal personality happened only after the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty, precisely in the Article 47 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
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European Union (European Union, 2010: 41). This meant that the EU acquired the 
ability to negotiate and sign international agreements in accordance within its powers 
as a single actor (trade and commercial agreements), to be a member of the 
international organisations and to join international conventions. However, all of the 
core energy-related agreements and initiatives prior to the Lisbon Treaty did not 
provide a specific legal basis for a united EU’s energy policy, as the individual MSs 
were fully responsible for their own energy actions. Therefore initiatives such as the 
PCA, or involvement in the Energy Charter Treaty, were decided upon and signed by 
the individual MSs within the European Community, rather than a supranational body 
like the EU Commission. Since the EU was granted its legal personality and de jure 
diplomatic recognition only after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the first two criteria 
of Jupille and Caporaso’s framework of assessing actor energy capacity had a 
transformative effect on EU energy actorness only since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009. If 
the EU aspires to be regarded as a substantial energy actor, it needs to pursue more 
interactions on the international energy arena, to establish its energy identity with 
coherently defined and shared interests by other MSs. Only through repetitive 
interactions can the EU reproduce a relatively stable identity, gain recognition and be 
perceived as an equal entity by other countries (Wendt, 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
2001).  
Alongside other interrelated criteria, the development of autonomy as an institutional 
distinctiveness in the EU energy sector has been in a place for more than two decades 
by now. Through gas and electricity binding directives the EU is committed to create a 
European Single Energy Market, regulating and facilitating open access to energy 
assets, competitiveness, sustainability, security of supply and market liberalisation. The 
process of promoting the internal and external dimensions of energy policy is organised 
through key energy-related institutions, such as the European Commission (mainly 
represented by the Directorate General (DG) for Energy, DG Trade and DG 
Competition), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and to a lesser extent the 
European Economic and Social Committee. Hence, since energy security is not a part 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, the involvement of the EEAS 
into energy policies is rather limited (only through basic mechanism of energy 
diplomacy which hardly can have any treaty-based or legal consequences). Likewise, 
the European Economic and Social Committee only has a consultative role that has 
little legitimacy in energy policy-making processes. Only the European Commission 
(mainly DG Energy) possesses some institutional policy-making power that can be 
imposed on the EU MSs, triggering normative and legal implications for the energy 
policies of individual member states.  
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Throughout the 2000s there was a visible but uneven centralisation of authority in the 
hands of the EU Commission, which aspired to gain energy decision-making autonomy 
from EU MSs by taking charge of the internal and external energy dimension. Since 
2004 the European Commission has considerably advanced its institutional autonomy 
in shaping EU’s energy market preferences and energy policies. It became rather pro-
active in the social construction of energy security discourses based around energy 
dependence, contributing to ‘a shift in political norms, successfully framing import 
dependency as a problem’ (Maltby, 2013: 435). Referring to growing import 
dependence, the EU Commission used the previous energy supply crises as 
opportunities to try and extend its supranational energy authority, claiming: 
The security of gas supply is a concern whose Community dimension is 
becoming more and more important, therefore justifying the involvement 
of Community institutions and the Commission in particular. In a 
Community emergency situation, the Commission is best placed to 
coordinate the actions of the Competent Authorities of the Member 
States and to facilitate the dialogue with third countries (European 
Commission, 2009: 3). 
The EU Commission has been slowly becoming a supranational policy entrepreneur 
and ‘a significant actor over time in influencing the social construction of norms 
regarding the appropriateness of a supranational solution to an issue presented as a 
problem, even threat, to the Union’ (Maltby, 2013: 442).  
Nevertheless, the EU Commission’s efforts to pursue energy policy on behalf of the 
whole EU faced some resistance on the part of the EU MSs. Starting from early 2006 
the Council discussions portrayed clashes with the EU Commission’s views. The EU 
MSs wanted to preserve their individuality in energy decision-making and demanded 
the EU ‘respect Member States' sovereignty over primary energy sources and choice 
of energy-mix’ (Council of the European Union, 2006a: 16; Council of the European 
Union, 2007: 11). Perpetual disagreements between the EU Commission and EU MSs 
about energy competences had a crucial negative impact on the formation of EU’s 
energy actorness and EU’s negotiating capacity to perform (Howorth, 2010). The EU 
essentially provides regulatory restrictions or stimulations for the EU MSs, related to 
the creation of the internal energy market, but its competences yet do not extend far 
beyond that. The external dimension of energy security is largely subordinated to the 
EU MSs’ sovereignties.  
136 
 
According to Article 4 in the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union, energy lies 
in the area of ‘shared competences’ (European Union, 2010), where the EU and its 
MSs may adopt legally binding energy acts, but they ‘can do so only where the EU has 
not exercised its competence or has explicitly ceased to do so’. The change from 
exclusively MSs’ competences to shared energy competences is seen in recent EU 
legislations, Energy Directives, Regulations and Treaties. For instance, the Council 
Directive 2004/67/EC in Article 3 (Council of the European Union, 2004) states that the 
MSs were responsible for defining the ‘roles and responsibilities of different gas market 
players in achieving’ security of gas supply. After the major energy crisis in 2009, the 
Directive was repelled by the EU Regulation 994/2010 concerning measures to 
safeguard security of gas supply (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2010). It legally enabled shared rather than individual responsibility 
between the EU MSs and the EU Commission for safeguarding ‘security of gas supply 
and to contribute to the proper functioning of the internal gas market in the case of 
supply disruptions’. The Community level framework Gas Coordination Group was 
established that entailed the ‘exchange [of] information and… [definition of] common 
actions between Member States, the Commission, the gas industry and consumers’ 
(European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010: 2).  
Nevertheless, in practical terms shared competences remain a ‘grey area’ in EU 
internal energy decision-making. The aims of the EU Commission to ensure the 
functioning of the energy market, provide the security of energy supply in the Union, 
promote energy efficiency and energy saving, the development of new and renewable 
forms of energy, and promote the interconnection of energy networks, regularly clash 
with the rights of MSs to develop their own energy policies. Mainly, the EU MSs46 
reserved the right to ‘determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply’ 
(European Union, 2010, Article 194: 134). Such a lack of a clear distinction between 
the EU’s and the MSs’ competences makes it extremely difficult to distinguish clearly 
the institutional authority criteria, due to the Council of the EU (with the official 
representatives of the MSs) influencing major energy-related competences of the EU 
Commission.  
Since identities are not static but fluid in nature, there are a number of relatively recent 
examples of legal empowerment of the European Commission over the MSs. The 
Council of the EU granted two mandates to the EU Commission to represent common 
EU energy interest in the negotiations of the Trans-Caspian pipeline project with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 In some cases, like the UK or Germany, if the energy market of the MS are industry-led, it is 
down to energy companies to decide about the energy mixes through their investment policies.  
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Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in September 2011 (European Commission, 2011c), and 
the mandate to negotiate with Russia and Belarus a new agreement on the electricity 
system in the Baltic States in February 2012 (Oettinger, 2012b). The mandates are the 
first precedents in history to enable the EU Commission to promote energy supply 
diversification from Russia on the supranational level. However, this can be regarded 
as an exception rather than a normal practice, especially since no evident results are 
seen from such empowerment on the ground, as yet. As Jupille and Caporaso noticed, 
‘assessing the autonomy of the EU with regard to its member states is notoriously 
difficult’ (1998: 218). It is even harder, when applied to energy policy. Only when and if 
the EU Commission acquires full energy institutional competence to act independently 
rather than selective policy areas, would it be possible to speak about the EU’s 
autonomy to act. 
However, the most central indicator that defines the success of the EU’s actorness, 
according to Jupille and Caporaso (1998), is cohesion, which is normally attributed to 
the ‘coherence between Member States, EU institutions and the various policy 
instruments at their disposal’ (Thomas, 2012: 457). As indicated in Section 2.2.2.2. the 
analysis does not focus on the exact degree of energy coherence of the EU 
actorness47 or does not aim to measure it. The thesis looks for any traits of energy 
actorness (in)coherence in general and explores the examples of EU’s struggle to bring 
its MSs to converge their preferences and act unified, examining the implications of the 
EU internal and external energy cohesion or rather the lack of it on the relations with 
Russia. In constructivist terms, the prevalence of ideational factors, such as shared 
interpretation of energy security goals, mutual norms, convergent views, similar values 
and collective policies that are based on the principles of solidarity among the EU MSs, 
is vital. Applying Jupille and Caporaso's (1998: 219) logic, cohesion in understanding of 
energy security and a necessity to act on it together are essential, and can be reached 
through the solidarity in the EU (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007: Article 194). It means that 
operating in the spirit of solidarity would be a direct indication of the cohesion of the 
EU’s energy actorness. 
The importance of the EU’s cohesion in foreign policy was mentioned by the EU 
institutions on many occasions. For instance, in the Green Paper of 2000 the EU 
Commission noted that ‘the Union suffers from having no competence and no 
community cohesion in energy matters’ (European Commission, 2000: 28). Likewise, 
the EU Council, claimed that ‘greater coherence is needed not only among EU 
instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Detailed analysis of the degree of coherence of the EU energy actorness goes beyond the 
scope of the analysis, hence remains to be an important issue for further research. 
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(Council of the European Union, 2003). Deriving from the above analysis of other 
criteria of the EU’s actorness, the areas where the EU’s energy cohesion is weak often 
depend on the existence of the variability in terms of energy-related competences, 
which are not always clear as between the EU Commission and the EU Council, and 
multiplicity of EU’s constituent parts (such as the EU institutions and EU MSs), when 
the EU MSs often override a unitary approach to EU energy security and solidarity by 
having bilateral agreements with Russia. 
Since coherence is vital for exerting the influence of the EU abroad, it is important to 
have a coherent external approach in relations with Russia. The existence of shared 
energy competences between the EU and its MSs and described above Article 194 of 
the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union has already indicated EU 
MSs’ legal superiority in choosing its energy mixes, suppliers and ways to securitise 
their energy supplies. It creates an incentive of the EU MSs to execute their sovereign 
energy interests as opposed to commonality of goals and policies, as well as impedes 
collective narrative of the emergent energy policy (the analysis of EU MSs energy 
policy choices will expand on this issue in more details in Chapters 6 and 7).  
The problems with the EU’s convergence of energy preferences and the 
implementation of policies were already mentioned in Section 5.1. The examples of the 
EU’s failure to commit Russia to promote an energy chapter in the PCA and Poland’s 
blocking of the PCA renegotiations, has violated EU’s credibility as a cohesive energy 
actor. External energy coherence still remains on the rhetorical level in the EU-Russia 
relations, as the Union has not succeeded in creating solid normative grounds for 
having a commonly shared approach towards Russia. The policy-making mechanism, 
strategy and procedural algorithm to pursue EU common external energy policy is 
missing in Brussels. There is no elaborate strategy or even no tangible initiative from 
the EU, indicating the clear aim to create either energy solidarity within the EU ‘on 
Russia’ or energy solidarity of the EU MSs ‘with Russia’ (Timmins, 2013). The EU MSs 
cannot agree on whether to use the policy of diversification energy supplies away from 
Russia or prioritising it as a key supplier for the EU and engaging it into expanding EU 
energy market. 
In addition, EU’s incoherence is exposed in treating Russia’s energy threat differently 
among the EU MSs. For the EU MSs threat perceptions are determined on the national 
level, rather than the EU collective level.  In rudimentary material terms, geographically 
closer and more gas import dependent CEE countries will a-priori care more about the 
imminent threat of possible supply disruptions than, for instance, France or Portugal, 
which are not as dependent on Russian gas and which have other than gas primary 
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types of fuel in their energy mixes. The ‘absence of shared threat perception amongst 
EU MSs regarding Russian dominance of energy supplies makes it even more difficult 
to find consensus’ (Tardy, 2009: 103-104) and to produce a consistent external EU 
energy security approach.  
The critics of the EU’s energy capacity to act are convinced that the ‘EU will continue 
having problems in trying to commit the MSs to a common EU energy strategy when 
there is none’ (Interview 8). Before promoting the solidarity of energy policies, the EU 
MSs should ensure the divergence of interests are a minimum (Gotz, 2008: 69), as 
solidarity and consistent external energy policy are possible mainly under the condition 
of having shared interests and common purpose for the will of acting together. Having 
a discrepancy in energy interests, a propensity to choose energy suppliers on the MS 
level, and the freedom to make bilateral deals and pursue individualistic policies, 
damages the coherent European energy actorness.  
Furthermore, the EU cannot be viewed as a coherent energy actor, when it comes to 
bargaining with Russia over gas (Krok-Paszkowska and Zielonka, 2005: 152-153). 
Countries like Germany and Italy have a more positive political and economic climate in 
relations with Russia, which puts them into an unequal position with more energy 
vulnerable CEE countries. From the Russian perspective, it is easier to deal with the 
EU MSs bilaterally, as the EU bureaucratic machine makes it difficult to have a clear 
understanding about with whom should Russia ‘come to terms on various energy 
issues – with the EU agencies like the Council of Ministers, European Parliament, 
European Commission, energy regulators, or separate nations and their national 
bodies’, as Russian Deputy Minister of Energy Anatoly Yanovski said (TheEFDGroup, 
2012). External Russian attitude of ‘dividing the EU’ into clusters of countries also 
breaches the construction of the coherent EU’s energy actorness.  
Hence, the EU still experiences problems with asymmetrical gas dependence on 
Russian gas supplies, variation in the economic and political positions of different EU 
MSs, affecting the creation of a common foreign energy policy and energy market, and 
diverse stages of market liberalisation and political relations with the main gas supplier, 
Russia. As far as Amineh and Guang are concerned:  
Overlapping competences of policy-making institutions in the EU and its 
member states, complex government-business ties, and competing 
energy priorities all hinder the effective establishment and execution of 
a common energy policy…Finally, distrust among member states about 
which interests will prevail has led to caution, hindering the formulation 
of clear strategies that the common external energy policy should focus 
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on in pursuit of the Commission’s goals (Amineh and Huang, 2010: 11-
12).   
Concluding the energy actorness analysis, until recently the Union failed to fully comply 
with all four components of international energy actorness. Bretherton and Vogler 
(2006: 60) called the EU having a ‘hybrid identity associated with inconsistencies of 
role and behaviour’. Namely, in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) the EU 
officially received a legal energy personality and energy has got ‘a solid legal 
foundation’ for energy policy through shared energy competences with the MSs 
(Oettinger, 2010a). However, the EU still struggles with the EU MSs providing full 
authority to the EU Commission to act on their behalf on most of the occasions. EU 
institutional distinctiveness and autonomy in terms of clarity of the competences are not 
pronounced and a coherent approach to the internal or the external energy policies is 
missing. Thus, deriving from the theoretical tenets of Jupille and Caporaso (1998: 220), 
all four criteria ‘form a coherent ensemble, depending upon one another for full 
meaning’. Since they are analytically interrelated, they cannot be observed separately 
from each other. If even one criteria is not definite, EU energy actorness capacity is 
undermined and should be observed on the levels of the EU MSs. As a result, having a 
problematic and incoherent energy image, lack of energy solidarity and missing 
commonly shared energy interests within EU MSs, relations between the EU and 
Russia are vulnerable and controversial. The next section illustrates the major 
misperceptions between the parties in the internal and external dimensions of 
European energy policies.   
 
5.4. The EU-Russia Energy Stress Points: Grounds for Mutual Misperceptions 
Drawing from the previous section, the EU quest for energy security of supply includes 
European solidarity in both internal and external energy-related policies. The chapter 
continues to develop this idea by analysing European energy policy steps, through 
which the EU pronounces its energy security. Externally, the EU aims to reduce its 
excessive import dependence by introducing a policy of diversification of supply 
sources and routes, and internally, the construction of a single well-functioning 
interconnected gas market still remains the key European objective. However, those 
European energy policies trigger immense tensions with Russia, which has polar views 
on energy interdependence and understanding of energy security, diversification policy 
and energy market regulations. The described areas of disagreement provide grounds 
for evolving threat perceptions and allow us to understand, which factors have a 
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negative impact on the EU relationships with Russia, answering the first research sub-
question.  
5.4.1. Contradicting Views on Energy Interdependence  
It is a matter of a fact that for the last decade the EU has been increasing its reliance 
on external energy sources. Since the importance of energy interdependent relations 
have been theoretically explored in Chapter 3, this section scrutinises the imbalance of 
EU-Russia interdependence in practical terms, focusing on the EU’s asymmetric import 
dependence as the presupposing factor in energy threat perceptions in the EU MSs. 
From 2004 onwards the average dependence of the EU on gas imports comprised 
around 60%, the largest part of which came from Russia, on average 34% (Eurostat, 
2014c), with prospects for growth in the demand for natural gas until 2030. Regardless 
some of the public statements of former EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger 
dismissing the EU overdependence on the Russian gas (Oettinger, 2012a), Green 
papers (2000; 2006) identified that the EU is alarmed by the growing reliance on 
external supply of energy sources, especially gas48. However, energy threats are more 
than just about gas import dependence overall; it is more about asymmetric gas import 
dependence within the EU MSs. To understand the grounds for misperceptions and the 
importance of asymmetric gas import dependence for the EU, it is essential to look at 
the level of the individual EU MSs. Building towards the thesis’s case studies, the 
chapter here observes European asymmetric gas import dependence based on the 
examples of Poland and Germany. 
Energy import dependence is a given material condition for the EU and most of its MSs, 
which may or may not become an energy security issue for the EU, depending on a 
range of risk factors. For instance, as confirmed by the Copenhagen School, threats 
travel easier over short geographical distances (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 461), thus 
the problem of adverse impacts of energy import dependence between geographically 
close countries is more acute. The crisis might occur due to physical shortage of 
delivering energy source, when there is a mismatch between consumption and supply 
levels, when markets fail, or where there are issues with energy market governance in 
supplying or consuming countries, etc. Energy import dependent relationships can be 
associated with geopolitical risks, when dependent countries are exposed to political 
pressure from the exporter that exercises power to gain economic, political or other 
benefits, concessions and favourable conditions (Wigell and Vihma, 2016). However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For more information on the EU MSs’ import dependence see the study of the European 
Commission. 2014b. Member State’s Energy Dependence: An Indicator-Based Assessment. 
Occasional Papers. Brussels: European Commission 196. 
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under normal circumstance import dependence is not a problem as such. In fact, heavy 
import dependence that might make a country feel vulnerable does not necessarily 
represent a security issue for every country or on every occasion. The problem of 
energy import dependence is not endemic and it does not unavoidably trigger 
vulnerability (Larsson, 2006: 265), since the country might be dependent, but ‘feel’ 
relatively safe (Skinner, 2006: 6). Therefore, the initial point of reference will be to treat 
the level of gas import dependence as proportional to the feeling of insecurity and 
threat perception within EU MSs. Below is the analysis of when does import 
dependence transfer into the security dimension of the EU and its MSs and which 
factors contribute to that? 
The reasons for EU countries feeling insecure are highlighted by Balmaceda (2004), 
who analysed material aspects of ‘energy dependency’.  According to her definition, the 
dependency occurs when 1) ‘more than 1/3 of a country’s total energy consumption 
comes from foreign sources’ or 2) if ‘more than 50% of a country’s annual consumption 
of a major energy source for that country comes from foreign sources’ or 3) when it is 
60% import dependent on a single external energy supplier or 45% of its consumption 
of the major energy source (Balmaceda, 2004: 6). The table below compares the 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The indicator is normally calculated as net imports divided by the sum of gross inland energy 
consumption plus bunkers. 
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Table 2: Energy Indicators, 2004-2012 (Million tonnes of oil equivalent and per cent) 
 
Source: Different indicators were generated from a variety of sources of the European 
Commission: European Commission (2012c), European Commission (2013a), Eurostat 
(2014c), Eurostat (2014a), Eurostat (2014b) 
According to the data from Table 2, the average consumption of natural gas in both 
Poland and Germany exceeds its production, at least 3 times in Poland and 5 times in 
Germany. The difference of natural gas consumption and production should be 
covered by imports from foreign sources, which constitute the required 30%. In fact, 
calculating import dependence as the relation of energy net import to energy 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Energy Production, 
Mtoe 



















Total Inland Energy 
Consumption, Mtoe 



















Net Imports, Mtoe 




















Dependence, %  14.6 17.6 20.0 25.6 30.6 31.7 31.5 33.7 30.7 
Poland 
Gas Import 
Dependence, % 68.3 69.7 70.7 66.0 72.6 67.3 69.3 75.1 74.0 
           
Energy Production, 
Mtoe 




















Total Inland Energy 
Consumption, Mtoe 




















Net Imports, Mtoe 
























Dependence, % 83.7 81.3 83.6 80.3 84.5 87.9 81.9 86.1 86.0 
144 
 
consumption, both countries are import dependent. According to Table 2, Poland is 
less dependent on the energy imports from foreign sources than Germany, including 
gas (in 2011 general energy import dependence composed 33.7 % in Poland and 
61.1% in Germany, together with gas import dependence – 75.1% and 86.1% 
respectively). Having relatively comparable sizes of the territory, similar energy 
intensities in the transport sector, and acknowledging that both countries’ heavy 
industries depend on external gas imports, Germany being more import dependent in 
relative terms (both in gas and in general) should feel more insecure than Poland. 
Controversially, it is Poland that ‘appears more vulnerable than the EU average’, 
regarding the external dimension of energy dependence, which for the last decade has 
raised security of supply trepidations (European Commission, 2013b: 205; Interview 9).  
For some CEE states gas imports from Russia comprise 80-100% (see Figure 2). The 
share of Russia as a singular gas supplier in Poland is considerably higher than in 
Germany. For instance, 90% of Polish gas imports arrived from Russia in 2010 (with 
the rest sourced in Germany), compared to 39.2% of German gas imports in the same 
year (see Sections 5.1.1. and 6.1.1.). It means that the German gas supply is more 
diversified, providing possibilities to cover the gas shortages from other sources more 
efficiently, whereas Poland has a low geographical diversification of gas supplies. 
Figure 2: European Gas Import Dependence from Russia  
 
Source:  RIAnovosti (2011) 
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Deriving from the above argument, the third criteria of Balmaceda’s energy 
dependence analysis (2004), energy pipeline dependence on a single external energy 
supplier prevails (Kirchner and Berk, 2010: 864). Regardless of European populist 
rhetoric about the necessity of decreasing single-source dependence (European 
Commission, 2000: 60; DG Energy, 2011: 10; European Commission, 2013b: 11, 16), 
Mitchell noted that ‘no member state has actually limited imports on security grounds; 
nor has the EU as a whole’ (2009: 10). Such steps would be politically unpopular and 
economically inefficient in the current energy climate as the feasibility of alternatives 
and unconventional sources of energy such as biofuels, LNG or shale gas will not be 
able to cover the economic needs and growing international demand.  
The situation with import dependence, in turn, brings the research to consider energy 
threats being posed externally by high gas import dependence on Russia, whose 
energy supply policies are characterised as assertive and often aggressive. They are 
commonly based on the perception of Russia using energy as a political tool directed 
towards other countries through supply disruptions, and Russia’s export expansionist 
strategy leading to the monopolisation of other countries’ energy markets (Milov, 2006b; 
Orban, 2008; Balmaceda and Rosner, 2006; Balmaceda, 2008). Predictably, energy 
vulnerability trepidations of growing gas import dependence on such a controversial 
supplier and the lack of alternatives in cases of gas disruptions, have been coming 
from the import dependent EU MSs, which are also geographically closer to Russia 
and also the first points of entry in the European supply chain. Thus energy supply 
politicisation and the energy security debates at the EU level were highly stimulated 
and sustained by such countries as Poland, followed by other CEE states. As the 
official sources from the Oil and Gas Department in the Polish Ministry of Economy 
have confirmed, the dependence on one source is what makes a country vulnerable 
and ‘it does not matter whether it is a dependence on the Russian company, German, 
French or any other, as long as there is a singular supplier there can be no flexibility 
and energy security’ (Interview 10). The veracity of such political opinion will be 
explored in details in Chapter 6. Hence for now it is clear that if gas import dependence 
per se on the supplies from one source was the main reason for the EU’s vulnerability, 
the EU might have been as much concerned about gas imports from Norway, which is 
the biggest supplier to the EU after Russia, comprising around 31.3% in 2012 
compared to the Russian gas imports of 32% in the same year (Eurostat, 2014c). 
However, since Russia is the one at the core of the European energy threat agenda 
(European Commission, 2006), it means that heavy import dependence on one 
country-source is not the key factor, unless this source is Russia.  
146 
 
Asymmetric gas dependence in the EU is worsened by the Russian strategy of 
clustering the Union into sub-regional energy markets, deriving from bilateral long-term 
gas deals the country has with individual MSs, using the ‘destination clause’ (Stern, 
2005: 132-133). Gazprom’s destination clause provisions forbade the buyer to re-sell 
the imported gas to other MSs allowing only to certain companies inside its own 
country. Not only this regulation breached the EU commitment to market liberalisation 
and free competition, but also threatened energy security as the countries cannot resell 
Russian gas to more needy EU MSs in emergency situations. In the process of EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue the EU Commission tried to persuade Russia to cancel the 
territorial sale restrictions. Over the years, Russia succeeded in removing the clause 
from some of its customers - Italian Eni (2003), Austrian OMV (2005) and German 
E.ON Ruhrgas (2005), but not Poland until recently.  
Russia’s interest to cluster the EU and control the EU’s asymmetric import dependence 
lies behind the fact that individually European countries are more dependent on 
Russian gas than Russia is dependent on selling its gas to a particular country. This 
means Poland is more dependent on Russian gas supplies than Russia is 
economically reliant on Poland. Gazprom is the primary gas supplier to Poland, while 
Poland is not even in the top 10 largest importers of Russian gas. The imbalance is 
obvious, which increases the country’s insecurity due to weak negotiating capacity and 
limited leverage to counter-balance Russian gas policies.  
If gas import dependence of the individual EU MSs is weak vis-a-vis Russia, the 
collective EU import dependence can be rather comparable with level of Russian 
energy export dependence on the EU. Bilateral asymmetry in EU-Russia energy 
dependence and European gas demand are perceived differently from the Russian 
side. Russian Deputy Minister for Energy Anatoly Yanovski at the conference in 
Brussels in 2012 noticed that ‘EU dependence is presented as a threat, the scale of 
this ‘disaster’ is trumped up…But the amount of Russian export dropped by 33% from 
1990s. So Russia should be alarmed’ (TheEFDGroup, 2012). Even in 2012, compared 
to 2011 the EU’s gas consumption fell by 2.4% within one year and even more so 
afterwards. This is important for Russia, which delivers more than 80% of its gas 
exports to the EU, comprising 151 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2012 (Gazprom, 2012a: 
76). In reality, Russia is more dependent on export revenues from the EU than the EU 
depends on Russian gas imports, as the export of fossil fuel is the main driver for the 
Russian economy and modernisation (Interview 4; Interview 11). For instance, prior to 
the culmination of the latest economic downturn, Russia’s hard currency reserves were 
the third largest in the world. The country was running a huge current account surplus 
and paying off the last of the debts accumulated in the early 1990’s (Leonard and 
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Popescu, 2007). After 2008 energy revenue declined, creating huge gaps in the budget. 
On top of that, since the 1980s the absolute share of Russia’s gas in EU consumption 
was almost twice as big as today. European gas demand has been gradually 
decreasing since the 1990s, long before the beginning of the economic crisis (Mitrova, 
2012). Due to the amount of market entrants and diversification policies of the EU, the 
relative market share of Russian gas in the EU has decreased (Interview 8). The 
adverse consequences of the economic crisis and the implications of the shale gas 
revolution in the US (bringing additional cheap gas from Qatar to Europe) gas also 
contributes to the reduced EU demand for Russian gas (Oettinger, 2012a). However, 
the biggest drop of demand was observed in 2009 (5.6%), reducing to 9% in 2011 
(Mitrova, 2012: 8-9) as a consequence of the economic crisis, decreasing economic 
advantages for gas due to renewables and warmer weather conditions. 
The situation described above creates immense vulnerabilities and uncertainties for 
Russia as a supplier, forcing the country to take decisions, which are unpopular in 
Europe (like active diversification ‘away from Europe’ to the Asian markets). Energy 
analyst Alexei Gromov (Interview 11), in his interview with the author, cannot justify the 
European energy security concern about deficiency of gas as the upcoming 
international gas glut (including the LNG from the USA and Qatar) will inevitably exert 
downward pressure on the gas price, benefitting European customers. Therefore, 
Russia will require consistent and innovative approaches to its gas production (Mitrova, 
2012: 8). Unlike some of the energy analysts, Russia is complacent about the increase 
of its energy exports to Europe and the growth of the EU gas demand in the future due 
to the decrease of internal production in the EU, seeing the negative effects of the 
global economic downturn as temporary (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 
2009). Gazprom officials (like Sergey Komlev, the Head of Contract Structuring and 
Price Formation in Gazpromexport) expects that due to recent ecological and energy 
efficiency requirements, the EU will substitute its coal plants with electricity generation 
based on gas (The Russia Forum, 2010). According to Closson (2009) Europe often 
overestimates the Russian energy leverage on the EU as its capacity and interests are 
rather limited. The described above economic indicators illustrate if not irrationality then 
definite exaggeration in the construction of fears in the EU regarding the Russian threat. 
Negative perceptions of Russia are not necessarily proportionate to the level of energy 
dependence. 
5.4.2. Different EU-Russia Accounts on Understanding of Energy Security  
The discrepancies in vulnerabilities between Russia and the EU are not uncommon 
among parties who are involved in export-import relationships and have opposite 
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positions on energy security as security of supply and security of demand (as a part of 
an economic understanding of energy security). In interdependent energy relations, 
there is a consensual recognition among EU officials that Russia is ‘entitled to security 
of demand inasmuch as the EU is entitled to security of supply’ (Mandelson, 2007; 
Oettinger, 2010a). However, while the recognition of Russia’s position on energy 
security as a supplier exists in theory, the situation is more complex in reality, 
especially when EU’s interests are at stake. The section aims to disclose if EU 
acknowledgement of Russian energy security is supported by the acceptance of it in 
practical terms. This can be done on the basis of the EU’s definition of energy security 
as ‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (European 
Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b). Therefore, on the supply side of energy security of 
EU MSs there are two major elements that can be directly or indirectly affected by 
Russian energy performance, which in various degrees matter to all energy dependent 
countries: physical security (the stability of material supplies and avoidance of 
disruptions from the main gas provider, Russia) and price security (competitive price-
making with little price volatility and unpredictability). 
By analysing which meanings Russia and the EU attach to energy disruptions as an 
indication of ‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources’ (physical security) and 
‘affordable price’ (price security), this section exposes differences on conceptualisation 
of energy security in the EU-Russia nexus. As for the EU energy security definition 
accounts for the vulnerability not exclusively to gas disruptions, but also a high 
unaffordable gas price, Russia understands gas supply disruptions and price-formation 
differently, from the producer’s point of view. To start with, it is important to explore how 
Russia understands energy security (in economic rather than foreign policy terms, as 
was disclosed in Section 5.2.1.).  
Being the major energy exporter and placing energy as an imperative in the state’s 
policy, Russian energy policy is better traced in the Energy Strategies Documents, 
distinct from the above National Security and Foreign Policy strategies. There are two 
key energy strategies for Russia – ‘The Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up 
to 2020’ accepted in August 2003 (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2003)  
and ‘Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030’ approved in November 2009 
(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2009). Both Strategies have relevant 
references to enhancing energy security and the efficiency of production and supply, 
reducing environmental pressure,50 promoting the technological development of the 
energy industry, and enhancing competitiveness. The importance of energy for Russia 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 As Russia was looking to sign the Kyoto Protocol, which happened in November 2004. 
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was emphasised in the Energy Strategy to 2020, which associated the country’s 
energy market and export with its foreign policy influence in the world. While the first 
Russian energy strategy up to 2020 was export-oriented, anticipating the increase of 
production and gradually growing international demand for fossil fuels (that would make 
Russia a leader in the global energy market), the new strategy had to adjust Russian 
energy realities just 7 years after the first strategy came into place. Energy Strategy of 
Russia until 2030 defined energy security for Russia as ‘protection of the country, its 
citizens, society, state and economy against the threats to a reliable fuel and energy 
supply’ (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, 2009), emphasising the 
reduction of energy dependence on certain consuming markets, search for alternative 
energy solutions, energy saving and technological renovation (with the special focus on 
attracting not governmental but largely private investment sources). Unlike the security 
of energy supplies being one of the key pillars of the EU’s energy strategy, there are 
not explicit references to the security of demand in the external dimension in the 
above-mentioned strategies. It seems that security of demand is only indistinctively 
mentioned and amalgamated into a broader focus of the Russian energy security.  
In relations with other countries, long-term energy contract is a basic guarantee of 
certainty of demand for Russia and balancing again external risks, such as increasing 
competition with other energy markets, volatility of energy prices on the international 
market, transit dependence, and other issues (Ministry of Energy of the Russian 
Federation, 2009: 35). Continuous and predictable quantities of required energy and 
stable price for the exported gas (that allow the security of revenues and coverage of 
expenses for the produced energy) generally constitute the security of demand for the 
producer. By controlling gas production and the delivery chain, Russia aims to provide 
security of demand, which is a fundamental element for the country’s economic stability 
(Mitrova, 2012). Thus, Russia aims to build its relationships with the EU MSs on the 
basis of bilateral long-term supply contracts, which it regards being a pre-requisite to 
their mutual energy security. In relation to energy assets and infrastructure, for energy 
exporting countries like Russia energy security of demand is essentially associated 
with ‘security of investment-recovery’ of the new pipeline infrastructure or other energy 
assets and the ‘security of export sales and income’ (Milthorp and Christy, 2011: 261; 
Konoplyanik, 2012). The construction of new infrastructure should be supported by 
long-term contracts in order to guarantee return on the invested capital.  
Regardless of Russia framing its energy security in terms of ‘security of demand’ or in 
terms of general ‘energy security’, the EU often overlooks and misperceives the energy 
challenges and economic uncertainties Russia faces, presenting Russia’s energy 
policy towards other countries as deliberately aggressive, subordinated to mainly 
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foreign policy underpinnings. The politicisation of energy relations with Russia, its 
geopolitical stance and the construction of threat ‘reality’ are believed to interfere with 
the normality of EU-Russia energy security and gas relations. It is imperative not to 
underestimate the economic side of Russia's conceptualising of the security of demand 
and the ideas that determine Russia’s energy demand-dependent position. Goldthau 
suggests that it is crucial to redirect public awareness from geostrategic exercises 
towards the categories that are at stake: the market and investments (Goldthau, 2008: 
691). Thinking in economic categories and de-politicising energy security might shed 
light on why parties struggle to share common understanding of energy security.  
As a general rule, the energy security of supply to EU MSs is likely to not be 
sustainable without encountering and accepting the supplier’s security of demand. The 
EU should not disregard the second half of the supply-demand equation and underrate 
the importance of factors affecting the producer’s position (like legislative predictability 
for long-term investments in building infrastructure, or guaranteed European demand 
for the amount of produced energy). Most of the energy supply problems related to 
Russia (including gas supply disruptions to the transiting states of Ukraine and Belarus, 
refusal to sign the Energy Charter Treaty, Russia’s adherence to an oil-indexed price 
formula, etc.) could be explained and adequately acted upon prior the culmination of 
the crisis. Instead, having complex and poorly defined energy identity, the EU has to 
apply costly reactionary rather than preventative measures to guarantee energy 
security for its members.  
• Physical Security 
Many references have already been made regarding the EU’s trepidations about the 
‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources’ or simply supply disruptions in Section 
5.2.3. and throughout the thesis. Analyses grounded in basic supply-demand relations, 
physical access and the diversity of energy resources, pipeline energy relations and 
transit issues, physicality of gas deliveries, provide economy-based explanations of 
European energy supply security. For instance, Goldthau (2008) argued that the threat 
to European gas supply lies in the lack of investments in Russian upstream energy 
production, whereas Yafimava (2011: 2, 7) identified transit in the energy trade and 
market segmentation according to differences in the gas price calculations as threats to 
the European energy security.  
As 2006 and 2009 energy supply conflicts between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine 
proved, gas supply disruptions remain the core of the EU energy threat perceptions 
(Yafimava, 2011). The EU treated Russia’s behaviour as politically motivated 
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(Oettinger, 2011; Interview 6), expressing its concerns about Russia’s approach to 
some of the CEE gas dependent countries (Westphal, 2009).  Russia rejected the 
political grounds for the Ukrainian supply disruptions in 2009, and confirmed it does not 
intend to disrupt gas supplies to its main energy consumer market in the EU 
intentionally. Vladimir Putin in his official statement about the Russian-Ukrainian gas 
crisis in 2009, stated the economic grounds for the supply disruptions, ‘[we do not tie 
political issues with economics. Those who do – do it with one goal – to cover 
economic failure and the lack of desire to fulfil their economic obligations’ (Putin, 2009). 
Likewise, high-level energy analysts underline Russia’s lack of deliberate political 
incentives in disrupting any energy supplies to the EU as its goal is to preserve energy 
export revenues. Russian energy expert Tatiana Mitrova assured that for the EU, 
energy security of supply is connected with economics, mainly the ‘question of price – 
not the physical availability of energy’ (Interview 7). 
Due to placing such a big political emphasis on problems with the gas flow, the issue 
can become politicised and over-estimated very easily (Interview 6). Thus in the 
aftermath of Russia-Ukraine conflicts during 2006 and 2009, the majority of further 
short-term, minor, planned or technical supply incidents (be it due to weather 
circumstances or testing pipeline capacities) were presented in a similar politicised way 
by different EU MSs and their officials. For instance, being dependent on cold weather 
and seasonal supply hesitations, Gazprom had to prioritise gas supply to the domestic 
market over exports to Europe, which triggered the drop in the gas volumes supplied to 
the EU. Thus, when in February 2012 gas supplies to Italy, Austria and France 
decreased for several days it was perceived as Russia making its point during the peak 
vulnerable cold season, flexing its energy and political ‘muscles’ (Henderson and 
Heather, 2012). Similar example of technical maintenance on Yamal-Europe pipeline in 
2012 was politically grounded by Polish political elites, even though it was announced 
in advance (see Section 6.3.2.)51.  
• Price Security 
As a part of the EU energy security of supply definition, ‘affordable prices’ for energy is 
an essential attribute of energy security. The price formation represents yet another 
reason for threat creation and security exploitation in EU-Russia relations, as the 
increase in energy price is often viewed in the EU as price discrimination and a foreign 
policy tool to gain compliance (Section 5.2.).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Similar problems with compression on Yamal-Europe pipeline in August 2015 occurred and 
the timing clashed with planned technical works on the Nord Stream pipelines. 
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In general terms, Russia explains the increase of the gas prices during 2000s based on 
economic grounds of the production costs. For the last decade structural changes in 
the geological architecture of energy resources has been progressing, triggering the 
decay of easy-accessible gas reserves in Russia (Konoplyanik, 2012; Dergunova, 2008; 
Interview 12). Gas extraction has become more capital intensive and technologically 
challenging, requiring the attraction of new technological solutions. The outcome is a 
negative economic effect on domestic and international prices for both consumers and 
producers.  
In more specific terms, the disagreements exist around the gas price formula. The EU 
has been contemplating to modify the historically applied Groningen oil-indexed price 
formation, which links long-term contract gas prices through specific formulas to the 
price of crude oil and oil products. As Asche et.al. (2002) point out the price level 
depends on the economic compound made of transportation costs, political risk and oil 
taxation, being complemented with the political compound (which can be adjusted by 
the supplier on the basis of preferential concessions (Larsson, 2007b: 36). Through 
changing the predominant oil-indexed contract-based gas price formation with a small 
share of hub pricing on a spot-market into a major hub-based short-term gas 
indexation 52 , the EU hopes to make the gas price less politically dependent on 
suppliers. This will trigger gas producers selling their gas directly at the hubs, which will 
enhance the competition. The EU Parliament Resolution of 2012 called on:  
the Commission to support the establishment of a comprehensive EU 
system of gas indexation based on gas market prices, so as to enable all 
EU gas trading companies to trade with external gas suppliers in a more 
fair and predictable manner, independently of oil prices, and to further 
foster competition in the EU's internal gas market (European Parliament 
Resolution, 2012).  
Unlike the majority of the Russia’s officials, some Russian energy market experts 
recognise the old system of price formation as ‘inefficient’. For instance, energy analyst 
Gromov suggested that oil prices are volatile, it has a negative effect on gas prices for 
the producers53.  ‘The reason for this that the oil market is an element of financial and 
economic system/markets, and gas has a different role in the energy balance of every 
country’ (Interview 11). Due to the fact that they occupy different niches (oil- for petrol 
fuel and industrial purposes and gas for electricity generation), the price calculation 
should be adjusted.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Based on the example of the energy markets in the USA and the United Kingdom. 




Generally, oil-indexed prices have been higher than hub-shaped spot prices and the 
fact that Gazprom has a practice of rather selectively providing gas price discounts, 
puts the EU MSs in unequal and vulnerable positions. The publication of the Center for 
Eastern Studies in Warsaw (2011), cites the Russian press agency Interfax and reveals 
data about Russian gas prices in 2010 per 1000 cubic meters. Germany paid on 
average 271 US dollars, France 306 US dollars, Italy 331 US dollars, the UK 191 US 
dollars, Hungary 348 US dollars and Poland 336 US dollars. The difference in the price 
range between Western and Eastern EU MSs depended on competition on the gas 
market, the development of infrastructure, availability of the alternative sources and the 
general pattern of bilateral relationships with Gazprom. The main concession in gas 
contract renegotiations come from the amount EU MSs are ready to purchase on a 
spot price beyond the contractual amount (Interview 13). This explains Russia’s 
reluctance to change rather predictable pricing within the scheme of the long-term take-
or-pay contracts. 54 
Gazprom’s authorities confront the idea of exclusive gas hub-linked pricing in Europe, 
preferring the existing ‘hybrid’ approach that is based on long-term contracts, risk-
sharing and win-win situation (Komlev, 2012). The Head of Contract Structuring and 
Price Formation at Gazprom Export Sergey Komlev believes that ‘gas indexation will 
change the balance of interests in favour of importers; it will create the opportunity for 
predatory pricing and devalue the entire supply portfolio of natural gas producers’ 
(Komlev, 2011: 14). There will be no incentive for the EU as gas importer in preserving 
the value of gas. Gazprom’s natural desire to secure its investments in energy 
production through long-term binding contracts, which create predictability in 
correlation between the quantity of supplied and consumed gas, clashes with the EU 
idea to create liquid gas market pricing and completely detach Gazprom from price-
making decisions. Mutually negative perceptions are produced, escalating into an 
energy security dimension on the basis of such controversies and a variety of 
economic interests that are not met in the middle. If the decisions are made one-sided 
by the importers via the hub-linked index shaped on a spot-market, then the EU is in 
danger of being left without guaranteed volumes of gas supplied from Russia, who is 
unlikely to accept the change.  
While one cannot deny Russia exercising the foreign energy policy of compliance on 
several all-known occasions, there is another side of the Russian energy identity that is 
not related to its realist interests, but rather country’s organisational structure of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For more information about difficulties of gas price-making see Energy Charter Secretariat. 
2007. Putting a Price on Energy: International Pricing Mechanisms for Oil and Gas. Brussels: 
Energy Charter Secretariat. 
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energy decision-making. The specificity of Russia’s energy identity lies in the existence 
of inefficient bureaucratic apparatus that impedes successful and straightforward 
energy behaviour. The EU often treats Russia as being a conspiracy and fails fully 
accept how the country works. Frequently Russia takes its decision-making at a slow 
pace, not necessarily due to the political reasoning behind the decisions, but rather due 
to time-consuming economic calculations or the famous Russian bureaucracy. Since 
energy is capital intensive and has a long investment cycle, Konoplyanik explains 
Russia’s delay in developing the Shtokman energy fields in terms of uncertainties with 
gas demand in Europe rather than for political reasons (Konoplyanik, 2012). Analogous 
misperceptions exist on the inter-personal and diplomatic level, when the European 
side regards Russia’s behaviour as retarding energy security and efficiency building. A 
one year absence of the Russian co-chair of the Energy Efficiency working group of the 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was interpreted in Brussels as politically motivated and 
intentional to cause disruptions in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (Interview 6). 
However, Russian official explained it as being a technically administrative or 
‘bureaucratic delay’ rather than a security-destabilising political intention (Interview 2).  
The above examples illustrate that misconceptions about the key elements of energy 
security, and inherent differences in conceptualisation of energy security for Russia 
and the EU, play an important causal role in shaping energy perceptions of each other.  
5.4.3. Conflicting Approaches to Energy Diversification Policies 
To remind, the nature of EU-Russia gas relations can be characterised by energy 
related confrontations and growing dependence on energy supplies from a single 
source. In the EU, high import dependence ‘on particular fuels, energy suppliers and 
routes’ has been perceived as a key source of insecurity (European Commission, 2006; 
Council of the European Union, 2004; European Commission, 2014a:2). Highlighting 
energy ‘variety’ (or diversification as countries currently commonly refer to) is an 
integral part of energy security, as described by former Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill during his speech in British Parliament in 1913 claimed: ‘On no one quality, 
on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we 
be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety, and in variety alone’ (Churchill, 
1913). The energy security priorities a century later remained unchanged, since the EU 
aims to reduce energy dependence on its main supplier Russia by pursuing a policy of 
diversification of routes and sources. 
EU’s course of energy supply diversification remains one the biggest ground for EU-
Russia disagreements over the nature and methods to pursue it. The disagreements 
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between Russia and the EU evolved around not only the choice of routes, the amount 
of serving EU countries and the existence of rival projects, but also legislative 
provisions of the suggested mutual energy projects.  
For the last decade Russia was interested in expanding its supply options to Europe, 
bypassing the transiting states and introducing two new major routes: the Nord Stream 
to Germany via the Baltic Sea and the South Stream through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, 
Greece, the Balkan countries, Italy and Austria. Whilst the first branch of the Nord 
Stream is already in place and running (and the second one being agreed on in 2015), 
the South Stream started years ago but finally terminated by Russia in 2015 due to 
disagreements about EU’s energy regulations of the Third Energy Package (De Micco, 
2015: 8). 
The EU, whilst agreeing on the above-mentioned mutual gas projects, also searched 
for a variety of diversification routes, avoiding Russia’s involvement and bringing 
natural gas from Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey and possibly Iran. So far the EU’s 
highest energy security diversification priorities within the European Southern Corridor 
(European Commission, 2008) only include the Trans-Adriatic pipeline from Azerbaijan 
to Greece and Italy, the South East Europe Pipeline from Turkey to Austria, the 
Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy and the Nabucco West pipeline from Turkey to 
Austria (which is de-scaled former Nabucco project), bringing Caspian and Middle 
Eastern gas to the EU. However, none of those EU priority projects have been put into 
operation and are still in the process of discussions and calculations of the investment 
plans. This section chose to focus on the Nord Stream as the biggest stumble block in 
the EU-Russia energy diversification endeavours between 2004 and 2012, causing 
misperceptions and contestations between them. 
The EU Regulation 994/2010 concerning the measure to safeguard security of gas 
supply clearly stated that ‘the diversification of gas routes and of sources of supply for 
the Union is essential for improving the security of supply of the Union as a whole and 
its Member States individually’ (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 2010: 2). De-facto the Union should have been equally interested in the 
diversification of routes and of energy sources. In reality, the diversification of energy 
routes for a long time was prioritised over the diversification of sources, especially if the 
country-source of energy is Russia.  
For a long time, the Nord Stream project has raised a variety of concerns. Those 
concerns ranged between the environmental issues raised by the Scandinavian 
countries and the political undermining of European solidarity and coherence. The 
latter was based on vulnerability of non-involvement in the Nord Stream project of gas 
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dependent countries like Poland and the Baltic States (more details about Polish 
resistance to it are presented in Chapter 6). However, in relation to the diversification 
policy, the major argument confirmed by the official EU sources against the project was 
that the Nord Stream diversified only routes, but not the country-source of the gas 
(Interview 3). Theoretically, the Nord Stream ticked the pan-European supply 
diversification boxes. It is easy to argue that the Nord Stream offered a diversification 
of the offshore routes from Russia to Germany, with further connection to the EU 
infrastructural network through the OPAL and NEL transiting pipelines, delivering gas 
to the Czech Republic and Denmark respectively. However, the diversification of 
sources is contested, since the country of origin still remains Russia, hence the 
suggested gas-source was supposed to be the new Shtockman gas field55. For the last 
decade, the EU has been relatively successful in the diversification of energy sources, 
diversifying into sources from North Africa (the DESERTEK program), Norway, the 
USA and the Middle East, hence not as successful in the diversification of routes 
(Interview 8). That is what Russia tried to promote. 
Initially a Finnish-Russian project called North Transgas from 1997 eventually became 
a North European Gas Pipeline (the Nord Stream) from 2005. The grounds for 
considering the Nord Stream a European project (rather than falsely portrayed by 
Poland as bilateral Russian-German deal) were laid by EU Decision 1364/2006/EC. 
The EU decision of 2006 emphasised the ‘identification of projects of common interest, 
their specifications and priority projects, in particular those of European interest, should 
be without prejudice to the results of the environmental impact assessment of the 
projects, plans or programmes’ (European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, 2006: 2). The European Parliament issued the guidelines on Trans-European 
Energy Networks (TEN-E), ranking 42 particularly prominent European projects into 
three categories. Since early 2000 the North European Pipeline was one of them and in 
2006 it gained the highest possible status of a ‘project of European interest’ (ibid.: 9). 
To gain this status means that the project should have a ‘cross-border nature or… have 
significant impact on cross-border transmission capacity’, receiving Community funding 
under the TEN-E budget (ibid.: 5). It satisfies both conditions. The consortium is based 
on the shares held by companies and financial institutions from Germany, the 
Netherlands, France and Russia. Taking into account the number of countries involved 
(those who directly participate in the ownership and those that will receive the gas) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 While the Nord Stream project is already functioning and delivers gas from Yuzhno-Russkoye 




its huge transmitting capacity (when the second branch is launched), the Nord Stream 
project must be regarded truly European rather than bilateral56.  
Unlike the Nord Stream, the South Stream was ranked lower in the EU’s energy 
diversification priority. In fact, the South Stream pipeline from Russia to Italy and 
Austria, which was suggested later in 2007, did not get the same status of ‘project of 
the European interest’, as the Nabucco pipeline or the pipelines from Turkey to Italy 
and Austria received (Van Aartsen, 2009). According to the spokesman for the South 
Stream Transport BV venture, who previously worked for Nord Stream (interview 8), 
the legal status of the ‘project of European interest’ could have been particularly helpful 
‘to respond to concerns of energy solidarity and implementing common objectives’, 
which is commercially vital for investment protection policies. Furthermore, in most 
national legislations the permission to build any infrastructure of this kind should 
represent common public interest (Interview 8). Brussels’s position in promoting and 
supporting the status of one project over similar alternatives appeared to be made on 
political grounds, as the South Stream complied with the same diversification principles 
as the Nord Stream or Nabucco for this matter in providing a new transportation route 
of Russian gas and covering considerable amount of EU and EU candidate countries 
(even more than the inaugurated Nord Stream).  
Seemingly, the idea behind the EU’s precaution was to decrease the overall gas 
dependence on Russia. What is more important, until recently, the EU official 
documents avoided a straightforward anti-Russian political rhetoric that gas import 
dependence should be decreased from Russia specifically. For the first time European 
Parliament Resolution (2012) officially emphasised ‘that diversification should mean 
new non-Russian sources of oil, gas and electricity for those Member States which are 
overly dependent on this single supplier’. Russia considered this European energy 
discriminating approach as a ‘hypocrisy’ and ‘double standard’ (TheEFDGroup, 2012; 
Interview 12), while the EU Commission sources called it ‘a selective justice’ (Interview 
4). The result, however, remains the same – mutual misperceptions of other’s action as 
threatening and undermining each other’s energy security. Ironically, despite all 
attempts to build an EU-Russia strategic energy partnership, maintain amiable 
relationships and trust, Jervis’s quote sums up the rival reality and threat-creation of 
the EU-Russia interplays: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Nevertheless, the expansion of the Nord Stream created a new wave of discontent, when 
Slovakian authorities called it a ‘betrayal’ that will put Slovakia and Ukraine under financial 
pressure. It is also regarded as ignoring Polish interest.  
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We tend to believe that countries we like do things we like, support 
goals we favor, and oppose countries that we oppose. We tend to think 
that countries that our enemies make proposals that would harm us, 
work against the interests of our friends, and aid our opponents (Jervis, 
1976: 117-118). 
5.4.4. Differences in Regulatory Energy Approaches: Market Liberalisation 
Principles 
One of the key European energy security priorities has been to develop the single 
energy market, which will be respected by all countries supplying energy to the EU or 
possessing energy assets in EU MSs. The introduced three-fold EU energy legislature 
(described in Section 5.3.1.) created tensions of the EU and Russia’s energy interests, 
caused by the adverse regulatory procedures and blame about the lack of reciprocity in 
EU-Russia energy relations.  
Russia strongly opposes the EU liberalisation legislation, in particular EU Third Energy 
Package of 2009 with the unbundling principle (mainly Gas Directive 2009/73/EC) that 
limits the activities of Russian energy companies in the EU market (EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue, 2009: 6). In order to provide the security of demand, Gazprom claims its 
need to have market segmentation and vertical control of the whole supply chain from 
the production to distribution. EU finds Russia’s controlling behaviour ‘problematic’ and 
breaching evolving open market principles (Interview 4). European energy market 
liberalisation makes gas market more uncertain and volatile, compromising the security 
of demand. ‘Russia dislikes uncertainty, as it wants to know the amount and price of 
gas it will have to supply in long-term perspective’ (Interview 4). Russia expressed 
strong opposition to the EU new energy regulations, interpreting them as being directed 
against Russia and representing a certain risk for Gazprom (Konoplyanik, 2012; 
TheEFDGroup, 2012; Gazprom, 2014c). Gazprom’s advisor Andrei Konoplyanik, 
attributes the risks to rapid regulatory changes caused by the EU new energy 
legislation, and wrong investment decisions, which brought uncertainties for Russia 
(Konoplyanik, 2012). Russian Deputy Ministry of Energy Anatoly Yanovski 
(TheEFDGroup, 2012) emphasised the insecurity of existing Russian energy assets 
and unprotected long-term investment projects in the EU, due to negative and 
unpredictable regulatory changes in the EU. Referring to the legal basis of agreements, 
Russia claims that the Third Energy Package should not be spread on the gas 
agreements and IGAs that were concluded prior this Energy package. Russia 
emphasises that the Third Energy Package should not affect relationships with third 
countries. Conversely, the EU rejects Russia’s interference into EU’s construction of its 
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internal energy market, claiming that having ‘anomalies’ and a ‘poorly organised and 
imperfect’ structure of a vertically-integrated gas sector itself, Russia ‘should not point 
out to the EU how to build its internal energy market’ (Interview 6; Interview 4). 
Whereas justifying the EU’s intentions to liberalise its energy consuming market and 
dealing with energy monopolists, Russian energy experts strongly believe that EU 
unbundling and a market liberalisation model is not suitable for the energy exporting 
country, and at this stage there can be no alternative to Gazprom’s export position 
(Konoplyanik, 2012; Interview 7). 
The former EU Trade Commissioner Mandelson accepted the clash of the EU and 
Russia’s interests, as parties have different views of how energy markets should ideally 
work:  
The EU wants – broadly speaking - competitive markets with strong rules, 
genuine rights of transit and the separation of energy production from 
distribution. Russia prefers state ownership, exclusive rights, vertical 
integration and limited transit rights. Russia would probably prefer asset 
swaps as a way of integrating the EU and Russian markets, while the EU 
is oriented towards a genuinely integrated and transparent cross border 
market (Mandelson, 2007).  
The Nord Stream yet again became the ground of EU-Russia energy disagreements. 
Russian investments into the Nord Stream pipeline cover not only gas supply to 
Germany, but also the exclusive control over gas transit to other countries through the 
OPAL and NEL interconnectors, which breach the new EU legislation about third party 
access to the pipeline on German territory (see Figure 3). Russia used its opportunity 
to apply for temporary exemptions from the new EU regulatory energy acquis to 
exempt the OPAL and NEL pipeline branches from third party access (European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2009b: Article 36). However, the 
status of the above interconnectors on EU territory was questioned by the EU. Despite 
that, the two main pipelines of the Nord Stream have received the exemptions from 
third-party access and from transit-free regulations for the period of 22 years from 
Germany’s national regulatory Agency (European Commission, 2014c), these 
exemptions have not been approved by the EU Commission. The EU Commission is 
reluctant to provide any concessions for Russia and allow Gazprom an exclusive and 
monopolised access to the pipeline on German territory, being the only supplier and 
co-owner of the transmission infrastructure. In practical terms the implications for 
energy supply to Europe are unclear. By not legally clarifying the operating regime of 
OPAL and NEL means that the pipelines will be half empty, since Russia is not allowed 
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to use their full capacity to fill them with gas and there are no other suppliers that can 
physically fill the pipeline capacity (Socor, 2014)57.  
Being concerned about economic loses and the security of demand, Russia blamed the 
exemption procedure being ‘not only overly bureaucratised and lengthy’, but also 
unpredictable since ‘even if the infrastructure is accepted on the national level, the EU 
can change and revoke this exemption on its own discretion’ (TheEFDGroup, 2012). 
The Russian Ministry of Energy again criticised the way the EU uses ‘double standards 
and adopts discriminatory solutions - hampering efficient functioning OPAL and NEL 
pipelines’ (TheEFDGroup, 2012), while providing the rival projects like Nabucco 
pipeline with the investment friendly regime at that time (European Commission, 
2014c). 
Figure 3: Interconnecting Branches of the Nord Stream Pipeline 
 
Source: NET4GAS (2013)  
Other misperceptions regard the EU and Russia’s views on the reciprocity principle, 
where openness of the gas market overrules control) and the asset swaps. Russian 
authorities strongly believe that ‘European companies are more represented in Russia 
that Russian companies in the EU’ (TheEFDGroup, 2012). The EU, in turn, is 
concerned about Russia’s 25% share in the EU energy market, claiming that Russia 
has more access to the downstream markets in the EU than the EU has to Russia’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Only in September 2015 for the first time Gazprom acted upon anti-monopoly reservations of 
the EU and stared auctioning gas that it supplies through the Nord Steam, which in turn will help 
to load the capacity of OPAL pipeline (gazpromexport.ru). 
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upstream. Reciprocity ‘would take a lot of the politics out of energy trade, without in any 
way denying Russia's legitimate right as a state to take the maximum benefit from her 
oil and gas’ (Mandelson, 2007).  
The lack of reciprocity principle in the countries’ relationships allowed the EU to 
introduce the so-called ‘Gazprom clause’, forbidding non-EU companies to own 
transmission and distribution systems. Guided by the fear that Russia already 
monopolised the EU gas market resulted in antitrust proceedings launched by the EU 
Commission against Gazprom in 2012 (European Commission, 2012a). Gazprom’s 
pricing policy and high tariffs based on the take-or-pay approach in Central and 
Eastern Europe is especially in the focus of the Commission’s probe. Since the 
investigation about possible violation of EU antitrust rules is an on-going issue, most of 
the official results have not been made public yet. However, Russian reaction followed 
almost immediately by issuing the Presidential Decree of 2012 (mentioned in Section 
5.2.1.), limiting access to important information of Russian strategic companies. This is 
a prime example how mutual perceptions of each other’s interests and identities trigger 




This chapter illustrated the complexity of EU-Russia energy relations and pointed 
towards spheres of potential mutual interests, where the interests of actors clash and 
create a conflicting and threat-generating environment. In a nutshell, it provided an 
answer to the first research sub-question by accounting for three major factors that 
undermined EU-Russia energy relations during 2004-2012. These influencing factors 
included: 1) Russia’s troublesome international energy policies that have material and 
threat perception-based negative implications for the gas import dependent EU MSs, 
compromising the relations with Russia; 2) Inherent differences between Russia and 
the EU in perceiving the role of energy interdependence in their relationships, the 
meaning of energy security and contradicting stances on EU’s energy diversification 
and market liberalisation policies; and 3) The EU’s weak and incoherent international 
and domestic energy actorness that is largely undermined by reluctance of the EU MSs 
to delegate their energy sovereign interests to the supranational EU level. 
This chapter commenced with analysing the reasons behind the constructed images of 
Russia and the EU as international energy players and their impact on energy relations. 
According to the first influencing principle, Russia’s aim to increase its international 
energy presence through the mechanism of assertive foreign energy policy-making 
(such as increasing shares in the European energy assets and infrastructures, 
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influence the gas prices, gas supply disruptions and individual energy deals with the 
EU MSs), and sustaining its identity as an energy superpower, has had immense 
energy security implications for the EU and its MSs.  
Firstly, Russia’s assertive foreign policy stance and problematic energy supply 
relationships with other countries initiated the policy of energy securitisation in the EU. 
Being affected by the Russia-Ukraine energy supply crises in 2006-2009 and having 
little regulative opportunity to affect Russian energy policy, the EU had to pursue an 
emergency energy policy and enhance its domestic energy security. The above 
securitisation was performed by emphasising the importance of solidarity among the 
EU MSs, prioritising energy supply diversification and accelerated the construction of a 
European integrated gas market. EU’s energy policy contradicted Russia’s energy 
supply strategy and provided grounds for insecurity, additional confrontations and 
threat perceptions. The differences in the EU and Russia’s approaches to energy 
security of supply and price security, various stances on energy interdependence, 
conflicting views on energy diversification policies (based on the example of the Nord 
Stream) and EU’s energy market developments (including unbundling principle) explain 
the grounds for EU-Russia energy misunderstandings and misperceptions (the second 
influencing factor).  
Secondly, Russian energy policies facilitated some changes in the consolidation of 
EU’s energy identity, catalysing attempts to centralise energy decision-making in the 
hands of the EU Commission (like the example of EU Commission’s mandate to 
negotiate the Trans-Caspian pipeline on behalf of the whole EU). However, those 
changes were not substantially supported by the EU MSs, as the EU failed to 
externalise and export its own energy security approach to Russia. Regardless of the 
endeavours of the EU Commission to make EU MSs delegate their internal market and 
external energy competences, the EU energy actorness is weakened by the national 
energy interests of the EU MSs. The authority of the EU MSs still prevails in the areas 
of security of supply, the choice of sources for their energy mix and selection of energy 
suppliers (Article 194 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union). 
The framework of EU actorness utilised by Jupille and Caporaso (1998) and applied 
here, vividly exposed the EU’s dysfunctionality and its vague propensity to be a 
coherent energy actor.  
The EU MSs’ strong hold on energy competences and preference to bilateral relations 
with energy suppliers creates problems in EU’s coherent energy security approach in 
general and relations to Russia in particular, resulting in poorly performing multilateral 
and bilateral energy initiatives, which lack mutually binding regulations and capacities 
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to deal with energy security situations. Russia’s disregard of the Energy Charter Treaty, 
the lack of consensus on modifying and renewing the PCA and the demise of EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue, allowed the chapter to conclude that there is a lack of political 
incentive from the EU and Russia to effectively build a strategic partnership and adhere 
to mutually shared energy challenges. More importantly, despite ‘somewhat’ coherent 
approach of the EU within general frameworks of the ECT and the WTO and building 
its internal energy market, EU’s collectively shared capacity to enforce the ECT 
regulations on Russia, renegotiate the PCA and consistently promote EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue were rather ineffective. These examples confirmed the weakness of 
the EU international energy actorness in general, but even more so in bilateral dealings 
with Russia, which remains a crucial factor in hindering EU-Russia energy interactions 
(the third influencing factor)58.  
Drawing inferences from the above analysis, Russia has been commonly perceived as 
a source of European energy supply insecurity, which identity and energy foreign policy 
are sometimes misperceived by the EU or largely exaggerated. Placing blame solely 
on its supplier for the EU’s energy insecurity seems inappropriate. Hence, ‘the Russian 
problem’ should be complemented with the incoherence of the EU’s internal and 
external energy actorness and the lack of solidarity among the EU countries, which are 
reluctant to subordinate their energy competences to the EU supranational level. 
Therefore, not only Russia’s energy identity, but the EU’s incoherence is 
simultaneously a cause and a consequence of the energy security impasse between 
Russia and the EU. Incompleteness of the explanation of the EU-Russia energy 
impasse creates the impetus to scrutinise in more details the determining role of the 
EU MSs in the EU’s incoherence and reasons for a non-unified sense of threat as 
between Poland and Germany, aiming to enhance understanding of the conditions and 
origins of energy insecurities within the Union (as an objective to answer the second 
research sub-question).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 As Chapter 2 emphasised, the analysis of the degree of the coherence of the EU energy 
actorness is not in the focus of this project. 
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Chapter 6. Case Study: Polish Energy Security between 2004 and 2012 
Deriving from the analytical conclusions indicating incoherence of the EU’s energy 
actorness, the first case study chapter presents the scrutiny of Poland’s energy security 
and its relations with Russia. After the collapse of the USSR, Poland was ‘trapped’ in a 
variety of material conditions (including but not limited to geographical location between 
the West and the East, vulnerability derived from historical legacies of World War Two 
and the Soviet occupation, and growing energy dependence on external energy 
sources), which can explain the country’s specific foreign policy behaviour and 
geopolitical vulnerability (Gorska, 2009; Bienczyk-Missala, 2016), contributing to a 
particular mode for general threat perceptions about Russia (complementing Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1.).  
The history of Polish-Russian energy relations stretches back to the Soviet era, when 
Poland as a ‘satellite state’ was under the direct political and economic influence of the 
USSR. Therefore, this section makes historical references to well-established inter-
state relationships that started in the 1960s, when Russia supplied countries of the 
Eastern Bloc with such natural resources like iron ore and crude oil, and Poland, in turn, 
sustained the Soviet Union with light industry produce (mainly textile and food products) 
and provided ship yards. Poland’s economic decline under the martial law of 1981 was 
accompanied with the growth of economic dependence on Russia in the 1980s 
(including on gas deliveries). Therefore, in order to satisfy energy demand in countries 
of the Eastern Bloc, Russia built two major pipelines Brotherhood (Druzhba) and 
Yamal-Europe, spreading to many CEE countries (see Figure 1 in 5.2.3.). Thus, Poland 
occupies an important transiting location for CEE and Western Europe in transporting 
the Russian gas westwards and is still closely incorporated into the Russian energy 
network (Raszewski, 2015). 
From the early 1990s the country stood on an unknown path of development, aspiring 
to become a part of Western international structures and the EU (Szczerbiak, 2012; 
Bienczyk-Missala, 2016). With EU accession the ultimate goal and an aspiration for 
Poland was to get an opportunity to promote its national security and energy interests 
in the EU arena and be a part of Western democratic and economically sustainable 
community (Roth, 2011: 601; Maltby, 2014). As Chapter 1 already mentioned, those 
pre-existent conditions were catalysed and aggravated with Poland’s joining the EU in 
2004, when the country had to reconsider and adjust its national interests, modify its 
institutional political structures, overcome the prominence of its national pride and re-
establish its national identity as a member of yet another economic and political bloc. 
Thus, the EU membership complicated rather than simplified the country’s energy 
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security choices and exposed a range of unresolved historical, cultural, economic and 
geopolitical issues, as a new member of the EU and in relations with Russia (to be 
discussed in Sections 6.2., 6.3., and 6.4.).  
According to Raszewski (2015: 31), ‘within the changing geopolitical context, security 
and markets turned out to be the key issue of energy security perceptions within the 
region in general, and for Poland, in particular’, as an anti-Russian energy security 
discourse prevailed in Poland. Showing import dependent Poland to be vulnerable 
towards Russian gas supply disruptions and energy price policies (Gorska, 2009; Roth, 
2011), ‘the disruptions and politicisation of EU–Russia energy relations have inevitably 
changed the Poles’ perceptions of gas supply security and Russia’s role in the process’ 
(Raszewski, 2015: 33). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to answer the second 
research sub-question about the conditions and origins of the energy insecurity in 
Poland and provide the analysis of Poland’s energy interests and identity that impacts 
the country’s threat perceptions (which is also a third research sub-question). For this 
reason the chapter explores whether Poland’s energy security policy is solely based on 
anti-Russian threat perceptions, and aims to identify which other factors contribute to 
the conceptualisation of energy security threats, having implications for Poland’s 
perception-based behaviour and energy relations with Russia.  
To satisfy these objectives, the first Section 6.1. inspects the structural conditions of 
Poland’s internal energy market for the last decade and identifies its domestic energy 
diversification priorities. This especially corresponds to the constructivist grounds for 
the creation of threat perceptions, since factors of both domestic and international 
nature play important roles in identity formation and the creation of energy threats 
(Hopf, 2002). As Alons (2007: 211) rightly points out ‘it is commonly acknowledged that 
in order to understand the preferences and behaviour of states in international 
relations, we need to take both domestic considerations and international 
considerations of states into account’. 
Looking at the domestic energy market of Poland is a part of analysis of the material 
conditions that provide the platform for the creation of energy threat perceptions. 
Hence to what extent and in what way the state utilises those material conditions for 
the ideation purposes of threat creation is a matter of that country’s choice and a 
subject for investigation in this research. Since threat perceptions are composed from 
both the international and domestic factors (Hopf, 2002; Alons, 2007), it is vital to 
understand if Poland’s insecurities might originate from the state’s internal energy 
policies, rather than or in addition to an externally posed threat by Russia.  
166 
 
Section 6.2. investigates Poland’s development under the EU supranational 
architecture and explores Poland’s reaction on EU energy policies of diversification and 
the construction of the integrated liberalised energy market. Polish opposition towards 
the Nord Stream project and controversial attitudes towards the EU energy Directives 
underlie country’s energy interests and energy security fears. Polish aggravation about 
the lack of energy solidarity in the EU in the case of the Nord Stream re-confirms the 
conflict of energy interests between the individual MSs and the supranational EU level 
(that was initially noted in Chapter 5) and reveals country’s supply vulnerability to both - 
Russia and other EU MSs (mainly Germany). 
Being a part of the evolving economic and political Union has its own trade offs and 
adds uncertainties in Poland’s bilateral relations with Russia. Section 6.3. proceeds 
with the analysis of perplexing and uneasy relations between Poland and Russia. The 
nature of Poland-Russia energy interactions can be best understood through the prism 
of the re-negotiations of the main IGAs, which display the collision of parties’ energy 
interests and highlights the points of tension. Polish energy security geopolitical 
rhetoric has been developing on the basis of national security concerns about growing 
Russian energy hegemony as a threat to energy, economic, military and political 
stability of Poland and the EU in general. The grounds for threat perceptions and 
energy security are demonstrated on the basis of a relative convergence between 
public opinions, governmental and private sector perspectives in conceptualisation of 
those notions.  
Moving from the level of domestic construction of energy interests, the chapter 
concludes with Section 6.4. analysing the formation of Polish identity in the EU as an 
energy actor through the prism of relations with Russia. Through the transformation of 
its national insecurities, Poland shows that its energy vulnerability is connected not only 
to Russia as an external energy threat to Poland’s national interests and energy 
security (based on a variety pre-existent material conditions and derived from the 
previous history of energy relations with Russia). Energy insecurity also comes from 
the pressure of the EU internal energy market trends and the impacts of energy 
policies of other EU MSs, mainly Germany. Exploiting the image of an energy victim 
allows Poland to gain some economic benefits and political concessions to prioritise 
and lobby its individual energy interests in the EU. Thus the first case study chapter 
serves an explanatory role for a broader analysis of the EU-Russia energy 
misunderstandings. It accounts for presenting part of the argument about the existing 
differences in threat perceptions and understandings of energy security in the EU and 
their impact for the EU energy security and its relations with Russia.  
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6.1. Poland’s Energy Policy 
With the intention to analyse domestic factors that might influence Poland’s energy 
threat perceptions, this chapter commences with the analysis of Polish energy mix, its 
internal market structure and the main market players. Finding inconsistencies in 
policies around the developing country’s internal sources and factors accompanying 
state-market relationships provide conclusive judgements about the role of domestic 
factors in the country’s energy security. 
6.1.1. Structure of Polish Energy Market 
The energy sustainability of Poland for the last 20 years has relied upon a variety of 
energy sources. Poland has the immense domestic sources of coal and lignite 
(especially in the Silesia region), crude and refined oil products, natural gas and other 
renewable energy sources that have composed its energy mix. Hitherto, the relatively 
low cost of power production from hard coal has made Poland self-sufficient in the 
electricity generation. It became also rather competitive on the international market, 
ensuring the country’s relative independence from external energy supplies. Poland is 
one of the EU’s biggest primary energy producers, accounting for 8.3% of the produced 
energy in the EU, after the UK, Germany and France. In 2009 more than 80% of Polish 
electricity was produced from coal and only 3.17% was generated from gas (Central 
Statistical Office of Poland, 2011). However, due to a pattern of decreasing its 
indigenous production of oil, troubles with coal’s compatibility with the European carbon 
dioxide reduction programme and underdeveloped production of gas, led Poland to 
importing most of its hydrocarbons from Russia, and as a result, created inbuilt 
insecurity of the gas dependent country from this supplier (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.4.1.).  
Gas, being used mainly for electricity generation as well as industrial and house-hold 
consumption, remains the key type of fuel for the EU. In 2010 around 59% of natural 
gas in Poland was used by mainly chemical industries and for industrial production with 
25% being consumed by households. Actually, since the 2000s, the increase of gas 
consumption remains the general tendency in all EU MSs, with Poland not being an 
exception (see Table 2 in Chapter 5.4.1). In the governmental policy document ‘Energy 
Policy of Poland until 2030’, gas demand is forecast to increase by 18% in 2020 and by 
43% in 2030, respectively, compared with 2010 (Ministry of Economy of Poland, 2009). 
Poland’s geographic location made it a strategically important country for the EU’s 
security of gas supplies. The legacy of Soviet Union infrastructure grids enabled east-
west gas flow from Russia. This makes Poland not only one of the biggest EU gas 
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importers but also a transit country for Russian fuel. There are several major entries for 
pipelines bringing Russian natural gas into the country from Belarusian and Ukrainian 
directions. Only recently the reverse flow from Germany was activated (to be discussed 
later in this chapter). 
According to the IEA sources, Polish gas import dependence from 2004 onwards on 
average has been floating at around 63%, whereas around 30% is covered by its 
domestic production (IEA, 2011a: 2). Out of the imported quota, the Russian share has 
increased from 62% in 2004, to around 90% in 2010 (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Origin of Polish Gas Imports in 2004 and 2010, (in %) 
 
Source: PGNiG (2010)  
Thus in 2010, Polish gas demand was internally covered with 4.2 bcm per year, and 
the other 10 bcm were imported from Russia through long-term supply contracts 
(PGNiG, 2010). In 2012, Polish gas demand of 15.4 bcm was satisfied with the same 
amount of domestic sources (4.3 bcm) and the rest was covered by Russia and intra-
Community supplies from Germany and the Czech Republic (The President of the 
Energy Regulatory Office in Poland, 2013: 13). 
While the previous Chapter 5 affirmed the asymmetric import dependence in the EU 
with Poland having relatively low level of import dependence in general, this section 
confirms high share of gas consumptions in Poland and high gas import dependence 
on Russia specifically (Table 2 and Figure 2 in Chapter 5). Poland often presents its 
import dependence on Russian gas as an energy security issue. Hence as Chapter 5 
indicated, Polish increased import dependence is not directly proportional to the level of 
polish insecurity (Ministry of National Defense of Poland, 2007; Interview 13; Interview 
18). 
Only a few years ago a plausible internal solution to decrease Polish gas reliance on 
external gas sources appeared. The statistical data presented by the Polish Geological 
Institute indicated that major stocks of conventional and exploitable gas resources were 
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found in Polish Lowlands, Carpathian Foreland and the Polish economic zone of the 
Baltic Sea. The publication of 2011 states that Poland’s ‘resources of exploitable fields 
were estimated at 120.24 bcm, which corresponds to 83% of total amount of all the 
exploitable resources’ (Polish Geological Institute, 2011). According to an energy 
expert at the Sobieski Institute and the European Commission adviser (Interview 14), 
‘the quantity of conventional gas is even higher if the 80-90 bcm of proven gas 
reserves that are less accessible and more expensive to produce are added’. If those 
prospects are correct, Poland has a chance to cover its gas demand entirely, and even 
start to export it to other neighbouring EU countries. The same energy expert (Interview 
14) claims that to reach gas self-sufficiency, Poland would need to produce at least 3-
10% of proven reserves a year (like other developed countries are doing, such as Italy 
or Denmark).  
In summary, Poland has a favourable geographic location being on the route of gas 
deliveries to Europe and plenty of internal material energy capabilities to be energy 
self-sufficient and enhance the security of energy supply position. Nonetheless, the 
country has been very slow and ineffective in pushing internal gas production forward, 
which illustrates the dilemma of the country’s irrational energy behaviour. If the external 
energy dependence is generally presented as a growing concern, it is unclear why 
Poland is so inactive about the development of internal conventional resources? A 
good place to look for the answers would be the analysis of the position of Polish key 
energy decision makers and their incentives to act in a particular way. Therefore, the 
section below scrutinises the energy interests of Polish gas players (mainly the energy 
monopolist PGNiG and the role of Ministries) and the perplexing domestic process of 
energy market liberalisation that undermines energy security. 
6.1.2. Main Energy Players 
The analysis of Polish energy market structure continues with the basic understanding 
that Polish gas market is almost entirely controlled by the state. Generally, there exist 
only two key types of players, which are responsible for Polish energy policy - the 
state-owned energy giant Polish Oil and Gas Company PGNiG created in 1976 and the 
Government represented by the set of Ministries. Both are strongly interlinked by 
shared interests and decision-making and mutually influential as for the last decade 
they consist of the decision-makers from same bureaucratic apparatus. 
The Polish energy market is dominated by the state-owned monopolist PGNiG, which 
became a joint-stock company in 1996 owned by the Ministry of State of Treasury, 
who’s share composed 72.94% in December 2009 (PGNiG, 2009: 12). PGNiG 
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explores and produces domestic conventional and unconventional natural gas, imports, 
stores and delivers natural gas to customers. It is the only operator of the country's 
UGS capacity until 2035 and effective controller of the wholesale natural gas market. 
Until 2004, PGNiG was the only owner of all the transmission assets. Together with 
Russia, PGNiG is still an equal owner of the EuRoPol Gaz transit operator (48%:48%) 
that was created specifically for serving the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and was the owner 
of the GAZ-SYSTEM transmission network of Poland until 2005, when all the shares of 
GAZ-SYSTEM went to the Ministry of State Treasury (Gaz System, 2014). 
Nevertheless, during 2004-2012 PGNiG still had a very strong market position by de-
jure and de-facto controlling the energy exploration and production licences for gas in 
Poland, LNG production, UGS access and the majority of the Polish energy projects. 
Polish energy experts explain PGNiG’s energy stance as extremely inefficient. The 
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) explains PGNiG’s performance as ‘rather politicised, 
shady, monopolistic and very poorly ruled’ (Interview 15). The expert from the Sobeiski 
Institute condemns the company’s inefficient performance and management 
operational capabilities and risk-averse culture of local management due to the fact 
that it continues to appoint different chief executives of political rather than economic 
and managerial background (Interview 14). The fact that until June 2011 PGNiG had 
no overarching well-structured energy strategy and until recently had no energy 
Strategic Department supports the above criticism. 
Despite EU regulations, by executing rigid control of the Polish energy market, PGNiG 
also undermines the European idea of energy security by complicating competition for 
other energy players and lacking economic and political incentives to invest. Firstly, the 
new entries (especially the gas importing companies) are faced with difficulties to 
compete on price with the energy giant. PGNiG’s gas prices represent a mixture of 
domestically-produced cheap gas and more expensive imported gas, which is cheaper 
than solely imported gas by other gas companies (ICIS, 2007). Secondly, by holding a 
monopolistic control over the production, PGNiG decides when and where to invest in 
local gas exploration. Hitherto, it has been very slow in investing money in production 
and development of prospective and proven reserves. From 2003 until 2010 
indigenous gas production increased only by 0.2 bcm, which is incredibly low, given the 
amount of proven reserves Poland possesses. Gas imports, on the other hand, 
increased by more than 2 bcm within the same period, most of it from Russia and 
Germany (PGNiG, 2010). Only in October 2012 PGNiG started to speed up the 
process of increasing domestic production of unconventional and conventional gas (the 
energy giant provided a share in exploration of 7 licenses to the state-controlled refiner 
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Grupa Lotos). Nevertheless, PGNiG did not give up its right to operate its concessions 
that will preserve its monopolistic interests (Zakrzewska, 2012). 
A very similar and ineffective energy security approach has taken place with UGS 
capacities. Poland has a relatively small amount of 6 UGS facilities that accommodate 
a relatively small total volume of 1.8 bcm by the end of 2012 (The President of the 
Energy Regulatory Office in Poland, 2013: 13). The key role of UGS in Poland is to 
balance seasonal variations of gas consumption, which are not necessarily caused by 
external supply failure, but also by severe weather conditions. Since access to the 
UGS is controlled by PGNiG, it decides about the investments in the expansion or 
construction of new UGS 59 , and has an authority to block the access of other 
companies by justifying it by the lack of space (ICIS, 2007; Interview 15).  
In a way such position imposes some important obligations on PGNiG to provide 
effective development of the domestic energy market, increase investments into local 
gas production, exploit new energy sources and storages, and enable energy security 
in general. However in reality, inefficient gas market structure, bureaucratic problems 
and PGNiG’s lack of interest to pursue tests and issue drilling licences, remain the key 
stumbling blocks in pursuing country’s internal energy security. On the one hand, it 
would be too short-sighted to put the blame on PGNiG solely, as a big role is played by 
governmental officials (which are also involved in owning the company) and state 
regulations allowing PGNiG to occupy such a position. For instance, according to the 
Act of 16 February 2007 on stocks of crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas, the 
principles of proceeding in circumstances of a threat to the fuel security of the State 
and disruption on the petroleum market (President of the Republic of Poland, 2007), 
the importers of natural gas are obliged to possess gas volumes in UGS equivalent to a 
proportion of their imports. However, it is impossible in practical terms if all the storage 
capacity is owned by PGNiG only.  
In addition, having no economic incentives for PGNiG to increase its local energy 
production can also be explained by the inefficiency of the taxation system in Poland. 
The government did not create essential incentives to encourage energy businesses to 
produce more gas domestically and enhance its energy security of supply. Corporate 
income tax in Poland is higher compared to other EU MSs, like Germany (in 2012 it 
was 19% compared to Germany’s 15%). Therefore, from the economic perspective, if 
the energy company increases the level of local production, it will have to pay higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For the last decade, PGNiG undertook very few investments into the UGS. The largest 
projects were the expansion of UGS Wierzchowice, UGS Husow and UGS Strachocina and 
construction of new UGS Bonikowo, UGS Daszewo and UGS Kosakowo in 2008.  
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taxes, destroying all incentives for energy companies to develop local production 
(Interview 14). Unclear geological and regulatory approaches in the country also cause 
immense delay in investments and commercialisation of domestic gas production. 
Thus, the legislation in Poland restrains the speed of the country to be domestically 
self-sufficient, self-sustainable, and therefore, secured. 
Only with the intensification of the European market liberalisation regulations and 
pressure of the EU gas and electricity Directives, was Poland ‘forced’ to adjust its 
energy market to more competitive conditions, adjusting its old-fashioned practices. 
Thus, in February 2012 PGNiG published the Natural Gas Release Programme, which 
introduced changes to gas price making, eliminating limits on prices PGNiG charges 
industrial consumers. Gas prices will be regulated by the Energy Regulatory Office 
rather than PGNiG, and a system of auctions will be introduced that will allow the sale 
of gas for a price calculated in accordance with the Regulatory Agreement (PGNiG, 
2012). In addition, the draft of the 2012 Energy Law Act, providing changes in the 
Polish energy market according to the Third Energy Package, introduces an obligation 
for gas trading companies to sell part of the gas through gas exchange: 30% to the of 
2013 and up to 70% from 2014 (The President of the Energy Regulatory Office in 
Poland, 2013: 6). PGNiG’s recent energy market deregulation policies give hope that 
even at a slow speed the Polish energy market can be transformed to be viable, 
efficient and competitive, which will enhance the country’s security on the European 
arena in the long run. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aspires, ‘it will create a place for 
new energy companies – in LNG, shale gas and Caspian gas’ (Interview 16).  
Furthermore, Polish authorities have been very critical about PGNiG’s position, and 
recognise the necessity to restructure the Polish energy market to improve country’s 
energy security. For instance, the perceptions in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MSZ) about the reasons for Poland’s energy insecurity were that it lies in the 
monopolistic position of PGNiG, leading to ‘no competition, no pressure on prices and 
a locking of the market and the transmission capacity’ (Interview 16). Similar views 
were expressed by official sources from the Ministry of Economy (Interview 10). 
Ultimately this source of domestic insecurity caused by PGNiG energy approach is 
projected onto energy relationships with Russia.  
Despite some recently visible changes towards market liberalisation, the governmental 
system that is responsible for energy security lacks coherence, structure and 
consistency of the energy competences. Having no allocated single Ministry of Energy 
responsible for the implementation of a consistent energy policy, there are too many 
Ministries that are sharing their energy security competences in Poland. Thus, despite 
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the fact that the Ministry of Treasury holds shares in PGNiG and the other largest 
power utilities, supervises gas operators, influences gas prices, which are regulated by 
the Energy Regulatory Office (Gierej, 2009: 182), official governmental energy policy 
and key energy market regulations are drafted by the Ministry of Economy. To ensure 
the energy security, the Ministry of Economy is responsible for the usage of 
compulsory 30-day gas stocks that was introduced by the European Commission 
obliging gas trading industries from October 2012 to maintain reserves of gas stocks 
(IEA, 2011a) and the technical side of transmission and distribution of Polish gas and 
electricity systems (Interview 10). Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for the coherence of Polish energy policy with the EU and provides strategic analysis 
for further developments), whereas the Ministry of Environment deals with the 
environment protection of natural resources and issues gas, oil and coal exploration 
and production licences.  
There have been constant changes and merges within the departments in 
governmental structures and the Ministerial cabinets (Interview 17) that complicate the 
division of competences between the departments and jeopardises the efficiency of the 
Polish bureaucratic machine dealing with the energy. Smith (2004: 48) associates 
frequent changes in the Polish government with general problems in Polish energy 
policy as such changes ‘have brought in ministers who lack sufficient knowledge of the 
energy market and expertise in negotiating with Russia’. In addition, concealed 
competition and political power sharing undermine the country’s energy profile. Having 
politically strong and opinionated personalities in charge of the Ministries, provide 
grounds for clashes of ideas and energy responsibilities between the Ministries. Such 
operational and personal contradictions affect the information flow, speed and patterns 
of negotiation regarding a particular energy issue (Interview 17).  
Consequently, in order to improve the country’s energy security, it is not enough to 
liberalise and restrict PGNiG’s monopoly on the energy market, but to complement this 
process with major governmental changes, including major reforms and improvements 
on the Polish ministerial levels. Section 6.1. argues that the relations between state-
dominated market structure and key energy actors hinders the country’s energy 
security of supply and breaches the liberalisation of a competitive energy market (as a 
precondition to energy security, emphasised by the EU Commission). However, the 
analysis of the internal developments of Polish energy market would be incomplete 
without accounting for Poland’s national energy interests within the structure of the 




6.1.3. National Energy Diversification Priorities 
In accordance with the Polish Energy Law Act (March 2005), the Ministry of Economy 
is obliged to develop and systematically review the Energy Policy covering energy 
security strategic issues every 4 years. In November 2009, the Council of Ministers 
adopted ‘Poland’s Energy Policy until 2030’, representing a long-term energy security 
strategy, highlighting a specific plan of action. The key focus was to decrease import 
dependence by improving energy efficiency, increasing the security of energy supplies, 
increasing competition at the energy market, introducing renewable and alternative 
sources of energy and reducing environmental impact (Ministry of Economy of Poland, 
2009).  
Like many other heavily gas import-dependent EU MSs, Poland shares European 
energy security challenges and has a goal to decrease energy import dependence on 
Russia. To enhance physical security of supply and provide ‘uninterrupted availability 
of energy sources’ (European Commission, 2006: 6) Poland pursued the policy of 
diversification of energy types, country sources and routes. While shale gas, LNG, 
nuclear and renewable energy priorities satisfy the diversification of energy types, the 
options of receiving gas from other countries, rather than directly from Russia, 
corresponds to the diversification of country sources and routes.  
6.1.3.1. Diversification of Energy Types 
• Shale gas 
For several years shale gas has remained the main priority and hope for energy 
security and efficiency in Poland and grew its importance as a diversification option in 
the EU. Since 2006 Poland has been involved in investigating the potential sources of 
unconventional shale gas to help boost Poland’s confidence as an import-dependent 
country. Preliminary estimates of Polish Geological Institute suggested that Poland 
could have between 346 bcm to 1.9 trillion cubic meters of unconventional gas (Polish 
Geological Institute, 2012: 5). Shale gas accumulations are likely to occur in the Upper 
Ordovician-Lower Silurian formations in the Baltic and Lublin-Podlasie Basins, as well 
as in the Lysogory and Bilgoraj-Narol basins. These formations are currently subjects 
to industry exploration activity under thorough supervision of environmental research 
and monitoring groups, which are observing the possible negative impact of shale gas 
bores on the environment.  If the environmental uncertainties about the pollution of 
water are settled and the stumbling blocks from PGNiG monopolistic position for 
unconventional gas exploration and production are tackled, shale gas has the potential 
to be the so-called ‘game changer’ in the energy landscape of not only Poland but the 
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whole EU (IEA, 2011a: 12). In order to promote shale gas exploration, Poland is 
actively involved in a variety of environmental research and monitoring that will enable 
the country to proceed to actively produce unconventional gas in accordance with the 
environmental regulations of the EU. However, the government is inactive yet again 
with introducing regulations, stable legislation about gas extraction, and an attractive 
taxation scheme. Due to the limited amount of issued licences for gas exploration, 
energy experts struggle to estimate reliably the amount of shale gas reserves (Cienski, 
2013). 
 
• LNG terminal  
In January and May 2006, the Polish Council of Ministers passed resolutions to 
sponsor the construction of an LNG terminal with the direct connection to Scandinavian 
deposits as a part of the diversification plans (Spruds and Rostoks, 2009). The 
projected dispatch capacity is 7.5 bcm per year (Naimski, 2007: 6), and in 2009 PGNIG 
secured a long-term contract with Qatar for supplying 1.5bcm of LNG. Poland managed 
to secure 465 million Euros from the EU Structural funds for developing its gas 
networks, including the Swinoujscie LNG project (European Commission, 2013d). 
Unsurprisingly for the state-controlled structure of Polish energy market, Polskie LNG 
S.A company (a subsidiary of the GAZ-SYSTEM S.A. owned by the Ministry of 
Treasury) owns, constructs and operates this LNG terminal. Despite Poland’s first LNG 
re-gasification terminal Swinoujscie was inaugurated at the end of 2012 and is planned 
to be completed by June 2014, in 2015 it was still non-operational. 
• Nuclear power 
Poland has a relatively long history of attempts to introduce nuclear power to diminish 
dependence on imported gas and environmentally problematic coal. However due to 
the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the Polish public has been strongly against building 
nuclear plants in the country. Having no nuclear plants of its own, in 2006 Poland 
joined Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in building a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania.  
The concept of adding nuclear power to the Polish diversified energy portfolio was 
revived in 2005 and has been subsequently included in the nation’s energy policy 
strategy. The pressure to introduce nuclear energy in Poland grows proportionally with 
the increased costs of greenhouse gas emissions within the EU. In 2009, the 
Government appointed a Special Envoy for Polish Nuclear Energy, who is responsible 
for introducing nuclear energy to into the Polish energy mix. As identified by the 
Ministry of Economy, nuclear is the most cost effective way to deal with CO2 emissions 
without decreasing energy production.  Aiming for energy independence, Poland plans 
to construct at least 2 nuclear plants, which according to Polish energy security stance 
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will more likely be state-owned (Kulczynski, 2014). Hence, this is a long-term 
perspective that if taken forward by the government will come in place by 2025 and will 
not be able to affect considerably the EU 20-20-20 climate change targets. However, 
after the Fukushima disaster and German nuclear phase out decision, the date of 
nuclear introduction might be postponed even further.  
• Renewable energy sources 
Poland shares the EU 20-20-20 targets and adheres to the development of sustainable 
and low-emission economic growth, as the Energy Strategy of 2009 implies. Directive 
2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council imposes an obligation for 
Poland to achieve a 15% level of renewable energy in final consumption and 10% level 
of biofuels in transport fuel consumption by 2020 (European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union, 2009a). Despite the EU attempts to stimulate countries 
to increase the implementation of renewable sources of energy, Poland has technical 
problems with its implementation due to its dated infrastructure. The reason is that 
renewables should be incorporated into the electricity grid, but the Polish grid is very 
weak and limited in its capacity (Interview 18). Technical safety with the overload of the 
electricity grids will inevitably arise.  
In general, the implementation of renewable energy sources in Poland is very slow and 
inefficient and its use in the electricity sector is significantly less than EU’s expectations. 
From October 2005 ‘Green Certificates’ were introduced for the electricity sector to 
encourage green energy thinking (Muras, 2011). However, Poland does not seem to 
take EU’s green energy vision as a key energy security priority. Poland vetoed the EU 
Council resolutions on the EU climate energy package twice within a year of 2012. 
These resolutions included ‘unfavourable’ for Poland annual quotas for the auction 
emission trading scheme and enforcing climate change and CO2 reduction targets 
(Torello and Kruk, 2012). Since the EU Commission is strongly against power 
generation plants based on coal and also proposes the increase of greenhouse 
emission cuts from 20% to 30% by 2020 – Poland will struggle to supply the country’s 
economy. It will also trigger the growth of electricity and gas prices. Some Polish 
Members of Parliaments in the EU and Poland (like Konrad Szymanski and Jan 
Szyszko) criticised the EU climate package as being ignorant of economic 
consequences (Economic Forum, 2012). For Poland, heavily relying on coal-based 
production, such regulations would destroy the country’s competitiveness potential. As 
an official from MSZ stated, ‘Until we find shale gas in Poland – there is no chance 
Poland will agree any climate change targets, there is simply no room for climate 
change options’ (Interview 16). In order to balance the substitution of coal with natural 
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gas, which comes at very high prices from Russia, ‘Warsaw seeks to transcend the 
energy-security and climate-change policy dilemma, which is not without 
consequences on the country’s spending on primary resources’ (Raszewski, 2015: 34). 
6.1.3.2. Diversification of External Gas Routes and Country Sources 
Like many other CEE countries, Poland lacks a variety of non-Russian gas delivery 
routes. Market liberalisation and the development of regional infrastructure will create 
competition for Gazprom’s gas and will allow gas to be traded as commodity, without 
any possible political leverage on it. To balance the east-west Russian gas pipeline 
network, Poland needs to develop north-south infrastructure. Poland is prepared to 
create a regional interconnected gas market with other CEE countries so that in case of 
emergency it can import gas through interconnectors from Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. This market should be integrated not only by a pipeline network, 
but through a transparent regulatory regime. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes 
that if the gas and LNG markets were fully integrated and as well-functioning as the oil 
markets - there would be no security issues in Poland with the suppliers like Russia 
(Interview 16).  
Despite Polish energy diversification aspirations, since late 1990s Poland made only 
two major attempts to diversify gas delivered from Russia through alternative 
infrastructure routes and suppliers. The first one was made under a right-centrist AWS–
UW coalition government (1997-2001) to connect the North of Poland with the gas 
pipeline to the Norwegian Continental Shelf, importing gas from the Norwegian Statoil 
and Danish DONG companies. However, the project called the ‘Baltic Pipe’ never 
came to life as the centre-left party that came to power in 2001 considered the project 
economically unviable (Interview 17). False trust and mistaken calculations led to the 
view that the Russian gas will be cheaper than that from Norway and Denmark in a 
long-run (Interview 17). Another attempt to revive plans to build the off shore pipeline 
from Denmark to carry Norwegian gas was made in 2006 by the centre-right PO/PsL 
governmental coalition, and it remains on the level of negotiations. Taking into account 
that since 2006 nothing has moved forward, the project can be regarded unsuccessful 
and incomplete. The example illustrates that changing governments and pursuing no 
continuity in the governmental decisions about consistent energy policies affects Polish 
energy security. 
The second attempt to connect Polish and German gas distribution systems through 
the Bernau-Szczecin gas pipeline was made in the early 2000s (the initiative about the 
reverse gas flow from Germany through the EU will be specifically described below). 
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However, in an energy market that is heavily controlled by the Polish state, due to the 
fact that the Bernau-Szczecin gas pipeline was a project of German Ruhrgas and a 
private energy company Bartimpex (owned by the Polish businessman Aleksander 
Gudzowaty), the pipeline was not approved by the state. One of the reasons behind it 
was the personality of Gudzowaty, who remained a controversial figure and was 
believed to have close connections with Gazprom, reflecting Russia’s interests on 
Polish market (Kupchinsky, 2009; Interview 14). At that time neither centre–right 
government under former Prime Minister Buzek (who during 2009-2012 was the 
President of the European Parliament) nor the Ministry of Economy favoured neither 
PGNiG’s involvement in this deal nor the participations of private individuals in cross-
border energy trade (Morka, 2001; Interview 10). In addition, the source and the origin 
of gas in this project would have still been Russia, just the supplying party would be 
German Ruhrgas (Orban, 2008), which in the non-integrated EU market was rather 
insecure. Both projects that could potentially involve more reliable supplies from other 
European countries failed.  
The above illustrates that Poland struggled to find substitutes to Russian gas, thereby 
increasing perceived insecurity. With the exception of the most feasible option for 
diversification of energy types being the LNG (with the terminal already being built and 
close to finishing), Poland is apprehensive about introducing controversial nuclear 
power due to public resistance, overly cautious in pushing forward the novelty of shale 
gas, which Poland is believed to have in abundance, and struggles with promoting 
politically unpopular renewable sources. In addition, the diversification of energy routes 
and suppliers through the Norwegian and German gas supply projects was poorly 
supported by political will and suffered from inconsistent governmental decisions. While 
Poland’s diversification of energy types has not used the discourse of Russia actively 
playing the determining factor in Poland’s energy insecurity, the diversification of the 
supply routes and country sources has been undermined with rather politicised anti-
Russian discourse. The political rationale for socially constructed energy security threat 
is especially visible in the example of the Nord Stream pipeline from Section 6.2.1. 
 
6.2. Polish Attitudes towards EU Energy Policy 
The section uncovers a variety of Poland’s attitudes towards energy security and the 
EU’s development of an integrated energy market. Being left out of the Nord Stream 
project illustrates the meaning Poland attaches to uninterrupted energy supplies and 
the concept of EU solidarity by presenting the Nord Stream as an energy security 
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threat. The supremacy of country’s national interests is explicated not only in the 
examples of the Nord Stream, but the Polish stand on the EU gas market liberalisation 
procedures. 
6.2.1. Poland’s View on European Energy Solidarity: the Nord Stream 
Example 
Regardless of the fact that solidarity is mentioned in most of the EU treaties, the ‘new 
MSs’ were the driving force behind the institutionalisation of solidarity and embedding it 
within the EU regulatory framework in mid-2000s. Solidarity in energy security and the 
internal gas market is naturally more appealing to countries from a more gas 
dependent CEE region, where smaller and weaker MSs try to generate a ‘mass effect’ 
in energy policy and decision-making. Historically, Poland has been actively promoting 
solidarity values in the EU (Roth, 2011; Misik, 2015), in reference to the successful 
example of the anti-communist ‘Solidarnost’ trade union movement in 1980s. Since 
joining the EU Poland was the one actively advocating for the significance of a 
commonly shared and coherent approach to energy on both internal EU and 
international levels (Ministry of National Defense of Poland, 2007; Naimski, 2007).  
The Nord Stream example represents not only a security issue that evolved around the 
EU’s choices of diversification projects and the pipelines routes, but for a long time the 
Nord Stream remained a focal issue of Polish understanding and conceptualisation of 
the solidarity principle in the EU. It illustrates that from 2004 European energy 
diversification was politically and economically underpinned by the political 
constructions of the individual EU MSs. According to Raszewski:  
The fact that Poland has not benefited from its geopolitical locus, ideal for 
playing a role in the region as a key transit country for Russian oil and gas 
exports, makes for geopolitical constraints in the background of its energy 
insecurity perceptions (Raszewski, 2015: 32).  
At first, politically grounded trepidations from the Polish side towards Germany 
appeared in 2005, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel failed to fulfil her 
declarations made during her visit to Poland in June 2005 about Poland being a part of 
the Nord Stream project (Koszel, 2007: 260). After several political statements made by 
German governmental officials about favouring the direct off-shore route60 for the 
pipeline from Russia to Germany (which according to expert estimations would have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 To eliminate the effect of the off-shore route, Poland advocated for the inland route of the 
Nord Stream, called Amber that would also go through Poland and the Baltic States. However, 
Russia did not accept the proposal. 
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been cheaper to build), Poland tried to raise its energy insecurity concerns by utilising 
political tools of influence. Being under an economic embargo regarding the export of 
meat to Russia since November 2005 and disappointed by the lack of political 
understanding from Berlin, Poland vetoed the PCA re-negotiations with Russia in 
November 2006, just before Germany would have taken over the EU Council 
Presidency in the EU in January 2007. This undermined Germany’s international image 
as it failed to put forward the development of the EU Neighbourhood Policy and to re-
negotiate the PCA with Russia, both priorities of German EU Council Presidency’s 
agenda (Ferrigno, 2006: 8). 
After the off-shore pipeline route was officially confirmed, the Polish state evaluated 
this project as undermining Polish energy security and European solidarity between the 
EU MSs. The Polish anti-Nord Stream position could be explained by a range of 
geopolitical, economic and environmental concerns, expressed by the official sources 
from the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Minister of 
Economy in Poland (2005-2007) Wozniak claimed that the project placed an 
‘environmental threat’ (Ministry of Economy of Poland, 2007) and the route of the Nord 
Stream was supposed to go through a Polish exclusive economic zone (Wozniak, 
2007). In addition, Poland was concerned that placement of the pipeline within the sea 
bed was dangerous due to the old ammunition on the bottom of the Baltic sea left from 
World War Two. According to Spokeperson Bosacki from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Poland (2011) the off-shore route of the pipeline jeopardised Baltic Sea navigation 
and access to Polish sea ports of Szczecin and the perspective Swinoujscie LNG 
terminal. Many investigations with the involvement of the Polish part were carried out 
during the pipeline construction. The Nord Stream consortium successfully completed 
the ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ according to the 1991 Espoo Convention to 
tackle all the possible environmental concerns in Poland. 
To satisfy the environmental concerns appeared to be much easier than to diminish 
Polish political and economic trepidations, which remained through all stages of 
carrying out this pipeline project. Notably, the majority of the observed foreign policy 
concerns were raised not by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the officials from the 
Ministry of Economy, which indicates two things: first, Poland views energy 
diversification from a merely politicised perspective; second, the competences of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy overlap and are poorly defined, 
making an understanding of how exactly Poland executes its energy security complex.   
Thus, Poland feared fears that the Nord Stream intended not to bring additional 
Russian gas to the EU but to redirect the existing gas flows through Poland. The former 
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Minister of Economy Wozniak stated that ‘the investment poses a serious threat to 
Polish national security. It negatively affects inter alia the transit and supply of natural 
resources through the Yamal-Europe and Druzhba gas pipelines’ (Wozniak, 2007). 
Those threat perceptions were supported by the former Secretary of State responsible 
for energy in the Ministry of Economy Piotr Naimski. He noticed that this threat will 
‘increase the risk that Russia will be able to limit unilaterally the supplies not only to 
Poland, but also to Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, Lithuania, Slovakia or even 
Czech Republic while keeping other – i.e. Western – consumers supplied’ (Naimski, 
2007).  
The ‘divide and dominate’ geopolitical discourse went further in Poland when the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski (2005-2007) at the Brussels meeting in 2006 
referred to the Russian-German bilateral project as being a ‘new Molotov-Ribbentrop’ 
pact (BBC news, 2006) aimed against Poland that virtually jeopardised the idea of 
European solidarity. In this case both Russian and German actions posed a threat to 
Polish national security. This statement received much attention in the mass media and 
was harshly criticised by the European political elites (especially in Germany), to whom 
historical associations of such type remain a sensitive issue. Mainly during the 
Conference in Columbia University in December 2007, the main promoter of the Nord 
Stream, former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, categorised the opposition towards the 
pipeline as being ‘a sheer political counter-pressure based on historic givenness that 
should not interfere in European energy discussions’ (Schroeder, 2007).  
It is important to understand Poland’s rationale behind the amalgamation of energy and 
national security concerns, leading to over-politicisation of energy relations with Russia. 
One of the Polish justifications for exposing a variety of geopolitical reasons lay in the 
economic rationale of the profit omission. By bypassing Poland’s territory, the country 
loses an opportunity for receiving transit fees through transmitting gas over Polish 
territory and by that have additional leverage on Russia in the contract negotiating 
process. These reasons were also discussed in the Ministry of Economy but were 
rarely acknowledged and articulated in the public speeches (Interview 18.). 
In addition, if energy security and uninterrupted gas supplies were as important as 
Poland initially presented, then it is logical that any additional gas supplies and 
connections to the German part of the pipeline would be vital for the country. However, 
when Germany suggested the connecting pipeline from the German brunch of the Nord 
Stream to Poland, the Polish government officially rejected it. Polish national pride and 
individual interests prevailed as Poland at that time officially refused to build the 
interconnector to receive any ‘Russian gas from the same pipeline and the same gas 
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supplier’ (Interview 10). In addition, it could undermine Poland’s diversification goal of 
the construction of the LGN terminal at Swinoujscie. If Poland agreed to build 
interconnector between the OPAL and the Polish gas system, then it would help 
‘Russian and German companies to win the competition with the LNG terminal, which 
is a part of not only economic security, but energy security’ (Interview 17; Misik, 2015). 
Additional Russian gas could lock up the market and create unwanted competition to 
the gas from Qatar 61 , since the gas market in Poland is not big enough to 
accommodate both. 
By trying to convey its anti-Russian message of an energy threat to the EU, Poland 
jeopardised supranational commitment to energy solidarity in building interconnectors 
within the EU to secure supplies in cases of disruptions (Article 194 of the Lisbon 
Treaty 2007) and as a result forges the EU energy market liberalisation intentions. In 
theory, for the EU emerging energy market it should not matter where the gas comes 
from and what is the first country of entry, as long as it can freely circulate on EU’s 
territory (Interview 9). Russian gas cannot be identified precisely in the EU’s distribution 
gas system. So the gas Poland could have received from the entry-exit point of the 
German gas network would be the mix of Russian and Norwegian gas, rather than 
purely Russian gas.  
Overall, the Nord Stream project explicated the importance of uninterrupted energy 
supplies for Poland as a part of energy security conceptualisation and provoked a 
chain reaction of Polish negative threat perceptions not only towards Russia, but also 
damaged relationships with Germany. It illustrated that the EU integrated energy 
market does not work and is undermined by politicisation from the European side, 
since it matters for the EU and its members where to and from the gas arrives. It also 
proved a vivid example of politically constructed and exaggerated attitudes of Poland to 
make something to become an energy security issue, based on general national 
security concerns that are often hiding behind presented economic justification for their 
opposition to the Nord Stream. Moreover, the Nord Stream illustrated that individual EU 
MSs’ interests prevail over common European energy interests (as Section 5.4.3. 
demonstrated of the Nord Stream being a ‘project of European interest’) that weakens 
not only the EU common energy market objectives to develop energy interconnectors, 
but also European coherence to promote energy security of supply.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The largest Polish chemical plant ‘Police’ in the north of the country is a big industrial gas 
consumer that is expected to receive gas from the LNG terminal.  
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6.2.2. Polish Attitude towards the EU Liberalisation 
Until recently, much of Polish energy security depended on the preservation of 
monopolistic control on the domestic energy market and state-controlled competition. 
For a long time Polish political elites and PGNiG’s management were reluctant to 
change a vertically integrated Polish gas market structure and allow competition to 
PGNiG. This could be explained not only by the lack of political incentives, but also the 
unfavourable conditions in the Polish private energy sector, which was at the 
embryonic stage of development. With growing energy needs and limited diversification 
options, the country was put in a vulnerable energy position in early 2000s, which was 
successfully exploited by Russia. When the new gas market liberalisation approach 
was introduced by the EU, the same political actors were having problems with letting 
go control over the monopolist market. Problems with embracing liberalisation only 
contributed to Polish energy insecurity. This section analyses Poland’s resistance the 
new EU gas liberalisation packages and presents negative implications of Polish 
protectionism.  
As a newly joined member of the EU in 2004, Poland has to comply the EU energy 
regulations and transmit the legislative acts into the national law. According to the 
‘Declaration on the implementation of Community Law’ in the Final Act and 
Declarations of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (1992: 9), the MSs have to ‘fully and 
accurately transpose into national law the Community Directives’ and maintain 
deadlines, as one of many forms of effective coherence. Hence some of the EU MSs, 
including Poland, often fail to comply with the implementation of EU energy regulations 
internally.  The EU Commission, which is acting from a scrutiny-based position towards 
the EU MSs, monitors the implementation of energy liberalisation packages and 
applies infringement procedures towards the countries, which fail to do it properly or on 
time.  
For instance, the EU Commission was dissatisfied with Poland’s violating some of the 
procedures of the Second Energy Package mainly in the wholesale sector such as:  
regulated wholesale and end user prices in gas; lack of transparency of 
the conditions for third-party access to natural gas transmission networks 
and failure to put in place appropriate procedures for dealing with 
consumer complaints; lack of congestion management and transparency 
provisions concerning access to the network for cross-border exchanges 
in electricity (European Commission, 2012b: 125-126). 
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However, even though Poland should have been favouring the provisions of the Third 
Energy Package that facilitated ‘full unbundling’ principle, Poland struggled to facilitate 
further market opening. According to Roth:  
While the Polish government recognises the potential of the internal 
energy market to increase its energy security, Warsaw has voiced 
concerns over further liberalisation. Polish officials remain deeply 
suspicious of Russian investment into the Polish energy infrastructure and 
stressed that the ownership unbundling foreseen in the third internal 
energy market package should not lead to hostile, foreign takeovers of 
transmission systems (Roth, 2011: 609).  
The EU Commission had to undertake legal actions against Poland’s non-compliance 
with the EU laws. Among other things the Commission alleged that Poland did not 
deregulate whole sale gas prices fully, did not provide sufficient opportunity to change 
suppliers and had poor protection mechanisms of vulnerable customers. The EU 
Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice in October 2012, when Poland 
failed to meet the final deadline for choosing the unbundling type and applying for the 
TSO, as the choice of the unbundling system had to be done by the MSs by the third of 
March 2012 (Balicki, 2013). Thus by the end of 2012 Poland transposed the key Gas 
Directives only partially. Deriving from the above analysis of inefficient Ministerial 
structure responsible for energy, the delay of domestic legislative process can be 
explained by lengthy public and inter-ministerial consultations. 
In fact, those were not Poland’s only infringements with the implementation of the Third 
Energy Package. In order to comply with EU ‘unbundling’ provisions, aiming to 
separate PGNiG’s production from transmission and distribution, GAZ-SYSTEM 
transmitting operator was specifically created for that reason in 2005. Having no clear 
indication, who exactly can buy transmission networks, GAZ-SYSTEM that was owned 
by PGNiG initially, was finally sold to the Ministry of Treasury.  
Thus GAZ-SYSTEM became an important player not only in Polish transmitting 
network, but also in building and operating the projected LNG terminal at Swinoujscie. 
As a result of the implementation of Directive 2003/55/EC, concerning common rules 
for the internal market in natural gas, GAZ-SYSTEM was fully unbundled in legal, 
functional and accounting terms from PGNiG in 2007 (OECD, 2014b). However, 
according to the obligatory ownership unbundling for the TSO advocated by the 
European Parliament and the EU Commission, Poland had a rather ‘cunny’ way to 
pursue the unbundling of the TSO (Interview 10). Thus, Article 9 of the Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC (2009b) states that the same person cannot ‘control’ generation, 
185 
 
production, supply and TSO at the same time or exercise ‘any right’ over TSO 
(including holding the majority of shares or voting rights). In theory, different companies 
are involved in production and distribution - PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM, and third party 
access is provided (but only to state-owned companies so far). Owing only 51% of the 
gas transmission networks in Poland, GAZ-SYSTEM has a 17-year operational leasing 
agreement with PGNiG, which owns the remaining network (since 2005). It means that 
Poland will not reach the full ownership unbundling of the TSO until the year of 2022 
(European Commission, 2010).  
Since ownership unbundling of the TSO is aimed to avoid conflicts of interest between 
producers and suppliers and to make sure that TSOs take their decisions 
independently (European Commission, 2013c), it is unclear how GAZ-SYSTEM TSO 
complies with the requirements of the Third Energy Package, being controlled by the 
Ministry of Treasury, which ‘presently supervises also other entities in the natural gas 
market involved in production’ (The President of the Energy Regulatory Office in 
Poland, 2013: 43). Emphasising that the Polish energy market is not open to new 
entries and lacks competition, a Polish energy expert claims that as both companies 
are owned by the same state body – the Ministry of Treasury, and in practice it would 
mean that unofficial control belongs to the same decision-makers (Interview 14).  
Deriving from the EU Commission’s own explanation of the ownership unbundling 
(European Commission, 2013c: 2), it is unclear how and why the European 
Commission does not find this way of market liberalisation and opening to competition 
problematic, unfair or dubious. Acknowledging that the EU Commission initially 
favoured full ownership TSO unbundling, independence in the decision-making, 
‘effective competition’ (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 
2009c: 41), ‘effective level of regulatory supervision’ (ibid: 37) and ‘non-discriminatory, 
transparent and effective access conditions to the network’ (ibid: 38), then it is unclear 
what the EU means by such ‘effectiveness’.  
In conclusion, Poland’s trepidations towards supply disruptions from Russia explained 
opposition towards the Nord Stream and a general feeling of vulnerability was 
expressed by resisting the liberalisation of the Polish energy market according to EU 
standards. Poland’s resistance to the EU energy packages was largely determined by 
its geographic location, structural peculiarities of the Polish domestic energy market, 
endowment of certain energy sources, resistance to easing the monopolistic control of 
the energy market by PGNIG, and opportunities in the political context of being a part 
of the EU to develop its energy mix in a certain way at the given period of time. Poland 
used the flexibility of the EU’s imperfect gas market legislation to its advantage and 
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justified the lack of political will of its key energy players to pursue changes on the 
domestic energy market by anti-solidarity and anti-Russia politically constructed threat 
perception rhetoric (as the examples of the Nord Stream and the unbundling revealed). 
EU’s acquiescence to such behaviour confirms that the EU cannot yet guarantee the 
effective functioning of the common European energy market and its fully-fledged 
energy authority.  
 
6.3. Understanding of Polish-Russian Energy Relations 
The geopolitical and historical context of Poland-Russia energy relations highlighted in 
the beginning of Chapter 6 helps to put their energy relations in perspective. 
Understanding of the importance of physical energy security for Poland in terms of 
‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources’ (European Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 
2013b) and the country’s stance were already mentioned above, while analysing 
Poland’s energy diversification attempts and perceptions of the Nord Stream project. 
This section explains the country’s growing anti-Russian fears about physical security 
of supply by analysing, firstly, Poland-Russia inter-state and inter-company energy 
relations through disputes about IGA renegotiations and the gas pricing; and secondly, 
the development of a politicised foreign policy approach to energy (Szczerbiak, 2012; 
Raszewski, 2015). 
6.3.1. The Nature of Polish-Russian Energy Interplays 
• Polish-Russian Energy Contract (Re)negotiations 
Polish-Russian energy interactions are best understood through interactions between 
the longest functioning vertically integrated monopolist in Poland PGNiG and its key 
gas contractor Gazprom. Consequently, both companies have rather stable knowledge 
and expectations of each other’s management styles and business negotiating 
practices. For a long time inter-company strategic relations were mutually shaped and 
their market policies were reflective of a similar approach to the energy market, 
especially in terms of protecting their energy markets from opening and liberalisation 
(Interview 14; Interview 17). As a Polish energy expert noted (Interview 17), Russian-
Polish energy relations were functioning according to the ‘unwritten’ agreement to 
divide the energy market, where PGNiG would control the whole supply chain and does 
not let Russian capital in (except Yamal-Europe pipeline), and Gazprom will remain the 
main singular commercial partner for Poland.  
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Until the liberalisation of the EU gas market, there was a sense amongst the above 
interviewed Polish energy experts of a resemblance in the nature of Gazprom and 
PGNiG. Hence, Polish governmental officials from the Ministry of Economy 
emphasised PGNiG’s advancement in liberalising the Polish energy market (compared 
to rigid vertically structured Russian energy market). Thus, unlike Gazprom, with total 
control over the Russian gas market, PGNiG has unbundled production areas from 
transmission, allowing third party access and delegating its responsibilities over the 
Polish part of the Yamal-Europe pipeline to the operator GAZ-SYSTEM. The official 
sources from the Ministry of Economy (2012) illustrate its fair and equal treatment of all 
market participants in Poland, avoiding mentioning that both companies are owned and 
subordinated to the same state department, which in the Polish case makes little 
difference for the decision-making on the ground.  
For comprehending the nature of Polish-Russian energy relations, a particular 
prominence should be given to inter-company contracts and IGAs. The renegotiation of 
the gas agreement provisions can be considered a critical juncture in Polish-Russian 
relations as usually it represents a time for mutual disparities, during which countries’ 
interests, perceptions and fears are revealed. While IGA’s information is relatively 
accessible, access to the majority of gas contract information is considerably restricted 
due to commercial confidentiality and information sensitivity. Therefore, most of the 
company information is scrutinised on the basis of the available secondary data and 
primarily sources of expert opinions, which are not bound by commercial obligations. 
Hitherto, Russia and Poland have been cooperating on the basis of agreements made 
in the 1990s and 2000s, which laid the foundation for further development of Polish-
Russian gas interplays. The IGA of 1993 and the inter-companies contract of 1996 
created the conditions not only for domestic gas consumption in Poland, but also 
transmitting possibilities to other EU member states. On August 25th 1993 a ten-year 
trilateral IGA for gas supplies between Polish monopolist PGNiG, Polish-Russian joint 
venture EuRoPol Gaz S.A. and Russian Gazprom took place, followed by the 1996 
inter-company agreement. The contracts had two main aspects: a specific volume for 
imported Russian gas to Poland on the basis of a ‘take-or-pay clause’ and the 
construction of two branches of the Yamal-Europe pipeline were agreed. Both 
provisions appeared to be problematic, creating energy threat perceptions and conflicts 
for the following 10 years.  
Firstly, the specific amount of gas needed to satisfy Poland’s internal long-term energy 
needs was hugely overestimated and according to the contract obligations was not 
easy to adjust. The expert from the state-supervised research institution Centre for 
188 
 
Eastern Studies (OSW), partly blamed Polish authorities that failed to envisage and 
calculate the needed volumes of gas for the country in 1993 properly (Interview 15; 
(Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 2010: 9). Poland did not need as much gas as was 
initially agreed on. As a result, it put Poland in an unfavourable financial position as 
under the ‘destination clause’ Poland could not re-sell the gas, but still had to pay for 
the agreed amount on the basis of take-or pay conditions. 
Secondly, the costs of Yamal-Europe construction should have been shared by PGNiG 
and Gazprom in proportion to the amount of the pipeline capacity that was used by the 
parties. Since Poland struggled to cover the essential construction costs of the pipeline 
compressor stations, EuRoPol Gas had to take a loan from the bank owned by 
Gazprom (Gazprombank). So for a long time the company was unprofitable as it had to 
cover the loan from fees paid for transiting the gas. The situation was escalated by the 
threat of Gazprombank to EuRoPol Gas if the latter does not pay its debts back (for 
more information see Orban (2008: 69-71). As with Gazprom’s approach to Ukraine in 
the mid-2000s, being financially indebted and dependent on Gazprom placed Poland in 
even more vulnerable position of financial and energy dependence on Russia. 
In regards to the main contract of the 1990s, several amendments were undertaken 
during the last decade. Due to technical overestimation of Polish gas demand and the 
existence of the ‘destination clause’ in the contract, PGNiG tried to modify the 
provisions of the initial contract with Russia. Renegotiations of the IGA in 2003 ended 
with the annex to the contract of the companies of 1996 between Gazprom and PGNiG. 
PGNiG agreed on dropping the previously binding obligation of construction of the 
Yamal-Europe-2 pipeline and Russia agreed to decrease the gas volumes by 34.5% 
from 2003 until 2020 (Orban, 2008: 72). Other sources claim that the disagreements 
about the necessity of building the Yamal-Europe-2 pipeline can also be attributed to 
problems with financing the two additional compressors, ‘lease of land from local 
farmers, the levels of transit fees and taxes charged by the Polish authorities’ as well 
as the volume of imported natural gas (Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 2010).  
In any case, Poland lost the battle to promote the construction of Yamal-Europe-2 
pipeline. In the meantime, aiming to expand Russia’s supply portfolio, Gazprom offered 
to build ‘Peremichka’ gas pipeline that would go from Belarus to southern Poland and 
then connect to Slovakia, bypassing Ukraine. Polish rejection of this pipeline was 
based on three rationales. Politically, some circles did not want to damage Ukrainian 
interests by creating an alternative Russian route and putting political pressure on 
Ukraine (Interview 17). Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine was considered to be 
Poland’s foreign policy priority (Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007; Roth, 2011: 601) and 
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Ukraine was regarded ‘a key Polish ally in the region’ (Bouzarovski and Konieczny, 
2010: 9). Economically, it did not make much sense for Poland as the pipeline would lie 
in an area with low gas consumption and in this case Poland would be just a transit 
territory for the Russian gas. However, when Poland suggested modifying the pipeline 
route to the southeast, which would connect to the industrial area of Silesia, with its 
higher demand for gas, Gazprom did not find it appealing. Environmentally, the 
concern was that the suggested ‘Peremichka’ pipeline route would also go through a 
national park and protected areas of Poland (Gorska, 2009). Disagreements over 
Yamal-Europe-2 and ‘Peremichka’ and the lack of compromise aggravated energy 
tensions between Poland and Russia. After realising Russia’s political intentions to 
‘block’ Ukraine from its gas supplies, Polish energy supply insecurity grew stronger 
during the Nord Stream case. Polish political elites believed that Russia would be able 
to switch off the gas not only to Ukraine, but to the whole region (Interview 17). 
The idea of Yamal-Europe-2 construction revived again in 2009. Trying to oppose the 
Nord Stream, Poland raised the issue of the pipeline construction as it would not 
require massive investments as the infrastructure and the capacity possibilities are 
already in place (only another compressor was needed). However, the feasibility of 
increasing the capacity of gas flows in the same direction was neither in Russian 
interests nor the EU’s since, unlike the Nord Stream, Yamal-Europe-2 did not diversify 
the routes or sources of gas supplies, according to the EU infrastructure priorities 
(Interview 18). It seems unclear if Poland felt truly insecure about Russian energy 
policies and pressure for particular type of decisions, why would it want to increase the 
amount of supplied Russian gas. As well as why would Poland choose to commit itself 
politically and economically to another infrastructural project from Russia (be it Yamal-
Europe-2 or even the Nord Stream), rather than developing its internal gas sources that 
shown in the example of Polish Geological Institute the country has in abundance. If 
Polish gas consumption since 2004 retained almost the same level, increasing by not 
more than 2 bcm (see Table 2), additional gas would be needed only if a regional 
interconnected gas market was constructed between Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic 
and Hungary, where Poland could play the role of a hub and a gas re-distributor 
(Interview 16). The economic rational of receiving additional transit fees can explain 
Polish desire for additional gas, but otherwise its anti-Russia energy security rhetoric 
about the increasing reliance on gas imports is hardly justified. Logically, Poland needs 
the security of already existing gas supplies from Russia and would prefer diversified 
supplies rather than the increase of the gas amount per se. 
Nevertheless, the most important energy security re-negotiation between Poland and 
Russia took place in October 2010, when new IGA with Russia was reached and vital 
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contract amendments took place. These were the negotiations when not only 
companies-contractors were involved, but also governmental authorities and EU 
representatives. As usual, the Russian-Polish gas contract was revised with some 
advantageous and some negative conditions for Poland, but the intensity of the 
negotiations and securitisation after the 2009 gas crisis were high.  
Firstly, during the IGA revision the limitation of the time frame of the contract with 
Gazprom and gas amount were set. Poland and Russia agreed on gas supply until 
2022 (with the possibility to extend this period until 2037) and agreed to increase the 
contractual amount of import from Russia up to 11 bcm per year starting from 2011. 
Poland will preserve its transiting obligation to transmit gas via Yamal-Europe to other 
EU countries until 2019 with possible extension up to 2045 (Gazprom, 2010). The 
elimination of the ‘destination clause’ imposing territorial sales restrictions to other EU 
MSs is regarded to be another immense achievement for Poland (IEA, 2011a: 13), as if 
needed additional gas can be re-exported to other countries.  
Besides widespread arguments that binding increase of gas deliveries is aimed to 
prolong Polish dependence on Gazprom, there is a number of obvious foreseen 
disadvantages. Surely, if Poland commits covering domestic supply with the imported 
Russian gas on a long-term basis, there will be no incentives to invest into energy 
diversification projects or develop local gas reserves. The diversification prospects of 
producing LNG and shale gas (which are believed to be cheaper than imported pipeline 
Russian gas in the long run) and energy security can be endangered by the long-term 
rigid commitments. 
Secondly, in 2010 IGA re-negotiations resulted in shifting the property rights of the 
Yamal-Europe pipeline from Russia-Polish company EuRoPol Gas to the independent 
operator GAZ-SYSTEM. As an independent operator GAZ-SYSTEM ‘will be 
responsible for concluding transmission contracts on a non-discriminatory basis’ 
(Oettinger, 2010b). Hence, despite GAZ-SYSTEM becoming a gas transmission 
operator of Yamal-Europe, it can provide only formal third party access to the pipeline. 
In reality, third-party access to the pipeline is very limited and can be provided only if 
Russian technical capacity decreases. This however is unlikely to happen in the 
foreseeable future as the full amount of contracted gas from Russia was agreed to be 
supplied by Gazprom.  
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Thirdly, the possibility of having a bi-directional virtual reverse flow 62  occurred 
(Interview 16). The reverse flow will allow importing the same Russian gas from 
Germany on spot prices (that even with German added value remains cheaper). The 
positive aspect of this take-or-pay flexibility in the contract with Russia and the 
additional 3 bcm of imported gas from Germany is the market pressure created on both 
monopolists – Gazprom and PGNiG (Interview 16). Compared to 2006, when there 
were no alternatives for Gazprom’s gas, after 2010 the Polish bargaining position in the 
negotiations with Russia is much stronger due to the increased transmission capacity 
between Poland and Germany. This in turn creates an additional so called ‘energy 
safety cushion’ for Poland63.  
Generally, Polish authorities and PGNiG were satisfied with the negotiating process, 
calling it a mutually beneficial compromise (Interview 10; Interview 16). The main 
energy industries reaffirmed the success. In January 2010, the moment after the deal, 
the PGNiG’s Chief Executive Michal Szubski concluded that ‘The accords reached put 
an end to the 10-year period of disagreements and open up prospects for favourable 
cooperation’ (Gazprom, 2010).  
Interestingly, these ‘bilateral’ contract negotiations, which by definition should be 
discussed between two parties, were observed by a third party – EU officials from the 
DG Energy, invited by the Polish side in February 2010. The Commission’s presence 
aimed to prevent breaching the EU new energy legislation and to promote compliance 
with the market liberalisation principles of the Third Energy Package. According to 
Regulation No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of The Council of 20 October 
2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply, the Commission was 
interested in free access to third parties and an independent operator for Yamal-
Europe pipeline transit route through Poland. The EU Commission’s scrutiny of the 
energy negotiations demonstrated yet another example of Poland being reluctant to 
fully embrace the implementation of the Third Energy Package (which can be added to 
the list of Polish obstacles to the EU market liberalisation described in Section 6.2.2.). 
The misunderstandings occurred about the division of the bilateral control between 
PGNiG and Gazprom over the Yamal-Europe operator, as both companies were 
reluctant to delegate the control to a third party (Interview 10). According to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The trading point allows the gas to be traded after the entry and before the exit within the 
transmission network. Annual Yamal capacity is about 33bcm, 3bcm of volume is delivered to 
Poland. But the capacity of the pipeline exit points is 6bcm. Taking into account that there are 
two exit points to the Polish domestic gas system, the difference between them – is 3bcm. That 
volume Poland can extract from Yamal by importing gas on German-Polish border, without 
asking for ‘Russian approval’.  
63  This virtual reverse flow became actual in March 2014 after conversion of network 
interconnectors, when first successful auctions for capacities to Poland took place. 
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Economist, by preventing Poland from expanding its gas contract with Gazprom and by 
demanding to incorporate ‘critical ownership unbundling regulations’, the EU 
Commission created some discontent within the Ministry of Economy, in particular 
causing some criticism from Waldemar Pawlak, who was the Minister of Economy from 
2007 until November 2012 (The Economist, 2010). While the Ministry of Economy was 
eager to solve this issue between PGNiG and Gazprom individually (Interview 10), the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was eager to support the European Commission in opening 
access to the third party (Interview 16), even though the Third Energy Package has not 
yet been fully transported into Polish national law. Thus, discontent reflected the 
external incoherence of Polish energy policies and the inconsistence between the 
Ministerial institutions in their attitudes not only to Russia but also to the EU’s energy 
market liberalisation. It also demonstrated the selective Polish approach to dealing with 
energy security issues: if the country feels overwhelmed with economic disagreements 
with Gazprom, it seeks selective political support from the EU Commission, but only 
when needed. That is where the political element of threat exploitation comes into 
place.  
• Gas Price Disputes 
Likewise with the EU, Poland’s energy relations with Russia are undermined by high 
energy prices, about which Poland engages in open confrontations with Gazprom. 
Despite occasionally receiving some price discounts from Russia for the purchase of 
gas amount beyond the contractual volumes, Poland has been constantly trying to 
address its price security by disagreeing with high contractual prices it has to pay for 
the Russian gas. Soon after the 2010 IGA agreement was reached, Polish energy 
companies started to renegotiate the price for gas (this question is legally allowed to be 
raised every 3 years). Since 2011, PGNiG have been fighting for price revision through 
trials with Gazprom in Stockholm arbitration (where due to the business ethics and 
confidentiality the Commission is not allowed to be present during the gas price 
negotiations). According to the President of PGNiG’s Management Board Shubskij at 
that time, the request was to increase the amount of gas being bought on spot market 
price (as opposed to take-or-pay contract which has the minimal limit of 85%) and 
revising the Groningen oil-indexed formula that was being applied in Europe since 
1960 for identifying whether gas prices should be modified (Shubskij, 2011). In 2010 
the average price for 1000 bcm for Poland was 336 US dollars, compared to 271 US 
dollars for Germany, 306 US dollars for France and 331 US dollars for Italy (ibid. 2011). 
According to the Minister of Treasury Budzanowski the gas price for Poland is even 
higher, around 500 US dollars (Radio Poland, 2012). Both the Ministry of Treasury and 
the Ministry of Economy consider it ‘absolutely unacceptable’, taking into account 
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Poland’s territorial proximity and the volume of consumed Russian gas. Poland is the 
third largest importer of Russian gas in the EU after Germany and Italy. According to 
the Minister of Treasury Budzanowski ‘We want to be treated on the same basis as 
other customers in Western Europe. Europe is still divided into the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe and Western Europe. A wall still runs through Europe along the 
River Oder [...] it is a wall created by Gazprom’ (ibid. 2012). 
Russian authorities partially explain such a price for Poland as being based on the 
amount of imported gas, claiming that Germany gets bigger discount due to larger 
import volumes and mutually beneficial asset swaps (Interview 2; Interview 17; Meister, 
2014). Hence, Poland being the second largest importer of the Russian gas in the EU 
pays more than France or Italy, which import much less gas from Russia. This, in turn, 
makes the price issue look more political for Poland than the economy-based. 
According to the energy expert Mitrova (Interview 7) the gas price also partly depends 
on the time lag when the contract was signed and oil prices at that time (so inasmuch 
depending on the global oil market conjuncture at that time). In the Polish case, when 
the gas contract was re-negotiated in 2010, the prices in the global oil market were at a 
peak, which was reflected in the higher gas price (that is calculated with a 6 month time 
lag from the oil price).  
However, Polish energy experts from the OSW related Russia’s recent reluctance to 
provide gas discounts to the choice of the unbundling type in Poland (Interview 15). In 
summary, the EU liberalisation energy package and the model of unbundling entering 
into force in March 2010 must be transposed into Polish energy system by 2014. 
Therefore, Gazprom’s resistance to lower the price for gas was regarded to be tactical 
pressure on Poland to avoid implementation of the radical form of unbundling 
(ownership unbundling that entirely separates production/supply from the 
transmission), where Gazprom can lose its full transit influence over the Yamal-Europe 
gas pipeline (Interview 15). Eventually in November 2012, the new head of PGNiG 
Grażyna Piotrowska-Oliwa and the head of Gazprom Alexander Medvedev finally 
reached a ‘win-win solution’. They signed the supplementary agreement about the 
prices of the imported gas through Yamal-Europe pipeline that was revised in 
accordance to changed European gas market conditions, closing this case in the 
Stockholm Arbitration (Gazprom, 2012b).  
Having a chance to observe ‘Russian energy diplomacy’ in practice and driven by the 
requests of the most gas price affected member states like Lithuania and Poland 
(Kanter, 2012), in 2011 the EU Commission launched an antitrust investigation against 
Gazprom’s monopolist position with the CEE members. The main purpose was to 
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check Gazprom anti-competitive practices 64 , and investigate if Gazprom was 
preventing gas trading across national borders, hindering diversification of supply and 
unfairly linking gas prices. Hitherto, there are not many details known about the 
process of the investigation 65 . The Commission tries to avoid any unnecessary 
speculations at this stage (Interview 9).  
In conclusion, the section illustrated the historical nature of Polish-Russian energy 
relations and emphasised particular key points of tension, where both parties’ energy 
interests clash. Being heavily reliant on gas supplies from Russia at a relatively high 
price and having a weak political and economic weight to bargain for re-negotiating the 
gas contracts and IGAs, Poland puts Russia at core of its energy threat debate (which 
will be observed below).  
6.3.2. Poland’s Understanding of Energy Security: The Role of Russia’s 
‘Phantom’ in the Construction of Energy Threats 
In the early 2000s energy became in the primary focus of Polish politics and a high 
policy priority, making Polish perceptions of energy security ‘remain mainly politicised 
and often linked to economic security and safety of supply’ (Raszewski, 2015: 32; 
Szczerbiak, 2012: 14). Through incorporating energy security in the National Security 
and Defence Strategies, energy was made imperative in the country’s national security 
and foreign policy. In National Security Strategy of September 2003 the meaning of 
energy security in Poland was attached to the national security priority in general 
economic and technical terms, having no correlation with Russia as an energy threat. 
Thus, the above Strategy states: 
Poland's energy security requires, among other things, an import policy 
towards energy carriers that will reduce the structural external 
dependence of our country, enable a diversification of the import 
structure and directions, safeguard reliability of the supplies, ensure 
favourable contractual prices and clauses…Equally important to the 
energy security of the State is the condition of national infrastructure, 
including the technical viability and functional efficiency of facilities and 
transport systems, transmission and distribution of fuels and energy and 
the level of stocks (Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 2003: 12). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Especially CEE countries like Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. 
65Only in April 2015 preliminary results have been disclosed where the EU Commission sent 
statement of objections to Gazprom that hinders its monopolistic energy position. 
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Therefore, in early 2000s there was no fear of Russia, which was regarded as 
‘potentially unstable but credible partner’ (Interview 17). Due to the Nord Stream 
confrontations with Russia and the first supply incidents caused by Russia’s energy 
policies, the discourse took a very anti-Russian turn. Russia being associated with an 
energy threat to Poland’s security became firmly rooted in the Polish political debate 
and official documentation. By illustrating its energy vulnerability and presenting Russia 
as an energy concern in the National Security Strategy of 2007 and the Defence 
Strategy of 2009, Poland launched the national securitisation process (Buzan et al., 
1998; Roth, 2011: 601) that would eventually spread to the rest of the EU. In the 
National Security Strategy of November 2007, Russia was implied and directly 
mentioned several times in the context of energy concerns and Polish insecurity:   
The Russian Federation, taking advantage of the rising energy prices, 
has been attempting intensively to reinforce its position on a supra-
regional level. Russia’s efforts to establish closer contacts with selected 
Western countries go hand in hand with the imposition of selective 
restrictions and discrimination of some NATO and EU members (Ministry 
of National Defense of Poland, 2007: 6). 
In addition, in the National Security Strategy of 2007, while emphasising the 
importance of the economic setting of energy security, Russia as the key and only 
major energy supplier was implied to present a risk to the country by using ‘energy 
resources as an instrument of political pressure by some states and the growing rivalry 
for energy carriers contribute to greater risks in this area’ (2007: 6).  
Another document that implies Russian energy policies are being used as a foreign 
policy tool is the Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland dated 2009, emphasising 
the economic risks of temporary shortages in the energy supply market:  
Economic security risks, especially those relating to energy security, top 
the list of non-military threats. A growing demand for energy resources 
accounts for the fact that they are used to exert political pressure and 
increasingly replace military power as a state’s policymaking instrument 
(Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 2009: 4).  
Allocation of energy security threat perceptions into the domain of the country’s 
national security was clearly presented in Polish National Security Strategies. As seen 
from the quotations and in diplomatic language, the terminology of energy ‘threat’ is 
missing from all official documents. Polish officials and politicians tend to substitute the 
use of the realist term ‘threat’ with ‘risk’, ‘challenge’ or ‘concern’, trying to redirect the 
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meaning from geopolitics to the economic dimension. Nevertheless, the roots of Polish 
threats perceptions go beyond simply economic dependence, being still influenced by 
stereotypes and the ‘ghosts’ from the past.  
As Gorska explained, Poland’s negative perceptions of Russian business interests 
being present in the country due to post-Soviet collective memories, where trade was a 
part of ‘Soviet-imposed order’ (Gorska, 2009: 5). Putting it in the broader geopolitical 
context, economic reliance on Russia (including energy) is still perceived as violating 
Poland’s sovereignty as an independent country (Prizel, 1998: 103-108) and as a 
member of the EU. De Jong and Van der Linder noticed the merger of energy issues 
into a wider security discussion, stating that Poland still prioritises security rhetoric over 
energy rhetoric and uses ‘the energy discussion to further their security concerns’ (De 
Jong and Van der Linder, 2008: 9). Energy security fears might serve a convenient 
excuse for general anti-Russian discourse, which is derived from history and 
geographical location between Germany and Russia (Roth, 2011). As described at the 
beginning of this chapter, anti-Russia discourses in contemporary Poland are still 
largely based around the inherent complexities of the collective memories in Poland 
about the World War Two and post-war years. The majority of Polish energy experts 
(Interview 15; Interview 17) attribute general Polish threat perceptions to Russia’s state 
identity that uses Gazprom as an instrument to gain control in the region. Poland felt 
unsure about Russia’s intentions, interests and reactions since the Presidency of 
Vladimir Putin in 2000s. ‘It is not about the amount of gas, market structure and price 
increase, it is about the general feeling of uncertainty’ (Interview 17), which Poland 
treats in a very presupposed political way.  
The construction of the perceived threatening environment by Polish political elites 
impacts a sense of country’s ‘self’ in Europe and a wider world. Hence it is not limited 
only to the perspective of the elites and governmental officials. Polish national energy 
threat perceptions of Russia are shaped on different levels, including also public 
opinions; companies’ views based on dealing with Gazprom. Overall, the country’s 
position on energy security is rather coherent, representing a blend of all the layers of 
perceptions, as they are cross-influential and mutually constituent.  
Poland’s public perceptions of Russia can hardly be called ‘friendly’ as Russia has 
been a political and ideological ‘enemy’. According to the research of the Institute of 
Public Affairs66, based on the expert opinions: ‘The Poles believe that Russia can be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The IPA research project entitled “Poland, Germany, Russia– perceptions, expectations, the 
potential for cooperation in the context of European politics” was undertaken together with the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the German-Polish Research Foundation and the Foundation 
for German-Polish Cooperation and the European Union. 
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threat, using economic instruments and the energy dependence of other states’ (Kasa 
and Lada, 2010: 4). The European Parliament Eurobarometer questioners of European 
citizens presented their research on Energy in 2011. Polish respondents are ‘highly 
concerned’ about energy security and guaranties of energy supply, composing 28% 
compared to the average 20% in the EU (Directorate General for Communication, 
2011: 6). It is unlikely that public opinion is shaped by knowledge that gas import 
dependence in Poland has been one of the lowest in the EU as a share of energy 
consumption compared to other countries (European Commission, 2013a: 21). Most 
commonly, public perceptions are affected by the mass media that shape public moods 
in its coverage of Polish-Russian energy interplays as well as Russian-Ukrainian 
conflicts of 2006 and 2009. It has become relatively easy to impact public perceptions 
through the amalgamation of energy dependence and security with national security in 
the country. The existing vulnerability of shaping the perceptions is visible not only in 
public perceptions. The general ‘temper of the debate among Polish political elites is 
very easily manipulated from outside’ (Interview 17).  
The securitisation discourse of Polish political elites and governmental officials mostly 
coincide in their Russia-apprehensive attitudes just varying in the spectrum of their 
intensity, ranging from extreme to moderate. In response to energy supply disruptions 
in 2006 and 2009 and non-solidarity approach to Poland in the case of the Nord 
Stream, the extreme of Polish anti-Russian threat perceptions was revealed in the 
suggestion to establish an ‘Energy NATO’ by Polish ex-Prime Minister Kazimierz 
Marcinkiewicz  'It is our conviction that NATO also means energy security. In today's 
world it is difficult to think of security without taking energy security into account,' ex-
Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz said after meeting NATO Secretary General 
Jaap de Hoop (Marcinkiewicz, 2006). An ‘Energy NATO’ would tackle energy security 
threats and promote solidarity in cases of energy interruptions from such countries as 
Russia and help to create common gas reserves (Roth, 2011). However, did Poland 
really feel so insecure and threatened by Russia in the past to involve the military 
alliance in the energy sector? Taking into account that the whole idea of unification of 
the EU MSs was based on anti-military and peaceful energy use67, this suggestion to 
unite energy and military dimension create false political signals. In the EU the concept 
became out-of-date very quickly (Roth, 2011: 613; Interview 9) and in Poland it was 
disregarded as being an ‘illusive concept’ (Interview 16). According to Szczerbiak 
(2012: 105), despite some sympathy and understanding towards Poland’s proposal of 
‘Energy NATO’ pact, it was rejected partly due to its timing as ‘energy security only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




emerged very slowly on the EU agenda’ in early 2000s. Moreover, the Union came to 
the initial market-based idea that with no interconnected infrastructure to re-organise 
energy flows within the EU during supply crisis, an ‘Energy NATO’ will be inefficient. 
Eventually, Polish attempts to unite all the EU MSs together to deal with energy 
security took a more moderate and relevant shape of promoting the solidarity principle. 
The European Council conclusions of 2006 satisfied Polish energy security concerns 
with mentioning ‘common operational approaches to address crisis situations in a spirit 
of solidarity’ (Council of the European Union, 2006a: 14). 
Returning to the importance of physical supply security, there might be a range of 
political and economic energy related insecurities that have a potential to be directly or 
indirectly associated with Russian policies, but it is unlikely that the deliberate action for 
physical gas interruption should be one of them. Russia has never used the action of 
gas cut off to Poland directly for political or any other reasons in the history of Polish-
Russian and Soviet Union–Polish energy interactions (unlike the cases of the pipeline 
technical maintenance). Often the gas crises with Ukraine are portrayed as a precedent 
for the general Russian approach to CEE countries, explaining them in a politicised 
way. For example, some OSW energy experts viewed planned temporary technical 
supply interruptions on the Yamal-Europe pipeline in 2012 as a demonstration that 
Russia might redirect its gas flows to the Nord Stream, leaving Poland without gas 
(Interview 15). On some occasions (like blocking the PCA re-negotiations in 2006 as a 
response to meat embargo or introducing a range of environmental and geopolitical 
obstacles to the Nord Stream) Poland tried to counter-balance Russia, using the same 
principles and methods. As the Polish Foreign Minister at that time commented: 
‘Russia uses energy as a political tool, it uses trade restrictions as a political tool, so 
there should be no surprise we are using the tools we have at our disposal’ (DW staff, 
2006). For Poland ‘a Russian energy threat’ is still associated with a source of political 
and economic uncertainty and is often a ‘radical and unpredictable’ policy in the energy 
sector. Speaking in economic terms, ‘Energy business should have certainty, but not 
the dependence on political circumstance’ (Interview 16).  
Importantly, some of the Polish officials from the Ministry of Economy and Foreign 
Affairs and political elites associate Polish energy insecurity since 2009 not necessarily 
with the gas industry and Russian position on the Polish gas market, but also with the 
electricity and oil sectors68. In the electricity sector, if Poland chooses to develop 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 The famous case with the Mazeika Nafta refinery was named as an example in the majority of 
my interviewees in the Government and the OSW organisation. They accuse Russia of oil 
supply cut off on the Mazeika Nafta in 2006, when the Lithuanian party preferred to sell it to 
Polish PKN Orlen rather than Russia. In such a way, Russia pushed Poland to sell its stake in 
the refinery. Most Polish officials have no doubt that it was not a coincident, when several 
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electricity, Poland might suffer black outs, having insufficient electricity sources and 
technical potential to transmit it (Interview 15). So Gazprom will have to be the main 
provider of electricity from the Baltic and Belarusian nuclear stations (which are built 
with Russian participation and control). In the oil sector, the threat is coming from 
supply disruption and price fixing. This is a result of the market being monopolised by 
supplies from one direction only’ (Ministry of Economy of Poland, 2009: 6). Since 
Poland is almost 90% dependent on Russia in its oil supplies from the ‘Druzhba’ oil 
pipeline, some of the OSW experts are concerned that Russia might shut down the 
pipeline for any reason (for example, technical condition of it being old and needing 
renovation). This fear only intensified after the recent launch of the sea oil pipeline 
Baltic System-2 (BPS-2) in the Primorsk region in Russia. In case the fears come true, 
Polish oil refineries will have to import oil by sea, which might bankrupt refineries in 
Poland (as it will be more expensive). It is only one of the possible speculative 
scenarios in the oil sector that has little preconditions and is not even bound to happen. 
Those are economy based energy concerns, which are speculated and not backed up 
by the evidence, but rather represent a tangible possibility.  
Overall, Polish energy security rhetoric converges with the European one, grounded on 
the physical availability of ‘uninterrupted availability of energy supply and its affordable 
price’. Hence, Polish threat perceptions include not only exaggerated energy import 
dependence, but feelings that Russia uses energy as a political mean of pressure in its 
energy supply policy, price formation and contract re-negotiations. Poland’s political 
construction of energy security threats makes Polish perceptions often look emotional, 
at times exaggerated and overestimated. In the interview with the author one Polish 
energy senior expert took it even further, claiming that: 
All the negative attitudes towards Russia and threat perceptions are of 
internal origin and are made in Poland for particular reasons, which 
Russia then successfully exploits to the benefit of its own energy policy 
(Interview 14).  
Nevertheless, as interests and identities are shaped over time and space, some slight 
improvements in the attitudes towards Russian energy policies can be observed in late 
2011 and 2012 compared to the early 2000s (Interview 17). Poland stood on the way of 
‘resetting’ its diplomatic and political relations with Russia, diminishing its antagonism 
and hostile attitudes (The Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, 
2011). Changes in Polish attitudes are related to many levels of Russian-Polish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




relationships. In economic terms, Poland became more receptive and less politically 
sensitive to Russian energy projects that do not directly include Poland. The official 
sources from the Ministry of Economy reflected that ‘with the previous government if 
Russia was figuring in the project – it was a definite veto’ (Interview 10). However, 
lately Poland started to focus more on checking the economic feasibility of the projects 
rather than political underlay of those. In political terms, the positive mode of 
relationships can be explained due to changes within the Polish government. Moving 
from a government with conservative dominated parliamentary and presidential 
elections in September and October of 2005, which prioritised deeper integration in the 
EU, enhanced the Trans-Atlantic strategic cooperation with the USA and NATO 
(Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2007; Koszel, 2007: 236-238, 260),  to a more moderate 
Donald Tusk government in 2007, re-enforced and established a more positive political, 
economic and diplomatic climate between Russia and Poland. His pro-European, but 
not anti-Russian position helped to establish better diplomatic relations with Russia and 
the rest of the EU. The amount of high official visits between the countries increased 
from zero in 2005 to three in 2008-2009 and the tone of Polish-Russian accord has 
improved especially in regards to the Nord Stream. As Bouzarovski and Konieczny put 
it, the ruling government was ‘wasting a lot of unnecessary political energy on the issue 
and losing its international credibility by engaging with the Nord Stream question in a 
negative manner’ (2010: 11).  
Despite relative progress in Polish-Russian relations, it will take more than a few years 
of narrowing the hostility gap and overcoming historical and geopolitical differences 
that cause stereotypes and negative patterns of behaviour. Section 6.3. just opened 
the door to initial changes that happened in the formation of Poland’s energy interests 
and developing its energy actorness. The process of contract renegotiations with 
Russia was more categorical and uncompromising in the early 2000s compared to the 
flexibility and improved understanding of each others’ differences in 2010. Albeit, 
Poland stood its ground in clashes with Russia about lowering the gas prices, which is 
strongly supported by the EU policy and similar approaches of other EU MSs. Despite 
difficulties in identifying what exactly triggered the ‘reset’ in Polish-Russian energy 
interactions, a few energy and geopolitical reasons could have facilitated them. Those 
include changes in the Polish government, Polish-Russian reconciliation of different 
historical narratives about the Katyn mass murders of the Polish officers in the 1940s, 
the possibilities of having a backup reverse supplies of gas from Germany, the 
development of the LNG and changes in Poland’s ‘mentality’ as a new equal member 




6.4. Polish Energy Identity in the EU: A Victim or Solidarity Agitator? 
As the previous chapter confirmed, European energy relations with Russia represent 
an area of energy security concern. Constructivism specifies that the EU MSs’ threat 
perceptions of Russia are affected by two key sets of causal factors: interests and 
identity and the previous patterns of energy interactions (Wendt and Friedman, 1995; 
Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002). While the nature of Polish energy interests and previous 
Polish-Russian energy interplays have been scrutinised in the previous sections of this 
chapter, this section presents a transformation of Poland’s energy identity under the 
EU infrastructure.  
The development of the country’s energy interests and identity in the EU has been 
rather uneven, inconsistent and controversial. To understand the initial stage of Polish 
membership in the EU, the lenses of previously identified material conditions and the 
historical contexts should be applied. Building upon references within Chapters 1 and 6, 
this section acknowledges the pre-existing geopolitical conditions, but focuses on the 
energy perspective of the argument. 
Poland was the biggest of all post-communist CEE countries in the region with 
substantial energy reserves and a prominent gas transit position from Russia to 
Western Europe. Gas import dependence on Russia, Poland’s transit location and 
rather tense political and economic relationships with Russia prior to 2004 EU 
accession, shaped Poland’s initial self-identification as a new member of the EU. Being 
regarded as a transit country for a long time, Poland joined the Union with the initial 
mentality of continuing to occupy similar position of transporting Russian gas to 
Western European markets (Interview 4). The transiting states were relatively secure, 
as the transit country could use transit fees and transit capacities as a tool for 
bargaining and negotiation (Larsson, 2007b). However, subsequent energy disruptions 
to Belarus and Ukraine with the direct impact on other CEE countries, price 
disagreements between Russia and EU MSs, and Poland’s exclusion from the Nord 
Stream project only reinforced Poland’s insecurity as a transiting state (Raszewski, 
2015: 32). Putting faith in the EU, Polish official sources from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs characterised the Polish energy position in the following way:  
Prior to energy supply disruptions from Russia we believed if we are 
transit countries – we are secure, which very soon proved to be the 
opposite. Supply disruptions were the starting point for the elaboration of 
the new strategy. Market liberalisation, regional market integration, new 
energy projects of the EU, enabled Poland to create a new strategy 
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based on the energy market of not a transit country, but an integrated 
member of the EU (Interview 16).  
Therefore, Polish self-conceptualisation in the EU has been re-oriented from being a 
vulnerable energy transit country into a vigorous member of the EU. However, the 
transition to a new energy strategy was undermined by monopolisation of Poland’s 
energy market by PGNiG state-owned company, and the lack of progress in 
liberalisation and politicised attitudes of Russia that still treated Polish territory as a 
‘transit route’ to Western Europe (having an impact of the mutual constitution of 
external and internal identities, studied by Wendt, 1999; Hopf, 2002 and others).  
As an integrated member of the EU, Poland has to choose what stance is best to take 
to effectively pursue Polish energy security interests. In this respect, Poland’s energy 
related identity is not monolithic and has two dimensions. Normally, the choice varies 
between: previously exploited geopolitical image of a ‘victim’ (Gorska, 2009; Zarycki, 
2013) or evolving identity as a regional activist among other the CEE countries and an 
‘agitator’ for energy solidarity (Copsey and Haughton, 2009; Buzek, 2011; Maltby, 
2014).  
Due to pre-existent legacies and the amount of energy vulnerabilities Poland is often 
viewed as an ‘eternal victim’ by the West (Zarycki, 2013: 133, 143), an identity that the 
country is both ashamed of and exploits at the same time. Trying to enhance its energy 
security in the EU, the country often ‘played a Russian card’ by portraying an image of 
historical victimisation, and transmitting it into other than foreign policy dimensions, like 
energy. The previous sections have already widely demonstrated the grounds for anti-
Russian energy perceptions and clichés of the Russian energy behaviour. Poland used 
its energy dependence and the above-described Nord Stream as a source of Polish 
energy vulnerability.  
Poland expressed its concerns on different levels about pro-Russian support within 
other EU MSs in European Institutions. Some evidence suggests that a Russian 
‘phantom’, ‘lobbying’ and ‘conspiracy’ are present in the European Parliament, which 
creates trepidation among Polish members of the European Parliament (MEPs). 
According to Mistrzak (2010), Polish MEPs such as Jacek Sarysz-Wolski (former 
Chairman of Committee of Foreign Affairs), Pawel Kowal and Lena Colarska-Bibinska 
admit direct and indirect Russian unwanted presence in EU Institutions. Gazprom’s 
undisclosed political lobby for the Russian government and friendly ties with MEPs 
from Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria with Russia is viewed as a threat by Polish MEPs 
(Mistrzak, 2010). Treating Brussels as ‘a specific place for expressing a country’s 
interests, where sometimes one should exaggerate in order to get a desired response’ 
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(Interview 16), Poland took on board its victim-like identity. Naturally, being a new 
member of the EU Polish bargaining capacity in Brussels is still limited, lacking the 
‘intensity of its policy preference, its skill at coalition-building, its administrative 
capacity, its persuasive advocacy, the receptiveness of other Member States and its 
domestic political strength’ (Copsey and Pomorska, 2010: 309; Roth, 2011: 602-604). 
This affects Poland’s confidence and self-conceptualisation in the EU, ultimately 
leading to the feeling of insecurity. 
Correspondingly, Poland treated the EU as a source of country’s progress and 
economic benefits, as the EU:  
provided the means and opportunities for a rapid general development 
of the country. Thanks to EU funds and policies, alongside to the new 
opportunities in communications, infrastructure, trade, education, and 
other areas, the modernization of the country took place (Bienczyk-
Missala, 2016: 102).  
The mid-2000s have been very challenging for all the EU MSs due to the international 
economic downturn leading to the insecurities on the world energy market and 
uncertainty with attracting business investments into developing energy markets (such 
as in energy pipeline infrastructure and UGS, and explorations of new energy fields). 
The inability to financially support a variety of energy security projects led Poland to 
intensively rely on the EU budget (Misik, 2015: 211). The EU Commission is bounded 
by its limited investment capacities and financial resources, which have been already 
allocated to a range of competing gas infrastructure projects of common European 
interest. In order to get the EU Commission’s financial support, Poland was resourceful 
in lobbying its own grounds for financing.  
Thus exploiting its energy vulnerability based on the country’s weak interconnected 
position within the emerging energy market and threats of disruptions from the external 
suppliers brought Poland visible financial benefits from the EU. Several major projects 
are to be funded by the Cohesion policy funds and the European Energy Programme 
for Recovery such as the LNG terminal in Swinoujscie that will help to diversify 
Poland’s energy supplies bringing gas from Qatar, three interconnections with 
Germany (between German VNG and Polish GAZ-SYSTEM) and the Czech Republic 
(between Czech NET4GAS and Polish GAZ-SYSTEM) and an upgrade of the 
transmission system in north-western Poland (European Commission, 2011e). Since 
2004 Poland has been financed by the EU Trans-European Energy Network (TEN-E), 
receiving funding almost every year, with the only exceptions in 2006 and 2007 
(European Commission, 2013e). In 2012, two interconnectors received the EU TEN-E 
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funding: 210 000 euro between Poland and Slovakia (operated by Polish GAZ-
SYSTEM and Slovak Eustream) and 2.3 million euro for Polish-Czech interconnector 
that is operated by Polish GAZ-SYSTEM and Czech NET4GAS (Enerdata, 2012). In 
2012, out of an existing four priority gas projects Poland will be granted EU financial 
support in two – the North-South Gas Corridor and the Baltic energy market 
Interconnection Plan. Simultaneously, Poland has also received a political platform to 
lobby for shale gas in the EU, which according to preliminary estimations Poland has in 
abundance. 
However, Poland’s vulnerable energy image included references not only to the 
Russian threat, but also the EU energy policies and its MSs. The image of a victim was 
initially directed against bigger and more influential EU states, mainly Germany, whose 
energy policy choices negatively affect Polish energy security and prevented Poland 
equally benefit from free gas circulation in the EU due to the layout of the Nord Stream. 
As described earlier, Poland incorporated historical events and the collective memories 
from the past about Russian and German threat into its energy security rhetoric, 
referring to the Nord Stream as the ‘new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact’, dividing Europe 
(BBC news, 2006). German anti-solidarity energy policies were not only related to the 
Nord Stream pipeline project that increased gas import dependence on Russia for the 
whole EU, but the anti-nuclear stance that was a unanimous German rather than a 
consensual European decision (as it can put strains on the mutually shared electricity 
networks). Another energy concern for Poland was the lack of German political support 
for other non-Russian energy diversification projects, limiting Polish choices for energy 
security. For instance, deriving from opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Germany rejected Poland’s initial application for a financial support for the LNG 
terminal in Swinoujscie from the EU budget. The main explanation for German 
opposition was that a market-oriented and economic viability approach should prevail 
and the companies should ensure the financial means for constructing the terminal 
(Interview 16).  
Understanding that more effective leverage on Germany was needed than the self-
victimisation of its energy dependent position, Poland offered its political support for the 
EU Commission’s funding if Germany plans to integrate renewable energy in its 
electricity grid and building interconnectors (Interview 10). The reciprocity of interests in 
getting funding for the LNG infrastructure (in the Polish case) and receiving funds for 
the needed electricity infrastructure (in the German case) led to a constructive 
discussion and positive outcome for Poland. After a year Poland received 9.2 billion 
euro from the EU Commission for the LNG terminal. In search of protection and 
support from Brussels against Russian aggressive energy policies, Poland skilfully 
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used energy insecurities originating from outside of the EU to instigate economic 
advantages from ‘inside’ Europe. Henceforth, this demonstrates the emergence of 
Polish energy identity as ‘a policy entrepreneur’ (Roth, 2011: 603).  
In fact, quite a few scholars and the majority of interviewed political elites subscribed to 
Polish self-sufficient and pro-active identity in the EU as being a ‘policy entrepreneur’ 
(Roth 2011; Maltby 2014) and an ‘assertive regional power’ in furthering the EU 
integration and common energy policy and security issues through the EU 
Neighbourhood Policy and from 2008 Eastern Partnership with its eastern neighbours 
(Copsey and Haughton, 2009; Bienczyk-Missala, 2016: 105). The political image 
promoted by the ex-President Lech Kaczynski, the 2005-2011 coalition government 
and other political elites that ‘Poland should be a major player, if not the major player, 
in the EU’s foreign policy towards Russia’ was finally taken into consideration by Polish 
political elites (Copsey and Haughton, 2009: 278). 
According to Bienczyk-Missala (2016: 104), Poland views the EU as the Union of 
‘sovereign member states rather than a federation of states’, advocating for ‘the right to 
determine the powers transferred to the community’ and the ability to upload its 
national and energy security priorities. However, the country is very selective about 
which policies and competences can be delegated to the EU level, and which should 
remain within Poland’s national sovereignty. For instance, Poland opposed many of the 
constitutional provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which excessively empowered the 
European institutions, ‘including the proposal to appoint a president of the European 
Council and to uphold the principle of ‘one state – one commissioner’ for the European 
Commission’ (Bienczyk-Missala, 2016: 104). Being one of the last countries to ratify the 
Lisbon Treaty, Poland’s position in the EU was often viewed as ‘anti-cooperative’ by 
other EU MSs (ibid: 104). 
On the other hand, Poland was supportive in the initiatives related to energy security. It 
emphasised the communal benefits of the solidarity that became reflected in the EU 
Council conclusions 2006 and pledged a neighbour-oriented approach within the EU 
MSs during the period of the Lisbon Treaty development. ‘It pursued the strengthening 
of cooperation on European Security and Defence Policy and an expansion of the 
solidarity clause to also cover energy security’ (Bienczyk-Missala, 2016: 104). As well 
as Poland’s successful EU Council Presidency in 2011, contributing to the preparation 
of the Energy Roadmap 2050, it advocated for the EU Commission’s leading position in 
the energy sector and common external energy approach to other countries. However, 
while some might view it as strength and pro-EU driven, it seems Poland’s pro-activity 
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in promoting solidarity was triggered by energy supply insecurity and individual energy 
interests rather than communal interests. 
During 2004-2012, more EU and neighbour-oriented changes of Poland’s energy 
actorness can be observed after the energy crises of 2009 and the misunderstandings 
about the Nord Stream settled down, when ‘Polish-German dialogue played a 
significant role in drafting EU-wide reform plans’ (Bienczyk-Missala, 2016: 110). Poland 
decided to reset the negative mode in the relationships with Russia and Germany and 
actively searched for partnership possibilities. During the Polish Presidency of the 
European Council in 2011, Poland went about ‘resetting’ its diplomatic and political 
relations with Russia and improving the perceptions of Germany and Russia as team-
players rather than de-stabilisers of European solidarity. As a further step, since May 
2011 the countries are involved in the Russia-Germany-Poland Trialogue meetings on 
the prime-ministerial level, which should facilitate putting their relations on a new 
improved level (Meister, 2014: 7). 
Poland currently tries to get rid of the ‘anti-Russian cliché’ by joining Germany in its 
efforts to shape Eastern foreign policy. Adopting a mutually shared approach with 
Germany towards Russia, Poland is likely to gain more and make its image more 
credible and pragmatic rather than emotional and ideologically-based. The German-
Polish tandem eventuated in a mutually written letter to the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton just before the 
December EU-Russia Summit 2011 about closer development of the relations with 
Russia and its Eastern neighbours, bringing Russia and others into democratic 
‘European family’ (The Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding, 2011). 
Claiming that ‘the European approach towards Russia should be based on two 
principles: constructive engagement and accountability’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Poland, 2011), the initiative indicates the finding of common ground in such EU foreign 
policy areas as furthering of the EU integration, encouraging Russia’s economic, 
political and energy modernisation. In Buzan’s and Waever’s terms it would mean 
energy security interdependence is affected by trepidations, but confidence building 
and reassurance arrangements are in place (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 142). However, 
German political elites are still sceptical about Polish energy image in the EU (Interview 
13; Interview 19). 
Therefore, Polish dual energy identity of a victim or an agitator can overlap or goes in 
parallel with each other, depending on geopolitical situation in the world, Poland’s and 
economic circumstances and national interests at stake. Poland skilfully and selectively 
‘manipulates’ with its geopolitical victimisation and exploits energy threat perceptions of 
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supply disruptions, if the country needs to reinforce its energy security position. 
Consequently, Poland looked for support of the EU Commission during the contract 
renegotiations with Russia in 2010, or facilitated an energy solidarity principle under the 
EU Commission competence, or ‘lobbied’ financial support for its national 
diversification projects. Whereas in other areas of policy-making the country prefers to 
execute its interests independently rather than through the ‘Community method’, 
resisting delegating its energy sovereignty to the EU (for instance, deciding to block 
climate initiatives or applying the unbundling principle the way that suits its national and 
economic interests). 
The section leads to the conclusion that reinforcement of the identity of a victim made 
Polish energy security stance stronger in respect to economic gains and political 
support from the EU; and weaker at the same time, jeopardising its credibility and 
reliability as a team-player within the Union. Concerning the latter, Poland created 
unnecessarily emotional and exaggerated fears of Russia, due to which it lost respect 
from other EU MSs, such as Germany, whose support within the EU could be very 
beneficial for Poland. Eventually, Poland came to realise that it can be better off with 
trying to promote leadership in certain sectors of the EU policy and pro-active energy 
stance, which has potentially positive spill-over effect on its energy supply security and 
its political weight in the EU for promoting its interests.  
 
6.5. Conclusion  
The analysis of the Polish case study chapter determined the key conditions and 
origins for Poland’s energy insecurity, answering the second research sub-question. 
While there exists a huge variety of material and ideational factors triggering Poland’s 
energy threat perceptions, they are all concentrated around three key areas, from 
which Poland’s threat perceptions originate. These broad energy insecurity origins 
included: 1) the Russian foreign energy policy, 2) Poland’s domestic energy policies, 
and 3) EU’s energy market liberalisation approach.  
Firstly, Poland’s geopolitical legacies and previous energy interactions with Russia, its 
growing reliance on external energy supplies, Poland’s historic geographic location as 
a ‘transiting’ state of energy supplied in the Western direction – all depend on credibility 
of Russia as a reliable political actor and a stable energy supplier. With growing single 
source dependence on the Russian gas supplies and Russia’s unpredictably 
aggressive energy behaviour with the use of energy as a geopolitical and economic 
tool of influence (as cases with Belarus and Ukraine illustrated), Poland prioritised 
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energy security of supply from Russia as a core element of its national security strategy 
in the late 2000s.  
This chapter demonstrated that the Russian energy policy towards other countries and 
the pretext of geopolitical conditions in Poland allowed for emotional, politicised and 
often historically prejudiced perceptions of Russia, presenting energy supply as a 
security issue. In this light, grounds for Poland’s energy security concerns can be 
grouped into:  
• imaginary or hypothetical threats, that create perceptions coming from the 
optional/possible action rather than actual ones, creating the search for political 
underpinnings, where it is unnecessary. For instance, Russian energy supply 
disruptions towards Belarus and Ukraine allow Poland to believe that Russia 
might deliberately apply similar mechanisms of pressure towards Poland, 
although there are no historical precedents of geopolitically grounded Russian 
gas interruption to Poland, neither in Soviet times, nor at present. A similar logic 
is applied to the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline that was presented as 
being directed against Poland by Russia and Germany in providing a possibility 
for Russia to redirect its energy flows, bypassing Poland. While this had not 
happen before with Poland, it does not eliminate the intangible possibility of 
occurring in the future. The elements of probability and potentiality undermine 
political trust in inter-state energy relations and justify the creation of ideational 
threat perceptions.   
• quasi-material threats, when Poland was physically affected by the international 
events that did not have intentional character. Thus the 2009 gas supply 
disruptions to Ukraine, or oil price hikes that triggered the increase of the gas 
price during the price re-negotiations with Russia had negative tangible 
consequences for the Polish economy. The circumstantial coincidence of being 
unintentionally affected by gas disruptions to Ukraine triggered the negative 
effects and influenced Polish threat perceptions, as even unintentional threats 
can bring actual harm.  
Poland’s economic conceptualisation of the European definition of energy security of 
supply as ‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (European 
Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b) and its vulnerability to supply disruptions and high 
energy prices imposed by Russia revealed the country’s vulnerability to the external 
challenges. Negative reaction to the Nord Stream project, price increase allegations 
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and other disagreements about a variety of gas contract provisions between Poland 
and Russia explicated and confirmed the above.  
Secondly, while scrutinising the structure of Polish internal energy market, Polish 
endowment of energy sources and the negative impacts of the state-owned and state-
operated energy monopolist PGNiG, a more complex and controversial understanding 
of Poland’s energy insecurity was discovered than simply perceptions of the external 
threat. The situation where a state company, PGNiG, ineffectively determines the 
choice of energy mix, selects contracting partners on uncompetitive grounds and tightly 
controls the processes of energy exploration (of conventional and non-conventional 
gas), energy extraction, production and transportation, and plays a superior role in 
country’s energy policy choices, is detrimental to the liberalisation of Polish energy 
market. Polish government acceptance and conformist position towards such 
behaviour, undermines Polish energy security. The problem of vulnerability of the 
internal energy market in the Polish case is aggravated by an inconsistent 
governmental approach to already constrained possibilities of energy diversification 
policies into alternative energy types and sources, and over-bureaucratisation and 
ineffectiveness of energy decision-making and vaguely defined energy responsibilities 
between the Ministries.  
As the situation stood by the end of 2012, the energy market in Poland was still 
burdened by PGNiG’s monopolistic position on the wholesale market and a high level 
of bureaucratisation and ministerial ineffectiveness, undermining the development of 
the liberalised energy market. Poland’s gas market lacked energy diversification 
options to the Russian gas supplies (except developing an LNG terminal) and was 
corroded by active state’s involvement into inter-company energy interactions.  
Thirdly, being a part of the EU imposed new regulatory changes and obligations to 
comply with the EU-wide market liberalisation campaign, which cannot by definition be 
beneficial to every EU MS equally, and created additional supranational pressure on 
Poland’s energy policies. It suits Polish interest in the promotion of external and 
internal energy solidarity in dealing with non-EU countries, but is not always favourable 
for making specific energy mix choices (among others, the EU’s enforcement of 
renewable energy in the Polish energy mix according to ‘20-20-20’ EU climate change 
targets, which the country is not economically ready to pursue). 
The pressure from EU energy packages to liberalise Poland’s energy market with the 
radical choice of ‘ownership unbundling’ brought only minor changes without 
significantly affecting energy competition and potential market openness. Despite 
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having shared Polish and EU energy security objectives in general terms and being 
united about the creation of a common European gas market, Poland has its own views 
on how to pursue these goals. The examples of Polish resistance to the separation of 
production from distribution and full implementation of the TSO unbundling type 
according to the premises of Third EU Energy Package illustrate the divergence of 
Polish energy interests from EU perspectives. Essentially, without incentives for Polish 
political elites to restructure its domestic energy market, fully adopt new EU energy 
market regulatory provisions, modify taxation legislation package and enhance internal 
energy security through boosting domestic energy exploration and production, Poland 
is bound to be a hostage of its domestic energy actors and will continue to be 
vulnerable to Russian energy policies, putting more emphasis on the Russian threat 
than it warrants. A large part of Polish threat perceptions have not only material and 
objective roots, but are also subjective and politically constructed. 
Combining the above aspects together, the chapter argued that Polish threat 
perceptions largely originate from the external Russian energy threat and its energy 
relations with Poland. However, Polish energy insecurity is aggravated by constraints 
of the EU supranational structure and a Polish state-monopolised domestic energy 
market. Yet, since interests and identities are not permanent and are shaped through 
inter-state energy interactions (Wendt, 1999), Polish energy threat perceptions are not 
monolithic and static in nature. They have been shifting from strictly negative anti-
Russian views in the early 2000s (being aggravated by disruptions and politicisation) to 
more tolerant and engaging by 2012 (largely due to the relative stability provided by EU 
membership and changes in the leading governmental elites). 
The change in interests was accompanied with the formation of Poland’s energy 
actorness in the EU that has a transformative effect on threat perceptions. This helps to 
address the last research sub-question about the role of Poland’s identity as an energy 
actor in the construction of threat perception. Undeniably, Russia has always been an 
uneasy partner not only for Poland, but for the whole EU. Energy supply disruptions 
during 2000s and the politicisation of the EU-Russia energy relations aggravated Polish 
threat perceptions towards Russia. Initially, Poland’s energy stance was geopolitically 
driven under the identity of a victim, caused by historical German-Russian legacies and 
current Russian and German policies. So Poland played an ‘anti-Russian card’ to 
facilitate its energy security through financial and political benefits from the EU (Misik, 
2015) and striving for more understanding from other MSs, mainly Germany. However, 
the acceptance of such victim conceptualisation by the EU affects Poland’s national 
pride, as the country does not want to be associated in the same basket with other 
post-Soviet countries, like Russia (Zarycki, 2013: 144). Thus, Poland realised that to be 
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able to reach its long-run objective to become a fully-fledged member of the Western 
community, it needs to abandon the anti-Russian victim image and stop expressing its 
energy threat perceptions in geopolitical terms. There is only a short time in which 
benefits can be reached for a country exploiting an victim image.  
The process of realisation was accompanied with the diplomatic decision of 
reconciliation with Russia and Germany, gradual changes in Poland’s political 
governmental structures, and gaining relative economic stability that EU membership 
provided. The above triggered more positive alterations in Polish perceptions of gas 
supply security and the formation of Polish energy actorness. Poland is aspired to 
become a pro-active regional player and its political elites became very vocal and 
visible in the political EU arena, promoting the virtues of solidarity and communal 
European interests. Though it is just the beginning, hopefully the initiated process of 
developing Poland’s team-player role in the EU will help to de-politicise the relations 




Chapter 7. Case Study: German Energy Security between 2004 and 2012 
The following chapter on German energy security is organised in a similar analytical 
manner to the preceding case study chapter on Poland. As with the Polish case, it will 
start by explaining the pre-existent material conditions and the importance of 
Germany’s geopolitical disposition that have path-dependent impacts on today’s 
energy security domain and relations with Russia.  
After World War Two, the German geographical Cold War split between West and East 
determined the country’s geopolitical dynamics, economic development and self-
identification. With economic, political and military constraints on German power, 
Western Germany became a part of the of the European Community unification around 
coal and steel industries and moved along the path of peaceful development and 
supranational integration (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1387). Leaving Eastern 
Germany behind, Western Germany had a quick economic recovery and became a 
leading exporter during the 1950s - 1980s, growing its economic and political weight. 
The negative consequences of the 1970s oil price shock, which West Germany shared 
with other European countries, resulted in global downturn and slowed economic 
growth, hampered the country’s investments, and raised unemployment. Energy 
security’s geopolitical application appeared on the European agenda during 1970s oil 
crisis, including Western Germany (Cherp and Jewell, 2011). 
An after-crisis effect triggered further European integration during the 1980s, facilitating 
the creation of economic and monetary union and the internal market, which Western 
Germany became a part of. Overcoming political and economic complexities after the 
end of the Cold War and mutual adjustments of Western capitalist market with Eastern 
socialist economy during the re-unification of Germany, and deep recession in the early 
1990s, the country eventually experienced a financial boom of prosperity and 
privatisation. The boom was facilitated with economic benefits gained from becoming a 
part of the single economic market in the EU in 1992 and the Eurozone, when 
Germany gained easy access to export its heavy industrial production and automotive 
products and services to the rest of the EU. At the same time, due to the trend of 
shifting its heavy industrial production to other Eastern and Asian countries and the 
closure of heavy industries in Eastern Germany in the early 1990s, the country 
managed to increase its energy efficiency, reduce energy intensity and at the same 
time became one of the most heavily energy import-dependent countries in Europe 
(Dhaka, 2009: 293). A growing assertiveness of German national interests and 
economic might (though constrained by structural economic power and impeded by the 
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collective memory) gave rise to the term ‘hegemony’ with respect to German power 
from the 1990s (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013: 1388-1391). 
In the aftermath of the 1970s oil crisis, ‘the issue of energy security evinced little 
attention from German policy-makers or the German public’ (Duffield, 2009: 4284). 
Despite its economic wealth, Germany’s energy situation is still characterised by ‘a 
mismatch between its great capabilities and its paucity of palpable resources. 
However, its encirclement by several European nations ‘gives it the benefit of being a 
centripetal force in terms of the European order’ (Dhaka, 2009: 283). Geographically, 
Germany has been always conveniently located near the periphery of energy endowed 
countries, so energy import was not a security priority as such. Germany was supplied 
with gas from the USSR since the 1970s, as well as Norway and the UK, in addition to 
relying on its own coal-burning and nuclear plants and actively developing renewables.  
However, the re-appearance of the energy supply security issue during the 2000s as a 
part of the European import dependent energy security discourse, could not leave 
Germany isolated from the heated European political debates and the policy of 
securitisation. Therefore, this section aims to explore the conditions and origins of 
Germany’s energy insecurity and to discover the role of Russia in Germany’s energy 
threat perceptions. The scrutiny of Germany’s energy interests and the formation of 
energy identity will be based on country’s relations with Russia (and Poland) during 
2004-2012, as well as indicating broader implications for understanding energy threats 
in the EU-Russia energy relations (answering the second and the third research sub-
questions).  
To begin with, Section 7.1. scrutinises material conditions of the German energy 
market, making references to the country’s high level energy import dependence 
already established in Chapter 5. The significance of energy companies as market 
energy decision-makers and guarantors of the security of energy supplies on the 
ground determine the industry-led and business oriented nature of German energy 
policy, making energy security a definitive part of economic domain. Regardless of 
rather restricted governmental involvement in the energy business trade, supply 
contracts and price making, Germany’s energy security strategy and the choice of 
energy mix are still set at the state level and determined by governmental policies. The 
section reveals peculiarities of German energy diversification priorities, which are 
mostly driven by the diversification of energy types, rather than routes or supply 
countries.   
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Similar to other EU MSs, there is a general tendency in Germany towards choosing to 
construct its energy policy based on the country’s national interests and an economic 
basis. Therefore, Section 7.2. lays out the controversies about Germany’s full 
compliance with the EU’s energy market liberalisation policy, indicating the lack of 
political will and the challenges of the energy industries giving up control over the 
market and the unbundling principle (Lohmann, 2006; Interview 19). The section 
continues to analyse Germany’s justification for the Nord Stream as a project to 
increase energy security in Germany and Europe, which caused many 
misunderstandings with Poland and the rest of the EU. The Nord Stream shows that 
Germany prioritises energy security through the diversification of energy types, which 
differs from the EU’s intentions for non-Russia diversification of country sources and 
routes. Simultaneously, it causes problems for a united approach to European energy 
solidarity, which Germany struggles to either understand or accept.  
Taking into account Germany’s energy strategy towards energy efficiency and stable 
relations with Russia, Section 7.3. draws upon the analysis of German-Russian 
relationships that has been a pivotal part of Germany’s ‘uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources’ (European Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b). This section observes 
the multi-level nature of German-Russian energy interactions that since 2004 gradually 
shifted from the status of ‘special relationships’ into the domain of ‘strategic 
partnership’. By treating foreign policy and geopolitics separately from energy security 
with Russia, Germany managed to preserve pragmatism and a non-politicised 
economy-based approach towards its gas supplier. Deriving from the previous analysis 
of German domestic gas policies, national energy diversification priorities, and attitudes 
towards the Nord Steam and the EU market liberalisation incentives, this section 
completes the understanding of German energy security, concluding on the role of 
Russia as a guarantor of German security of supply rather than an energy threat.  
As a part of threat perception analysis, the last Section 7.4. looks at German energy 
identity formation, which is constituted by self-conceptualisation and external 
perceptions of Germany’s energy actorness. The section highlights the conflict 
between German self-identification as an equal partner with other EU MSs, and 
external perceptions of a strong economic and political energy actor, which does not 
always ‘comply’ with the EU energy solidarity policy (as the Nord Stream case or the 





7.1. Germany’s Energy Policy 
Following the logic of constructivism, in regard to the importance of domestic factors in 
understanding a country’s energy security policy choices, this section scrutinises the 
structure of the German internal gas market and its operation under the influence of 
energy actors and changes in the domestic energy diversification portfolio. 
7.1.1. Structure of German Energy Market 
The structure of the German energy sector has been evolving and reshaping through 
the last decade. Coal, oil, gas reserves, nuclear and renewable energy comprise the 
main energy sources for Germany. Due to the size of its economy, Germany remains 
the largest energy consumers in the world. In 2005 Germany’s primary energy 
consumption was composed of a 35.5% oil share, 22.3% natural gas, 12.4% coal, 
12.2% nuclear energy, 11.0% lignite and the rest – biomass, wind and solar power. As 
opposed to 2012, when the same indicators were 33.0% for oil, 21.5% for natural gas, 
12.9% for coal, 7.3% for nuclear energy, 12.2% for lignite respectively (AGEB, 2015).  
Out of all the conventional energy sources, German reliance on gas is historically 
strong, making it the second largest consumer of gas in the EU after Great Britain. In 
2012 natural gas consumption comprised more than 21.7 % of the energy mix, more 
than half of which goes to the household and industrial sectors (AGEB, 2015).  Over 
the last 30 years German state energy policy has become more energy efficiency 
driven and renewable energy oriented (Hobohm, 2009). This can be explained by high 
level of energy import dependence that ‘forced Germany to become a research and 
development hub of renewable energy resources’, becoming the largest producer of 
wind-generated electricity (Dhaka, 2009: 292).  
Unlike Poland, Germany tries to decrease the use of coal and nuclear power, which the 
country has in abundance. Strong environmental pressure from domestic anti-nuclear 
and anti-coal green lobbies to reduce CO2 emissions, and general EU climate change 
targets, seemed to compromise the importance of ‘dirty’ types of fuel in electricity 
generation for German heavy and energy-intensive industries. This pressure led to the 
government’s decision to close down loss-making coal mines by 2014 and terminating 
state subsidies for coal by 2018 (Hobohm, 2009: 96; Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology of Germany, 2012: 49), with the next long-term plan to shut down coal-
fired power plants by 2040. Together with the commitment to phase out the use of 
nuclear energy by 2022, this will directly affect the country’s energy supply. The share 
of energy, which declining coal and nuclear represent will have to be substituted by the 
development of renewable sources and additional gas supplies (mainly from Russia, 
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which became possible after the completion of the Nord Stream). This means Germany 
has to develop strong energy links with its key regional gas supplier. 
Having very limited domestic gas production, which from 2005 until 2012 has been 
continuously decreasing from 14.3% to 9.0% (AGEB, 2015), the country has to import 
its main energy resources, remaining a net-importer of gas. Having no LNG terminals, 
almost all of German gas imports come through pipelines from Russia such as the 
Yamal-Europe, Druzhba and the newly built Nord Stream; from Norway through 
Europipe and Norpipe systems and four small entries from the Netherlands. In 2011 
Germany imported 89.6% of its gas through pipelines, the biggest part of which came 
from Russia at 36.7% (IEA, 2013a: 70), which is consistently increasing since early 
2000s, making Germany the biggest importer of Russian gas in the EU.  
Figure 5: Origin of German Gas Imports in 2007 and 2010, (in %) 
 
Source: (Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany, 2014)  
Despite the evident increase of reliance on Russian gas imports (according to Figure 5), 
the level of gas in Germany’s energy consumption have been gradually dropping, 
correlating with increasing energy demand through renewable energy. The drop in gas 
consumption was confirmed by the IEA analysis of the German energy market, 
reporting its decline by 10% in 2006 compared to 2010, dropping from 100 bcm in 2005 
to 90 bcm in 2010 (IEA, 2012: 18). Even though the share of natural gas in Germany’s 
total primary energy consumption has decreased, the potential for the growth of gas 
supply to Germany is anticipated by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy (2012: 49-50). Such growth of gas supply from Russia could be attributed to the 
continuous depletion of indigenous gas reserves and import reduction coming from the 
North Sea and Norway (IEA, 2012: 20), the ruling out coal usage and growing needs 
for the electricity generation. The above-described changes in Germany’s energy 
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portfolio for the last decade (to be complemented with the goals of diversification policy 
in section 7.1.3.) bring modification to the country’s energy security position in the EU 
and in relations with Russia.  
7.1.2. Key Energy Players 
Germany is one of the few countries in the EU that does not have gas-producing 
companies-champions (since the country produces a very small amount of gas locally). 
Instead, a variety of German energy companies are responsible for energy import, 
transportation and electricity generation and represent a core of the German energy 
market. In the early 2000s, the German energy market was split between five largest 
gas companies, including E.ON Ruhrgas AG, RWE AG, Wingas (Wintershall-Gazprom 
joint venture with shares of 50.02% and 49.98% respectively), VNG (where Gazprom 
has 10.5% of shares) and EnBW. In 2010 German companies had comparable quotas 
in gas imports and electric energy generation (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: German Companies’ Shares on the Gas and Electricity Markets, % 
 
Source: Mazur (2011: 8)  
The same German energy industries are responsible for the stability of energy supply 
security by maintaining 47 UGS with total capacity of around 20 bcm, 16 of which are 
operated by E.ON (E.ON, 2012). To maintain the continuity of supply, Germany tends 
to buy more gas in summer (due to technological specialities like pressure, 
temperature, etc.) and stores this gas in UGSs at home and abroad. According to the 
IEA (2007), Germany has enough gas reserves to enable gas supply for about 80 days 
of average demand, which is much higher than the mandatory EU gas stocks of 30 
days, introduced by the European Commission by the Regulation 994/2010.  
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Until the introduction of the EU unbundling principle and the EU Third Energy 
Liberalisation Package in 2009, the German gas market was ruled by the above-
mentioned vertically integrated companies. Those supra-regional companies controlled 
not only production, but also supplies and transmission, impeding competition and the 
access of alternative gas suppliers (IEA, 2002). Having no officially established energy 
sector regulator at a national level in 1990s (IEA, 2002: 9), the government allowed the 
energy industries to self-regulate, deciding for themselves the way the gas market 
should function. The regulator-free market architecture led to the high concentration of 
several energy industry champions, which were very protective of the German energy 
sector (Lohmann, 2006).  
For example, E.ON AG was one of the most important energy companies in Germany, 
which reinforced its dominating position on the market by merging with Ruhrgas in 
2003. E.ON changed the German market by becoming the largest wholesale producer 
and gas provider, accounting for half of German gas imports. Before the Second and 
Third Energy packages, German companies were strongly interlinked by ownership or 
contractual relationships, complementing each other and working as a well-organised 
team rather than competitors (demarcation principle (Lohmann, 2006: 21-22)). At an 
operational level, these strong ties created a ‘special type’ of oligopolistic industry-led 
market, where the gas market was divided into strict market areas controlled by these 
companies. This, in turn, generated very limited competition and restricted the access 
for any new market players. In relation to external energy suppliers, there existed a 
degree of freedom among the energy industries to choose its suppliers, which initially 
prioritised cooperation with Russia in 1990s, impacting German energy security 
situation in the 2000s.  
After the EU unbundling energy regulations, German energy market became more 
competitive, encompassing the energy interests of a larger amount of energy players 
that are responsible for import, transmission and distribution of gas. However, German 
energy policy is not dominated by the influence of a single monopolistic energy 
company owned by the government. The structurally distinctive feature of German 
energy companies is that they are mainly public companies, owned by investors, 
municipalities and combined shareholding of energy industries and financial institutions 
(IEA, 2007; 2013), as opposed to state-owned and state-operated companies, like 
PGNiG in Poland. In principle, it means that paramount decision-making is done with 
economic interests as a goal, rather than politically driven policies. In addition to 
maintaining the obligatory gas reserves in the UGS, energy importing companies, 
rather than the Federal Ministries, are responsible for maintaining the country’s security 
of supply as they are the first ‘filters’ of external energy supply being directly involved in 
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energy contract obligations with Russia. Even though the state is not a shareholder in 
the energy industries, German laws oblige these companies to secure energy supplies 
in national and the EU levels. For instance, the main acts putting in practice energy 
regulations were: firstly, the German Energy Industry Act (EnWG) created in 1998 and 
significantly modified in 13 July 2005, that aims for secure low-priced and environment-
oriented energy supplies. The second act is the Federal Renewable Energy Act (EEG) 
created in 2000, emphasising the privilege of renewable sources. Thus, EnWG in the 
Section 11(1) clearly obliges German energy supply operators to operate a safe, 
reliable and efficient energy system, protecting them against threats (Federal Ministry 
for Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany, 2005).  
The amount of state involvement into the energy security processes has always been a 
sensitive question in Germany. Having an industry led energy market, the former 
Minister of Economics (2009) and later Minister of Defence (2009-2011) Karl-Theodor 
Freiherr zu Guttenberg prioritised the importance of market and companies over 
governmental level involvement (German Marshall Fund, 2009). At a general level, the 
government has little say when it comes to gas contracts and the choice of energy 
partners (despite having de-jure power to veto the purchase of shares in German 
energy firms by non-EU companies, which de-facto has been rarely executed). It can 
only affect companies through legislative procedures and stimulate businesses to 
preserve energy security in the country and on the EU level.  
Having a pragmatic energy private sector Germany’s mixed economy model is an 
exemplary solution to energy security. As noted in the German energy concept (2010: 
3), Germany aspires ‘for a market-oriented energy policy that is free of ideology’. Unlike 
other European countries like France, when the French President Nicolas Sarkozy was 
involved in promoting deals for GDF/EDF (Interview 19) or when Poland invited the 
European Commission to participate in the gas contract negotiations with Russia in 
2010, Germany does not tend to actively involve currently ruling political elites into 
energy business negotiations or use EU institutions as a ‘safety cushion’ for getting 
better energy deals with Russia. Some might argue that former Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroder, or some members of the opposition parties and the social-democrats, or 
ministers from the lower level, might be present during the contract re-negotiations and 
be a part of the Nord Stream project, but no high level political elites, which are 
currently in power (Interview 19).  
Thus, the nature of industry-state relations is limited to the following: the German state 
creates a favourable and stable instrumental framework for energy projects and energy 
companies, in turn, guarantee the attraction of investments, technological 
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developments, a risk free marketplace and the energy supply at competitive prices in 
practice. Several German Federal Ministries define energy policy priorities and set up 
strategic energy-related directions, among which are the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy (BMWi), Federal Foreign Office (Auswaertiges-amt), Federal 
Ministry of Environment, Natural Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).  
Having no separate Ministry responsible for energy issues, energy aspects have 
always being regarded as a part of national economy under the BMWi umbrella. Over 
the course of 2006, further institutional distinction regarding energy policy 
responsibilities were launched. Whilst the responsibilities about renewable energy, 
climate protection and energy efficiency were transferred to the BMU during the 
Gerhard Schroeder Chancellorship (the BMBF got engaged in it later), the Federal 
Foreign Office was reluctant to be left out and became involved in sharing the 
responsibilities about the international aspects of energy with BMWi in 2006 (Duffield, 
2009: 4286). No matter how hard the Federal Foreign Office tried to promote foreign 
energy policy in the 2000s (facilitating greater dialogue between energy producing, 
transiting and consuming countries, approving the EU’s intentions of speaking with one 
voice, convincing Russia to ratify ECT, etc.), German foreign energy policy was 
overshadowed by national priorities of energy efficiency and climate protection (Duffield, 
2009: 4288). Thus BMWi reserved its competences as key policy-making in the energy 
sector and monitor of security of supply and is responsible for announcing emergency 
situations in case of gas supply disruptions or other market bottle necks (IEA, 2007; 
The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany, 2012: 4). In addition, 
BMWi maintains in close coordination with both EU institutions and energy industries. 
Section 51 of EnWG together with Directive 2003/54/EC obliges the BMWi to submit a 
monitoring report on energy security to the European Commission at two year intervals. 
Through maintaining close economic ties with companies, BMWi preserves the right 
balance, remaining an advocate of the energy industries (largely cooperating with 
Gazprom and relying on Russian energy supplies), but without imposing government’s 
political interests. Therefore, the German government did not actively advocate for 
diversification policies away from Russia and raised very restrained criticism of Russia 
during the 2006 or 2009 supply crises, not wanting to ‘upset’ its key energy partner.  
To sum up, the German energy market is mainly industry-led and industry-operated, 
which gives energy security a more market-driven meaning. This means that the 
political aspect of energy security is relatively detached from the economic one, which 
in theory should provide a less politicised approach to energy security (to be tested in 
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Sections 7.2. and 7.3.). The next section covers German national energy diversification 
policies, which illustrate the country’s energy security priorities for the last decade. 
7.1.3. National Energy Diversification Priorities: Diversification of Energy 
Types 
The legacies of the market developments outlined previously and Germany’s energy 
import dependence on external supplies, created the setting for country’s energy 
diversification policy since 2004. Unlike the EU, which identifies energy security in 
terms of growing European energy import dependence and security of gas supplies 
(Council of the European Union, 2004), the German solution to enhance energy 
security for a long time was largely based on energy efficiency and stable relations with 
Russia. Despite attempts to develop the three-fold European approach to energy 
security, Hobohm (2009: 108) noticed that during the 2000s ‘sustainability became the 
most important issue’ for the country.  
After the opposing parties of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) formed a Grand coalition at the end of 2005 under the rule of 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who from 1994 until 1998 was the Minister of Environment, 
the development of the official energy policy concept started. Hence, it mostly focused 
on environmental problems in relation to climate change and the domestic issues of 
nuclear energy and economic competitiveness in regards to high energy prices, rather 
than security of supplies or import dependence per se. Since the German Foreign 
Office failed to advance energy security at an international level in 2006-2007 (Duffield, 
2009), German domestic energy developments prioritised the enhancement of energy 
security through battling climate change and boosting energy efficiency and 
sustainability through renewable energy sources (Rohrkasten and Westphal, 2014). It 
was under Angela Merkel’s Chancellorship that the German national position on 
climate change, renewable energy and increasing energy efficiency became the 
mainstream of German domestic energy policy, prevailing over energy security and the 
diversification of energy routes or sources (Duffield, 2009: 4287; The Federal Ministry 
of Economics and Technology and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2010).  
Deriving from the acknowledgement that the security of energy supplies is not more 
important than two other pillars of the EU energy security strategy, Germany had very 
different approach to energy supply diversification, compared to Poland. Having well-
established additional sufficient supplies from Norway and the Netherlands to satisfy its 
import dependence, Germany did not have an ultimate goal to diversify away from 
Russian supplies and supply routes. On the contrary, having the Nord Stream in place 
increased German gas reliance on imports from Russia. Instead, the country pursued 
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the diversification of energy types, which were determined by the direction of 
Germany’s efficiency policy and the economic rationale for energy security. 
• LNG  
As far as LNG is concerned, it is an important energy source to diversify away from gas 
pipeline supplies and promote the development of a liberalised energy market, where 
gas can be treated as commodity that can be competitively traded. However, Germany 
is one of very few EU coastal countries that has no operational LNG terminals on its 
northern coast that are essential for supply diversification. Plans to construct the first 
LNG terminal in Wilhelmshaven were announced by Angela Merkel’s government in 
2006 (Umbach, 2008). Hitherto LNG terminal has failed to produce any results and 
since then its status has been suspended. The reason for that is that LNG in Germany 
is still regarded to be economically less viable than pipeline gas supply (Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology of Germany, 2012: 50). Regardless of 
predictions about the access of currently cheap LNG from the Middle East and shale 
gas from the US, Germany is not reliant on these temporary energy solutions. Instead, 
the Federal Government persists with the pipeline gas cooperation with Russia and 
investments in expensive renewable energy (IEA, 2013a), which are expected to 
produce significant long-term benefits.  
Even if Germany decides to resume its plans to build the LNG importing terminal, the 
capacity of the terminal will be relatively small to cover Germany’s demand, only 10 
bcm per year (Duffield, 2009: 4289). This is an example of not having a politicised 
approach to energy security, as despite growing gas demand, the country has made an 
economic rather than politically grounded decision. Unlike Poland, with no cost 
effective justification and high construction expenses for supplying generally more 
expensive LNG compared to the pipeline gas, Germany has made different choices 
(Interview 21). Instead of having a domestic LNG option, German energy companies 
have shares in other LNG terminals: E.ON has 45% of shares in the Tauern project 
(through LNG terminal in Croatia, Austria and North Africa) and 25% of shares of LNG 
import Gate Terminal in the Netherlands (Antas and Loskot-Strachota, 2009). Since the 
last decade, the country is focused on the expanding diplomatic links with Nigeria 
about LNG supplies, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan regarding Caspian region gas 
exploration and LNG supplies from Algeria, Libya and Egypt through the Tauern gas 
project (for more information see the Strategy for Central Asia produced during 




• Shale gas 
The diversification of conventional gas supplies into unconventional fracking has been 
highly debated in Germany since 2008. Due to environmental lobbies, strict regulations 
and general public concerns about the potential risks for public health and the 
environment (water pollution in the area due to the technological process of the gas 
extraction) Germany is not rushing into shale gas fracking. The Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy is taking its time to organise a detailed study of actual 
shale gas reserves, which should be completed in 2015, to get a reliable estimate of 
domestic unconventional gas deposits (Interview 21). According to approximate 
estimations of German Ministry of Environment, most of the reserves are located in the 
North of the country, but since not all Federal States have given full permission to 
explore shale gas it is difficult to make accurate estimations. A survey by the Federal 
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources estimates the amount of the 
accessible unconventional gas reserves seven-times more than the conventional 
deposits (Andruleit et al., 2014: 23-24). If the economic gains are certain and safety 
issues are cleared, Germany is likely to be more positive about shale gas as in the 
medium-term. 
• Nuclear energy debate 
Unlike coal that accounts for more than 40% of produced electricity in Germany, gas 
and nuclear energy remain the ‘cleanest’69 conventional sources with relatively minimal 
impact on climate change and the environment. Almost one quarter of German 
electricity was produced by 17 nuclear reactors in Germany in the early 2000s. Nuclear 
energy utilisation has always been a highly debated topic within German political elites. 
To date, Germany has had multiple attempts to shut its nuclear reactors taking place 
after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) but was put on 
hold by the Christian Democrat (CDU) federal government until October 1998, when 
the coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party 
suggested it again. In June 2001 the Red-Green federal government and the nuclear 
plants operators signed an agreement on Phased Termination of nuclear power use in 
Germany and prohibited building any new reactors. Environmentalists in the governing 
coalition managed to pass a Nuclear Exit Law to gradually phase out nuclear power by 
2020 (World Nuclear Association, 2015).  
However, during Angela Merkel’s second Chancellorship term, general changes of 
German energy policy occurred that also affected nuclear energy. The adopted ‘Energy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Nuclear plants are less CO2 polluting compared to coal plants. However, the nuclear wastes 
are the major environmental concern of the Green lobbies. 
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Concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply’ issued 
by BMWi in September 2010 set out the long-term climate and energy approach 
focusing on fundamental restructuring of its energy system ‘Energiewende’ by 2050. 
Among the aims of 2010 Energy Concept were: the incentive to produce high economic 
opportunities and growth; focus on innovations and cost-effective technologies for 
market, competition and environmental purposes; climate and energy targets through 
renewable energy, increase of energy efficiency and the reduction of energy 
consumption and a cap and trade system (The Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2010: 29). As for nuclear 
energy, after years of negotiations and lobbying for licence extensions for reactors, the 
operating time of 17 nuclear plants in Germany was to be extended on average by 12 
years (ibid.: 15-16).  
However, the Fukushima energy calamity in Japan in March 2011 instigated rapid 
changes in the German approach to nuclear energy as the source for electricity 
generation, creating a huge wave of political discontent. Through the adoption of 
amendments to the 2010 Energy Concept on 6th of June 2011, Angela Merkel’s 
Federal Government accelerated the nuclear phase-out by closing down 8 nuclear 
reactors straight away and the remaining 9 plants will be closed by 2022 (World 
Nuclear Association, 2015).  
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s unilateral and prompt decision to accelerate the 
nuclear power phase-out uncovered a whole spectrum of attitudes about the political, 
economic and technological challenge that the country had to face. The ‘old-new’ 
nuclear exit plan will require replacing around 22% of the gross electricity output 
generated by the nuclear plants. The optimistic environmentalist are assured that 
Germany can be economically sustainable and environmentally efficient without 
nuclear energy (with the help of Russian gas imports and energy renewables), while 
environmental pessimists fear that nuclear energy demand will have to be covered by 
CO2 emitting coal-burning plants. Hockenos (2012) shows the examples of vocal 
criticism of Angela Merkel’s decision not only from her own party members and the 
owners of country’s nuclear power plants and grid operators, but also from the federal 
states (Landers), the members of German Green Party, private sector companies 
(RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall and ENBW), the influential opinions of think tanks close to the 
government like German Energy Agency (DENA) and Agency for Renewable Energies 
(AER). Some official sources of the European Commission continuously referred to 
Germany’s energy strategy as inconsistent and not leaving much ‘room for manoeuvre’ 
within the suggested policy (Interview 4). 
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In June 2012, four German energy companies E.ON, RWE, EnBW, Vattenfall, that own 
the nuclear power plants expected to be shut down, presented a case against 
governmental actions in the Federal Constitutional Court to get the fuel tax 
reimbursement on the unused fuel in the already closed reactors.70 RWE and E.ON 
were refunded 74 million euro and 96 million euro respectively (World Nuclear 
Association, 2015). It was bad timing for energy policy changes as the country, 
together with the whole EU, was dealing with the burden of the world economic crisis. 
The fact that German industries can be openly confrontational with the government and 
use their legal rights against state actions underlines the above observations about the 
energy market being industry-ruled.  
The wide opposition towards Angela Merkel’s ‘Energiewende’ is rather surprising from 
the political circles but understandable from the energy companies’ perspective. 
Especially if taking into account that the key targets of energy system restructuring (like 
the nuclear exit but with a postponed timeframe for 12 years by 2022, CO2 emission 
reduction and the boost of share of renewables in energy consumption) were laid out 
and accepted in 2010 Energy Concept even before the Fukushima disaster in March 
2011. Angela Merkel’s Federal Government just accelerated the implementation of the 
previously established measures of 2010 Energy Concept. Hence, the energy 
industries’ discontent seems plausible due to additional economic, structural and 
human resource burden. 
As most of substantial transitions, German nuclear ‘Energiewende’ will likely be time-
consuming and expensive, with many conflicting interests and lobbies involved. 
Naturally, all the actors affected by this step have their own reasons to support or 
condemn the government’s decision. To name but a few: economic (such as loss of 
nuclear supply revenues, enormous investments, tax burden, loss of jobs and increase 
of energy inefficiency), ideological (re-election and vote gaining purposes), political 
(inability to satisfy public demand, increased dependence on one dominant gas 
supplier Russia and pursue credible federal state policies) or ecological reasons 
(additional burden on environmentally unfriendly coal, deforestation for placing wind 
turbines and others).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 By introducing the nuclear fuel tax in 2010, the Federal Government looked at the extending 
the life of the nuclear power plants in Germany. Since the government revoked its intention, 
energy industries demanded compensation. Nuclear Fuel Tax Act was illegitimate and the 
introduction of the tax depended on the extension of the nuclear power plants application.  
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• Renewable energy 
For the last decade, the environmental aspect of the energy security has been 
prominent in German thinking, as the country has been interested in the production of 
renewable energy for a long time. The German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) of 2000 
intended to increase the cost-effectiveness of energy usage and introduced renewable 
energy in the energy basket. Since the 2000s the German government implemented 
feed-in electricity tariffs 71  (which aimed to subsidise emerging renewable energy 
technologies in solar electricity and wind-power systems to provide stable environment 
for risky investments in renewables) and regulations to enhance energy efficiency (IEA, 
2002; 2013). The Energy Concept of 2010 re-emphasised the increase in subsidies of 
low-carbon, secure energy supplies and environmental projects (feeding ‘green energy’ 
into the power grid according to the Renewable Energy Act EEG). It also focused on 
the use of the significant amount of revenues from auctioning CO2 emission allowance, 
when by 2013 power plants would be obliged to purchase a larger amount of CO2 
emission allowances (The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2010). The financial support of the German 
government is seen to help to fulfil German energy and climate EU commitments.  
However, like with the nuclear phase out opposition, Angela Merkel was criticised for 
introducing a rather hostile regulatory regime, for the superficiality and the radicalism of 
climate change and energy efficiency targets. Some would argue that Angela Merkel’s 
‘Energiewende’ and energy efficiency improvement strategy is too ambitious, costly 
and unrealistic (Duffield, 2009:4289; Interview 21). The 2010 Energy Concept 
ambitious greenhouse gas strategy reduction up to 40% by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050 
from the level of 1990 (articulated on the 1st of July 2008) and a 20% reduction of 
primary energy consumption by 2020 puts a strain on the country’s budget and a 
burden on other energy market players and consumers. According to Deutsche Bank 
Research (Auer and Heymann, 2012), Germany requires around 30 billion euro of 
investment per year to meet climate and energy objectives (including 17-19 billion into 
renewable energy per se). Subsidies into renewable energies are not sufficient and 
they also undermine international competition, sending the wrong signals to the energy 
market and potential investors (IEA, 2013a: 12). In addition, Germany lacks a precise 
roadmap with the means of describing how exactly to reach the policy targets, including 
insufficient involvement of European cooperation on a regional and international level 
to reach common European 20-20-20 energy goals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Feed-in energy tariff allows citizens, farmers, small industries and community groups to install 
their own renewable energy systems and sell the electricity they generate for profit.    
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The post-Fukushima modification of German energy policy (dated by June 2011) put 
clear emphasis on prioritising not only renewable energy.  For the first time, natural gas 
was mentioned as a key strategic environmentally friendly source for electricity 
generation (Auer and Heymann, 2012: 3; IEA, 2013a). Whereas the goals for the clean 
power generation are understandable, there are no solid grounds to believe that gas-
fired generating stations can override coal-generating stations in Germany. Out of 24 
stations, which were under construction currently, 10 were coal-based, 12 were wind-
generators, 1 was a hydro station, and only 1 was based on gas (Mitrova, 2012: 15). 
This indicates a straight-forward intention to prioritise renewable energy over the non-
environmentally friendly conventional sources. Moreover, by subsidising the use of 
renewable energy and accounting for rather high gas prices in the EU, the existing gas-
fired plants are becoming less competitive and have to be shut-down (Auer and 
Heymann, 2012). Gas supply becomes even more expensive if financial assistance is 
provided to domestic energy sources like renewables.  
How things stood by the end of 2012, the share of renewable energy in primary energy 
production increased from 18.8% in 2005 to 33.4% in 2012 (AGEB, 2015). Hence even 
with the artificial boost of subsidies into renewables, it is not enough to meet the 
German government’s goals to increase energy production from renewables. With 
current trends, Germany still struggles to meet EU low-carbon goals with current 
energy demand (as well as the whole EU with its 20-20-20 targets). Most of the energy 
industries are struggling to effectively implement renewable energy for power 
generation (since many energy industries like E.ON, RWE and others invested heavily 
into conventional generation before the ‘rush for renewables’). Having no return on 
their investments means the financial burden has to be shared with citizens, individual 
investors, farmers, community groups and small enterprises (IEA, 2013a: 12). Despite 
long-term relative benefits for the country’s energy producers, the studies of Thure and 
Kemfert (2009) proved that the German feed-in energy law that promotes renewable 
technologies, puts temporary pressure on customers, additional tax burdens on the 
wealthy and increases the electricity price for consumers.  
Moreover, there is a technological problem with the reliability of the electricity supply 
system - the tension on the electricity grids might lead to power blackouts and 
additional expansions of power grids might be needed. German energy grids are not 
prepared for the surplus of energy and the stability of the energy grid depends on the 
amount of sunny days and wind, which puts additional strain on congested 
infrastructure networks (IEA, 2013a: 13-14). As cited in the Spiegel Online news by 
Gerhard Schroeder (2012), the survey of members of the Association of German 
Industrial Energy Companies calculated, the number of interruptions to the German 
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electricity grid has increased by 29% since 2009. Therefore, in the scenario where 
there is an excess of electricity, the country has to export it to other EU members at low 
prices. This situation creates a potential danger of an electricity glut if other MSs lack 
the demand for it or do not have connectors to the German grid to receive the energy 
(which will create financial burden for the EU budget that is already involved in the 
construction of interconnecting grids). However, the opposite situation could arise with 
a shortage of energy produced by renewables like solar and wind power, seasonal 
fluctuations of the grid has to be covered by cheaper imports from other EU MSs, like 
the Czech Republic and France, or gas fired power stations (Hockenos, 2012) 
combined with gas supplies from Russia. In both cases effective inter-state electricity 
trade is undermined by restricted cross-border transmission capacities (Thure and 
Kemfert, 2009: 155). In summary, for Germany domestic disruptions (either due to the 
vulnerability of infrastructure, or insufficient power generation capacity or high energy 
intensity) are more probable risks rather than international energy cut offs from Russia.  
As a result, in summer 2011 the Federal Government stood by the long-term 
purposeful process to restructure the energy sector in Germany by passing through the 
6 laws and 1 ordinance, known as the ‘Energy package’. None of these laws are 
related to natural gas directly, but rather focus on nuclear, electricity and environmental 
issues (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology of Germany, 2012: 7), and will 
have medium and long-term indirect economic implications not only for Germany but 
also other EU MSs. While there is not a single LNG terminal in Germany, and 
prospects for shale gas are underexplored, nuclear energy remains controversial and 
renewable energy has a long-term potential but currently suffers from under-investment, 
Russian gas remains a safe, consistent and reasonable option for Germany.   
The changes in priority energy diversification choices for the last decade are 
characterised by the growing reliance on gas, the active development of renewable 
energy, the determination to reduce the usage of coal and phase out nuclear energy – 
which allows us to conclude that gas supplies from Russia should remain the key 
priority for German sustainable development. The particular structure of Germany’s 
energy market, the described changes in the German energy mix and high import 
dependence on Russian gas supplies were not found to be decisive factors that would 






7.2. German Attitudes towards EU Energy Security Policy 
Germany is generally committed to the three-fold European energy security approach 
of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply, defined as ‘uninterrupted 
availability of energy sources at an affordable price’ (European Commission, 2006: 6; 
IEA, 2013b). In Germany, since ‘energy security is almost solely linked to domestic 
energy developments’ and ‘Energiewende’ with the immediate concerns about stability 
of electricity supplies rather than gas (Rohrkasten and Westphal, 2014: 50), references 
to energy security of supply are made mainly in the context of the above EU 
Commission’s priorities, rather than presented as a perspective of the German national 
view. The definition of energy security in general is missing in the diplomatic circles of 
Berlin, as confirmed by the official in the German Permanent Representation to the EU: 
The energy security notion is commonly used to refer to the security of 
supply that is an equal dimension to other pillars of energy policy – 
sustainability and competitiveness. However, there is no overarching 
political strategy to guarantee ‘energy security’ as such (Interview 20).  
Therefore, reflecting the EU’s energy security definition, Germany enables 
‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources’ by developing its internal energy types 
(mainly renewable energy as Section 7.1.3. underlines), its reliance on supplies from 
Russia through the Nord Stream pipeline and a generally effective energy partnership 
with Russia (as Section 7.3.1. will demonstrate). This section presents German 
attitudes to EU intentions to embrace energy security through the internal mechanism 
of building the EU integrated energy market, and illustrates the country’s approach to 
the principle of solidarity through the example of the Nord Steam.  
7.2.1. German Stand on EU Gas Market Liberalisation 
The German national energy market liberalisation strategy developed alongside EU 
energy market initiatives. German energy policy started from the market de-regulation 
process and market opening based on EU Directive 98/30/EC in 1998 and has been 
gradually changing ever since through the Second EU gas directive of 2003 and the 
Third Energy Package of 2009.  
Like other EU MSs Germany had some complications with liberalising its gas market. 
Despite implementing EU First Gas Directive in 1998, the German oligopolic market 
lacked sufficient competition (IEA, 2002). The effectiveness and progress of the 
liberalisation processes leading to the stagnation of the gas market in 2000-2005 have 
been highly debated. According to Lohmann’s studies for the Oxford Institute of Energy 
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Studies (Lohmann, 2006; 2009), complications of the liberalisation processes and the 
stagnation can be explained by most of the political choices of the government in 
power. Lohmann claimed, ‘there has never been a clear political commitment to market 
liberalisation in Germany. The government has not followed a coherent strategy of 
opening the market’ (Lohmann, 2006: 5-6).  
At first, neither the German government, nor German political circles or energy 
companies supported this initiative. The lack of political incentives for market opening 
was confirmed by the BMWi, which overruled the decision of the Federal Cartel Office 
of 2002 on the basis of security of supply, forbidding the merge of E.ON with Ruhrgas. 
The following step only strengthened dominant position of E.ON Ruhrgas on the 
market (Arentsen and Kunneke, 2003). Surprisingly, the EU Commission did nothing to 
prevent this clear example of a monopolistic merger on the evolving competitive energy 
market in the EU. 
German gas industries and network users in July 2000 signed the Association 
Agreement, choosing an energy regulator-free gas market architecture with negotiated 
third party access to networks (IEA, 2002: 9). Applying this logic meant that the access 
to energy infrastructure and prices were negotiated between energy companies and 
other market players (like the Federation of German Industries), making it non-
transparent and non-equal for other market players, as well as violating the competition 
rules. For instance, Russia being the biggest energy exporter to Germany, for a long 
time had preferential access to pipelines and storage of its gas in German UGS. In 
addition to the negotiated access to pipeline infrastructure and UGS, the German gas 
market has been constrained by long-term inflexible gas contracts at the wholesale 
level, lack of liquidity and had ineffective long delivery chains from gas importing 
companies to their end-user customers (Lohmann, 2006: 8-9, 20; IEA, 2007).  
Hence a few attempts to accelerate the development of competition have been made 
during early 2000s. In order to open the German market, the Federal Network Agency 
(BNetzA), the German grid regulator for electricity, gas, telecommunications, post and 
railway markets (1998), in cooperation with the German anti-trust authority (BKartA), 
ensured transparent pricing, bringing the divergent interests of various energy 
industries and stakeholders together under a structural framework (Lang, 2012). They 
enabled energy giants like E.ON Ruhrgas and others to adapt their market behaviour 
and be perceptive to structural changes in the market (Lohmann, 2009: 127-128). 
Nevertheless, the crucial liberalisation and market opening changes in Germany 
started to take place when Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the 
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Council (Article 25) and the Third Energy Package were implemented, committing 
Germany to the formulation of a new energy policy. It created some additional 
struggles for German energy political elites, as it demanded the introduction of an 
independent regulator that would monitor fees and the implementation of the regulated 
third party access to the gas networks. Hence, Germany was among the last members 
of the EU to create an independent network regulator, the Federal Network Agency 
(Bundesnetzagentur) in July 2005, reluctantly moving from a negotiated to a regulated 
approach. In 2007 the EU Commission initiated an anti-trust investigation against E.ON 
and RWE, pushing the companies to sell their transmission networks to independent 
operators, which proved to be successful. From the very beginning, Germany was one 
of the strongest protesters of the Commission’s initial proposal of full ‘ownership 
unbundling’ (Vaisse and Kundnani, 2011: 52), since it would downsize energy 
industries.  
The EU Commission’s facilitation technique was successful as both companies 
unbundled production from transmission. However, not all the profit-oriented energy 
industries followed the same path. For instance, Wingas was against the unbundling of 
sales from transportation activities, since the nature of its business was based on 
building pipelines first and supporting them with contracts with big energy-customers 
for gas deliveries later. For that reason, Wingas was interested in controlling the whole 
delivery chain (Lohmann, 2006: 63). Since the Ministry of Economy reflects the 
interests of German gas industries, officials expressed their reservations publicly many 
times. Thus, former Minister of Economy in Germany Guttenberg, despite 
acknowledging the significance of the EU common market approach to energy, 
regarded unbundling as a bad idea, claiming that ‘more market’ does not have to mean 
‘more unbundling’ (German Marshall Fund, 2009).  
When the new model of free network access was introduced in October 2006, 
Germany was divided into about 20 various market areas, with the ultimate aim of the 
new model to reduce the number of such areas, facilitating competition, more market 
participants, liquidity and efficiency of wholesale markets (eventually bringing the 
domestic gas price down). A market area aggregates different interconnected networks 
of different operators, it is usually composed of at least 1 interregional transmission 
network with its own separate entry point of natural gas, as well as a number of local 
distribution networks with their own separate entry points. Larger market areas facilitate 
the transport of gas at lower costs, since the flows do not have to cross the borders of 
the market areas. A joint report of BNetzA and BKartA in 2012 indicated the 
consolidation of market areas into 2 areas by October 2011, containing two major hubs 
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- NCG and Gaspool (The Federal Network Agency and the Federal Cartel Office of 
Germany, 2012: 2).  
Nevertheless, the problems with low liquidity in the wholesale gas market compared to 
its neighbours still persist. Gas market experts suggest it is happening because 
industrial energy firms prefer buying gas under existing long-term familiar contracts 
from the large suppliers, and not from the trading platforms and hubs (Riemens, 2013: 
44-45). The standard contracts on the hubs are too large for small and medium size 
companies and there is ‘no contractual possibility to purchase partially on the hubs’ 
(ibid. 45). In addition, despite having a national energy regulator responsible for price 
regulations, by the end of 2012 Germany still did not have regulated retail energy 
prices but prices set by state intervention that do not provide end-users with the best 
deals (European Commission, 2012d).  
The analysis above indicated the country’s struggle to comply with the EU gas market 
liberalisation, which resembles Poland’s reasons to oppose market restructuring. A 
strong stand of the German state and its national energy industries against unbundling 
was dictated by the economic rationale and the ‘old way’ for German energy industries 
to function within the same market segments, using familiar market practices and 
supply structures. It would be superficial to claim that Germany fully resisted changes 
and opposed market liberalisation, but rather that the German ways of doing it (guided 
by national interests of its energy industries) did not correspond to the European vision 
for market opening. 
7.2.2. German Approach to Energy Solidarity in the EU: The Nord Stream 
Project 
Germany’s pronounced energy interests in the EU have been illustrated in the example 
of the Nord Stream pipeline. According to Meister (2014: 7), ‘Germany’s bilateral 
relations with Russia have in the past undermined the construction of a coherent 
European Russia policy’, and was viewed by Poland and the EU purely as national 
interest-driven, selfish and disregarding European energy solidarity. German 
authorities do not deny the ‘convenience’ of participating in the Nord Stream project for 
German energy security, especially as ‘the majority of costs were covered by the 
Russian side, it reduces the supply chain and eliminates potential political transit risks 
from other countries’ (Interview 13). However, all sorts of Polish remarks and 
accusations were regarded as ‘overly emotional and groundless’ (Interview 13; 
Interview 21). The official from BMWi underlined the prejudicial attitudes and the 
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politicisation of the energy security discourse in the EU, stating that ‘you can find every 
hidden sense in any policy if you are deliberately searching for it’ (Interview 13).  
Chapter 6 observed Poland’s opposition to the Russian energy approach but also to 
German ‘non-solidarity’ individualistic and interest driven energy policy-making. In the 
attempts to raise credibility of the Nord Stream, former German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder, and simultaneously the Head of the Nord Stream Shareholders Committee, 
emphasised that Gazprom is not the only decision-maker in this project. In case of any 
controversial situation that can harm EU energy interests, Gerhard Schroeder had a 
casting vote in decision-making that could override supervisory decisions in deadlock 
situations. Gerhard Schroeder called it an ‘indication of trust’ from the Russian side that 
clearly demonstrates the lack of threatening intentions to the EU in general (Schroeder, 
2007). Since the Nord Stream has been built and put into service in 2012, there have 
been no anti-EU MSs’ directed energy actions from the Russian side, at which point 
Germany had to intervene with its casting vote.  
Deriving from interview responses of German political elites, there is a clear confusion 
regarding what European energy solidarity practically means in political and economic 
terms (Interviews 21; Interview 13; Interview, Interview 19, Interview 22). The example 
of the Nord Stream exposed the lack of solidarity interests in both Polish and German 
cases. If Germany undermined solidarity by not considering Polish energy interests and 
prioritising another Russian pipeline, then Poland infringed the mutually European 
intention of enhancing energy security on the gas market by refusing to facilitate 
flexibility of EU infrastructure intentions to build the interconnector between Germany 
and Poland, providing north-south gas flow (Roth, 2011). A German senior energy 
expert questions why political ‘blocking’ of the Nord Stream pipeline does not impede 
solidarity or why solidarity should mean that a wealthier and more economically 
advantaged MS should pay an expensive price for the idea of construction of the 
European energy market (Interview 21). For instance, if a country like Poland has a 
less favourable gas supply contract at higher prices, economically indebting the country, 
does it mean that according to solidarity principle Germany should help with Poland’s 
unfair treatment by paying out its debts, or it should supply energy below market prices? 
Some of the EU MSs already pay a bigger portion for the construction of the European 
energy market, because the EU budget is often over-used to install infrastructure that 
has not been provided by market demand (Interview 21). For instance, many 
economically unviable west-east gas pipeline interconnectors are being sponsored and 




Polish anti-Nord Stream accusations of the German-Russian bilateral deal and 
Poland’s emotive behaviour were criticised by the former German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder in an interview with European Energy Review. He emphasised that 
‘Solidarity is not a one-way street. Western Europe needs this gas through the Nord 
Stream pipeline. And of course the others need gas as well, they also are entitled to 
solidarity’ (Schroeder, 2008: 47). That means Poland cannot use energy solidarity 
connotations only in its favour, applying double standards in defining it. German 
officials emphasise pragmatism in approaching solidarity and that ‘there can be no 
solidarity without responsibility’ (German Marshall Fund, 2009). Apparently, Brussels 
should pay attention to the concept of ‘responsibility’ (which was also mentioned in 
Article 80 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union of 2010, C 83/47) as much as ‘solidarity’. 
Looking beyond the Nord Stream example, Germany was rather efficient and fulfilled 
its solidarity ‘duties’ in practice during the supply crisis in 2009. Germany put a lot of 
effort not only in redirecting the flows from the east to the south of the country, but also 
in assisting other EU MSs in need. Wingas, for instance, was able to compensate gas 
shortages through the increased flow via the Yamal-Europe pipeline. VNG and Ontras 
managed to deliver Norwegian gas to the Czech Republic by reconfiguring the gas flow 
(gas reverse). Additionally, RWE Transgas and VNG assisted Slovakian gas provider 
SPP from German-owned UGS (which Germany rents in Slovakia for its internal 
energy needs during the peak winter consumption). Finally, Ruhrgas ensured gas 
supplies to Hungary, Slovenia and some other South-European countries (Schroeter, 
2009: 102-104). According to Antas and Gotkowska (2009), ‘not only did the gas crisis 
not adversely affect Germany but it also revealed the importance of German energy 
companies in the region’. Consequently, Germany’s responsiveness positively 
contributed to the improvement of its image in the EU (which will be analysed in 
Section 7.4. in details). Actually, such ‘regional energy solidarity’ was the principle 
adopted by the European Council conclusions of March 2007 and inserted in the 
Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas 
(Article 6) and emergency supply situations. Derived from that, German support can be 
regarded as a fulfilment of required solidarity rather than a gesture of a good will. 
In general, German energy security priorities are based on the market-driven interests 
of national energy companies (not necessarily coherent with the EU interests). The 
country is rather open about their national energy interests, which do not necessarily 
correspond to the common energy priorities of the EU or other EU MSs. In a 2012 
energy policy document BMWi states that Germany: 
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welcomes many of the proposals of the European Commission72… the 
Federal Government must pursue its own foreign energy policy to 
accommodate Germany’s specific interests and circumstances at the 
international level’ (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology of 
Germany, 2012: 50).  
However, it is difficult to see where Germany goes wrong in utilising its freedom of 
choice in energy suppliers (mainly Russia) and energy mixes (like prioritising 
renewables and phasing out nuclear energy) according to the stipulations of Lisbon 
Treaty Article 194. So do other countries of the EU, like Poland that chose to build an 
LNG terminal and kept using coal-generating plants unless they find plausible 
alternative, rather than increase supplies from Russia. One thing remains evident: EU 
MSs’ energy policy choices and energy preferences are locked into the pre-set 
European energy security values, environmental targets and domestic energy policies, 
having a domino effect on each other.  
The example of the Nord Stream illustrated that Germany’s understanding of energy 
solidarity varies from the EU’s (and Poland’s). Unlike Poland, which viewed the Nord 
Steam as a redirection of Russian energy flows to Poland’s disadvantage (that 
threatens its energy security of supply), Germany perceived this project as an 
opportunity to provide additional supplies that can be re-circulated between the EU 
MSs in the case of crisis (which enhances the security of gas supplies). Those 
conceptually different understandings of energy solidary created a lot of tensions and 
misperceptions in relations between Germany and Poland. 
 
7.3. Understanding of German-Russian Energy Relationships 
The history of energy supplies between Germany and Russia is one of the oldest in 
Europe, which began after the Second World War, when in the 1960s Soviet gas was 
delivered to Poland, Austria and Germany. Trying to play the role of mediator in easing 
the tension in east-west conflicts and improving relations with Eastern Germany, 
Western Germany built the first gas pipeline from the USSR in the 1970s with the help 
of funding from Western Europe (Aalto, 2008: 94). That was the foundation in 
establishing economic relations and mutual interdependence with the former Soviet 
Union and later Russia. Germany has always been interested in having stable political 
and economic relations with Russia, with the key political focus on democratising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Including EU’s Early Warning Mechanism, broader energy mix, diversification of energy 
supplier countries and routes but where economically viable. 
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Russia and liberalising its market. According to Meister (2014: 2), modernisation and 
diversification of Russia’s economy was supposed to come through investments and 
knowledge transfer, making Russia an important market for German exports. After the 
break-up of the USSR, both Germany and Russia, which re-emerged as independent 
states, underwent the process of forming their energy identity via different means, 
becoming political and economic drivers in the EU and the former Soviet Union space 
respectively.  
The German positive mode of energy cooperation with Russia on the inter-
governmental and inter-company levels and deepening integration of their gas supply 
relationships through the Nord Stream created a platform for ‘uninterrupted availability 
of energy supply’ (European Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b) and diminished the 
existence of threat perception. However, while Germany manages to effectively reduce 
the threat perception account of gas supply security, the clashes over ‘affordable price’ 
for the supplied gas from Russia (European Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b) proves 
to be more energy security related for Germany. The analysis continues with 
discovering the reasons why energy security hasn’t been a part of a broader national 
security strategy in Germany and explores to what extent import dependence on 
Russia and the previous examples of supply disruptions affect German energy threat 
perceptions related to Russia. 
7.3.1. The Nature of German-Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’ 
Since the 1990s the two countries have had much in common not only in economic 
prosperity goals but also politically, driven by inter-personal relationships of the heads 
of state and government (which have a positive impact on building energy bridges 
between Russian and German economies). During the 1990s, cooperation with Russia 
was largely characterised by a so-called ‘sauna-friendship’, based on a personal type 
of ‘special relationships’ between the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the 
German Chancellor at that time Helmut Kohl (Adomeit, 2005: 6). Major political 
changes in German-Russian relationships occurred under the rule of the Red-Green 
coalition headed by the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder during 1998-2005 and 
under the newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin in early 2000s. The leaders 
shifted the previous mode of ‘special relationships’ into a more politically driven and 
economy based type of relationships (with elements of personal friendship). This was 
the period when both countries were involved in building mutual trust on governmental 
and parliamentary levels, laying down the official grounds for their relationship through 
German-Russian bilateral policy initiatives. Thus, German-Russian inter-governmental 
consultations on commonly important topics in economics (including energy), foreign 
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policy, cultural and civil society were launched in 2001 at the ‘The Petersburg Dialogue’ 
forum. The forum included regular meetings with the different levels of government 
involved and businesses. In 2011 Germany launched similar type of consultations with 
Poland adding to the list that contains France, India and Israel. Notwithstanding, since 
September 2000 there have been only two Friendship Groups functioning in the 
constitutional body of Bundesrat - Franco-German and German-Russian Parliamentary 
Friendship Groups, which clearly illustrates the priorities of German political agenda. 
These groups aimed to ‘to help strengthen the many existing regional contacts 
between the German Lander, or federal states, and the Russian federal subjects, whilst 
also further improving the existing good relations’ between the two states’ (The Federal 
Council of Germany, 2015).   
Unlike the boost in political and diplomatic foreign policy relations on the 
intergovernmental level, German-Russian trade and energy interactions were limited to 
corporate level of cooperation between German companies and the Russian Gazprom. 
Hence, under Gerhard Schroeder’s Coalition, for the first and only time the positive 
tone of the political relationship between Russia and Germany directly affected the 
energy market, when the Nord Stream gas pipeline project was agreed in 2005 and 
Gerhard Schroeder was appointed as a Head of the shareholder committee of the Nord 
Stream at the end of his term. As seen before, this political move created many 
concerns among other EU MSs about Germany’s energy-related intentions within the 
EU. Despite the EU’s wide criticism towards Vladimir Putin’s non-democratic rule, 
Gerhard Schroeder was reluctant to present Russia in this unfavourable light and 
publicly criticise it (Adomeit, 2012: 5, 8), preferring to discuss his reservations about 
energy affairs during private meetings (Timmins, 2011: 193-194). 
After Gerhard Schroeder’s Chancellorship era, Angela Merkel ‘inherited’ a rather 
different Germany in 2005 and a structurally different political and economic 
architecture of the EU, having to deal with massive anti-Russian pressure from newly 
joined CEE countries. This explains a more pronounced European context of German 
policy-making. If during the first term Chancellorship under the CDU/SPD coalition in 
2005-2009 Germany was more restrained about Russian energy politics, then under 
the CDU/FDP coalition between 2009-2013 Angela Merkel’s attitudes towards Russia 
were more critical and energy security determined. The latter was explained by the 
impact of 2009 energy supply disruptions, Russia’s different from the West international 
foreign policy stance and due to its problems with democracy, corruption and human 
rights. The general trend of German-Russian energy relationships can be characterised 
by the gradual shift from the unconditional ‘special relationship’ towards more 
‘diplomatic pragmatism’ with a precise focus on economic interests.  
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Nevertheless, Russia’s newly assertive foreign policy after 2000 did not prevent 
Germany from prioritising energy relationships over politics, shaping a ‘strategic 
partnership’ with Russia. There is parity between the two states as they enjoy long 
lasting and stable energy supply interactions, allowing an understanding of each other 
as energy partners (Helm, 2006; Adomeit, 2012). They have had similar views on the 
structure of the gas market dominated by vertically integrated energy companies 
(which Germany only changed on the basis of the EU legislation in the late 2000s) and 
symmetrical energy interdependence (German demand for Russian gas is comparable 
to Russian need for German investments, technologies, modernisation and energy 
efficiency). For the BMWi in Berlin, the best way to organise a successful foreign 
energy policy is through energy dialogues and energy partnerships 73, which is key to 
the security of supply and trust-building between the countries (The Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany, 2012: 51-52). BMWi confirmed that ‘of all 
the countries supplying gas to Germany, a special status is afforded to Russia’ 
(Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology of Germany, 2012: 50). German-
Russian strategic partnership ‘entails frank, constructive and critical dialogue’, where 
among other issues energy and transportation are also discussed (Federal Foreign 
Office of Germany, 2012).  
An example of mutual understanding and amiability is demonstrated by the statement 
of the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during the press-conference in Germany 
presents. He straightforwardly emphasised high dependence of Germany on Russian 
energy exports by posing a rhetorical question for German political elites about their 
energy strategy to drop the nuclear and coal from the German energy mix: 
How will you heat your houses? You do not want gas, you do not want to 
develop nuclear energy. Where will you get your heat from then? From 
firewood? Even for firewood you will need to go to Siberia. You do not 
even have wood (Dempsey, 2010). 
German political elites’ light-hearted reaction to this non-diplomatic and provocative 
statement allowed concluding that German and Russian energy relations are based on 
trust, open criticism, and constructive engagement. Otherwise, it would be unlikely for 
political leaders to freely express their opinions in such a manner without putting strain 
on their relations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Germany has some successful energy partnerships with two main fuel suppliers Norway and 
Russia (mainly German-Russian Partnership for Modernisation with the focus on efficiency), 
Energy partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia (main partners in renewable energy production 
within the DESERTEC project) as well as Turkey, China, Brazil and some others. So being 
rather important energy supplier, Russia is not an exclusive German energy partner. 
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Therefore, as a ‘strategic partnership’ in energy was identified as an inseparable 
attribute of energy supply security, the analysis of German-Russian multi-level 
cooperation will correspond to the first part of the commonly acknowledged definition of 
‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources and affordability of price’ (European 
Commission, 2006; IEA, 2013b). Germany’s conceptualisation of ‘affordable price’ as 
presenting an energy threat will be examined through the prism of gas price 
controversies with Russia below. 
• German-Russian Multi-Level Cooperation  
If broader foreign policy perceptions of the Russian interests and identity are rather 
isolated74 from economy, then Germany and Russia are ‘on the same page’ regarding 
the energy sector. Germany is the only EU country that has a rather equal and 
comparable bargaining position during negotiations of energy issues with Russia due to 
its economic weight and the importance of import-export interactions. Russian 
assertive and controversial foreign policy has had only minor effects on the economic 
side of German-Russian energy relations, both during Gerhard Schroeder’s or Angela 
Merkel’s Chancellorships. Thus, Germany and Russia have been successfully 
cooperating on two levels: the inter-governmental level (including the Federal states 
and individual political elites) and the corporate level (mainly between Gazprom and 
German energy industries).  
The list of already mentioned inter-governmental initiatives can be complemented with 
a few more. Naming all of the cooperative initiatives would go beyond the scope of this 
thesis and stretch the word limit, therefore only a few following examples will be 
mentioned. Regarding inter-governmental cooperation, during Angela Merkel’s official 
visit to Russia in October 2008 she managed not only to restore bilateral relations after 
the Georgian war in 2008, but also provided a platform for signing major gas 
agreements between Gazprom and E.ON. During the same year both countries 
created the framework for the Partnership for Modernisation (Meister, 2014), which was 
focused on energy efficiency and included energy and climate issues, transportation 
and logistics as well as scientific collaboration (Federal Foreign Office of Germany, 
2008). Furthermore, energy relations were developing through the German-Russian 
Raw Materials Forum, a bilateral discussion on political and scientific levels established 
in 200675.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For general perceptions of Russia in the economic, political, historical, societal and cultural 
terms by the German media and political experts see (Krumm, 2012: 147-184). 
75 See http://www.rohstoff-forum.org  
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Bilateral negotiations between former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in July 2009 in Munich facilitated the further development of 
energy relations. Russo-German inter-governmental consultations proposed to include 
informal semi-annual summits between energy companies and cabinet ministers. The 
decision to enhance energy cooperation eventuated in the creation of a German-
Russian Energy Agency (Rudea, where 40% belongs to the German Energy Agency 
DENA and the rest to its Russian counterparts). Both Rudea and DENA are extremely 
influential in the Russian-German energy arena, providing energy consultations and 
bringing commercial partners together in promoting energy efficiency. Those two 
agencies pose evidence of how the German government tries to politically support the 
interests of energy businesses and how the level of companies and the state becomes 
more and more integrated and interlinked. Another example of all-round energy 
partnership was the Roadmap for Cooperation in power generation and gas supply 
between Gazprom and the largest and the most economically fast growing German 
Federal State of Bavaria in September 2011 (Gazprom website, 2011).  
The amount of bilateral German-Russian initiatives confirms the mutual interest in 
strategic energy cooperation and high level of trust between the two parties. The more 
de-politicised interplays and efficient discussions the countries have – the more 
productive and positive their relations are. The paradox of the German-Russian ‘special 
relations’ is that there is not a single legally binding intergovernmental agreement (IGA) 
between the two states to regulate, maintain or secure energy cooperation (unlike 
Poland that builds its energy relations with Russia based on a variety of IGAs, followed 
by commercial contracts). In other words, the volatility of energy markets, question of 
security of supplies and probable energy-related conflicts are dealt with on the inter-
company level, without the state’s direct interference. A minor degree of state 
involvement would be the inter-governmental Russian-German discussions, where 
controversial energy issues are tackled, but the German state does not have legal 
leverage over Russia.  
Strategic partnership on the corporate level is driven by profit-oriented business 
incentives and economic lobbies. The biggest Russian partners are E.ON Ruhrgas and 
Wingas as these are the companies that import and transit Russian gas to Germany 
and other EU MSs like to France, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands. German E.ON Ruhrgas has the gas supply contract with Gazprom until 
2035.  
Cooperation is built on getting shares in energy companies and pipelines (for example, 
31% of the Nord Stream pipeline belongs to E.ON and Wintershall) and resource fields 
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through asset swaps, like being partners in the developing Yuzhno-Russkoye, Achimov 
and Urengoy oil and gas fields. As Aalto and Korkmaz Temel noted: 
In a swap deal, the German companies involved, E.On Ruhrgas and 
BASF Wintershall, ensured access to fields in western Siberia to have 
goods to sell to their customers; and in return E.On Ruhrgas allowed 
Gazprom to invest in its three Hungarian sister companies and BASF 
Wintershall in its domestic long-distance pipeline operator Wingas (Aalto 
and Korkmaz Temel, 2014: 764). 
The fact that Germany participates in the Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas field 
development gives Germany additional security over Russian gas supplies from this 
field to Germany through the Nord Stream. According to Kupchinsky (2006) Russia is 
very consistent in its spreading into the German energy market, as it owns 50% of 
Wintershall Erdgas, 100% of Zarubezgas Erdgashandel in Germany, 50% of Wingas 
and WIEH. In June 2009 Gazprom signed an agreement on asset swap in natural gas 
production and marketing with E.ON Ruhrgas, receiving a 49% share in Gerosgaz in 
exchange for 25% of Severneftegazprom stakes in Russia (Gazprom website, 2009). 
Around 80% of Russia’s gas pipeline cooperation with Germany occurs on the basis of 
mutually agreed long-term take-or-pay contracts. Since E.ON Ruhrgas, operating in 30 
countries, is responsible for the quantity and the price of gas, it is in E.ON’s interest to 
maintain the affordable price for ends-users and consumers. Hitherto, the long-term 
contractual gas deliveries seem to have worked well for German energy companies as 
the energy companies managed to find mutually beneficial cooperative approaches. 
Remarkably, Russia eliminated the territorial restrictions of the resale of gas to other 
EU countries for German companies like E.ON Ruhrgas in 2005. Considering that most 
of the EU MSs used to have the ‘destination clause’ restriction until very recently 
(Poland until 2010), the German-Russian high levels of trust and cooperation are 
evident. 
The general tendency of Russian-German relationship also spreads to underground 
cooperation – pipelines and UGS. Gazprom has shares in two key German UGS 
facilities - Europe’s largest UGS Rehden and Katharina (see Figure 7). The importance 
of gas storage facilities in Germany and the whole of Europe is significantly increasing, 





Figure 7: Gazprom’s Operational and Prospective UGS Facilities in the EU in 2013, 
bcm 
 
Source: (Gazprom website, 2013) 
From Chapter 5, it became clear that Russia’s access to gas pipelines, energy down-
streams, UGS and other energy assets creates anxiety in the EU about over-
domination of the European energy sector by a single non-EU energy player. Hence, 
German attitude towards Russia’s expanding energy ownership is more restrained. 
There are very few statements made by the management boards of German industries 
that help to understand the companies’ attitudes towards Gazprom and the Russian 
energy strategy. Company officials from BASF/Wintershall and a representative of the 
E.ON (Interview 22) assured that the majority of German energy companies feel ‘safe’ 
and ‘comfortable’ cooperating with Gazprom and the Russians. ‘As a company 
Wintershall has a very positive experience with Gazprom, if the contract is signed – 
they will deliver’ (Interview 22). Hence, the intensity of the German-Russian corporate 
interactions, gas delivery contracts, exchange of shares in energy companies, pipeline 
projects, UGS and energy reserves indicate more than the official statements. McKillop 
(2012) noticed, ‘from upstream joint ventures, to capital raising in Russia, and 
downstream operations in Europe and overseas, the German corporate sector has 
already shifted and adapted to heavy Russian influence, sometimes dominance, across 




• German Attitudes towards Rising Gas Prices 
If security of gas supplies is not an issue for Germany, then the situation with gas 
prices is different. Some energy analysts assert that not all the energy industries have 
positive perceptions of dealing with Gazprom. For instance, Gotkowska (2011) and 
portrays German industries76 like E.ON, RWE or VNG as already being financially 
disadvantaged and indebted due to expensive gas price contracts with Gazprom. 
Companies such as E.ON, BASF or Wintershall are forced to cooperate with Russia 
and sell their profitable gas network assets to Gazprom to survive energy market 
restructuring (ibid.). Additional burdens come from the government’s energy policies 
(Mazur, 2012). Being heavily reliant on the coal and nuclear-based production, energy 
industries become the unintended victims of German efficiency targets (and European 
as well). Similarly to the logic that was applied to the Polish case, German energy 
companies, whose financial sustainability affects the energy security of the country, are 
‘locked in’ due to German energy related domestic political decisions. 
Since 2010 the level of satisfaction within German energy inter-corporate relationships 
with Gazprom has noticeably decreased (Meister, 2014: 7). The volatility of the 
international energy market triggered by the inflows of cheaper LNG to the European 
market as a result of the US shale revolution created an oversupply of energy for the 
EU. Relatively high Russian pipeline gas prices were under-cut by cheaper LNG prices 
on the spot market. In 2010 German energy enterprises like E.ON Ruhrgas AG, EnBW 
and RWE AG submitted applications to the court of arbitration in attempts to adjust 
Gazprom’s inflexible oil-indexed price formation. Eventually, in 2012 Gazprom Export 
reached agreements with several major customers in Europe, correlating the price of 
supplied gas according to changing gas market conditions in Europe. Out of all 
German companies Wingas GmbH and E.ON managed to get a price reduction (Mazur, 
2012). Some experts, like Meister (2014) assume that even though Russia is a priority 
energy partner for Germany, Gazprom’s inability to react on global gas price changes 
will eventually force German companies to find alternatives to Russian gas. 
Nevertheless, it does not relate to all of the energy industries. For instance, Wintershall, 
treat price volatility and related disagreements rather emotionlessly, and consider price 
confrontations to be an ‘inevitable part of normal business practice’ (Interview 22). 
Every 2-3 years the contractual parties scrutinise the price formula to adjust it to altered 
international energy market conditions and have an opportunity to renegotiate it. 
Hitherto, by its own practical example Germany continues to demonstrate that isolating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Vattenfall is the only company that does not import energy from Russia and was not affected 
by the nuclear phase-out inasmuch (Gotkowska, 2011). 
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the political level from commercial gas contract re-negotiations helps the de-
politicisation of energy relations with Russia.   
As opposed to Poland, which uses the EU in its gas price negotiations with Russia, 
Germany self-sufficiently settles their key price issues on inter-corporate level. 
According to German official sources (Interview 13) to a large extent it is impossible to 
compare the pipeline gas prices in Germany and in Poland, since the amount of 
imported Russian gas and the pricing principles in each country are quite different. For 
instance, since the price for gas in Germany is calculated in relation to competing fuels 
in this specific sector, the numbers can vary. Thus ‘in the heating sector gas is priced in 
relation to gas oil, in the industrial sector mainly in relation to fuel oil and in the power 
sector partly to fuel oil and partly to coal’, (Lohmann, 2009: 129). Such variation can 
explain differences in the internal gas price making of Germany. 
The subordination of the German gas market to the rule of energy industries, account 
for economic concerns like competitiveness and gas prices that override the political 
grounds of Gazprom’s behaviour. Since German energy industries are relatively 
successful in addressing gas price disagreements with Gazprom, external gas price 
challenges exist. As a gas consuming country, dependence on energy imports in 
Germany is exacerbated by the global increase of energy price due to growing 
competition with China and India (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology of 
Germany, 2012: 49). Identifying important energy policy goals in terms of high 
dependence on imported energy, the Ministry of Economy emphasised rising energy 
prices due to the increasing energy demand and geopolitical risks in inter-state 
relationships as emerging concerns for Germany (Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology of Germany, 2012). However, these factors are more internationally shared 
insecurities, between all consumers, rather than factors that can be attributed 
exclusively to German energy security situation.  
Therefore, this section has illustrated through interview data and a wide range of 
secondary data analysis that despite the changes in the political moods and 
perceptions under the Gerhard Schroeder’s and Angela Merkel’s Chancellorships the 
nature of German-Russian energy relationships has remained consistently cooperative, 
stable and more importantly prejudice-free. The inter-governmental level of energy 
interactions is affected and guided by mostly economy-based interests of German 
privately owned energy companies, based on companies’ contracts, which prevent the 
interference of emotive discourses and politicisation. German energy industries are 
reasonably complacent about Russian energy supply security and Gazprom’s potential 
as a stable energy partner. The next section complements the understanding of 
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energy’s role in Germany’s national security debate and reveals Germany’s attitudes 
towards gas import dependence and supply disruption from Russia as the basis for 
constructing threats. 
7.3.2. Germany’s National Strategy and Country’s Perceptions of the 
Russian Energy Threat 
In the first half of the 2000s, the protection of gas supplies and energy security have 
only tentatively been in German focus, evolving alongside European energy security 
debates. Hence the priority for security of energy supplies during Angela Merkel’s first 
term was still relatively low compared to the interest towards the nuclear debate and 
energy efficiency based on renewables (Duffield, 2009: 4285). Energy security was not 
transferred to the level of national security and was ‘clearly framed in commercial 
rather than strategic terms’ (Rohrkasten and Westphal, 2014: 50). The reasons why 
energy security conception was not deeply rooted in geopolitics and foreign policy 
stance are explained below.  
In the aftermath of the first noticeable energy crisis of 2006 the first attempts were 
undertaken to place the security of energy supplies onto the German national security 
agenda. The German Government initiated a national summit in April 2006 to discuss 
the future of German energy policy, dealing specifically with energy efficiency and 
energy diversification, with attention to the nuclear debate and the perspectives of the 
LNG terminal remaining a top priority (Umbach, 2008). In May 2008 energy was 
included into the draft concept for ‘A Security Strategy for Germany’ developed by the 
parliamentary group of CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU), which 
encompassed the 5 main security areas of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, energy and 
pipeline security, climate change and conflict prevention and resolution (CDU/CSU 
Parliamentary Group, 2008). Nevertheless, the initiative was criticised by mainly left-
wing opposition as it suggested allowing using military forces inside Germany in case 
of terrorist attacks, as well as ‘diminish the role of the Bundestag and to unduly 
centralise foreign and security policy making inside the Chancellery’ (Gartzke, 2008). A 
large proportion of the lack of political support towards the National Strategy was 
grounded in historical legacies and mentioned military security issues, like the 
deployment of the German army at home or sending German troops to Kosovo and 
Afghanistan under NATO operations. Political elites aimed to avoid sending any wrong 
messages about physical threats, the reinforcement of German national security 
interests or re-establishing a strong state security identity (Interview 19), as Germany is 
a soft-power par excellence. Hitherto, Germany is one of a few EU MSs that still does 
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not have a traditional state-centric national security framework or normalised and 
codified foreign and security policy. 
As a result of the rejection of the National Security Strategy, made on domestic and 
international political grounds, energy security was neglected as a part of the whole 
national security package, therefore being under-represented in broader German 
energy interests. Current reflection on the changing energy environment and global 
energy threats such as growing energy demand and import dependence, bottlenecks, 
resource conflicts and energy price hikes were mentioned in the draft of the National 
Security Strategy. German national energy security challenges like ‘dependence on 
energy and raw materials as well as a secure supply infrastructure’ presenting 
‘additional risk factors’ (CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, 2008: 5), which had no 
chance of being delivered and acted upon adequately. The advantages of the National 
Security Strategy could have been a comprehensive template for Germany to define 
country’s national energy priorities and render tools for responding to future external 
and internal energy security challenges (e.g. possible supply disruptions or re-
orientation of energy imports)77. Hence, with the complete rejection of such a strategy 
the German message was clear – the country refused to associate energy security with 
other foreign policy interests directed against Russia, leaving energy in the economic 
realm.  
Despite extensive and potentially increasing import dependence on Russian fossil fuels 
during the 2000s, German political perceptions made no direct correlation between 
energy insecurity (including the fears of interrupting gas supplies) and the Russian 
energy threat. BMWi official sources consider possible fears of gas over-dependence 
on Russia to be very extreme and ungrounded as ‘no country will not put itself in a 
more vulnerable position than it can afford’ to cope with (Interview 13). BMWi in Berlin 
calls growing dependence on energy imports a ‘phenomenon’ to be dealt within the 
realm of normal politics rather than a ‘threat’ requiring extreme actions, pointing 
towards the central importance of  ‘stable, long-term ties with our energy suppliers’ 
(The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany, 2012: 49-50). 
Unlike other EU MSs, Germany has ‘complacency and undue optimism’ about its 
energy supply security situation (Duffield, 2009: 4290). German security of energy 
supply is reached by a geographically diversified gas supply basket and a ‘high degree 
of infrastructure reliability, including the diversification of supply routes and substantial 
storage capacity’. It is supplemented with the recently developed ability of organising 
gas ‘reverse flow’ at the borders with other countries in case of emergency (IEA, 2012: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 This version of the Strategy was not very different from the British or French versions.  
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24).  Furthermore, the Federal Network Agency (2013) noted that Germany has a very 
high security of gas supplies according to the System Average Interruption Duration 
Index, calculating the average gas supply interruption time per country-consumer. This 
indicates the high quality of German gas networks and the reliability of underground 
storage capacities (Ibid. 2013).  
Neither high import dependence nor the cases of supply interruptions from Russia in 
2005-2006 significantly undermined German trust of Russian energy reliability. 
Goldthau (2008) assured that Germany’s restrained reaction on Russian energy 
diplomacy in the neighbouring countries of Belarus and Ukraine during the 2000s 
demonstrated the lack of grounded energy threat perceptions towards Russia. The 
Report by the German Government on the Oil and Gas Market Strategy adopted by the 
Federal Government on 5 November 2008 claimed the lack of security of supply 
shocks. The lack of energy security fears was elaborated in the opening of this report:  
We are faced with the challenge of keeping our supply and use of energy 
affordable, secure and environmentally friendly in the future. Despite 
certain risks, the energy supply is not yet threatened. Nor is there any 
danger to energy security in the medium term (2008).  
The same Report also reflected the lack of concerns within German energy industries, 
highlighting instead the stability and positive tone of energy relations with Russia: ‘With 
gas delivery contracts lasting up to 2030 and beyond, German firms have a secure 
foundation for deliveries in this field. In previous years, Russia has always proved to be 
a reliable supplier. This partnership must be expanded further’ (Federal Ministry for 
Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany, 2008). The idea of the Former German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder at the Conference at Columbia University in 2007, that 
‘Germany never had problems with supply integrity from Russia’ (Schroeder, 2007) 
was confirmed by similar views within the political elites (Interview 13; Interview 22). 
The opinions of political elites and public attitudes towards Russia’s energy supply 
reliability mostly coincided, resulting in treating Russia in a very tolerable way. Spanger 
and Zagorsky (2012: 221-222) referred to the German-Russian survey of 2008 held by 
the Levada Center and the Institute for Allensbach about public attitudes towards 
Russia. According to the opinion poll, 45% of respondents in Germany perceived 
Russia as a country for close cooperation, and in Russia 51% of respondents were 
ready to regard Germany to be the first in a range of partners.  
Whereas 2006 supply disruptions were treated like a matter of concern rather than an 
energy threat as such, the 2009 energy disruptions had a bigger impact on German 
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political elites’ perceptions, slightly aggravating German political discourse about 
Russia. The survey of political elites, members of Bundestag, journalists and think-tank 
foreign policy experts by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and the 
Centre for Discrete Mathematics and its Applications (DIMAP Group) in February 2009, 
revealed more critical results towards Russia and energy security. Only 8% of 
respondents regarded Russia as a ‘reliable partner’, 31% expressed opposition 
towards Russia and 60% view it as a self-interest led actor (2009: 12).  
However, the disruptions of Russian flow through Ukraine made little difference for 
Germany’s overall position and perceptions of energy industries about Russia, having 
relatively little impact on the German energy market (Antas and Gotkowska, 2009). 
Furthermore, the under-supplied gas volume was covered through the increased gas 
flow through the Yamal-Europe pipeline and other supplies from Norway. Likewise, the 
gas supply termination to eight EU MSs that took place in February 2012 due to 
overload of the Russian energy grid had little negative effect on German energy 
perceptions of Russia, even though it affected gas-fired power plants in the South of 
Germany. The termination created almost no alarmed discussion in Germany as 
supplies were compensated from UGS and additional supplies from Norway, the UK 
and the Netherlands, and good cooperation between international transmitting system 
operators (IEA, 2012: 24). It seems like emergency mechanisms finally started to work 
in the EU. 
Gas supply disruptions from Russia explicated two main issues in the German case: 
Firstly, the change in German attitudes towards other EU MSs, making a point in favour 
of expanding the pipeline interconnectedness in the EU. Germany became more wary 
and considerate to the concerns of other EU MSs, mainly under EU pressure for 
solidarity (see Section 7.2.2.).  
Secondly, energy crises emphasised the necessity for modernisation of dated 
infrastructure grids in Russia (Goldthau, 2008: 686; Umbach, 2008), which cannot 
always cope with the internal and external gas demand during the peak season. The 
Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up to 2020 (2003: 4)  mentioned a ‘high 
degree of wear of the main funds (more than 50 %) and remaining shortage of 
investment resources in the fuel and energy sectors (except for the oil industry) and 
their misallocation’ as threats to energy security. Gazprom’s monopolistic position in 
Russia, unclear energy regulations, and gas price dumping through subsidising 
Russian domestic sector provides no incentives to invest in existing infrastructure, 
upstream sector and new gas fields in Russia.  
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Thus, for Germany, supply disruptions from Russia can be only associated with 
insecurities about the resource scarcity and the technological rather than political 
inability of Russia to fulfil its long-term supply obligations. Taking into account Russian 
need for energy market modernisation, Germany occupies a very strong position in this 
symmetrically interdependent energy relationship, as Germany is the key provider of 
technological innovations and experience for modernising Russia’s economy, in return 
to stable energy import. Yet again, to deal with this sort of insecurity Germany expands 
technical cooperation with Russia, providing benefits for long-term energy cooperation, 
as opposed to politically constructing an energy threat around those issues.  
Deriving from the above, German energy insecurity is not a part of the national security 
discourse due to Germany’s historical legacies and the country’s political identification 
as a ‘civilian power’. That is why political underpinnings of factors like high energy 
import dependence on Russia and geopolitical possibilities of gas supply disruptions to 
Germany are excluded from economic conceptualisation of energy security of supply. 
 
7.4. German Energy Identity:  ‘German’ Europe or ‘European’ Germany?  
As in Poland’s case, Germany’s perceptions of Russia form through the process of 
countries’ interactions, during which the identity is shaped and reconstructed, 
consisting of the meanings which Germany attaches to the ‘self’ and external inter-
subjective understanding by ‘the other’ (Wendt and Friedman, 1995; Wendt, 1999). 
Since the previous three sections focused on German domestic and international 
energy interests, this section scrutinises the formation of German energy identity in the 
EU.  
As was highlighted in the Introduction to this chapter, the conception of German 
external energy identity derives from the country’s very strong position in the global 
economic and political system. Between 2004 and 2012 Germany made efforts to 
reinforce its international status through improving Trans-Atlantic relationships with the 
US from 2005 after the Iraq war, chairing the G8 from January 2007 and hosting the 
G8 summit in June 2007. Likewise, on the EU level Germany actively promoted 
European cooperation in CFSP, and provided the impetus to re-launch the European 
Constitutional Treaty by coming up with the ‘Berlin Declaration’ in 2007, designed to 
revive common European spirit after the failure to sign the Constitutional Treaty 78.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For more information see http://www.eu2007.de  
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However, the most visible economic prominence and decisiveness of German policy-
making took place during the global economic recession in 2008, when Germany 
played the paramount role in dealing with the lasting consequences of the Eurozone 
crisis through financial austerity measures and recovery procedures of some of the EU 
MSs79. Germany’s leadership position during the crisis in the EU was ‘accepted’ by the 
EU institutions and welcomed by the majority of EU MSs (Interview 5), even Germany's 
biggest critic, Poland. The Economist cited Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski 
who suggested Germany should ‘take over the leadership in the EU’. He stated ‘I will 
probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear 
German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity’ (E.L., 2011). Such 
recognition of German economic authority and decision-making power from Poland’s 
senior officials reveals expectations and indications of trust, even from those countries 
that have not suffered the economic crisis as much. Admittedly, from the previous 
chapter, Poland’s approval of Germany's financial and economic stance does not 
correlate with hostility towards German energy policies.  
Similar influential trends in leadership can be observed in German energy policy. 
During 2007-2008, when the EU has been actively trying to pursue the establishment 
of the external energy security policy, focusing on the centralisation of the external 
energy competences in Brussels and having a specific focus on foreign policy (Youngs, 
2009: 27), Germany managed to ‘deviate’ the European energy security course into 
environmental and energy efficiency dimensions. Thus, the country launched a range 
of European energy and climate change initiatives during German Presidency of the 
EU Council in the first half of 2007, when EU binding energy efficiency ‘20-20-20’ 
targets and the Energy Action Plan aiming for the development of an external energy 
policy for 2007-2009, were adopted (Council of the European Union, 2007; Germany 
2007- Presidency in the EU Webpage, 2007).  
In addition, during German Presidency of the EU Council in 2007 the progress and 
founding problems of the ‘Priority Interconnection Plan’ that evaluates essential 
pipelines for EU’s internal energy market were thoroughly examined under German 
supervision (Germany 2007- Presidency in the EU Webpage, 2007). Germany's 
prominent advocacy for enhancing energy security through innovations and domestic 
renewable energy have become the adopted energy trends for the rest of the EU for 
the next decades (Federal Ministry of Defence of Germany, 2006; Klinke, 2011). The 
earlier mentioned German controversial decision about the nuclear phase out had an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 For more information how the bigger-picture perspective such as the  political climate, timing 
and circumstantial realities influence agenda setting processes and decision-making, that 
eventually affect the image of the country see Kingdon, J. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives and 
Public Policies. London: Longman. 
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‘echo-effect’ on energy policies in other EU MSs, putting strains on mutually shared 
electricity networks.  
German opinion is influential when it comes to reminding the EU that the Union does 
not have many competences to dictate energy policies of EU MSs. Germany's 
authoritative voice is more likely to block or modify decisions and processes of the EU 
energy legislation. The influence of Germany’s internal energy interest in the EU can 
be shown by the following examples. Firstly, according to German Permanent 
Representation in the EU (Interview 20), Germany asked for the ‘specific wording’ in 
the Council Conclusions in November 2011 about the competences of the MS and the 
EU when it comes to international bilateral agreements (Council of the European Union, 
2011). The exception that empowered the EU Commission to negotiate the Trans-
Caspian pipeline project ‘should not be the role model for other international projects’ 
(Interview 20). Germany opposed EU normative approach in the energy field and its 
attempts to generalise its energy policy towards other countries, recognising the 
specific context to each individual situation or energy project. Accordingly, during the 
negotiation of the Council Conclusions dated by 24 October 2011 under the Polish 
Presidency Germany reacted negatively on the suggested chapter about the energy 
infrastructure. The initial version of the Conclusions named priority regions with exact 
corridors (like Eastern corridor, South-Eastern corridor or the Mediterranean corridor), 
while Germany insisted on avoiding labelling energy corridors in terms of specific 
routes. As was admitted by the German Permanent Representation in the EU, this 
‘prejudged the infrastructure package with specific names’ and could potentially 
exclude alternative energy routes (Interview 20).  
The IEA started its Energy Policies of IEA Countries Review about Germany in 2007 
(IEA, 2007), highlighting Germany’s prominent energy position, stating:   
Only a handful of countries can have as dramatic impact on global energy 
policy as Germany. Its large size and strategic position within Europe give 
it great importance in the economic region and, by extension, the world. It 
is, therefore, vital that the country have sound energy policies and strong 
energy market design (IEA, 2007). 
In the light of having one of the most liberalised, relatively de-regulated and responsive 
energy markets in the EU and a growing strong economy, the position of the country 
has become consistently more powerful and stable, attracting many foreign investors 
(Dhaka, 2009). German energy companies are widely represented on the EU energy 
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market and play a paramount role in preserving energy security of supplies (as the 
example of the 2009 crisis has demonstrated).  
To a considerable extent, since 2004 Germany has turned into an economic locomotive, 
a ‘hegemon’ (Bulmer and Paterson, 2013) and an energy pioneer in the promotion of 
energy efficiency, renewable energy utilisation and climate change protection on a 
regional and pan-European scale. In the European Foreign Policy Scorecard (2011: 17) 
it was referred to as an ‘emerged superpower’ and a ‘hegemon’ within the EU with 
Chancellor Angela Merkel being the ‘head of the one real global economy in Europe’ 
(The Telegraph, 2011). Angela Merkel was placed by Forbes (Ewalt, 2012) in the top 
three of the ‘world’s most powerful people’ in 2011 and 2012 (unsurprisingly, together 
with the Russian President Vladimir Putin). Occupying a rather stable and significant 
position within the EU, Germany consolidated its presence in EU institutions with the 
appointment of a German EU Commissioner for Energy Gunther Oettinger in 2010 and 
the appointment of a German MEP Schulz as the President of the European 
Parliament since January 2012.  
Germany’s occupying of important positions in EU institutions, heading major policy-
making events in the EU and the world, and German political leadership during the 
euro-zone crisis, created a clichéd external image of a ‘German Europe’ (Westerwelle, 
2012; Beck, 2013). The general phenomenon of the spread of Germany’s economic, 
political and energy influence can be attributed to the new meaning of the aged 
concept of the ‘Germanisation’. The ‘Germanisation of Europe’ resonates with the 
historical phenomenon of forceful imposition of German culture and language upon 
Poles and Czechs that has generated some negative connotations from correlating 
with intolerable supremacy and hegemony. However, it would be short-sighted to 
regard Germany’s emerging leadership identity in the EU as being unconditionally and 
indubitably accepted, approved or supported as, in fact, it creates intrinsic 
contradictions in the EU. Even though German economic superiority over the rest of 
the EU MSs is tolerated in Brussels, its energy stance causes many contradictions, 
disputes and misunderstanding as not all the EU countries want to see a Germany-
driven Europe.  
There already exist alarms about current domination and strengthening of the German 
energy identity in the EU (Stern, 2008), that ‘German dynamism threatened the political 
independence and economic well-beings of its neighbours’ (Behr and Helwig, 2012: 3). 
Common perception about Germany in the EU, mainly among the CEE MSs, is that it 
plays according to its own rules, and hampers the spirit of solidarity by making 
individual energy deals with Russia. According to Dhaka (2009: 283) ‘the wider EU 
253 
 
community sees Germany as straying in search of self-interest as the EU fights 
Russia’s monopoly over natural gas supplies’. Discouraging a ‘speaking in one voice 
approach’ has become synonymous with German energy policies towards Russia, that 
has been actively referred to by Poland and other CEE countries. That is why 
antagonism against German energy actions exists in the EU, treating it as ‘an advocate 
of Russian interests in Europe’ (Adomeit, 2012: 4). Roth defined ‘Germany’s increasing 
dependence on Russia as a key obstacle against a more assertive EU policy affecting 
Moscow’s interests in the former Soviet Union beyond the realm of energy’ (Roth, 2011: 
608). 
As covered earlier, Germany has a reputation in Europe for having an inconsistent 
energy strategy and for prioritising its individual energy interests over the Union’s goals 
(Stern, 2008). German dominance creates an imbalance in EU common policy and 
leads to the fragmentation of the Union, as small groups of member states tend to form 
regional economic alliances and coalitions to counterbalance German power (Vaisse 
and Kundnani, 2011: 18). Thus, calling for the ‘European Germany’ rather than 
‘German Europe’, some academics regard it essential to restrain German economic 
and political domination in the EU and its narrow self-interests (Stern, 2008; Behr and 
Helwig, 2012).  
The mistrust of the EU institutions towards German energy policies can derive not only 
from its particular energy policy-making, but from Germany’s extreme over-
protectiveness of its energy market. The suggestion of the EU Commission to increase 
the transparency among MSs and to provide energy security and internal market rules 
was not easily accepted in Germany. While in the making, Germany revealed some 
reservations about Decision No 994/2012/EU to establish the Information Exchange 
Mechanism in the field of energy. Some German officials, including the German 
Permanent Representation in Brussels, produced considerable concerns about 
revealing the information about previously made inter-governmental energy 
agreements to the European Commission, as it might uncover some commercially 
sensitive information of the parties involved (Interview 20). German concerns were 
satisfied with Article 3 of the Decision, which stated that the MS should provide the 
information about the IGAs only and ‘that obligation shall not apply in respect of 
agreements between commercial entities’ (European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2012: 15). This indicates that Germany pursues investor-oriented 
energy diplomacy, trying to protect companies’ contractual energy interests. 
Noteworthy it proved hard for the IEA to find reliable data and factual information about 
German gas contracts and energy flows (IEA, 2007) as there is no consistent German 
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gas market national data base. Despite the fact that Germany’s grid operators are 
legally unbundled network from supply operations (according to the Energy Industry 
Act, which entered into force in July 2005) and should release information about 
supplies under certain circumstances, only information about transit contracts of gas 
flow from Norway through Germany to Italy was available to public access in 2007 (IEA, 
2007). One of the reasons for this is that ‘physical swaps often occur in Germany, 
meaning that the gas does not always flow physically along the contractual path’ (ibid.: 
96) and contracts often are ‘not for a specific volume but for the buyer’s total demand’ 
(Lohmann, 2006: 20). Such gas-to-gas competition makes it difficult for the EU to 
monitor the exact gas supply volumes passing through the trading hubs, undermining 
the transparency of these gas trading hubs.  
This situation implies uncertainty, as Germany is a large energy consumer in the EU. 
The protective approach can explain Germany’s opposition and criticism towards the 
Commission’s proposal to implement the Information Exchange Mechanism, releasing 
information about agreements with third countries (Interview 20). The consequent 
vicious circle triggers trepidations within the EU (especially the EU Commission) 
towards Germany: by wanting to provide security for investors and gas trade parties, 
Germany creates security concerns at the EU bureaucratic and regulatory level, 
fragmenting EU energy policy (Oettinger 2011). In this respect the gas supply situation 
is more predictable and known in Poland, as wholesale trade is organised through 
long-term bilateral agreements, and there is no gas trading on exchanges or through 
hubs yet.   
In contrast to the external European perceptions of dominating German interests and 
energy identity, Germany’s national identity has been characterised by the ambiguity of 
its strategic foreign policy interests after the long-term historical loss of political weight 
(Mey, 2004: 68). Germany’s self-identity is limited to being strictly a civilian power 
(Maull, 2006: 1; Federal Ministry of Defence of Germany, 2006) or as Katzenstein calls 
it ‘a teamed power’ (1996), assuring stable and ‘conflict-free existence’ with other 
countries (Mey, 2004: 68). Hitherto, the country uses trade soft-power means to tackle 
security and economic threats, and strongly determines its image in Europe. German 
senior energy expert from the influential German think-tank DGAP, emphasised that 
‘Germany is at first an economic power, and our political elites are socialised in that’ 
(Interview 19).  
German officials do not aspire to have a dominant position and be the central political 
authority in Europe, but rather prefer being a vigorous economic member in the EU and 
multilateral society in general. This idea of multilateral German identity as a foreign 
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policy actor is both a guide for action and causal set of beliefs. Rejecting the idea of 
German domination in Europe, the former Foreign Minister of Germany Guido 
Westerwelle in his interview with Der Spiegel in 2012, emphasised the lack of desire to 
create a German Europe, but instead a European Germany (Westerwelle, 2012). In the 
interviews with the author, German political elites also rejected the internal identity of 
Germany being only a self-interest seeking actor, trying to dominate energy decision-
making in the EU (Interview 18; Interview 19; interview 21). Reluctance about taking 
the lead in energy external relations of the EU was underlined in historical terms by 
experts from DGAP (Interview 19) and within the Energy Department in BMWi during 
interviews with the author (Interview 13).  
For Russia, Germany has always been the main partner, importer of gas in the EU and 
final consumer. The completion of the Nord Stream reinforced Germany’s position as 
the ‘transiting state’ or unofficial re-distributor for Russian gas to other EU MSs, via the 
interconnectors. According to Meister (2014: 4), ‘Gazprom is trying to develop 
Germany as the northern hub for its export infrastructure to other EU member states’. 
This idea was largely advocated by Vladimir Putin since 2006 (Socor, 2014). Deriving 
from the opinions of the interviewees, Russia encourages Germany to be a ‘mediator in 
gas supplies’ in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (Interview 13; Interview 18). Hence, 
Germany resists the idea of being the main gas re-distributor. The Official source from 
the Energy Department in BMWi was quite explicit about the reluctance of Germany to 
be ‘the energy hub of Europe’ by claiming ‘We don’t mind gas being transported 
through us but we do not need being a key decision-maker in this area’ (Interview 13). 
Undeniably, being a leader or even an intermediary of EU external energy policy 
imposes enormous responsibility that in the case of a supply failure from Russia, 
Germany can be easily blamed for. German unwillingness to be a ‘scapegoat’ due to 
the ineffectiveness of the EU energy market and poor pan-European responsiveness to 
external energy challenges is understandable. At the same time, it appears to be a 
vicious circle as the energy competences of the EU institutional levels are very 
restricted by the shared energy competences with the EU MSs. Behr and Helwig (2012) 
explain German reluctance for being the ‘European leader’ through its weakness and 
insecurities. The authors list numerous structural explanations for this, such as 
‘Germany’s post-war institutions, strategic culture and economic principles’ and Angela 
Merkel’s short-term problem-solving approach that does not encompass the EU’s 
vision, including energy policies (Behr and Helwig, 2012: 11). Hence, calling it a 
weakness as such does not match with German actual presence on the EU arena, 
instead those can be the constraining factors of German foreign and energy policy. 
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In summary, there are discrepancies between the internal and external perceptions of 
Germany's energy role in Europe. The external perceptions of Germany were of overly 
pronounced and self-centred energy interests, and domination of energy policies in the 
EU, resulting in it being perceived as the ultimate driver for energy efficiency policy and 
the unofficial leader in EU decision-making. Germany felt rather confident in pursuing 
unilateral energy policies and having multi-dimensional bilateral energy relations with 
Russia, which often went against the emerging EU energy security values and 
collective approaches of dealing with external energy threats, creating a conflict of 
energy interests in the EU, and undermining cohesion in EU energy actorness.  
 
7.5. Conclusion 
Similar to Poland’s case study analysis, the German case study r identified a variety of 
reasons for Germany’s energy insecurity, which originate from the following dimensions: 
the domestic structure of German energy market; the EU energy solidarity and gas 
market liberalisation programme; and energy relations with Russia. However, unlike 
with the Polish case, German energy security policy is underpinned by economic 
guiding principles, which are not undermined by politicisation of energy security and 
political constructions of threats, hence have their own challenges.  
The first guiding principle is the belief that the foreign policy and political level should 
be insulated from gas business relations and the energy market. This persuasion 
comes not only from historical legacies of Germany during the last century of being a 
‘civilian power’, but also from the pre-existent structure of Germany’s energy market. 
The analysis of the industry-operated energy market in Germany indicated that 
Germany considers its energy companies as providers of energy security of supply. 
Despite being de-regulated and compliant with the liberalisation packages of the EU, 
the German market is organised according to private profit-oriented and business-
minded interests of energy giants that are obliged to maintain the security of gas 
supplies. Thus if the increase of energy supplies and energy cooperation with Russia 
was regarded as economically viable, Germany facilitated the construction of the Nord 
Stream pipeline, without being undermined by the political constructions of threats of 
increasing energy dependence or the possibility of supply disruptions. Building German 
energy relationships with other countries on the basis of inter-company contracts rather 
than IGAs facilitated by the state, helps to avoid politicisation and unnecessary political 
involvement in energy relations. 
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However, even though energy industries are in control of organising their gas trading 
relationships and maintaining energy security of supplies, it is the Federal Government 
that imposes nuclear phase-out and renewable usage goals on the companies. Thus, 
the concerns about having structural energy challenges and negative externalities of 
the domestic decision-making in Germany are not necessarily generated externally, but 
also domestically.  
The second guiding principle of German energy security is the priority of its national 
energy interests, followed by the European community principle. While the EU adheres 
to the logic of energy security defined as non-Russian energy supply diversification of 
routes and sources, Germany diversifies its domestic energy resources into different 
types. The country has taken many significant steps to restructure Germany’s domestic 
energy portfolio by reducing coal usage, a nuclear exit, and actively utilising 
renewables in energy production. However, any major restructuring of the energy 
sector is not risk-free, but comes with a variety of negative externalities for environment, 
local energy companies, the public sector and business investors. Germany has not 
chosen the easiest and the shortest way to enhance its energy security in developing 
its national energy mix differently from other EU MSs, which in itself is an indication of 
decisiveness and putting national interests first. 
While the EU aims to commit other EU MSs to the mutually shared internal principle of 
energy solidarity in the process of gas market opening and liberalisation, the above 
European energy priorities are only formally accepted and acted upon in Germany. The 
country resists being ‘locked in’ between European ideas of diversification of non-
Russian routes and sources and the EU binding ‘20-20-20’ environmental targets (a 
large part of which was contributed by Germany itself). Hence, German political elites 
struggle to fully comprehend the idea of European solidarity in both internal and 
external energy domains, taking full advantage of the energy sovereignties of the EU 
MSs engraved in the Lisbon Treaty.  
The last guiding principle is that energy threat perceptions are not dictated by high 
import dependence on the Russian gas or fears of its unpredictable energy supply 
disruptions from Russia as a political actor. Instead, Germany’s threat perceptions are 
more technical and economic in nature, based on slow energy market modernisation in 
Russia and the influence of external energy constraining environment and international 
energy price hikes. To minimise its energy supply risks, Germany increases their 
interdependence by asset swap policies and building new pipelines, builds a reliable 
strategic partnership with Russia on company and state levels, and engages the key 
supplier politically and economically, rather than isolating on politically constructed 
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grounds. Germany is involved in deepening and widening its ‘strategic partnership’ with 
Russia on various levels, building interaction on business principles and economic 
interests, which are segregated from the foreign policy realm. The ‘side effect’ of such 
policies is that some of the more energy vulnerable members of the EU perceive such 
exclusive bilateral engagement with Russia as an energy threat and a violation of 
solidarity and energy coherence of the EU. This brings the chapter to the logical 
conclusion about the nature of Germany’s energy actorness and its effects. 
The German case study unveiled the differences in perceptions between Germany’s 
internal and external energy identity and mapped out certain conceptual implications. 
The formation of German identity as an energy actor is controversial and not prejudice 
free, stemming from the pre-existing material developments in this country during the 
last century. Being generally treated as a ‘hegemon’ of the EU (Bulmer and Paterson, 
2013) and the post-Eurozone crisis leader, Germany transmits its pro-active and 
national interest driven actorness into the energy dimension, facilitating energy 
efficiency and having overly pronounced interests in the EU external and internal 
energy policies. Such perceptions exist not only inside the EU, but also in Russia, 
which is eager to have Germany as an energy hub of Europe and a partner that is easy 
to have bilateral energy deals with, bypassing the bureaucracy and legislative 
interference of Brussels. Hence, external perceptions seemed to contrast with the 
domestic German self-conceptualisation as a non-confrontational team-player in the 
European family, complying with the solidarity principle more in practice than on paper 
(as the 2009 gas crises exposed) and rejecting the idea of a ‘German Europe’ 
(Westerwelle, 2012). 
Basing the analysis on the constructivist premises about mutual influence of the 
internal and external identities (Wendt, 1992), it was shown that external identity 
formation had a partial ‘constitutive effect’ on Germany (De Buitrago, 2012: XV)). It 
empowered Germany to become a ‘reluctant leader’ in the EU that is ‘in denial about its 
power’ (Vaisse and Kundnani, 2011: 17), but still actively using it. In this case, the 
external perception of German power overrides German self-identity, impacting on the 
country’s critical self-reflection and affecting German behaviour (Wendt, 1992; 1999; 
Hopf, 2002). As a result, energy self-conceptualisation of German actorness presents a 
controversy between a desire to unanimously pursue its individual energy interests, 
have bilateral deals with Russia and being a leader, and at the same time be a 
neighbour-oriented team player to other EU MSs, which is not burdened by the 
responsibility of sole energy decision maker. Thus, regardless of what states make of 




However, Germany’s external energy identity is often viewed by some EU MSs as 
dominating and threatening, producing a variety of negative perceptions related to 
violating commonly shared attempts for energy security. Not always can its energy 
policies deliver a positive and mutually beneficial result for all the EU MSs concerned 
(as the case of the Nord Stream illustrated, when Poland was left out of the project that 
undermined its energy security). Under pressure from the CEE countries, voices from 
the EU Commission and other EU Institutions raise the question about a more 
constrained German individualism and deeper subordination to commonly shared 
European energy interests and solidarity.  
The mismatch of the internal and external energy identity of Germany not only allowed 
explanation of why Germany’s energy interests are perceived differently in Germany 
than in the rest of the EU. It also affected EU-Russia energy relations in the broader 
sense, by compromising European attempts to deal with external energy challenges as 
a united front. Therefore, the chapter concludes that for other EU MSs, like Poland, 
Germany’s self-driven and independent energy actorness undermines trust and creates 
a threatening environment, compared to when Germany is solidarity-driven and 
considerate actor. The example with the Nord Stream illustrates that Germany exposed 
Poland to an unnecessary vulnerable situation, where Russia can exploit Poland’s 
dependence in their favour. Furthermore the nuclear phase-out put additional tension 
on Polish electricity networks that are connected with other EU countries. On the other 
hand, having a positive history of energy relations with Russia and acting as a leader 
and a driving force on behalf of the EU, Germany facilitates a threat-free environment, 
contributing to treating Russia as a strategic partner and a ‘friend’ (Wendt, 1999: 259-
266) and diminishing the existing energy tensions within the EU as a whole.  
As a result of the conducted research, there is plentiful evidence that Germany, is more 
successful in building pragmatic energy relations and strategic partnership with its key 
gas supplier than Poland or the EU in general. Thus, through building a threat-free 
environment in relations with Russia (not even being secured with the IGAs but 
business contracts), Germany managed to secure its gas supply position in a more 
stable and effective way than the EU. The analysis provides an answer to the third 
research sub-question about the role of German identity as an energy actor on threat 
perceptions within the EU and in relations with Russia.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusions 
The research illustrated that energy security and the nature of related threat 
perceptions are still largely underexplored in the security studies literature, and even 
less so in constructivist approaches to IR. Predicating on selected realist tenets and the 
Copenhagen School of Security Studies, European threat perceptions were analysed 
mainly through the lenses of constructivism. Through utilising the ideational dimension 
of interests and identities and the previous history of inter-state energy interactions as 
determinants of state behaviour and ingredients for the creation of energy threats, the 
thesis was able to disclose how and why the energy threat perceptions towards Russia 
were constructed.  
This final chapter aims to summarise the research findings and particular aspects of 
the key thesis arguments through revisiting the research questions. The main research 
findings are closely related to initial observations, which facilitated the analysis of the 
EU-Russia energy security topic. However, the initial observations that EU-Russia 
energy relations are undermined by inherent energy confrontations and threat 
perceptions of the EU and its MSs, which are externally posed by Russian assertive 
foreign energy policy and EU’s high import dependence, proved to be incomplete and 
over-simplified. Therefore, linking the research questions with the key findings of this 
thesis will not only adjust the initial research assumptions, but will provide a conceptual 
contribution to a more intricate understanding of the EU-Russia energy security 
relationships and advance the debate on threat perceptions through problematising 
their constructed nature. In addition, this section will re-emphasise the theoretical value 
and original contribution of the research findings, finishing with delineating the 
opportunities for future research agenda.  
 
8.1. Key Research Findings and Revisiting the Research Questions 
The outline of this thesis was structured around broad themes, representing one 
primary and three secondary research questions, which were posed in the Introduction 
within Chapter 1. In brief, the analysis was focused on comprehending the differences 
in threat perceptions and energy security threats among the EU MSs and their 
implications for EU energy security policy and relations with Russia (in response to the 
primary research question). In order to answer it, the thesis had to investigate (in 
response to the three secondary research questions):  
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1) Why Russia has been perceived as a concern for European energy security by 
looking at the main factors contributing to the impasse in EU-Russia energy relations 
between 2004 and 2012;  
2) Under which circumstances Germany and Poland perceived Russia as an energy 
threat by exploring the conditions and origins of their domestic perception-based 
energy policies and their bilateral interactions with Russia; 
3) In what way Germany’s and Poland’s perceptions of energy security had an adverse 
impact on EU energy actorness and its gas relations with Russia by analysing energy 
identities of those two cases.  
As a part of understanding the existence of variations in meanings that Poland and 
Germany attach to energy security and threats (posed by the primary research 
question), the thesis had to address the importance of external conditions (such as 
geographic location and geopolitical disposition, national identity and sovereign 
interests, energy source endowment, material energy dependence, and Russian 
energy supply and price politics) and pre-existent historical legacies of interactions with 
Russia in energy and foreign-policy arenas. They provide essential material 
foundations and explain the basic causes for differences in perception-driven behaviour, 
and largely complement socially constructed and often politicised grounds for countries’ 
threat perceptions (which was the main focus of this research).  
In providing an answer to the first research sub-question, the analysis of Russia’s 
strong energy foreign policy stance and its superpower energy identity, and weak and 
incoherent EU energy actorness and conflicting positions between Russia and the EU 
about a range of issues (like gas supply security, asymmetric energy interdependence, 
EU energy supply diversification and EU energy market restructuring), explicated three 
key undermining factors in EU-Russia energy relations. The thesis argued that it is not 
only Russian energy behaviour (which does not have to be direct or intentional against 
the EU MSs to pose an energy threat, as the example with gas supply disruptions of 
2006 and 2009 demonstrated), and self-explanatory EU-Russia differences in energy 
market structures and approaches to energy security, that present external energy 
threats to European energy security. It was found that the EU’s energy security is 
undermined by the weakness and incoherence of the EU’s energy actorness in 
pursuing internal and external energy policies, which is largely compromised by the 
sovereign energy interests of its EU MSs and countries’ reluctance to transfer their 
individual energy competences to the supranational EU level (according to the Article 
194 in the Lisbon Treaty). Since the objective of this research was not to illustrate 
which factor is dominating the EU’s threat perceptions, the thesis concludes that EU 
energy insecurity is as much undermined by external threats (mainly Russia’s 
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international energy stance) as by internally-created energy vulnerabilities of the EU 
itself and individual member states (which modifies the first initial research observation). 
The above analysis led the research project to address the second research sub-
question about the role of conditions and origins of Polish and German energy 
insecurity in triggering threat perceptions. As with the EU, it is vital to acknowledge the 
impact of pre-existing external factors (high import dependence on gas supplies, 
natural resource endowment, alternatives for the supply diversification, etc.) and 
countries’ previous interactions with Russia on the development of their threat 
perceptions. For instance, stemming from high energy import dependence in the EU 
MSs, it was found that the level of energy import dependence matters much less than 
the source of gas. High energy import dependence is not a security issue as such, 
unless it is a single source dependence and this source is Russia. In general, Russia’s 
assertive energy policy approach to the transiting states, involving supply disruptions 
and price policies, played a determining role in the development of threat perceptions 
in the EU MSs.  
However, the externally imposed energy insecurities have different meanings for 
Poland and Germany, though both are gas import dependent. Thus, for Poland energy 
supply security is a matter of national security, and represents an important economic 
and political threat associated with Russia. Based on the history of supply contract 
renegotiations with its main gas supplier and the examples of gas supply disruptions in 
2006 and 2009, Poland’s projected concerns were that Gazprom abuses its 
monopolistic position over the Polish energy market, pricing gas higher than it should 
be, and might use gas supply disruption as a tool of political pressure in cases of 
energy disagreements. In contrast to Polish politically-driven attitudes, for Germany 
energy supply threats are market-related and a matter of priority of economic interests. 
Germany claimed that Russia poses no physical security threat, treating volatility of gas 
prices as the major economic factor defining its energy uncertainties. If price and 
supply security depend on the political stance of Russian energy policies, then for 
Poland and Germany much depends on the positive mode of previous and current 
interactions with Russia, as one of the two key constructivist principles for analysing 
threat perceptions. 
In addition to the Russian external factor, Poland’s and Germany’s threat perceptions 
are conditioned by the pressure to comply with the EU’s evolving regulatory market 
changes, including the unbundling principle, promoting certain interconnectors, 
competitiveness and market opening and ‘20-20-20’ environmental targets. Being 
bound to comply with the above provisions had a dual impact in respect of energy 
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security. On the one hand, the long term benefits of market opening, enhancing 
competition by providing third party access to pipelines, is aimed to enhance EU MSs’ 
energy security. On the other hand, in the short run, this seemed to put additional 
financial and political pressure on countries’ domestic energy markets, which 
temporarily made their energy bargaining position with Russia vulnerable due to the 
period of adjustment in their regulatory frameworks and the need to commensurate 
energy interests of various actors in Poland and Germany.  
Further analysis of countries’ internal factors and their impact on energy security 
trepidations was instigated by the constructivist premises of Hopf (2002), Checkel 
(2006), and Alons (2007) and derived from the analysis of EU energy actorness 
regarding the determining role of the EU MSs in European perception-based policies. 
The role of domestic structures of the EU MSs’ energy markets, the nature of state-
corporate relations, and energy diversification choices, should not be treated as 
unproblematic and undeserving of consideration in evaluating threat perceptions in 
Poland and Germany. Accounting for variations in the material structure and 
operational nature of energy market conditions in Poland and Germany, both countries 
responded differently to the same energy security challenges 80 . For instance, 
Germany’s relatively independent industry-led market approach to energy security and 
energy relations with Russia (which are based on the commercial contracts rather than 
IGAs), and a more balanced diversification of the energy supply basket, produced very 
little political concern about the Russian energy threat. The fact that Germany 
managed to break through domestic resistance to a rather expensive long-term energy 
efficiency policy, involving the utilisation of renewables and the phasing out of nuclear 
energy, contributed greatly to its energy security. Whereas Poland, having a lack of 
political support from its authorities combined with slow and weak governmental 
pressure on the key energy monopolist PGNiG to develop shale gas and the enormous 
amount of recently found gas reserves, is bound to suffer from external energy security 
challenges. Poland’s state-owned and state-operated domestic energy market allowed 
for politicisation of the energy security domain and relations with its gas supplier.  
Thus in attempts to hide its energy inefficiency due to uncompetitive practices and 
ineffective management, Poland chooses to portray Russia as a bigger energy threat 
than it is, while Germany does not tend to create the same political constructions and 
blame Russia for energy insecurity. This leads to the second modification of the initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Such challenges as the increased gas demand for scarce gas supplies in Europe, growing 
import dependence on external supplies, the EU’s pressure on MSs to liberalise EU MSs’ 
energy markets under the principle of solidarity, and Russia’s expanding monopolisation of its 
energy position and supply disruptions. 
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research observation about diverse energy security threat perceptions being internally 
socially constructed by the EU MSs themselves, often for political reasons and 
economic gains. As the findings revealed, regardless of having ‘real’ or exaggerated 
energy security concerns about Russia, Polish authorities and PGNiG were enabled to 
justify their rationale for making specific political choices. Those included making use of 
the EU Commission’s political support during the gas contract negotiations with 
Gazprom in 2010, relying on EU funds to develop an LNG terminal and organising the 
reverse flow from Germany, which could be beneficial not only in case of emergency 
supply halts from Russia but could also provide additional gas supplies that will be 
cheaper than direct supplies from Russia. As a result, it allowed Poland to enhance its 
external energy security position with relatively little financial losses and minimum 
political obligation. Whereas Germany, having pragmatic and de-politicised gas 
relations with Russia, invested in internally-focused and self-sufficient energy policy 
through developing renewable energy sources, as well as deepening its reliance on 
Russian gas through the Nord Stream project and developing energy partnership with 
Russia on the inter-company level. Thus, the research project demonstrated that 
intangible threat perceptions, which evolve around both material and socially 
constructed conditions, trigger substantial tangible energy policy results.  
Lastly, while tackling the third research sub-question about the role of Polish and 
German energy identities in the construction of threat perception, the thesis revealed 
incoherence in their internal and external energy identities. The initiated shift from a 
victim-like Polish energy stance to a solidarity facilitator and a proactive energy security 
promoter went relatively unnoticed by Germany. Regardless of the evolved mutual 
initiatives between Germany and Poland in 2011-2012, Germany still treats Poland as 
an emotive partner that manipulates its energy image, exploits its energy security 
vulnerability position and has a selective approach to EU energy solidarity. Whereas 
Poland, being influenced by collective memories and historical legacies, has 
apprehensions about Germany’s economic strength and political weight in EU decision-
making, rather than treating it as an equal player and energy security partner.  
Therefore, it is argued here that generating mutually threatening identities due to 
divergence of energy interests and policy goals, and the lack of a shared 
understanding of energy security challenges, creates threats between the EU MSs. 
This undermines the EU’s goal to build a ‘security community of states’, or as the 
European Commission referred to it in the Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament (2003), an ‘energy community’, where the understanding of 
external threats are commonly shared rather than triggered by the ‘in-group’ members 
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(Buzan and Waever, 2003: 46). In attempting to achieve this goal a variance of energy 
interests is not beneficial, as currently the energy interests of politically weaker states 
with less bargaining possibilities in expressing energy priorities both inside and outside 
the EU (like Poland) tend to be locked in with dominating and more powerful states 
(like Germany).  
The constructivist argument is that countries act according to the meanings they attach 
to energy and, thus, inter-subjectively shared interests and understandings of energy 
identities have transformative effects on inter-state relationships and reduce the 
anticipation of conflict and threat perceptions, as was confirmed by the empirical 
findings. German and Polish interest clashes during the early 2000s (which involved 
Poland’s blocking the PCA renegotiations, and boycotting the Nord Stream project, 
Germany’s initial lack of support for the Polish LNG terminal, Germany’s resistance to 
the Energy Information Sharing Mechanism, its unilateral nuclear phase-out decision 
and bilateral choice of dealing with Russia) and inconsistent energy identities, 
prevented the EU from having a unified energy approach to Russia and compromised 
EU’s energy solidarity. If there is no convergence of interests and acceptance of 
energy identities among the EU MSs, there can be no shared position on energy 
security on the EU supranational level. Changes in Germany’s energy identity to a 
‘reluctant leader’ with more pro-EU (rather than anti-Russia) energy priorities, and the 
decrease in Polish anti-Russian politicised energy discourse demonstrated evolving 
improvements in the relationships between Poland, Germany and Russia. Therefore, 
continuing to advance their energy interactions and bringing their energy interests and 
identities towards a common denominator will help to improve EU-Russia energy 
relations. 
In conclusion, based on answers to the main research questions and three sub-
questions, the key findings of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
The general argument of the thesis, answering the key research question, explains 
differences in threat perceptions and understandings of energy security among the EU 
MSs in terms of pre-existent material conditions and ideational factors, which have a 
detrimental impact on the coherence of EU energy policies towards Russia.  
1. The research findings related to the first research sub-question are: 
• Energy security of the EU is impeded externally by both Russian energy 
identity and international energy policies and by inherent EU-Russia differences 
in energy markets and geopolitical positions; and internally weakened by 




• EU MSs’ divergent stances on external energy security, diversification 
policies, a common energy market and the principle of solidarity seemed to 
undermine the coherence of the EU’s energy actorness, trigger an impasse in 
EU energy interactions with Russia and more importantly create unnecessary 
insecurities among the EU MSs.  
• Intangible and politicised constructions of threat perceptions of the EU MSs 
are causal triggers for certain perception-based tangible energy policies, which 
breach the idea of European internal and external solidarity and compromise 
positive energy relations with Russia.  
2. The research findings related to the second research sub-questions are: 
• Energy security of Poland and Germany is compromised by Russian energy 
policies, the EU’s requirements to create well-functioning common energy 
market, and is conditioned by countries’ domestic market structures, key energy 
actors and inefficient market-state relationships.  
• For Germany understanding of energy supply security is largely independent 
of the Russian foreign political factor and is economy based, whereas for 
Poland energy security is an integral part of the national security discourse with 
Russia being the key energy security de-stabiliser.  
• Having no commonly shared intersubjective conceptualisation of EU energy 
threats between Russia, the EU and among EU MSs creates grounds for 
misperceptions. It allows that conceptualisation of energy security is ‘what 
states make of it’ and provides opportunities for political elites from the EU MSs 
to manipulate energy security threats and sublimate the economic definition of 
energy security of supply with politicised meaning. Thus, threat perceptions are 
politically constructed, subjective and a matter of a political choice, rather than 
an objective reality. 
3. The research finding related to the third research sub-questions are: 
• During 2004-2012 the formation of Poland’s energy self-identity is confirmed 
to have dual features of a geopolitical victim and an EU’s energy solidarity 
advocate, depending on geopolitical situation in the world, Poland’s and 
economic circumstances and national interests at stake.  
• Discrepancies between Germany’s self-identification as an energy team-
player in the EU and external identification as a dominating leader had 
transformative effect on Germany’s emerging energy identity as a ‘reluctant 
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leader’ in the period under study, both within the EU, and in the EU’s relations 
with Russia. 
• The inter-subjective understanding of countries’ energy security is 
undermined by incoherence between internal and external energy identities of 
Poland and Germany, which prevents convergence of interests between the EU 
MSs (as interests and identity are mutually constitutive). This, in turn, creates 
diverse threat perceptions in the EU MSs and has negative implications for the 
EU’s common approach to Russia. 
 
8.2. Original Contribution of the Research  
Deriving from findings for the research questions in Section 8.1., the general research 
findings of this thesis provide grounds for presenting the original contribution of this 
research. The initial claim to originality, which emphasised the importance of analysing 
threat perceptions in the EU MSs case studies to provide enhanced understanding of 
EU-Russia energy security relations, will be elaborated on here based on the 
conclusions summarised above.  
8.2.1. Empirical Contribution to Conceptual Approaches of Energy 
Security and Threat Perceptions 
Expanding into economic, political and technological domains of IR and EU literature, 
the conceptualisation of energy security became all-encompassing ‘catch-all’ term and 
gained theoretical complexity, conceptual multi-dimensionality and ultimately 
encompassed a variety of diverse material and ideational meanings. After exploring an 
analytical account of energy security in the example of the EU and case studies of 
Poland and Germany, it was possible to argue that energy security and threat 
perceptions became valid concepts for analysing inter-state relationships only when:  
a) contextualised in specific commonly shared external energy circumstances (like 
challenges with physical supply security and price security caused by Russia),  
b) defined by particular international and domestic market conditions (such as 
asymmetric gas import dependence, growing reliance on Russian gas supply, and 
nature of the EU MSs’ domestic energy markets), and  
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c) constrained by the time frame of  2004-2012 (during which a range of energy 
security threatening events happened).  
Only after conducting the case study analysis and generating some primary data was it 
possible to distinguish which interpretations of energy threats are included or excluded 
in the list of energy security threats in Poland and Germany (see the section above). 
The comparative analysis of three important energy security threats in Poland and 
Germany (related EU’s solidarity, diversification and market liberalisation policies) has 
not been done before in a systematic way. 
The fieldwork findings indicated that energy security is more than just a simple market-
based issue, but is politically constructed. Even though the European definition of 
energy security of supply as ‘uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price’ (European Commission, 2006: 6; IEA, 2013b) is presented in clear 
economic terms, the political component of its meaning was utilised very differently by 
the EU MSs (as Section 8.1. summarised). While the majority of authors exploring EU-
Russia energy interactions mention the growing level of politicisation of energy security 
issues (De Jong and Van der Linder, 2008; Goldthau, 2008; Romanova, 2010; Casier, 
2011; Bohme, 2011), they overlooked the causes and implications of the EU MSs’ 
different perception-based policies in presenting energy as a security issue for general 
European energy security and relations with Russia.  
The analysis of the EU MSs’ energy threat perceptions filled in the conceptual gaps in 
the current realism-dominated materially-based literature by exploring the political 
construction of energy threats by the EU MSs and by contrasting a European 
conception of energy security with the meanings individual EU countries attach to it 
(which in itself is a research contribution). For instance, having no specification about 
the actors and reasoning behind the ‘uninterrupted’ supplies – by whom, how long for 
and on which grounds (for instance, technological maintenance, interrupted by the 
supplier or disrupted because of transit countries) – or a definitive explanation of the 
‘affordable’ price (that can vary from country to country), made the concept of energy 
security subjective and prone to be politically exploited and manipulated (the next 
Section 8.2.2. supports this contribution with related methodological observations).  
Thus by specifying the meanings of ‘energy security’ and applying threat perception 
data, the thesis has made a unique contribution theoretically and empirically, which 
allows to take academic debates on energy security forward. Poland represents an 
example of the confusion of non-energy foreign policy related issues with energy 
security. Having a relatively secure energy position (with large internal stocks of 
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conventional and unconventional gas, and building the first LNG terminal), a 
comparably low level of general energy import dependence and having not 
experienced significant supply interruptions from Russia compared to other CEE 
countries, Poland nevertheless made a conscious choice to frame energy security 
related to Russia based on political grounds. By contrast Germany, which is more 
energy import dependent (with no LNG terminals, but with internal focus on renewable 
energy resources) and having no overarching understanding of energy security on the 
national-level, made a decision to present energy as a solely market-based issue. 
Therefore, threat perceptions are created as a function of images that states produce 
(Casier, 2011). Those case-study empirical findings provide an enhanced 
understanding of how countries utilise theoretical conceptualisation of energy security 
differently and construct their energy policies around the chosen definition. This is 
something that constructivism has not considered before in exploring inter-state 
relations in energy sector, making those findings original.  
The lack of parity and commensurability in European threat identification created a 
situation where energy supply threats from Russia are perceived and responded to 
differently. The examples above provided an analytical insight on different 
securitisation practices in Poland and Germany as a reaction to similar energy 
challenges. They also affirmed the use of a constructivist theoretical framework to 
forward the energy security research agenda through contributing to the understanding 
of the nature of threats. By highlighting the subjectivity in choosing how to view energy 
security and energy threats, the thesis clarified the importance of the specific context, 
which leads to different attitudes towards threat assessments and securitisation 
practices.  
The above insights, in turn, represent the additional novelty of the theoretical approach 
to energy security. It lies in clarifying and crystallising the politically constructed nature 
of energy security and threat perceptions as drivers for a country’s particular policies, 
which become a powerful governmental tool to justify particular policy choices, pursue 
specific actions and reach certain political and economic goals. This can be applied not 
only to Poland and Germany, but can be analytically generalised to other EU MSs, and 
with due attention to specific contexts more widely generalised to any case of ‘energy 
security’. The political reaction to energy challenges is grounded in an understanding 
that to galvanise particular resources something should be presented as a threat. As of 
yet, no one has specifically analysed the underlying motivation and reasoning behind 
political constructions of energy issues on the level of the individual EU MSs in detail, 
and very few literature sources mention variability in the origin and means of political 
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manipulation of energy-related threat perceptions. For instance, in the Polish case only 
a few scholars such as Roth (2011) and Maltby (2014) observed the effects of Polish 
energy interests and identity on the EU level, hence, their findings are mainly focused 
on the Europeanisation of Polish energy policy rather than how Polish political 
constructs impact its relations with other EU MSs and with Russia. Similarly the 
German case demonstrates an analytical vacuum about how the quest for energy 
efficiency overrode energy security trepidations of other EU MSs and the EU’s three-
fold energy policy.  
In general, no systematic comparative research has been done to explore the diversity 
of the reactions of MSs on energy threatening situations, based on interests and 
identities vis-a-vis gas relations with Russia. The research findings about divergence of 
EU MSs interests provide an additional empirical contribution to the EU literature about 
the (in)coherence of the EU’s energy actorness and its energy security policies. This is 
a result of having looked for evidence of incoherent European energy security policy, 
since my analytical model and the choice of specific case studies enabled me to do so 
in a novel way. The novelty of the analytical tool kit employed here could enhance 
opportunities for analysing other context and actor specific energy security perceptions, 
going beyond the EU studies. The analytical generalisation would contribute to the 
wider IR debates about understanding the nature and conditions of energy security 
inter-state relations (under the influence of non-EU structural factors). For instance, in 
assessing the demand side of Arabian Gulf countries with non-EU consumers the 
insecurities would lie in the stability of demand or new routes or energy-intensive local 
use of their own energy resources. This provides a broader contribution to the IR 
dimension of energy security and gas relations.  
8.2.2. Methodological Impact on Understanding the EU Energy Security 
Politicisation 
The interpretative case study methodology used in the thesis allowed the study of a 
variety of divergent perspectives on how Poland and Germany shaped the meanings of 
energy security threats from 2004 to 2012. The usage of primary methods of data 
collection, political elite interviews and document analysis, mapped out the political 
context and domestic energy market circumstances for threat creation. It was possible 
to infer from the opinions of the interviewees a clarification of diplomatic and 
documentary sources, exposing the meanings attached to energy threats by the state, 
as well as in-depth explanation of the drivers behind these perception-based policies.  
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The fieldwork revealed a mismatch between the documented sources and the 
underlying definitions about energy priorities and intentions of energy policies in the EU 
(which is often the case in the EU practical policy-making). The official documentation 
and legislative acts often diverged from the political incentives and the meanings that 
actors aimed to attach to the nature of the energy policies. For instance, until recently, 
very few EU official documents referred to energy diversification of sources and routes 
away from Russia, instead mentioning energy diversification as a general priority of the 
EU (with the exception of the European Parliament Resolution of 12 of June 2012 on 
Engaging in Energy Policy Cooperation with Partners Beyond our Borders: A Strategic 
Approach to Secure, Sustainable and Competitive Energy Supply). By contrast, the 
priority of moving to non-Russian sources and routes has been widely discussed during 
official meetings in Brussels, and in a variety of public speeches of political elites in the 
EU and EU MSs, and openly acknowledged by the majority of the interviewed political 
elites.  
The same applies to the EU Third liberalisation package and the unbundling principle, 
which formally advances the EU’s internal energy market, hence having wider external 
implications for Russia as an energy supplier and owner of energy industries and 
infrastructure in the EU. The intended attempts at ‘blocking’ Russia’s energy 
domination of the EU gas market (like the examples that illustrate the impossibility of 
reaching consensus on the status of OPAL and NEL pipelines) are rarely publicly 
emphasised by EU officials, but can be easily ‘read between the lines’ by Russian 
authorities and energy analysts. The methodological approach led to findings which 
confirmed the key argument of the thesis about the existing politicisation of the EU 
energy policy-making and overly diplomatic language. It also raised theoretical 
implications for understanding the ambiguous and limited capacity of EU energy 
actorness, which is characterised by avoiding making straight-forward statements or 
providing clear priorities with regard to the EU’s unified objectives.  
In practical terms, on the one hand, a generally constructed politicised approach, and 
incoherent conceptualisation of European energy policy priorities, which are not 
officially documented or commonly agreed on by European countries (and as a result 
can have sublimated meanings), provide political leeway for the complex EU-
machinery to adjust political moves according to the situation to improve its bargaining 
position with Russia. On the other hand, discrepancies between what is stated in the 
EU documents and what is assumed by its policy-makers (including a variety of 
meanings they allocate to energy security) can be characterised as ‘double standards’, 
polarising the positions of Russia and the EU on how to reach their common energy 
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security goals of building a successful and functioning strategic energy partnership. As 
a result, such reticence creates unpredictability and unnecessary tensions between the 
EU and Russia on the inter-subjective and diplomatic levels, leads to an impasse in the 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, impedes the progress of mutual energy security initiatives, 
and de-stabilises energy security for the EU and its members. The fact that bilateral 
German-Russian energy interactions represented a successful example of rather 
pragmatic, open and de-politicised relations, which led to more security, predictability 
and trust, should be taken on board by the EU bureaucratic apparatus and other EU 
MSs as a way forward.  
In general, the methodological approach to the case studies and chosen methods of 
gathering and scrutinising information, allowed the analysis to reflect on conceptual 
premises of constructivist approach to energy security. It was achieved through 
deepening understandings about threat perceptions based on the differences in the 
conceptualisation of energy threats and illuminating subjective choices of each 
individual EU MS to politicise or de-politicise its energy relations with Russia. 
 
8.3. The Future Research Agenda 
The topic of this thesis covers a variety of complex and interconnected energy security 
issues and often cross-disciplinary theoretical accounts. Therefore, based on the limits 
and the limitations of this research (as highlighted in Section 4.4.), and the chosen 
constructivist focus on energy security (Section 2.2.), this section presents some 
practical and theoretical suggestions for future research agenda. 
To begin with, this research builds on constructivist theoretical premises, deriving from 
a limited set of particular analytical features of realism and the Copenhagen School of 
Security Studies (like threats, energy security, and interests and identities). The 
analytical basis for this thesis was limited to exploring the constructivist account of 
state-actors’ energy interest and identities, as determinants of behaviour and attributes 
for analysing threat perceptions. The natural progression of this constructivist work 
would be to include, firstly, a more specific and individualistic analysis of actors; and, 
secondly, extend analysis of countries’ interests and identities into a broader normative 
dimension.  
According to the first suggestion for further research, downsizing the state-centric 
constructivist approach to energy security to a range of sub-actors (such as certain 
political parties and groups, public structures, companies and commercial actors, 
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interest groups, consumers and other individuals) would allow explanation of more 
detailed levels of threat creation by actors that can also account for and substantially 
impact energy security perceptions of the country. For the purpose of driving the 
research beyond the scope of predominantly inter-state energy interactions between 
the EU, its MSs and Russia into the more social dimensions of constructivism, which 
deals with the decision-making and threat perceptions of individuals, more research is 
required to determine which inter-personal mechanisms can be used by human actors 
to create threats.  
Secondly, bringing up normative differences of Russian and European energy policies 
and broader values (such as adherence to democratisation, effectiveness of 
institutional functions, the rule of law, legislative differences of their economic and 
political systems and legal approximation of the EU-Russia energy market principles 
that guide and determine the development of energy relations) can potentially enhance 
the assessment of EU-Russia energy controversies during this period. More 
information on the above historically-driven normative differences will establish an 
additional degree of accuracy to explanations of why energy interplays with Russia can 
become a security issue as such, and clarify the source of difficulties in collaborating 
on multilateral and bilateral legally binding energy frameworks with Russia.  
In addition, the analysis of EU-Russia energy cooperation helped to raise important 
questions of whether Russia should be perceived as an ‘energy superpower’ or treated 
as a reliable and trustworthy energy partner of the EU, and why the threat of energy 
security is particularly visible at certain energy security junctures (such as the Nord 
Stream project, gas liberalisation processes, etc.). The research project has 
demonstrated that the differences in energy interests and identities of Russia and the 
EU endure from the past, carrying the burden of historical legacies that are tied up with 
ideational nature of stereotypes in threat perceptions. The former EU Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson simplified the difference of Russia and EU views on 
energy security and the gas market in the following way: ‘Unless we recognise our 
different perceptions of what has happened since the end of the Soviet Union we risk 
getting the EU-Russia relationship badly wrong’ (Mandelson, 2007).  
However, stemming from constructivist theoretical tenets, the situation of energy-
related confrontations is not permanent due to identities and interests changing over 
time, having transformative effect on the EU and EU MSs energy relations with Russia. 
It is important to acknowledge that what is threatening to energy security today, might 
not be in the future, when the circumstances or the perceptions of actors alter. As the 
EU official sources noted, ‘much in the EU-Russia energy relations is connected to 
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stereotypes, which can be overcome only through trust building’ (Interview 1). Hence, 
neither trust nor threat perception is built in a day; instead these are constructed over a 
prolonged period of time and through repetitive positive experiences. What is more 
important to understand is that even if threat perceptions can be re-constructed over a 
period of time, that re-construction would be in an entirely different context to be 
accounted for in renewed analysis, which provides the rationale for a continuing energy 
security research programme drawing on important insights from this research.  
Therefore, even though the research explores EU-Russia energy relations within the 
2004-2012 time frame, a variety of internal EU processes and important international 
events have happened since, which impact on the dynamics of threat perceptions in 
EU-Russia energy relations. Thus, it is natural to extend future research investigation 
beyond 2012. For instance, the development of EU-Russia energy security and threat 
perceptions in the context of Crimea’s annexation and lasting political confrontations 
between Russia, Ukraine and the EU (followed by the EU sanctions on financial and 
energy sectors of Russia) are difficult to ignore, as they deepen the conflict between 
the parties rather than promote trust-building. In addition, suspension of the South 
Stream project in 2014 by Russia, launch of the Nord Stream-2 pipeline 
(confrontational for some of the CEE countries), and the EU Commission’s 
unfavourable conclusions on the 2015 anti-trust investigation against Gazprom fuels 
misunderstandings between the parties. The above examples negatively impact EU-
Russia energy relations, illustrating through constructivist tenets how conflict can be 
created through historical practices over time, triggering conditions and sources for 
threat perception in the EU. The bigger the degree of conflict, the more states tend to 
defend their interests and identities (Wendt, 1992), which leads to even deeper 
confrontations. This opens up a whole new dimension of threat perceptions based on 
foreign policy and energy-related policies to be analysed. On the level of the EU 
internal energy market, 2014 was a deadline year to implement Third Energy Package 
on the domestic level for the EU MSs. Acknowledging how problematic the gas market 
liberalisation process during 2004-2012 period was for Germany and Poland, the 
analysis of EU countries’ success or failure to fully comply with all the requirements 
after 2012 would provide a richer comprehension of perception-based policies arising 
at the EU MSs level and allow for conclusions on the internal development of EU 
energy actorness and its ability to unite its MSs under the supranational umbrella.  
Finally, to draw out the wider implications of sufficiently understanding energy security 
and threat perceptions, the narrow focus on the nature of EU-Russia energy relations 
could be expanded. Going beyond the scope and the focus of this research, a cross-
national study about the impact of global trends in international energy politics (like the 
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shale gas revolution in the US, potential major gas reserves discovered in Cyprus and 
Israel, or the historical drop in oil prices), and the significance of global energy players 
like the USA, China and India for gas supply and demand, would cast light on broader 
external factors with potential to affect EU-Russia relations. For instance, primary data 
collection revealed a potential to identify the impact of the USA’s efficacy as the EU’s 
greatest political ally on threat construction and perception of Russia. There already 
exist influential cross-Atlantic tendencies to treat European pipeline politics in 
geopolitical terms (Casier, 2011: 539; Bohme, 2011: 26). Smith (2010) and Rohrkasten 
and Westphal (2014) looked at role of the United States in the EU diversification and 
pipelines politics, and energy policy in general. The sub-text of the interviews with the 
political elites in Brussels and Warsaw indicated that the United States plays an 
important role in influencing general anti-Russian rhetoric in the EU, including energy 
and in the wider foreign policy realm. It was with the unofficial support of the United 
States that the Polish ex-Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz suggested the 
creation of an ‘Energy NATO’, and several bilateral meetings were held between 
Brussels and the US Administration, where Russia’s ‘negative energy influence’ was 
discussed (Interview 9). Therefore, if the debate on EU-Russia energy relations is to be 
moved beyond the scope of interests and identities shaping threat perceptions between 
Russia and the EU (including its MSs), further research into the causal impact of 
political support of the EU by other IR actors as an external structural factor could 
provide additional insights. In conclusion, based on conceptual findings and the 
empirical importance of this research project that enhanced understanding of political 
construction of energy security threats in the EU-Russia relations, the suggested above 
future research agenda could potentially add theoretical value to an overarching 
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